CN109586909B - Bell state quantum database access control and bidirectional identity authentication method - Google Patents
Bell state quantum database access control and bidirectional identity authentication method Download PDFInfo
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
Abstract
The invention belongs to the field of quantum database resources, and discloses a Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and two-way identity authentication method, which is used for carrying out asymmetric QKD (quantum key distribution) based on Bell state; quantum privacy query: the first communication party and the second communication party perform post-processing operation on the shared raw key string to obtain a final key sharing string key; the second communication party encrypts the whole database in a one-time pad mode, executes exclusive or operation on the key in the opponent according to the value of s and encrypts the database by using the generated new key; the first communication party inquires the content corresponding to the database according to the key value and s of the first communication party; bidirectional identity authentication: and the second communication party verifies the identity of the first communication party and the first communication party verifies the identity of the second communication party. Compared with a QPQ protocol based on single photons, the QPQ protocol based on the single photon beam with the Bell-state particles has better noise-tolerant performance under a collective noise channel.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of quantum database resources, and particularly relates to a Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and two-way identity authentication method.
Background
Currently, the current state of the art commonly used in the industry is such that:
over the past thirty years, with the rapid development of computer technology, there has been a need for more secure and efficient communication and cryptographic protocols. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed the first quantum cryptography protocol, namely BB84 protocol, and researchers have a large number of quantum cryptography protocols and quantum communication protocols, including quantum key distribution protocol (QKD), quantum direct secure communication protocol (QSDC), quantum secret sharing protocol (QSS), quantum privacy Query Protocol (QPQ), quantum identity authentication protocol (QIA), and the like.
The quantum privacy query technology needs to ensure the privacy of the query content of the user and the absolute security of the database content at the same time. Symmetric privacy information retrieval (SPIR for short)[10]The method is an effective QPQ query scheme, and the SPIR scheme needs to meet the following conditions:
the user can obtain information about the data he has purchased, but the database provider cannot know which piece of data the user has purchased.
In 2008, Giovannetti and the like propose a first QPQ protocol based on SPIR thought, namely a 'G L M protocol', the protocol needs to use two quantum states, one is used for data information query, and the other is used for detecting whether a database manufacturer has dishonest behavior or not.2011, L. Olejnik and the like propose an 'O protocol', the protocol only needs one quantum state to complete the functions which can be completed by two quantum states in the G L M protocol[15]The protocol makes the probability of privacy query failure 0. However, the existing QPQ protocol mostly puts the emphasis on the dishonest behavior of the user, that is, only the database resource is in the absolute safety position at present, but the confidentiality of the user query content is not considered. The quantum identity authentication technology is mainly divided into three categories:
a point-to-point quantum identity authentication scheme, Yuan et al 2014 proposed a single-particle-based non-entanglement identity authentication protocol.
Identity authentication and quantum key transmission combined protocol, Ma et al in 2017 propose a quantum key distribution protocol (MDI-QKD) irrelevant to measuring equipment, and in the process of completing QKD, bidirectional quantum identity authentication is realized.
An identity authentication protocol in a network, 2014, zhang et al, proposes a wireless communication network identity authentication scheme based on quantum invisible state transfer.
In summary, the problems of the prior art are as follows:
most of the existing quantum resource access control technologies can only ensure the security of a database, and the security consideration of a user is only established on the 'eavesdropping sensitivity', that is, although the user can detect the behavior that a manufacturer eavesdrops on data inquired by the manufacturer, the content is already acquired by the manufacturer, which has great potential safety hazard for the user.
Since most protocols require the second communication party to send back all particle resources, not only is the communication overhead increased, but also the security of the query content of the user is greatly threatened.
Most of the existing identity authentication schemes are one-way schemes, and under certain specific application scenarios, both communication parties need to authenticate the identity of the other party. In the existing two-way identity authentication scheme, the protocol implementation complexity is higher.
The existing identity authentication technology does not or rarely considers the problem of bidirectional identity authentication of multiple users in a distributed network, the protocol can effectively solve the problem of bidirectional identity authentication between two users, the asymmetric QKD process is popularized to the distributed network, and the multi-user identity authentication can be realized by using the protocol.
