CN109541564B - ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering - Google Patents
ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses an ADS-B ground station anti-interference experiment verification method based on mean value filtering, which comprises the following steps of constructing an anti-interference antenna array; step two, establishing a wireless signal transmission model; step three, generating ADS-B simulated deception signals by the ADS-B transmitter; step four, 8 directional antennas receive ADS-B simulated deception signals, whether the deviation of the analyzed information and ADS-B information analyzed by an ADS-B receiver theory is within a set deviation range is analyzed and judged, if the deviation is within the set deviation range, the next step is carried out, and if not, alarm information is generated; step five, calculating a received signal strength RSSI value by adopting a wireless signal transmission model; step six, filtering the collected RSSI values; and step seven, comparing the RSSI value generated by the signal input by the directional antenna to determine whether alarm information is generated. When the invention is applied, whether the ADS-B ground station receiver can analyze and identify the deception jamming signal or not is conveniently judged, and the deception jamming resistance of the ADS-B ground station receiver can be further tested.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to an aviation monitoring technology, in particular to an ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering.
Background
ADS-B technology is the aviation monitoring technology mainly pushed by the international civil aviation organization and is one of four new navigation technologies which are greatly promoted at the present stage of civil aviation in China, and the successful implementation of ADS-B marks the transition of airspace monitoring modes because the global ATC is being changed from an independent radar-based technical means to a satellite-based monitoring technical means. As a technology which is forced to be carried out, most of the air space in the world faces the convenience brought to the ADS-B technology in the next years, and simultaneously actively responds to the new challenge brought to the ADS-B technology.
The ADS-B technology is a novel developing aircraft monitoring technology, and has important potential safety hazards in the aspect of safety: ADS-B information can be forged, ADS-B information can be illegally received, and effective ADS-B information can be illegally interfered. These safety hazards can cause the ground air traffic control system and the systems onboard the aircraft to be disturbed by erroneous data, seriously affecting air traffic control and flight safety. The ADS-B information is forged and interfered, serious potential safety hazards brought to flight safety by illegal means cannot be ignored, and at present, researches for anti-interference and anti-cheating of the ADS-B are also being conducted internationally.
The ADS-B ground station receiver mainly has the function of transmitting and receiving ADS-B signals and is divided into a transmitting channel and a receiving channel. The transmitting channel comprises a baseband interface, a signal modulation unit, a power amplification unit, a power control unit, a power detection unit, a transmitting detection unit, a standing wave detection unit, an antenna existence detection unit and the like; the receiving channel comprises units such as low noise amplification, local oscillation, frequency mixing, intermediate amplification, demodulation, baseband shaping and the like. At present, manufacturers and users at home and abroad still conduct a series of researches on ADS-B ground station receivers in a tight and dense way, however, no corresponding test scheme is provided for the anti-deception jamming signal capability of the ADS-B ground station receivers, and the popularization and application of the ADS-B technology are influenced to a certain extent.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art and provides an ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering, which is convenient to judge whether an ADS-B ground station receiver can analyze and identify deceptive interference signals or not when the ADS-B ground station receiver is applied, and further can test the deceptive interference resistance of the ADS-B ground station receiver.
The purpose of the invention is mainly realized by the following technical scheme: the ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that firstly, an anti-interference antenna array is built, the anti-interference antenna array comprises 8 parabolic directional antennas with the working frequency of 1090MHZ, the 8 directional antennas are distributed on the same circumference at equal intervals, an antenna array which surrounds the circumference to form 360 degrees is built according to an included angle of 45 degrees, and each directional antenna is correspondingly connected with an ADS-B ground station receiver;
step two, establishing a wireless signal transmission model in the ADS-B ground station receiver;
step three, controlling an ADS-B transmitter to be positioned in any one directional antenna receiving range, and generating an ADS-B simulated deception signal by the ADS-B transmitter;
step four, 8 the directional antennas receive ADS-B simulated deception signals and transmit the ADS-B simulated deception signals to corresponding ADS-B ground station receivers, and the ADS-B ground station receivers analyze the received signals to obtain airplane longitude and latitude data contained in the signals; judging whether the deviation of the analyzed ADS-B information and the ADS-B information analyzed by the ADS-B receiver theory is within a set deviation range or not, and entering the next step if the deviation is within the set deviation range; otherwise, generating alarm information by the ADS-B ground station receiver;
step five, calculating a received signal strength RSSI value by adopting a wireless signal transmission model;
step six, filtering the collected RSSI values by adopting a mean filtering mode;
step seven, transmitting RSSI values generated by signals input by all the directional antennas to any ADS-B ground station receiver, judging whether the RSSI values generated by the signals input by the directional antennas in the receiving range of the directional antennas where the ADS-B transmitters are located are larger than the RSSI values generated by the signals input by the other directional antennas, and if so, not generating alarm information; otherwise, generating alarm information by ADS-B ground station receiver.
