CN109541538B - Method for realizing distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-cheating function based on opportunity reference source - Google Patents
Method for realizing distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-cheating function based on opportunity reference source Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S5/00—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
- G01S5/02—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
- G01S5/06—Position of source determined by co-ordinating a plurality of position lines defined by path-difference measurements
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
- G01S7/02—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
- G01S7/36—Means for anti-jamming, e.g. ECCM, i.e. electronic counter-counter measures
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- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
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Abstract
The invention relates to a method for realizing a distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-cheating function based on an opportunity reference source, which comprises the following steps of (1) carrying out track processing on the ADS-B system, and rejecting interference information and screening wrong messages; (2) The ADS-B system carries out relative position goodness of fit verification; (3) Selecting an opportunity reference source which is suitable for multi-site synchronization and has high local arrival time TOA measurement precision from the trusted group; (4) Calculating a TOA synchronization correction value of local arrival time of each station according to the position information in the opportunity reference source message and the position information of each station; (5) Passively positioning the ADS-B target source through the arrival time difference; and (6) detecting and reporting the deception ADS-B source. By adopting the method, the detection of the deception ADS-B message and the positioning function of the deception source can be simultaneously realized only by receiving ADS-B signals by a plurality of ADS-B receivers, and the method has the characteristics of good detection performance, low system cost and capability of realizing the positioning of the deception source.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to the technical field of aircraft security monitoring and information security crossing, and specifically relates to a method for realizing a distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-cheating function based on an opportunity reference source.
Background
The broadcast type automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) is a novel traffic surveillance technology which utilizes an airborne navigation sensing system to obtain information such as the accurate position and speed of an aircraft, and utilizes an air-to-ground and air-to-air data link to automatically broadcast outwards so as to complete the monitoring of the state of the aircraft and the information transmission. The ADS-B system adopts an open data protocol, has the characteristics of high monitoring precision, high data updating rate, strong information integrity, low terminal cost, convenience in maintenance and the like, and is widely applied to air transportation systems of various countries in the world, particularly air traffic control. However, the system also has a great safety hazard, which mainly appears in two aspects: on one hand, the ADS-B system adopts a public data protocol to transmit in an unencrypted channel, and is very easily subjected to malicious deception interference of a false ADS-B base station; on the other hand, the ADS-B system highly depends on a GNSS system to sense the position of the aircraft, and is easily interfered and deceived by regional GNSS to cause wrong aircraft position broadcasting.
In order to solve the problem of cheating prevention of an ADS-B system, the methods adopted in the industry at present mainly comprise a radar data calibration method, a multi-base-station time difference positioning calibration method and a multi-array antenna calibration method, but bottlenecks of complex system and high cost exist; with the improvement of GNSS time service precision, there are also multi-base station time difference positioning devices based on GNSS time service with lower cost, but the devices themselves also depend on a GNSS system seriously, and cannot be applied to the scene of GNSS local interference. In addition, in recent years, researchers at home and abroad have proposed other methods, including a track check method based on Kalman tracking filtering proposed by paper 1 (Mueller K, krozel j. Aircraft ADS-B interaction verification based on a Kalman tracking filter. Aiaa Journal, 2013), a GNSS integrity information check method proposed by chinese patent (ADS-B autonomous anti-spoofing method based on GNSS integrity information, patent No. CN 201610231106.1), and a single station doppler check method proposed by paper 2 (chenille, wurencheat, ludan, ADS-B interference detection method using doppler effect. These methods all have the characteristics of low cost and complexity, but are based on the verification of a data or signal waveform domain, have no characteristics that position and orientation information is difficult to cheat, still have the possibility of being cheated by a 'vivid' target, cannot locate an interference source, and are inconvenient to take countermeasures and law enforcement measures.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art and provides a method for realizing the distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-cheating function based on the opportunistic reference source, which has the advantages of accurate positioning, good anti-cheating effect and high reliability.