The difficulty of solving the technical problems is as follows:
(1) how to ensure that the privacy of the user is not eavesdropped by the database vendor. At present, all protocols are concentrated on the analysis of database security and guarantee unconditional security, and the privacy of user query content is not well guaranteed. The protocol better guarantees the security of the database, and meanwhile, because the protocol is a unidirectional protocol in a QPQ stage, the second communication party of a database manufacturer has no chance to execute eavesdropping means such as false signal attack and the like on the first communication party of a user.
(2) The current identity authentication protocol lacks equivalence and equality. Because most identity authentication protocols are unidirectional, the requirement that multiple users perform bidirectional and multidirectional identity authentication simultaneously in a multi-user network or a distributed network cannot be met. If the bidirectional identity authentication between two users can be realized, the method can be further popularized to a multi-user network, and the requirements of many application scenes requiring strict identity authentication in the existing distributed network can be solved.
The significance of solving the technical problems is as follows:
by using the protocol, a database manufacturer has no opportunity to execute attack means such as false signal attack and the like on a user, so that the protocol can better solve the problem of privacy of the user.
The protocol has bidirectional equality on the problem of identity authentication. Either party of the communication can authenticate the other communication participant. The two-way identity authentication between two users is realized, and the identity authentication problem of the multiple users in the distributed network can be realized.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a quantum database resource access control and bidirectional identity authentication method based on Bell state, and provides a multifunctional quantum cryptography protocol with practical application based on Bell state particles. After the communication parties establish the asymmetric QKD association, the quantum privacy query and the bidirectional quantum identity authentication function can be completed more safely and effectively by using the protocol. The protocol does not need to use a wavelength filter and PNS equipment, and the complexity of the identity authentication process is low. Due to the fact that Bell-state particles are used, compared with a QPQ protocol based on single photons, the QPQ protocol has better noise-tolerant performance under a collective noise channel.
The invention is realized by the following steps: a quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method based on Bell state comprises the following steps:
in a first step, the second communication party verifies the identity of the first communication party: the first communication party and the second communication party establish an asymmetric QKD relationship; key of first communication party is required to be published by second communication partyAliceThe second communication party inquires the Key of the published position of the first communication party corresponding to the second communication partyBobValue, if KeyBobtoAlice＝KeyAliceIf the first communication party is authenticated, the second communication party passes the identity authentication of the first communication party; protocol entry step the first party verifies the identity of the second party; after the eavesdropping detection is completed, the first communication party requests the second communication party to publishAll the particle positions in the returned particle sequence which are positioned in the Z base are subjected to Z base measurement and corresponding Key value Key by the first communication partyBob(Z)In the asymmetric QKD relationship, the coding scheme "0": |00>And "1": l 11>Get the KeyAlice(Z)(ii) a If KeyAlice(Z)＝KeyBob(Z)If yes, the first communication party passes the identity authentication of the second communication party; otherwise, the protocol is cancelled; the first correspondent may also ask the second correspondent to publish all particle locations in the Bell base, but the Bell base measurement is more difficult than the Z base measurement, where it is reasonable to choose the Z base in order to reduce the complexity of the protocol.
In the second step, the first communication party verifies the identity of the second communication party: after passing the identity authentication of the first communication party, the second communication party sends all the particles of the second communication party back to the first communication party;
a first communication party randomly extracts some particles to carry out Z-based or Bell-based measurement, then the first communication party publishes the position information of the particles, and a second communication party is required to publish the state information of the first communication party for preparing the particles at the positions;
after the eavesdropping detection is finished, the first communication party requires the second communication party to publish all the positions of the particles in the Z-base in the returned particle sequence, and the first communication party performs Z-base measurement and corresponding Key value Key on the particles at the positionsBob(Z)The first communication party performs the encoding method "0" in the asymmetric QKD relationship: |00>And "1": l 11>Get the KeyAlice(Z)(ii) a If KeyAlice(Z)＝KeyBob(Z)And if so, the first communication party passes the identity authentication of the second communication party.
