CN109426236B - Method and system for establishing analysis model of trip and pile skip equipment - Google Patents
Method and system for establishing analysis model of trip and pile skip equipment Download PDFInfo
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- G05B23/0245—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults model based detection method, e.g. first-principles knowledge model based on a qualitative model, e.g. rule based; if-then decisions
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Abstract
A method and a system for establishing an analysis model of a trip and pile-jump device are provided, wherein the method comprises the following steps: s0, determining fault models and associated event lists of all equipment; s1, defining a top event; s2, determining the analysis boundary of the system; s3, according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event is located, performing the following modular processing on the loop; s4, connecting an OR gate under the top event, wherein the event of each device on the series loop is used as the input of the OR gate; s5, determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement until the column is written to the basic event level, and finally building a fault tree; and S6, performing simulation analysis on the established fault tree. The invention can establish a double failure fault tree model of the trip and pile jump equipment, and modularize the loop, so that the structure becomes simple and clear; the analysis boundary of the system can be effectively determined by adopting a unit system mode; furthermore, the real-time state of the equipment is introduced into the fault tree model, so that the real-time risk of the power station can be accurately reflected.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of nuclear power stations, in particular to a method and a system for establishing an analysis model of trip and reactor jump equipment.
Background
Avoiding the occurrence of an event requires that a single cause or even multiple causes of the event be made clear to take targeted precautions. In order to improve the availability of the nuclear power plant and reduce the occurrence of the trip and pile-jump event, the cause of the trip and pile-jump caused by single failure needs to be mastered, and the cause of the trip and pile-jump caused by double failures needs to be mastered according to the grading criterion requirement of the power plant. And making correct and more targeted decisions aiming at production activities such as operation, maintenance, design improvement and the like. This has achieved wide acceptance in the nuclear power industry. RCM maintenance theory developed from the 80's of the last century, AP913 device reliability management processes, and subsequent SPV identification and mitigation techniques developed further are all based on such insights. At present, identification of single failure trip and pile skipping equipment is basically completed, but identification of double failure trip and pile skipping reasons is not systematically carried out, and the FMEA method is suitable for identifying the single failure equipment, so that the difficulty of identifying conditional SPV equipment in combination with the actual running state of a power station exists.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method and a system for establishing an analysis model of a trip and pile-jump device, aiming at the above-mentioned defects in the prior art.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: a method for establishing an analysis model of a trip and pile-jump device is constructed, and comprises the following steps:
s0, determining fault models of all equipment and event lists related to the fault models;
s1, defining an unexpected top event, describing the occurrence condition and the fault state of the top event;
s2, determining the analysis boundary of the system by adopting a unit system mode;
s3, according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event is located, performing the following modular processing on the loop: converting the equipment with the parallel structure into a module structure;
s4, connecting an OR gate under the top event, wherein the event of each device on the series loop is used as the input of the OR gate;
s5, determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement until the column is written to the basic event level, and finally building a fault tree;
and S6, performing simulation analysis on the established fault tree.
Preferably, the step S6 further includes: and acquiring real-time state data of the equipment through the PIAF, modifying the fault model associated with the event according to the real-time state data of the equipment, and carrying out simulation calculation again according to the modified model.
Preferably, in step S5, for each module structure, the corresponding intermediate event is analyzed according to the processing manner of the top event until the column is written to the basic event hierarchy.
Preferably, the granularity of the fault tree considers the equipment failure state level and does not consider the failure and human factor failure of the passive equipment; wherein the equipment failure state stage comprises: the shunting of meters, control devices and meter manifolds.
Preferably, the determining the analysis boundary of the system in the manner of a unit system in step S2 includes: the analytical boundaries of the system need to comply with the principle of "influencing only the operation of the system".
Preferably, the event codes are coded in a mode of combining power station equipment function position codes with failure modes, and the event description is described in a mode of combining equipment function positions, equipment names, operating conditions and event codes; the fault state of the top event is defined as that a certain unit can not keep operating in a power mode.