The ADS-B message information comprises: aircraft ID and type messages, air location messages, ground location messages, air speed messages, aircraft status and condition messages, aircraft operating condition messages, test messages, ground system status messages, airline change messages, extended intermittent oscillation aircraft identity messages, and the like. The deviation range of the ADS-B information analyzed by the ADS-B ground station receiver and the ADS-B information analyzed by the ADS-B receiver theory is set according to the actual detection environment. The invention analyzes the received radio signal through the ADS-B ground station receiver connected with the directional antenna system, and if the ADS-B information which is accurate and analyzed by the ADS-B receiver theory has deviation within the set deviation range, the signal received by the invention is the signal which can be adopted. Otherwise, if the ADS-B information is not received or the deviation between the received ADS-B information and the ADS-B information analyzed by the ADS-B receiver theory is not in the set deviation range, the information is an unavailable signal.
The present invention relates to a method for performing spatial diversity control by providing a plurality of directional antennas and dividing virtual channels in a spatial angle domain, that is, spatial Division Multiple Access (SDMA), also called multi-beam frequency multiplexing, and performs frequency multiplexing by labeling antenna beams having the same frequency in different directions. The invention analyzes ADS-B deception signals by a space division multiple access SDMA technology.
The antenna has different radiation or receiving capability to different directions in space, which is the directivity of the antenna. The antenna has both omni-directional and directional characteristics, depending on the directivity. The necessary facilities for implementing the space division multiple access technology are directional antennas. A directional antenna is an antenna that emits and receives electromagnetic waves in one or more specific directions with a high intensity, and emits and receives electromagnetic waves in other directions with a null or minimum intensity. Compared with the omnidirectional antenna adopted by the traditional ADS-B system, the directional transmitting antenna is adopted to increase the effective utilization rate of the radiation power and increase the confidentiality; the main purpose of using directional receiving antenna is to enhance the signal strength and increase the anti-interference capability.
The invention aims to verify that the ADS-B ground station receiver decodes the same Signal in different directions to obtain the aircraft longitude and latitude data contained in the Signal, and simultaneously obtains the RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indication) values of the Signal in different directions, and then compares the RSSI values to determine the validity of the aircraft longitude and latitude data contained in the Signal. Wherein RSSI is an optional part of the radio transport layer to determine link quality. It can be achieved in every data transfer without requiring additional bandwidth and energy, nor additional hardware cost. However, since the deployment environment of the sensor nodes is complex, the receiving strength of the signals is affected by multipath effect, non-line-of-sight, antenna gain and the like, and the propagation loss of the signals is obviously changed, so that a large error is generated when the distance information is acquired. Therefore, to obtain a good positioning effect by the RSSI method, the error in the RSSI ranging process must be eliminated as much as possible. In order to reduce errors, the invention firstly filters out data with small probability by means of mean value filtering, and then calculates the mean value, thereby avoiding the influence of the data with small probability and large interference and improving the precision.
Further, in the fifth step, a calculation formula for calculating the received signal strength RSSI value by using the wireless signal transmission model is as follows:
RSSI＝A-10nlogd+X dB
wherein RSSI is the received signal strength, A is the RSSI value at one meter, n is the path loss exponent, d is the measurement distance, X dB Are gaussian random variables.
Further, m data are collected in the sixth step, and then an average value is obtained, wherein the formula is as follows:
wherein, the value of i is an integer between 1 and m and is the ith sampling. Therefore, when the method is applied, the data are sampled for m times, and small probability events are filtered, so that the aim of improving the precision is fulfilled.