Further, in a first step, the method of the first party verifying the identity of the second party comprises:
after passing the identity authentication of the first communication party, the second communication party sends all the particles in the handle back to the first communication party; a first communication party randomly extracts some particles to carry out Z-based or Bell-based measurement, then the first communication party publishes the position information of the particles, and a second communication party is required to publish the state information of preparing the particles at the positions; if the measurement base selected by the first communication party is different from the preparation base of the second communication party, the first communication party cannot obtain a correct measurement result, otherwise, the first communication party obtains the same particle state information as the second communication party, the measurement probability of obtaining an error result is p-1/2, and if the error rate is higher than a set threshold value, the protocol is cancelled; the first communication party defends against the second communication party's glitch attack, and the external attacker performs an interception/retransmission attack.
Further, the method for establishing an asymmetric QKD relationship is based on the Bell state, and the asymmetric QKD is established; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
1) the first correspondent prepares 2N particles, which are randomly at { |00>，|11>，|φ+>，|φ->}; the first communication party arranges the 2N particles according to the subscript, and every two particles form a group of N pairs of particles, which is marked as a sequence S, and S ═ { p ═1,p2...,pn-1,pnAfter the first communication party stores the particle information, all the sequences S are sent to the second communication party;
2) the second communication party performs eavesdropping detection on the received sequence S: randomly selecting particles from the sequence S by the second communication party, and randomly measuring the particles by using a Z base or a Bell base; the second correspondent then publishes the location information of the particles and asks the first correspondent to publish the status information that she prepared the particles at these locations;
3) after the eavesdropping detection is finished, the second communication party randomly generates a string of binary character string keyBob∈{0,1}NIf keyiThe second communication partner measures the ith particle pair in the sequence S with the Z-base, if keyi1, the second communication party measures the ith particle pair in the sequence S by using Bell base; the second communication party retains the string key as his generated key;
4) for each pair of particle pairs, the second correspondent publishes a number 0 or 1; wherein 0 represents the measurement result of the second communication party at { |00>，|φ+>In the base, 1 represents that the measurement result of the second communication party is in 11>，|φ->In the radical; if { | ψ appears in the measurement result of the second communication party+>，|ψ->In the state, an external eavesdropper or a first communication party has illegal behaviors, and the protocol is cancelled at the moment;
5) for each particle pair, the first communication party presumes partial generated key information in the second communication party according to the particle information prepared by the first communication party and information published by the second communication party; the ith bit is that the particles prepared by the first communication party are in |00>, the digital information published by the second communication party is 0, and the first communication party cannot derive any key information; if the number published by the second communication party at this time is 1, the first communication party can presume that the second communication party selects an incorrect measurement base, and the key at this time is 1; an asymmetric QKD relationship is established between a first party and a second party, the second party knowing the values of all the generated keys, the first party only inferring 1/4 the value of the generated key.
Further, in step 2), in the eavesdropping detection of the received sequence S by the second communication party, if the measurement basis selected by the second communication party is different from the preparation basis of the first communication party, the second communication party cannot obtain a correct measurement result, otherwise, the second communication party obtains the same particle state information as the first communication party, the measurement probability of obtaining an error result is p-1/2, and if the error rate is higher than the set threshold value, the protocol is cancelled.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a computer program for implementing the Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method.
The invention also aims to provide an information data processing terminal for realizing the Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and bidirectional identity authentication method.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer-readable storage medium, which includes instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method.
Another objective of the present invention is to provide a quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication network communication device for implementing the quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method based on the Bell state.
In summary, the advantages and positive effects of the invention are:
the invention provides a multifunctional quantum cryptography protocol with practical application based on Bell-state particles. After the communication parties establish the asymmetric QKD association, the quantum privacy query and the bidirectional quantum identity authentication function can be completed more safely and effectively by using the protocol. The protocol does not need to use a wavelength filter and PNS equipment, and the complexity of the identity authentication process is low. Due to the fact that Bell-state particles are used, compared with a QPQ protocol based on single photons, the QPQ protocol has better noise-tolerant performance under a collective noise channel.