Preferably, the modeling quality of the fault tree is controlled based on the following six principles in the process of constructing the fault tree:
determining the occurrence condition and the occurrence fault state of an event;
judging whether the fault state of the event is caused by equipment fault, if so, classifying the event as the equipment state fault, and if not, classifying the event as the system state fault; if the event is classified as a device status fault, adding an OR gate below the event, and then performing primary failure, secondary failure and demand failure mode analysis; if the event is classified as a system fault, performing direct cause analysis;
if the normal functioning of a device causes a fault sequence, it is assumed that the functioning of this device is normal;
before further analysis, all inputs of a logic gate must be defined to completion;
the doors cannot be directly connected;
no jumps in the analysis step can occur during the analysis and a step-by-step analysis is required up to the underlying event.
The invention also discloses a system for establishing the analysis model of the trip and pile-jump equipment, which comprises the following steps:
the device comprises a preparation unit, a fault analysis unit and a fault analysis unit, wherein the preparation unit is used for determining fault models of all equipment and event lists related to the fault models;
the top event determining unit is used for defining an unexpected top event and describing the occurrence condition and the fault state of the top event;
the system boundary determining unit is used for determining the analysis boundary of the system in a unit system mode;
the fault tree building unit is used for performing the following modular processing on the loop according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event is located: converting the equipment with the parallel structure into a module structure; connecting an OR gate under the top event, wherein the event of each device on the series loop is used as the input of the OR gate; determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement until the column is written to the basic event level, and finally building a fault tree;
and the fault tree simulation unit is used for carrying out simulation analysis on the established fault tree.
Preferably, the fault tree simulation unit is further configured to obtain real-time status data of the device through the PIAF, modify the fault model associated with the event according to the real-time status data of the device, and perform simulation calculation again according to the modified model.
Preferably, for each module structure, analyzing the corresponding intermediate event according to the processing mode of the top event until the column is written to the basic event level;
the granularity of the fault tree considers the failure state level of the equipment and does not consider the failure and the human factor failure of the passive equipment; wherein the equipment failure state stage comprises: shunting of the instrument, the control equipment and the instrument branch pipe;
the determining the analysis boundary of the system by adopting the unit system mode comprises the following steps: the analysis boundary of the system is required to accord with the principle of 'only influencing the operation of the system';
the event codes are coded in a mode of combining power station equipment function position codes with failure modes, and the event description is described in a mode of combining equipment function positions, equipment names, operating conditions and event codes; the fault state of the top event is defined as that a certain unit can not keep operating in a power mode.
The implementation of the method and the system for establishing the analysis model of the trip and stack jump equipment has the following beneficial effects: the invention can realize the establishment of a double failure fault tree model of the trip and pile skip equipment, and in the modeling process, the following modular processing is carried out on the loop, so that the structure becomes simple and clear, and the possibility of missing events is greatly reduced; the analysis boundary of the system is effectively determined by the unit system mode, and the defect that repeated fault tree modeling is caused, so that the quality and the overall control of the project are adversely affected is avoided; furthermore, the real-time state of the equipment is introduced into the fault tree model, the actual running state of the power station is reflected through the fault tree model, the real-time risk of the power station can be accurately reflected, the risk that the equipment quits running can be evaluated, and the equipment maintenance plan and the isolation operation are further optimized.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the provided drawings without creative efforts:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a trip and pile-skip equipment analysis model building method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the partitioning of system analysis boundaries;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a fault tree model constructed based on a standard method of direct cause analysis;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the invention for constructing a fault tree model.
Detailed Description
To facilitate an understanding of the invention, the invention will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings. Exemplary embodiments of the invention are shown in the drawings. This invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete.
Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. The terminology used in the description of the invention herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention.
In order to better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the technical solution of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings and the specific embodiments in the specification, and it should be understood that the embodiments and the specific features in the embodiments of the present invention are detailed descriptions of the technical solution of the present application, and are not limited to the technical solution of the present application, and the technical features in the embodiments and the examples of the present invention may be combined with each other without conflict.
Referring to fig. 1, the method for establishing an analysis model of a trip and stack jump device mainly includes the following steps:
s0, determining fault models of all equipment and event lists related to the fault models; the fault model comprises a general fault model with operation failure and demand failure.
S1, defining an unexpected top event, describing the occurrence condition and the fault state of the top event;
the intermediate event, the top event and the basic event code of the fault tree need to satisfy two basic principles of uniqueness and readability. Uniqueness requires that the code cannot be repeated and readability requires that the nature of the event can be judged by the code. In order to establish a double failure automatic shutdown and shutdown fault tree model, the real-time state of the power station equipment needs to be correlated in the future application stage, and effective input is provided for the fault tree. Considering that the functional position code of the power station has uniqueness and the failure mode has a uniform code form, as shown in the example of table 1, the event code in the invention is coded by combining the functional position code of the power station equipment with the failure mode, and the event description is described by combining the functional position of the equipment, the name of the equipment, the operating condition and the event code, so that the event description has proper length and the readability is improved.