Furthermore, the directional antenna is a directional cutting grid parabolic antenna with the working frequency of 1.1G +/-0.1 and the antenna gain of 15 dBi.
In conclusion, compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects: (1) The principle of the verification experiment is realized based on a wireless signal propagation model and error analysis, an antenna array is formed by arranging 8 directional antennas, and ADS-B simulated deception signals are generated by an ADS-B transmitter. The invention carries out direction verification on the radio wave signal sent by the information source, ensures the consistency of the signal source and the information content, and prevents other ADS-B signals from influencing the implementation of the invention by utilizing the consistency verification on the incoming wave direction of the ADS-B signals. The invention can identify the external interference source influencing the ADS-B ground station receiver, achieves the aim of verifying whether the ADS-B ground station receiver can analyze and identify the ADS-B simulated deception signal generated by the ADS-B transmitter, and is convenient for testing the deception interference resistance of the ADS-B simulated deception signal.
(2) According to the invention, 8 parabolic directional antennas with working frequency of 1090MHZ are arranged, and each directional antenna is correspondingly connected with an ADS-B ground station receiver, so that the analysis data volume of the invention can be increased, and the verification precision of the invention can be further ensured.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, illustrate embodiment(s) of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 shows RSSI values of 300 times of transmission and reception at 1 m.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to examples and accompanying drawings, and the exemplary embodiments and descriptions thereof are only used for explaining the present invention and are not meant to limit the present invention.
The embodiment is as follows:
as shown in fig. 1, the method for detecting the anti-interference performance of the ADS-B ground station based on mean value filtering includes the following steps: step one, building an anti-interference antenna array; step two, establishing a wireless signal transmission model; generating ADS-B simulated deception signals; judging whether the deviation of the analyzed ADS-B information and the ADS-B information analyzed by the ADS-B receiver theory is within a set deviation range, if so, entering the next step, otherwise, generating alarm information; step five, calculating a received signal strength RSSI value by adopting a wireless signal transmission model; step six, filtering the collected RSSI values by adopting a mean filtering mode; and seventhly, judging whether the RSSI value generated by the directional antenna covering the ADS-B transmitter is larger than the RSSI values generated by the other directional antennas, if so, ending, and otherwise, generating alarm information.
The first step of this embodiment specifically includes the following steps: the method comprises the steps of building an anti-interference antenna array, wherein the anti-interference antenna array comprises 8 paraboloid directional antennas with working frequency of 1090MHZ, the 8 directional antennas are distributed on the same circumference at equal intervals, the antenna array which surrounds the circumference to form 360 degrees is built according to an included angle of 45 degrees at intervals, and each directional antenna is correspondingly connected with an ADS-B ground station receiver. In this embodiment, the wireless signal transmission model established in step two is a shadowang model, which is established inside the ADS-B ground station receiver. In the third step of this embodiment, the ADS-B transmitter is controlled to be located within the receiving range of any one directional antenna, and then the ADS-B transmitter generates the ADS-B spoofing analog signal.
In the fourth step of this embodiment, when the specific implementation is performed, the 8 directional antennas all receive the ADS-B spoofing analog signal and transmit the received signal to the corresponding ADS-B ground station receiver, and the ADS-B ground station receiver analyzes the received signal to obtain the aircraft latitude and longitude data included in the signal. Then, judging whether the deviation of the analyzed ADS-B information and the ADS-B information analyzed by the ADS-B receiver theory is within a set deviation range, and if so, entering the next step; otherwise, generating alarm information by ADS-B ground station receiver.
In the specific implementation of step five in this embodiment, a calculation formula for calculating the received signal strength RSSI value by using the wireless signal transmission model is as follows:
RSSI＝A-10nlogd+X dB
wherein RSSI is the received signal strength, a is the RSSI value at one meter, n is the path loss exponent, which is usually measured from a specific site, generally between 2 and 6. d is the measured distance, X dB Are gaussian random variables without any meaning.
In the sixth step of this embodiment, m data are collected, and then an average value is obtained, where the formula is as follows:
wherein, the value of i is an integer between 1 and m and is the ith sampling.