The safety performance is good: compared with the existing QPQ protocol and QIA protocol, the QPQ protocol can effectively resist external attacks, and due to the fact that the interception detection particles are inserted into the particles in the transmission process, when Eve measures at each step, the probability of 1/2 is obtained to obtain an error result, and in the whole process, the probability of 1/4 is obtained to obtain the error result, and when the number of the interception particles is enough, an external eavesdropper Eve can be detected by a communication participant.
The invention needs few measuring instruments: because the protocol is a quantum protocol based on the asymmetric QKD idea, the GHZ state preparation and measurement are reduced compared with other protocols, and the protocol does not need to use a wavelength filter and PNS equipment, so that the communication overhead can be better reduced compared with other protocols.
The invention has strong noise-tolerant performance: because the protocol uses the Bell-state particles, the Bell-state particles have better noise-tolerant performance under a collective noise channel than a QPQ protocol based on a single photon due to the structural stability of the Bell-state particles.
The following provides a comparison between the "G protocol" and the "J protocol" in the QPQ protocol, and an identity authentication protocol (WD protocol for short) in the QIA protocol, with privacy, particle utilization efficiency, channel noise tolerance, and security.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a method for controlling resource access and bi-directional identity authentication of a quantum database based on a Bell state according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a flow chart of a specific usage scenario of the present protocol.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the following embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
Most of the existing quantum resource access control technologies can only ensure the security of a database, and the security consideration of a user is only established on the 'eavesdropping sensitivity', that is, although the user can detect the behavior that a manufacturer eavesdrops on data inquired by the manufacturer, the content is already acquired by the manufacturer, which has great potential safety hazard for the user.
Since most protocols require the second communication party to send back all particle resources, not only is the communication overhead increased, but also the security of the query content of the user is greatly threatened.
Most of the existing identity authentication schemes are one-way schemes, and under certain specific application scenarios, both communication parties need to authenticate the identity of the other party. In the existing two-way identity authentication scheme, the protocol implementation complexity is higher.
The existing identity authentication technology does not or rarely considers the problem of bidirectional identity authentication of multiple users in a distributed network, the protocol can effectively solve the problem of bidirectional identity authentication between two users, the asymmetric QKD process is popularized to the distributed network, and the multi-user identity authentication can be realized by using the protocol.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the following detailed description is provided for the application of the present invention with reference to specific embodiments.
The invention is described in terms of protocols in which a first party knows 1/4 of an entire key when the first and second parties have established an asymmetric QKD association, while the second party knows both parties. One specific example of QPQ is as follows:
the second communication party encrypts the whole database by using One Time Pad (OTP), and if the key string in the first communication party is the key at the 6 th position and she wants to query the database content at the 11 th position, the first communication party publishes a conversion value s which is 11-6 or 5. The database vendor second party performs an exclusive-or operation on the key in the adversary according to the value of s and encrypts the database with the new key generated. At this point, the first party can query the database for the corresponding content based on the key value (bit 6) and s (5) in the hand.
As shown in fig. 1, the quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method based on the Bell state provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes:
1) asymmetric QKD process based on Bell state:
(1) the first correspondent prepares 2N particles, which are randomly in { |00>，|11>，|φ+>，|φ->}. The first communication party arranges the 2N particles according to the subscript, and every two particles form a group of N pairs of particles, which is marked as a sequence S, and S ═ { p ═1,p2...,pn-1,pnAnd after the first communication party stores the particle information, all the sequences S are sent to the second communication party.
(2) The second communication party performs eavesdropping detection on the received sequence S: the second party randomly picks particles from the sequence S and measures them randomly with a Z-base or a Bell-base. The second party then publishes the location information of the particles and asks the first party to publish the status information of the particles that she prepared at these locations. (if the second party chooses a measurement basis different from the first party's one, the second party will not get the correct measurement result, otherwise he can get the same particle status information as the first party, get the wrong measurement probability p 1/2, and if the error rate is higher than the set threshold, the protocol is cancelled).