In order to achieve the purpose, the method for realizing the passive location anti-spoofing function of the distributed ADS-B based on the opportunistic reference source comprises the following steps:
the method for realizing the distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-cheating function based on the opportunity reference source is mainly characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) The ADS-B system carries out track processing, and eliminates interference information and screens wrong messages;
(2) The ADS-B system carries out relative position goodness of fit verification and divides the ADS-B source into a credible group and an in-doubt group;
(3) Selecting an opportunity reference source suitable for multi-site synchronization and high local arrival time TOA measurement precision from the trusted group;
(4) Calculating a local arrival time TOA synchronization correction value of each station according to the position information in the opportunity reference source message and the position information of each station;
(5) Passively positioning the ADS-B target source through the arrival time difference;
(6) And detecting and reporting the deception ADS-B source.
Preferably, the interference information in step (1) includes a false ADS-B message with obviously wrong target location, motion information and flight identification.
Preferably, the step (2) comprises the following steps:
(2.1) intercepting and monitoring the position of the ADS-B message received in the airspace and the arrival time information of the ADS-B message arriving at each measuring station at regular intervals, and randomly grouping the message information in pairs;
(2.2) performing relative position goodness of fit verification on the first group;
(2.3) sequentially carrying out relative position goodness of fit verification on the groups in the step (2.1) one by one until a credible group is found out;
(2.4) traversing the ADS-B source to obtain an initial trusted group containing the M element;
and (2.5) carrying out pairwise relative goodness of fit verification, finding out the maximum subset which accords with the coincidence of pairwise relative positions of all elements, determining the maximum subset as a credible group, and classifying all the other elements into a doubt group.
Preferably, the verifying of the goodness of fit of the relative position in the step (2.2) specifically includes:
performing relative position goodness of fit verification according to the following formula:
wherein, TOA A0 、TOA A1 The arrival times, TOA, of the messages 0 and 1 to the master station A respectively X0 、TOA X1 (X = B, C, D \8230;) are arrival times of messages 0 and 1 to the substations, respectively, and r is A0 、r A1 The distances r from the signal source to the master station A, calculated from messages 0 and 1, respectively X0 、r X1 (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the distance from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from messages 0 and 1, respectively, C is the electromagnetic wave transmission speed, B, C, D \8230;, each substation, and MTL is a distance error threshold.
Preferably, the step (3) comprises the following steps:
(3.1) judging whether an ADS-B source with high signal-to-noise ratio and the highest navigation integrity level given by the message exists, and if so, selecting the ADS-B source as an opportunity reference source; otherwise, continuing the step (3.2);
and (3.2) continuing to use the current reference source.
Preferably, the step (4) comprises the following steps:
(4.1) passing said opportunity reference source computer to the opportunity reference source C i The arrival time measurement value of the ADS-B message arriving at each base station;
(4.2) calculating a difference between the time references of the respective secondary base stations and the primary base station;
and (4.3) correcting the local time of arrival (TOA) measured value of each secondary station through the difference of the time references.
Preferably, theComputer opportunity reference source C in step (4.1) i The measured value of the arrival time of the ADS-B message arriving at each base station specifically comprises the following steps:
calculating an opportunistic reference source C according to the following formula i The arrival time measurement value of the sent ADS-B message arriving at each base station is as follows:
wherein, TOA Xi (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the arrival time of the message i at each substation, t i For the moment of transmitting ADS-B message, r Xi (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the distance from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from message i, Δ t X The deviation from standard clock is C electromagnetic wave transmission speed, A, B, C, D, 8230823060, 8230, and each substation.
Preferably, the step (4.2) of calculating the difference between the time references of each secondary base station and the primary base station specifically includes:
calculating the difference between the time references of each secondary base station and the primary base station according to the following formula:
wherein, Δ t A Deviation of the master clock from the standard clock, Δ t X Is the deviation of the secondary station clock from the standard clock, c is the electromagnetic wave transmission speed, TOA X0 、TOA X1 (X = B, C, D \8230;) are arrival times of messages 0 and 1 to the substations, respectively, and r is Xi (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the distance from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from message i, and r is Ai The distance from the signal source to the main station A, which is calculated by the message i, is B, C, D \8230, and \8230iscalculated for each substation.