Fig. 1 shows RSSI values obtained by transmitting and receiving signals 300 times at a distance of 1m between a transmitting node and a receiving node. Since the RSSI value is susceptible to the influence of environmental factors, a large error is generated, and in order to obtain a relatively stable RSSI value, the filtering process is performed on the RSSI value first.
Step seven of this embodiment is implemented specifically: the RSSI values generated by the signals input by all the directional antennas are transmitted to any ADS-B ground station receiver, whether the RSSI values generated by the signals input by the directional antennas in the receiving range of the directional antenna where the ADS-B transmitter is located are larger than the RSSI values generated by the signals input by the other directional antennas is judged, and if the RSSI values are larger than the RSSI values generated by the signals input by the other directional antennas, no alarm information is generated; otherwise, the ADS-B ground station receiver generates alarm information.
The performance of the ADS-B ground station receiver system used in this embodiment is shown in table 1:
TABLE 1 ADS-B ground station receiver system performance
In order to verify the anti-interference performance of the ADS-B ground station receiver, an interference source for experimental detection is necessary, and the ADS-B simulated deception signal generated by the ADS-B transmitter in the embodiment can be used for the ADS-B simulated deception signal. The system composition of the ADS-B transmitter comprises hardware modules such as a data transmitter, a GNSS receiver, a signal processor, an information processor and the like, and key data such as the attitude, the position, the speed, the acceleration and the like of a carrier are broadcasted to the outside. The ADS-B transmitter of this embodiment is used as a transmitting device, and can implement various parameters of an analog signal through its open interface. The performance of the ADS-B transmitter system used in this embodiment is shown in table 2:
TABLE 2 ADS-B transmitter System Performance
| Serial number | Categories | Performance requirements |
| 1 | Transmitting power | ≥37dBm |
| 2 | Frequency of operation | 1090MHz±1MHz |
| 3 | Meets the standard | DO-260B |
| 4 | Coding format | DF17/DF18 |
| 5 | Positioning accuracy | Better than 10m (95% confidence) |
| 6 | Location update rate | 5Hz |
| 7 | Data interfaceMouth with a filter | RS232 serial port |
| 8 | Working power supply | Internal rechargeable battery |
| 9 | Operating temperature | 10～40℃ |
The performance parameters of the directional antenna of this embodiment are shown in table 3:
TABLE 3 Directional antenna Performance parameters
The directional antenna of the embodiment is a directional cutting grid parabolic antenna with the working frequency of 1.1G +/-0.1 and the antenna gain of 15dBi, is a die-cast aluminum reflection grid net, is coated with an ultraviolet aging resistant coating, has high gain and low standing wave, can be vertically polarized or horizontally polarized and is provided with an angle-adjustable rotary clamp code in a standard manner, and is suitable for wireless remote transmission.
The output information of the ADS-B ground station receiver of this embodiment includes: receiver number, signal strength, target ICAO address, call sign, longitude, latitude, speed, altitude, and heading; all information is transmitted in ASCII frames with comma separation between data items in each frame.
The numbers of the 8 ADS-B ground station receivers in the embodiment are 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07 and 08 respectively; the directional antennas are circularly arranged at 45-degree intervals, numbering is carried out from 01-08 in the counterclockwise direction, and the ADS-B ground station is anti-interference and corresponds to the directional antennas with corresponding numbers. A specific example of the anti-interference verification when the embodiment is applied is as follows:
the Guanghan airport is selected as the experimental site, and the receiving station coordinates are 30.94842N and 104.32194E. In the experiment, the signal of the ADS-B transmitter is independently decoded, and the validity of the signal is verified through the RSSI value.
Firstly, RSSI contrast test is carried out on actual position signals of an ADS-B transmitter, the ADS-B transmitter is positioned in the receiving range of a No. 01 directional antenna, and 8 ADS-B ground station receivers respectively decode the signals. The decoded data is:
MSG,01,-6.52,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,02,-9.11,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,03,-11.56,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,04,-13.67,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,05,-18.21,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,06,-13.24,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,07,-10.91,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,08,-8.97,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
the ADS-B transmitter ICAO address is FFAABB, call sign is TESSTADSB, longitude is 104.22187, latitude is 31.4684, altitude is 1450 feet, heading is 320 degrees, and speed is zero. The RSSI values of the receiver channels of each ADS-B ground station are shown in table 4:
TABLE 4 RSSI values of receiver channels of ADS-B ground stations before correction
| Channel | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 |
| RSSI | -6.52 | -9.11 | -11.56 | -13.67 | -18.21 | -13.24 | -10.91 | -8.97 |
After verification, the actual position of ADS-B transmitter is consistent with the position of the decoded signal, and the RSSI 01 And if the RSSI value is larger than the RSSI values of other channels, the signal can be judged to be an effective signal, so that the system displays normally and no alarm information appears.