(3) After the eavesdropping detection is finished, the second communication party randomly generates a string of binary character string keyBob∈{0,1}NIf keyiThe second communication partner measures the ith particle pair in the sequence S with the Z-base, if keyiThe second communication partner measures the ith particle pair in the sequence S with the Bell base, 1. The second party retains the string key as his generated key.
(4) For each pair of particles, the second party publishes a number "0" or "1". Wherein "0" represents his measurement result at { |00>，|φ+>In the base, "1" represents that the measurement result is { |11>，|φ->In the radical. Note that: if { | ψappears in the measurement result of the second communication party+>，|ψ->And state, namely an external eavesdropper is present or the first communication party has illegal behaviors, and the protocol is cancelled.
(5) For each particle pair, the first party may infer partial secret key information in the second party's hand based on the particle information she prepared and the information published by the second party. For example: the ith bit is that the particle prepared by the first communication party is in |00>, the digital information published by the second communication party is "0", at this time, the first communication party cannot derive any key information, and if the digital information published by the second communication party is "1", the first communication party can derive that the second communication party selects an incorrect measurement base, and then key at this time is 1. Based on the idea of SARNG QKD, an asymmetric QKD relationship is established between the first and second parties, and based on the above analysis, the second party knows all the values of the generated keys, while the first party can only deduce 1/4 the value of the generated key. Table 1 shows the relationship between the preparation state of the first communication partner and the measurement basis of the second communication partner.
TABLE 1 relationship between the preparation state of a first party and a second party measurement base
2) And quantum privacy inquiry process:
(1) assume that the first party is the querying user and the second party is the database provider. Through the above steps, an asymmetric QKD relationship is established between the first party and the second party. And when the key string is consistent with other QPQ protocols, the first communication party and the second communication party execute post-processing operation on the shared generated key string to obtain a final key string key. The final key string must satisfy that the key value in the first communication partner hand is only one bit. If the key value in the first party's hand is less than one bit, then the QPQ protocol process is cancelled.
(2) The second communication party encrypts the whole database by using a one-time pad (OTP), and at this time, if the key string in the first communication party is the j-th key and she wants to query the i-th database content, the first communication party publishes a conversion value s as j-i. The database vendor second party performs an exclusive-or operation on the key in the adversary according to the value of s and encrypts the database with the new key generated. At this time, the first communication party can inquire the corresponding content of the database according to the key value and s in the hand.
3) And the bidirectional identity authentication process:
(1) the second communication party verifies the identity of the first communication party: and (5) after the first communication party and the second communication party complete the step (5), the two parties establish an asymmetric QKD relationship. At this time, the second communication party requires the first communication party to publish Key in her handAliceThe second party inquires the Key of the corresponding first party published position in his handBobValue, if KeyBobtoAlice＝KeyAliceThe second party passes the identity authentication of the first party. The protocol proceeds to step (9), otherwise the protocol is cancelled.
(2) The first communication party verifies the identity of the second communication party: after the identity authentication of the first communication party is passed, all the particles in the handle of the second communication party are sent back to the first communication party. The first party randomly picks particles for Z-based or Bell-based measurements, and then the first party publishes the location information of the particles and asks the second party to publish her presence at these locationsAnd preparing state information of the particles. (similar to step (2), if the measurement basis selected by the first communication party is different from the preparation basis of the second communication party, the first communication party will not obtain the correct measurement result, otherwise, she can obtain the same particle status information as the second communication party, the measurement probability of obtaining the error result is p-1/2, and if the error rate is higher than the set threshold, the protocol is cancelled. After the eavesdropping detection is finished, the first communication party requires the second communication party to publish all the positions of the particles in the Z-base in the returned particle sequence, and the first communication party performs Z-base measurement and corresponding Key value Key on the particles at the positionsBob(Z)She follows the encoding scheme in step (4) ("0": 00: |)>And "1": l 11>) Get the KeyAlice(Z). If KeyAlice(Z)＝KeyBob(Z)And if so, the first communication party passes the identity authentication of the second communication party. Note that: in this step, the first communication party may also request the second communication party to publish all the positions of the particles in the Bell base, but the Bell base measurement is more difficult than the Z base measurement, and in order to reduce the complexity of the protocol, it is reasonable to select the Z base here.