Preferably, the step (5) comprises the following steps:
(5.1) calculating the arrival time difference between the ADS-B target source and each site through the local arrival time TOA synchronous correction value;
and (5.2) estimating the actual position of the ADS-B target source by means of multi-station time difference positioning.
Preferably, the step (6) comprises the following steps:
(6.1) judging whether the error between the positioning result of the ADS-B target source and the position information in the corresponding ADS-B message is within the error range, if so, judging the ADS-B target source to be a real ADS-B source; otherwise, judging as a deception ADS-B source;
and (6.2) reporting the number of the deception sources, the interference mode and the estimated value of the actual position information.
By adopting the method for realizing the distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing function based on the opportunity reference source, the inter-station synchronization technology based on the ADS-B source credibility grouping of the relative position goodness of fit and the dynamic selection of the credible ADS-B target source as the reference source can realize the detection of spoofed ADS-B messages and the positioning function of spoofed sources at the same time only by receiving ADS-B signals by a plurality of ADS-B receivers, and the method has the characteristics of good detection performance, low system cost and capability of realizing the positioning of the spoofed sources. Compared with the background technology, the method has the following specific advantages: (1) Compared with the existing radar data calibration method, the multi-array antenna calibration method and the multi-base-station time difference positioning calibration method adopting non-GNSS system time service synchronization, the method has the advantages of obvious cost advantage and convenience in deployment and maintenance. (2) Compared with a multi-base-station time difference positioning calibration method adopting GNSS system time service synchronization, the method can effectively relieve the serious dependence of multi-base-station synchronization on a high-precision GNSS system on the premise of keeping the cost equivalent, and can be better suitable for the scene of GNSS local interference. (3) Compared with other verification methods based on data or signal waveform domains proposed in recent years, the method has the advantages of obvious advantages in reliability of the verification method, capability of providing the position information of a deception source and capability of providing more effective information for further countermeasures and law enforcement, although the cost is increased to a certain extent.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a processing flow chart of the method for implementing a distributed ADS-B passive location anti-spoofing function based on an opportunistic reference source according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic view of an application scenario of the method for implementing a distributed ADS-B passive location anti-spoofing function based on an opportunistic reference source according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order that the technical contents of the present invention can be more clearly described, the present invention will be further described with reference to specific embodiments.
The method for realizing the passive location anti-cheating function of the distributed ADS-B based on the opportunity reference source comprises the following steps:
(1) The ADS-B system carries out track processing, and eliminates interference information and screens wrong messages;
(2) The ADS-B system carries out relative position goodness of fit verification and divides the ADS-B source into a credible group and an in-doubt group;
(3) Selecting an opportunity reference source which is suitable for multi-site synchronization and has high local arrival time TOA measurement precision from the trusted group;
(4) Calculating a TOA synchronization correction value of local arrival time of each station according to the position information in the opportunity reference source message and the position information of each station;
(5) Passively positioning the ADS-B target source through the arrival time difference;
(6) And detecting and reporting the deception ADS-B source.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the interference information in step (1) includes a false ADS-B message with obviously wrong target location, movement information and flight identification.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step (2) comprises the steps of:
(2.1) intercepting the position of the ADS-B message received in the monitoring airspace and the arrival time information of the ADS-B message arriving at each measuring station at regular intervals, and randomly grouping every two message information;
(2.2) performing relative position goodness of fit verification on the first group;
(2.3) sequentially carrying out relative position goodness of fit verification on the groups in the step (2.1) one by one until a credible group is found out;
(2.4) traversing the ADS-B source to obtain an initial trusted group containing the M element;
and (2.5) carrying out pairwise relative goodness of fit verification, finding out the maximum subset which accords with the coincidence of pairwise relative positions of all elements, determining the maximum subset as a credible group, and classifying all the other elements into a doubt group.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the verifying the goodness of fit of the relative position in step (2.2) specifically includes:
and (3) verifying the goodness of fit of the relative positions according to the following formula:
wherein, TOA A0 、TOA A1 The arrival times, TOA, of the messages 0 and 1 to the master station A respectively X0 、TOA X1 (X = B, C, D \8230;) respectively represents the arrival time of the messages 0 and 1 at each substation, and r is the arrival time of the messages A0 、r A1 The distances r from the signal source to the master station A, calculated from messages 0 and 1, respectively X0 、r X1 (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the distance from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from messages 0 and 1, respectively, C is the electromagnetic wave transmission speed, B, C, D \8230;, each substation, and MTL is a distance error threshold.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step (3) comprises the steps of:
(3.1) judging whether an ADS-B source with high signal-to-noise ratio and the highest navigation integrity level given by the message exists, and if so, selecting the ADS-B source as an opportunity reference source; otherwise, continuing the step (3.2);
and (3.2) continuing to use the current reference source.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step (4) comprises the steps of:
(4.1) passing said opportunity reference source computer to the opportunity reference source C i The arrival time measurement value of the ADS-B message arriving at each base station;
(4.2) calculating the difference between the time references of each secondary base station and the main base station;
and (4.3) correcting the local time of arrival (TOA) measured value of each secondary station through the difference of the time references.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the computer in the step (4.1) is referred to the source C i The measured value of the arrival time of the ADS-B message arriving at each base station specifically comprises the following steps:
calculating an opportunistic reference source C according to the following formula i The measured value of the arrival time of the ADS-B message arriving at each base station is as follows:
wherein, TOA Xi (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the arrival time of the message i at each substation, t i For the moment of transmitting ADS-B message, r Xi (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the distance from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from message i, and Δ t X The deviation from standard clock is C electromagnetic wave transmission speed, A, B, C, D, 8230823060, 8230, and each substation.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step (4.2) of calculating the difference between the time references of each secondary base station and the primary base station specifically includes:
calculating the difference between the time references of each secondary base station and the primary base station according to the following formula:
wherein, Δ t A Deviation of the master clock from the standard clock, Δ t X Is the deviation of the secondary station clock from the standard clock, c is the electromagnetic wave transmission speed, TOA X0 、TOA X1 (X = B, C, D \8230;) are arrival times of messages 0 and 1 to the substations, respectively, and r is Xi (X = B, C, D \8230;) is the distance from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from message i, and r is Ai The distance from the signal source to the main station A calculated by the message i is B, C, D \8230 \ 8230;, each substation.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step (5) comprises the steps of:
(5.1) calculating the arrival time difference between the ADS-B target source and each site through the local arrival time TOA synchronous correction value;
and (5.2) estimating the actual position of the ADS-B target source by means of multi-station time difference positioning.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step (6) comprises the steps of:
(6.1) judging whether the error between the positioning result of the ADS-B target source and the position information in the corresponding ADS-B message is within the error range, if so, judging the ADS-B target source to be a real ADS-B source; otherwise, judging as a deception ADS-B source;
and (6.2) reporting the number of the deception sources, the interference mode and the estimated value of the actual position information.
In the specific implementation mode of the invention, the invention provides a distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-cheating method based on an opportunity reference source aiming at the bottleneck problems in the aspects of performance, cost and adaptability of the ADS-B system anti-cheating technology. The method is established on the basis of the traditional multi-base-station time difference positioning verification method, and has the advantages of accurate positioning of a deception source, good deception prevention effect and high reliability; meanwhile, multi-station synchronization is realized by dynamically selecting a credible ADS-B target as an opportunity reference source, so that the synchronous time service dependence on an expensive inter-station clock distribution network or a fragile GNSS system is avoided, and the bottleneck problems that the traditional multi-base-station time difference positioning calibration method is high in cost or is difficult to adapt to a GNSS local interference scene are effectively solved.
The distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing method based on the opportunity reference source collects ADS-B messages and corresponding local arrival Time (TOA) information by means of a plurality of independent ADS-B receiving sites which are deployed in a distributed mode geographically, and therefore accurate identification of spoofed ADS-B messages and accurate positioning of spoofed sources can be achieved. The specific implementation method comprises the following six steps:
(1) ADS-B track processing and message primary screening;
(2) ADS-B target credibility grouping;
(3) Opportunistic reference sources are preferred;
(4) Multi-station synchronization based on opportunistic reference sources;
(5) Passively positioning an ADS-B target;
(6) ADS-B spoofing message detection and spoofing source information reporting.
The ADS-B track processing and message primary screening method is characterized in that partial ADS-B interferences with weak disguise are eliminated by adopting a traditional message validity detection and track tracking method, the interferences comprise false ADS-B messages with obviously wrong target positions, motion information or flight identifications, and the data flow of the false ADS-B messages can be effectively reduced by using small operation cost through the step.
The ADS-B target credibility grouping is to utilize the position information in the message of the ADS-B source (including a real source and a deception source) received by each receiving station within a certain time period and the corresponding local TOA information, to group the ADS-B source by calculating the relative position goodness of fit between the ADS-B sources, the division of the high target relative position goodness of fit and the stable track enters into a credible group, and the rest is classified into a suspicion group. This step belongs to one of the key steps of the method.
The opportunistic reference sources are preferably selected at intervals, wherein the opportunistic reference sources which are more favorable for multi-site synchronization are reselected, the selection range of the opportunistic reference sources is a credible group defined in the previous step, and one or more real ADS-B sources which are favorable for multi-site synchronization and have high TOA measurement accuracy are selected from the opportunistic reference sources; if a good confidence group sample cannot be obtained within a specified time period, the opportunistic reference source of the previous time period can still be used, but the additional clock synchronization error caused by the unstable frequency of the internal clock of each station should be considered. This step belongs to one of the key steps of the method.
The multi-station synchronization based on the opportunity reference source is characterized in that the opportunity reference source selected in the last step is used, the position information in the ADS-B message of the opportunity reference source and the position information of each station are utilized, the relative delay of receiving the same ADS-B message from the reference source among the stations is calculated, then the TOA of one station (which can be set as a master station) is taken as a reference, the TOA synchronization correction value of other stations is obtained, and the TOA values of other stations at the time point are synchronized to the master station uniformly.
The ADS-B target passive positioning method comprises the steps of utilizing a plurality of stations to receive TOA synchronization correction values of the same ADS-B target source after multi-station synchronization based on a reference source is completed, calculating arrival time differences between the ADS-B target source and each station, and estimating the actual position of the ADS-B target source by adopting a multi-station time difference positioning mode.
The ADS-B spoofing message detection and spoofing source information reporting are to compare the actual position of each ADS-B target source (the important point is the ADS-B target source in the in-doubt group) estimated in the last step with the position information in the corresponding ADS-B message, detect spoofing messages by using the goodness of the absolute position information of each ADS-B target source, and report the number of spoofing sources, the interference mode and the actual position information estimation value, so as to be used as the basis for further interference situation judgment and implementation of copy-back and law enforcement.
The specific embodiment of the invention is as follows: in the embodiment, a specific implementation scheme of a distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing method based on an opportunity reference source is provided. The ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing method aims at a typical application scene as shown in figure 1, a plurality of receiving stations with distributed characteristics in space are used for receiving ADS-B messages sent by real airplanes and spoofing sources and measuring the arrival time of the messages, and the messages are transmitted to a data processor in real time for recording and processing.
The processing flow of the ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing method is shown in figure 2, and specifically comprises six steps of ADS-B track processing and message primary screening, ADS-B target credibility grouping, opportunity reference source optimization, multi-station synchronization based on the opportunity reference source, ADS-B target passive positioning, ADS-B spoofing message detection and spoofing source information reporting.