Then, analog coordinates of ADS-B transmitters are set, the actual positions of the ADS-B transmitters are not changed, the analog coordinates are corrected to be within the receiving range of No. 05 directional antennas, 8 ADS-B ground station receivers respectively decode the signals, and the decoded data are
MSG,01,-6.58,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,02,-9.04,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,03,-11.41,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,04,-12.97,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,05,-18.2,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,06,-12.84,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,07,-11.51,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
MSG,08,-8.93,FFAABB,TESTADSB,104.22187,31.46842,1450,320,000；
The RSSI values of the receiver channels of each ADS-B ground station obtained after the correction are shown in table 5:
TABLE 5 corrected RSSI values of all ADS-B ground station receiver channels
| Channel | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 |
| RSSI | -6.58 | -9.04 | -11.41 | -12.97 | -18.2 | -12.84 | -11.51 | -8.93 |
It can be seen that since the actual position of the ADS-B transmitter does not coincide with the decoded position of the signal, the RSSI should be used if the true position of the signal is the decoded position 05 But the actual case is RSSI 01 Therefore, the actual position of the signal can be judged to be in the receiving range of the directional antenna No. 01, and the system generates alarm information for the signal.
The above-mentioned embodiments, objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention are further described in detail, it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are only examples of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. The ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that firstly, an anti-interference antenna array is built, the anti-interference antenna array comprises 8 parabolic directional antennas with the working frequency of 1090MHZ, the 8 directional antennas are distributed on the same circumference at equal intervals, an antenna array which surrounds the circumference to form 360 degrees is built according to an included angle of 45 degrees, and each directional antenna is correspondingly connected with an ADS-B ground station receiver;
step two, establishing a wireless signal transmission model in the ADS-B ground station receiver;
step three, controlling the ADS-B transmitter to be positioned in the receiving range of any one directional antenna, and generating an ADS-B simulated deception signal by the ADS-B transmitter;
step four, 8 the directional antennas receive ADS-B simulated deception signals and transmit the ADS-B simulated deception signals to corresponding ADS-B ground station receivers, and the ADS-B ground station receivers analyze the received signals to obtain airplane longitude and latitude data contained in the signals; judging whether the deviation of the analyzed ADS-B information and the ADS-B information analyzed by the ADS-B receiver theory is within a set deviation range, and entering the next step if the deviation is within the set deviation range; otherwise, generating alarm information by the ADS-B ground station receiver;
step five, calculating a received signal strength RSSI value by adopting a wireless signal transmission model;
step six, filtering the collected RSSI values by adopting a mean value filtering mode;
step seven, transmitting RSSI values generated by signals input by all the directional antennas to any ADS-B ground station receiver, judging whether the RSSI values generated by the signals input by the directional antennas in the receiving range of the directional antennas where the ADS-B transmitters are located are larger than the RSSI values generated by the signals input by the other directional antennas, and if so, not generating alarm information; otherwise, generating alarm information by ADS-B ground station receiver.
2. The ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering of claim 1, wherein the formula for calculating the received signal strength RSSI value by using the wireless signal transmission model in the fifth step is as follows:
RSSI＝A-10nlogd+X dB
wherein RSSI is the received signal strength, n is the path loss exponent, d is the measurement distance, X dB Are gaussian random variables.
3. The ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering of claim 1, wherein m data are collected in the sixth step, and then an average value is obtained, wherein the formula is as follows:
wherein, the value of i is an integer between 1 and m and is the ith sampling.
4. The ADS-B ground station anti-interference performance detection method based on mean value filtering of any one of claims 1-3, wherein the directional antenna is a directional cutting grid parabolic antenna with an operating frequency of 1.1G +/-0.1 and an antenna gain of 15 dBi.
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