The invention is further described below in connection with the context of a security analysis:
1) and (3) analyzing safety and efficiency:
external attack:
compared with the QPQ protocol based on B92, the present protocol can resist external attacks. Assuming that Eve wants to obtain the secret information queried by the first communication party, since the database manufacturer encrypts the database by the second communication party using a one-time-pad (OTP) which is an encryption method that has been strictly proven to be absolutely secure, Eve can obtain the corresponding data only by obtaining the value key of the biometric key in the hand of the second communication party. In order to obtain the key, Eve needs to know the measurement basis selected by the second communication party for each pair of particle pairs in step (3). The second party publishes some information about the key values in step (4), but Eve needs to know the initial state of the first party preparation sequence S to deduce some useful key values. For this reason Eve can perform a truncation/retransmission attack on the particles sent by the first communication party, however this attack behavior is also very easy to find: assuming that the particle state prepared by the first communication party in step (1) is |00>, Eve intercepts the particle and randomly measures the particle using the Z-base or the Bell-base, the probability that Eve can correctly measure is 1/2, when correctly measuring, Eve will not cause an error, and according to the eavesdropping detection mode that the second communication party performs on the particle sent by the first communication party in step (2), Eve will have a probability of 1/4 being found. When the number of eavesdropping particles is large enough, Eve will be very easily discovered by both communicating parties.
2) Safety analysis of quantum privacy inquiry process:
and (4) database security:
assuming that the first party is an illegitimate user and she wants to obtain unpaid content information from the database, she can use "JM attack", "additional particle entanglement measurement attack" to obtain the database content.
JM attack:
to complete a JM attack, the first correspondent must satisfy two conditions:
(1) she holds all the particles.
(2) She must know the locations of all particles associated with the final generated key string key.
In step (1), the first party prepares the particle sequence S, she holds all the particles but does not know the association of these particles with the final generated key string key, and in step (5), the second party publishes the particle information associated with the final generated key, but this time the particles are not in the first party' S hand. If the first correspondent uses additional particle entanglement attacks to assist in completing the JM attack, for example: the state in which the first communication party is prepared in step (1) is
The first party holds particle 1 and sends particles 2,3 to the second party, who will get | φ with the same probability according to equation ①+>Or | phi->However, in step (2), the second communication party randomly selects the positions of the particles and randomly selects the measurement bases to measure the sequence S, so that the first communication party cannot know which base the second communication party selects to measure, and can only randomly publish one preparation state, and only when the preparation state published by the first communication party is the same as the particle state measured by the second communication party, the second communication party can simply deduce that the probability that the first communication party passes the detection is 1/4 through eavesdropping detection on the first communication party. When the number of eavesdropping particles is sufficiently large, the first communication party must be found. Therefore, the protocol can resist JM attacks.
3) Additional particle entanglement measurement attack:
the first communication partner prepares an additional particle | e > and performs a U operation on the sequence S:
according to the formula ②, | φ+>After the U operation, the following steps are carried out:
4) User security analysis:
at present, all QPQ protocols cannot guarantee unconditional security of a user, and only when a second communication party of a database vendor wants to illegally obtain data content queried by the user, his behavior is necessarily perceived by a first communication party of the user. In order to obtain the query location of the first communication partner, the second communication partner must obtain initial state information of the particle sequence S prepared by the first communication partner. According to the description of the present protocol, the second communicating party will not send the particle sequence S back to the first communicating party in completing the QPQ procedure, so he will not have the opportunity to perform a glitch attack on the first communicating party. He cannot acquire the initial state of the first communication partner prepared particle sequence S. Therefore, the protocol can better enhance the safety of the user.