(1) ADS-B track processing and message preliminary screening: according to flight number, airplane position, motion state in the ADS-B message and information such as preliminary flight path obtained by processing, some ADS-B messages with obvious errors in flight information, position and flight speed information are screened out and directly classified as deception source messages. ADS-B interference with low disguise can be screened out relatively effectively through the step.
(2) ADS-B target confidence grouping: the method comprises the following steps of carrying out relative position goodness of fit verification on an ADS-B message, and dividing an ADS-B source into a credible group and an in-doubt group, and specifically comprising the following substeps:
1) Intercepting and monitoring ADS-B message position received in the airspace and arrival Time (TOA) information of the ADS-B message position and arrival Time (TOA) information of each measuring station at intervals of a period of time (such as 10 seconds), and randomly grouping the message information in pairs.
2) And carrying out relative position goodness of fit verification on the first group, wherein the specific method comprises the following steps: the serial numbers of two message information in a group are respectively set as 0 and 1, the main measurement station is a station A, the secondary stations are B, C and D A0 、TOA A1 The arrival time, TOA, of the message 0 and 1 to the master station A respectively X0 、TOA X1 (X = B, C, d.. Are.) are the arrival times of message 0,1 at each substation, respectively. r is A0 、r A1 The distances, r, from the signal source to the master station A, calculated from the position information solved by the messages 0,1, respectively X0 、r X1 (X = B, C, D.. Eta.) is the distance from the ADS-B source to each substation, which is calculated according to the position solved by the message 0,1; the verification of the coincidence degree of the relative positions can be performed by the following inequality group (1), wherein c is the transmission speed of the electromagnetic wave, MTL is a distance error threshold, and only the object satisfying the inequality is considered to be coincident with the relative positions and can be classified into a credible group.
3) And sequentially carrying out relative position goodness of fit verification on the groups in the first step one by one until the first credible group is found by the method.
4) Quickly traversing all ADS-B sources by taking 2 members of the first credible group as references to obtain an initial credible group containing M elements;
5) And (3) carrying out pairwise relative goodness of fit verification on all elements in the initial credible group set, finding out a maximum subset which accords with the coincidence of pairwise relative positions of all elements, determining the subset as a credible group, and dividing all the other elements into a doubt group.
(3) The opportunistic reference sources are preferably: selecting an ADS-B source with a high signal-to-noise ratio (more than 10dB, better TOA measurement accuracy can be ensured at the moment) and the highest navigation integrity level given by the message from the trusted group confirmed in the last step as a reference source; if the trusted group does not have a suitable ADS-B source, the current reference source continues to be used.
(4) Multi-station synchronization based on opportunistic reference sources: using the opportunity reference source selected in the last step, the source coordinate C is referenced i (x i ,y i ,z i ) Can be directly obtained from ADS-B message at t i ADS-B messages are sent at all times, and the coordinates of each base station are respectively (x) X ,y X ,z X ) (X = a, B, C, d.. And.) with a deviation Δ t from the standard clock X Then opportunity reference source C i The measured value of the arrival time of the sent ADS-B message reaching each base station can be expressed as:
for a distributed multi-station positioning system based on time difference of arrival (TDOA), the system time is synchronized to the same reference, the uniform synchronization is selected to the main base station A, and the time reference difference between each secondary base station and the main base station is as follows:
the TOA measured value of each secondary station is corrected by using the difference of the time reference, so that the TOA values of other stations at the time point can be uniformly synchronized to the primary station.
(5) The ADS-B target passive positioning method is characterized in that under the premise of realizing multi-station synchronization, the target can be positioned by directly utilizing the arrival time difference measured by each station, and the three-dimensional positioning of the ADS-B source can be realized by 4 or more receiving stations.
ADS-B spoofing message detection and spoofing source information reporting: comparing the positioning result of each ADS-B target source obtained in the last step with the position information in the corresponding ADS-B message, judging that the difference between the positioning result and the corresponding ADS-B target source is a real ADS-B source when the difference is within the error range, judging that the ADS-B target source is a deception ADS-B source when the difference exceeds the error range, and reporting the positioning result of the deception source and the relevant information of the mobile state.