5) Security analysis of the two-way identity authentication process:
according to the description of the protocol on the bidirectional identity authentication process, in the identity authentication process of the second communication party on the first communication party, if the position of the particle or the Key value published by the first communication party is not authentic, the Key isBobtoAlice＝KeyAliceThe equation will not hold and the first party cannot be authenticated by the second party. In consideration of the identity authentication process of the first communication party to the second communication party, the second communication party sends back all particle information, so that potential safety hazards such as additional particle entanglement attack and false signal attack are hidden. However, the first communication party adopts the eavesdropping detection mode of the step (2) in the asymmetric QKD process in the step (9), so that the security analysis contents of the analysis process of the security risks and the security analysis contents of the quantum privacy query process are consistent, and therefore, the description is not repeated.
6) And (3) analyzing efficiency:
in the protocol, all particles prepared by the first communication party except the particles for eavesdropping detection are used in quantum private data query and quantum bidirectional identity authentication processes. In the QPQ process, based on the SARNG QKD process, the first communication party and the second communication party will have an efficiency value of 25% to establish a symmetric QKD association, and in the two-way identity authentication process, since the first communication party only adopts Z-based particles to authenticate the second communication party, the particle utilization efficiency in the identity authentication process is 50%, however, in order to reduce the complexity of the authentication protocol, it is worth sacrificing the utilization efficiency of some particles.
The use of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with specific experiments.
Examples
As shown in fig. 2, the database vendor Bob provides data resources, and users 1 to n can query the database. The following describes in detail the usage scenario of the protocol:
assuming that the user 1 (Alice) requests to query the data content in the database manufacturer Bob, the query process of the other users is similar.
Firstly, Alice initiates a query request, Alice prepares 2N pairs of Bell-state particles to Bob, and by using the protocol, Alice and Bob establish asymmetric QKD connection, and then Bob and Alice perform bidirectional identity authentication by using the contents of the bidirectional identity authentication part in the protocol. After both parties are determined to be legal communication participants, the protocol is executed again, and the asymmetric QKD relationship is reestablished. And through the operation steps of XOR and the like, Alice can only inquire the data content purchased by her. The database query process is also completed up to this point.
The computer instructions may be stored on or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, e.g., from one website site, computer, server, or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DS L) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means to another website site, computer, server, or data center via a solid state storage medium, such as a solid state Disk, or the like, (e.g., a solid state Disk, a magnetic storage medium, such as a DVD, a SSD, etc.), or any combination thereof.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents and improvements made within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (5)
1. A quantum database resource access control and bidirectional identity authentication method based on Bell state is characterized in that the quantum database resource access control and bidirectional identity authentication method based on Bell state comprises the following steps:
in a first step, the second communication party verifies the identity of the first communication party: the first communication party and the second communication party establish an asymmetric QKD relationship; key of first communication party is required to be published by second communication partyAliceThe second communication party inquires the Key of the published position of the first communication party corresponding to the second communication partyBobValue, if KeyBobtoAlice＝KeyAliceIf the first communication party is authenticated, the second communication party passes the identity authentication of the first communication party; protocol entry step the first party verifies the identity of the second party; after the eavesdropping detection is finished, the first communication party requires the second communication party to publish all the positions of the particles in the Z-base in the returned particle sequence, and the first communication party performs Z-base measurement and corresponding Key value Key on the particles at the positionsBob(Z)In the asymmetric QKD relationship, the coding scheme "0": |00>And "1": l 11>Get the KeyAlice(Z)(ii) a If KeyAlice(Z)＝KeyBob(Z)If yes, the first communication party passes the identity authentication of the second communication party; otherwise, the protocol is cancelled;
in the second step, the first communication party verifies the identity of the second communication party: after passing the identity authentication of the first communication party, the second communication party sends all the particles of the second communication party back to the first communication party;
a first communication party randomly extracts some particles to carry out Z-based or Bell-based measurement, then the first communication party publishes the position information of the particles, and a second communication party is required to publish the state information of the first communication party for preparing the particles at the positions;