The invention adopts the method for realizing the distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing function based on the opportunity reference source, and the interstation synchronization technology for grouping the reliability of the ADS-B source based on the relative position goodness of fit and dynamically selecting the credible ADS-B target source as the reference source, and can simultaneously realize the detection of spoofed ADS-B messages and the positioning function of spoofed sources only by receiving ADS-B signals by a plurality of ADS-B receivers, thereby having the characteristics of good detection performance, low system cost and capability of realizing the positioning of the spoofed sources. Compared with the background technology, the method has the following specific advantages: (1) Compared with the existing radar data calibration method, the multi-array antenna calibration method and the multi-base-station time difference positioning calibration method adopting non-GNSS system time service synchronization, the method has the advantages of obvious cost advantage and convenience in deployment and maintenance. (2) Compared with a multi-base-station time difference positioning calibration method adopting GNSS system time service synchronization, the method can effectively relieve the serious dependence of multi-base-station synchronization on a high-precision GNSS system on the premise of keeping the cost equivalent, and can be better suitable for the scene of GNSS local interference. (3) Compared with other verification methods based on data or signal waveform domains proposed in recent years, the method has the advantages of obvious advantages in reliability of the verification method, capability of providing the position information of a deception source and capability of providing more effective information for further countermeasures and law enforcement, although the cost is increased to a certain extent.
In this specification, the invention has been described with reference to specific embodiments thereof. It will, however, be evident that various modifications and changes may be made thereto without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the invention. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.
Claims (7)
1. A method for realizing distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing function based on opportunity reference source is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) The ADS-B system carries out track processing, and eliminates interference information and selects wrong messages;
(2) The ADS-B system carries out relative position goodness of fit verification and divides the ADS-B source into a credible group and an in-doubt group;
(3) Selecting an opportunity reference source which is suitable for multi-site synchronization and has high local arrival time TOA measurement precision from the trusted group;
(4) Calculating a local arrival time TOA synchronization correction value of each station according to the position information in the opportunity reference source message and the position information of each station;
(5) Passively positioning the ADS-B target source through the arrival time difference;
(6) Detecting and reporting a deception ADS-B source;
the step (2) comprises the following steps:
(2.1) intercepting the position of the ADS-B message received in the monitoring airspace and the arrival time information of the ADS-B message arriving at each measuring station at regular intervals, and randomly grouping every two message information;
(2.2) performing relative position goodness of fit verification on the first group;
(2.3) sequentially carrying out relative position goodness of fit verification on the groups in the step (2.1) one by one until a credible group is found out;
(2.4) traversing the ADS-B source to obtain an initial trusted group containing the M element;
(2.5) carrying out pairwise relative goodness of fit verification, finding out the maximum subset which accords with the coincidence of pairwise relative positions of all elements, determining the maximum subset as a credible group, and dividing all other elements into suspicion groups;
the relative position goodness of fit verification in the step (2.2) is specifically as follows:
performing relative position goodness of fit verification according to the following formula:
wherein, TOA A0 、TOA A1 The arrival times, TOA, of the messages 0 and 1 to the master station A respectively X0 、TOA X1 (ii) a X = B, C, D \8230; the arrival times, r, of the messages 0 and 1 arriving at the substations respectively A0 、r A1 The distances r from the signal source to the master station A, calculated from messages 0 and 1, respectively X0 、r X1 (ii) a X = B, C, D \8230; respectively calculating the distance from the ADS-B source to each substation by the messages 0 and 1, wherein C is the electromagnetic wave transmission speed B, C, D \8230, and \8230, MTL is a distance error threshold, and | | represents the absolute value;
the step (3) comprises the following steps:
(3.1) judging whether an ADS-B source with high signal-to-noise ratio and the highest navigation integrity level given by the message exists, and if so, selecting the ADS-B source as an opportunity reference source; otherwise, continuing the step (3.2);
and (3.2) continuing to use the current reference source.
2. The method for realizing the distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing function based on the opportunistic reference source of claim 1, wherein the interference information of the step (1) comprises a false ADS-B message with obviously wrong target position, motion information and flight identification.
3. The method for implementing distributed ADS-B passive location anti-spoofing based on opportunistic reference sources of claim 1 wherein the step (4) comprises the steps of:
(4.1) passing said opportunity reference source computer to the opportunity reference source C i The arrival time measurement value of the ADS-B message arriving at each base station;
(4.2) calculating a difference between the time references of the respective secondary base stations and the primary base station;
and (4.3) correcting the local time of arrival (TOA) measured value of each secondary station through the difference of the time references.
4. The method for implementing distributed ADS-B passive location anti-spoofing based on opportunistic reference sources of claim 3 wherein the computer opportunistic reference source C in step (4.1) i The measured value of the arrival time of the ADS-B message arriving at each base station specifically comprises the following steps:
calculating the opportunistic reference source C according to the following formula i The arrival time measurement value of the sent ADS-B message arriving at each base station is as follows:
wherein, TOA Xi (ii) a X = B, C, D \8230; the arrival time of the message i at each substation, t i For the moment of transmitting ADS-B message, r Xi (ii) a X = B, C, D \8230; for the distance, delta t, from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from message i X The deviation from standard clock is C electromagnetic wave transmission speed, A, B, C, D, 8230823060, 8230, and each substation.
5. The method for implementing a distributed ADS-B passive positioning anti-spoofing function based on opportunistic reference sources as claimed in claim 3, wherein the calculating the difference between the time bases of each secondary base station and the primary base station in the step (4.2) is specifically:
calculating the difference between the time references of each secondary base station and the primary base station according to the following formula:
wherein, Δ t A Deviation of the master clock from the standard clock, Δ t X Is the deviation of the secondary station clock from the standard clock, c is the electromagnetic wave transmission speed, TOA X0 、TOA X1 (ii) a X = B, C, D \8230; respectively, the arrival time of the messages 0 and 1 at each substationM, r Xi (ii) a X = B, C, D \8230; for the distance r from ADS-B source to each substation calculated from message i Ai The distance from the signal source to the main station A calculated by the message i is B, C, D \8230 \ 8230;, each substation.
6. The method for implementing distributed ADS-B passive location anti-spoofing based on opportunistic reference sources of claim 1 wherein the step (5) comprises the steps of:
(5.1) calculating the arrival time difference between the ADS-B target source and each site through the local arrival time TOA synchronous correction value;
and (5.2) estimating the actual position of the ADS-B target source by means of multi-station time difference positioning.
7. The method for implementing distributed ADS-B passive location anti-spoofing based on opportunistic reference sources of claim 1 wherein the step (6) comprises the steps of:
(6.1) judging whether the error between the positioning result of the ADS-B target source and the position information in the corresponding ADS-B message is within the error range, if so, judging the ADS-B target source to be a real ADS-B source; otherwise, judging as a deception ADS-B source;
and (6.2) reporting the number of the deception ADS-B sources, the interference mode and the estimated value of the actual position information.
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| CN110057372B (en) * | 2019-04-25 | 2020-08-25 | 电子科技大学 | Single-satellite passive positioning method suitable for satellite-borne ADS-B |
| CN110988922B (en) * | 2019-10-19 | 2021-09-17 | 中国电波传播研究所（中国电子科技集团公司第二十二研究所） | ADS-B-based three-dimensional ellipsoid cross GNSS interference source positioning method |
| CN110855397B (en) * | 2019-11-07 | 2023-03-28 | 中国民航大学 | ADS-B delay forwarding message detection and jamming station positioning method |
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| CN110673087B (en) * | 2019-12-06 | 2020-04-14 | 南京萨利智能科技有限公司 | Aircraft route monitoring method and device based on ADS-B broadcast signal and computer storage medium |
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| CN113759392B (en) * | 2021-08-23 | 2023-08-18 | 中国民航大学 | Robust GNSS interference source positioning method based on flight big data |
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