after the eavesdropping detection is finished, the first communication party requires the second communication party to publish all the positions of the particles in the Z-base in the returned particle sequence, and the first communication party performs Z-base measurement and corresponding Key value Key on the particles at the positionsBob(Z)The first communication party performs the encoding method "0" in the asymmetric QKD relationship: |00>And "1": l 11>Get the KeyAlice(Z)(ii) a If KeyAlice(Z)＝KeyBob(Z)If yes, the first communication party passes the identity authentication of the second communication party;
in a first step, the method of the first party verifying the identity of the second party comprises:
after passing the identity authentication of the first communication party, the second communication party sends all the particles in the handle back to the first communication party; a first communication party randomly extracts some particles to carry out Z-based or Bell-based measurement, then the first communication party publishes the position information of the particles, and a second communication party is required to publish the state information of preparing the particles at the positions; if the measurement base selected by the first communication party is different from the preparation base of the second communication party, the first communication party cannot obtain a correct measurement result, otherwise, the first communication party obtains the same particle state information as the second communication party, the measurement probability of obtaining an error result is p-1/2, and the protocol is cancelled if the error rate is higher than a set threshold value; the first communication party defends the false signal attack of the second communication party, and an external attacker executes interception/retransmission attack;
the method for establishing the asymmetric QKD relationship is based on the Bell state, and the asymmetric QKD is established; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
1) the first correspondent prepares 2N particles, which are randomly at { |00>，|11>，|φ+>，|φ->}; the first communication party arranges the 2N particles according to the subscript, and every two particles form a group of N pairs of particles, which is marked as a sequence S, and S ═ { p ═1,p2...,pn-1,pnAfter the first communication party stores the particle information, all the sequences S are sent to the second communication party;
2) the second communication party performs eavesdropping detection on the received sequence S: randomly selecting particles from the sequence S by the second communication party, and randomly measuring the particles by using a Z base or a Bell base; the second correspondent then publishes the location information of the particles and asks the first correspondent to publish the status information that she prepared the particles at these locations;
3) after the eavesdropping detection is finished, the second communication party randomly generates a string of binary character string keyBob∈{0,1}NIf keyiThe second communication partner measures the ith particle pair in the sequence S with the Z-base, if keyi1, the second communication party measures the ith particle pair in the sequence S by using Bell base; the second communication party retains the string key as his generated key;
4) for each pair of particle pairs, the second correspondent publishes a number 0 or 1; wherein 0 represents the measurement result of the second communication party at { |00>，|φ+>In the base, 1 represents that the measurement result of the second communication party is in 11>，|φ->In the radical; if { | ψ appears in the measurement result of the second communication party+>，|ψ->In the state, an external eavesdropper or a first communication party has illegal behaviors, and the protocol is cancelled at the moment;
5) for each particle pair, the first communication party presumes partial generated key information in the second communication party according to the particle information prepared by the first communication party and information published by the second communication party; the ith bit is that the particles prepared by the first communication party are in |00>, the digital information published by the second communication party is 0, and the first communication party cannot derive any key information; if the number published by the second communication party at this time is 1, the first communication party can presume that the second communication party selects an incorrect measurement base, and the key at this time is 1; an asymmetric QKD relationship is established between a first party and a second party, the second party knowing the values of all the generated keys, the first party only inferring 1/4 the value of the generated key.
2. The Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and mutual authentication method according to claim 1, wherein in step 2) the second communication party performs eavesdropping detection on the received sequence S, if the measurement base selected by the second communication party is different from the preparation base of the first communication party, the second communication party cannot obtain a correct measurement result, otherwise, the second communication party obtains the same particle state information as the first communication party, the measurement probability of obtaining an error result is p-1/2, and if the error rate is higher than the set threshold value, the protocol is cancelled.
3. An information data processing terminal for implementing the Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method of any one of claims 1-2.
4. A computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method of any one of claims 1-2.
5. A quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication network communication device for implementing the Bell-state-based quantum database resource access control and mutual identity authentication method of any one of claims 1-2.
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| CN110929294B (en) * | 2020-02-03 | 2020-05-26 | 成都信息工程大学 | One-way transmission quantum database privacy query method |
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| CN113162753A (en) * | 2021-04-29 | 2021-07-23 | 南京大学 | Quantum two-party cryptographic protocol construction method irrelevant to measuring equipment |
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