TABLE 1
The double failure causes a fault tree model of shutdown and shutdown, and shutdown signals are clear and comprise two signals for triggering the steam turbine and the generator to be shut down. The power can not be output due to grid faults, main transformer faults and the like, and further shutdown is caused. If the top event is defined as 'shutdown and shutdown', the grid fault event cannot be covered, so the fault state of the top event is defined as that a certain unit cannot be kept in the power mode for operation. In conjunction with the definition specification of the events in table 1, taking the landlord 3 machine as an example, the top event is defined as "the LA-3 machine cannot keep operating in power mode".
S2, determining the analysis boundary of the system by adopting a unit system mode;
considering that a single process system is often composed of power supply, gas supply, cooling and lubrication systems, which are supported by the power supply and gas supply systems to operate, if no clear analysis boundary exists, repeated fault tree modeling is caused, and adverse effects are generated on the quality and overall control of a project. Therefore, the step of determining the analysis boundary of the system in the manner of a unit system in step S2 includes: the analytical boundaries of the system need to comply with the principle of "influencing only the operation of the system".
For example, for a pump of a certain system, if the power supply failure of the pump needs to be analyzed, only a breaker or a contactor supplying power to the pump needs to be analyzed, and the failure of a power supply bus does not need to be analyzed when the system analyzes; similarly, for the air supply circuit, only the failure of the pipeline or valve supplying air to the system needs to be analyzed, and the failure of the air supply main pipe does not need to be considered. The failure of the bus and the gas supply bus is considered in the modeling process of the related power supply system and gas supply system, and the division scheme of the specific system analysis boundary is shown in fig. 2.
S3, according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event is located, performing the following modular processing on the loop: converting the equipment with the parallel structure into a module structure;
since the existing fault tree generally adopts a direct cause analysis method, referring to fig. 3, the assumed operation mode of the system is as follows: after signal input a, through a triggers the signal and provides inputs to B and C, which transmit the signal to D and ultimately to E. If a fault tree top event is defined as "E has no input signal" and passive elements, such as cables between active elements, are ignored, the immediate reason for the top event is "D has no output signal". According to the principle of the direct cause analysis method, the 'D does not output signals' becomes the top event of the next stage, and the direct reason is that: 1) d has input signal but no output signal; 2) d has no input signal. For the fault tree of fig. 2 in which there is no input signal for the top event "E", the probability of occurrence of the top event can be calculated by the following formula:
P(E)＝P(D)+P(D)’
P(D)’＝P(B)’*P(C)’＝[P(B)+P(B)”]*[P(C)+P(C)”]
P(B)”＝P(C)”＝P(A2)+P(A1)
by performing a cut-set calculation on the above formula using boolean algebra, we can obtain:
p (e) ═ P (d) + P (d) ═ P (a1) + P (a2) + P (b) × P (c) + P (d) formula 1
Wherein;
p (a 1): a fundamental event, a has an input signal but no output signal;
p (a 2): an intermediate event, a has no input signal;
p (B): a fundamental event, B has an input signal but no output signal;
p (B)': intermediate event, B no output signal;
p (C): a fundamental event, C has an input signal but no output signal;
p (C)': intermediate event, C no output signal;
p (D): a fundamental event, D has an input signal but no output signal;
p (D)': intermediate event, D no output signal;
p (E)': top event, E has no input signal.
Therefore, the method is a very huge work for constructing the fault tree, and is one of the main reasons why the risk analysis and evaluation software cannot be effectively applied to each power station.
Therefore, in step S3, according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event exists, the following modular processing is performed on the loop: and converting the equipment with the parallel structure into a module structure. Still taking fig. 3 as an example, after the parallel structure of B and C is regarded as the functional module BC, the transmission process of the signal is as shown in fig. 4, and after the parallel structure of B, C is modularized, the structure becomes simple and clear, that is, the relation between each element is "or", and failure of any one element will result in occurrence of a top-level event (BC may be regarded as the functional module), and the possibility of missing the event is greatly reduced. With respect to fig. 4, still taking "E" without input signal as the top level event, the cut set that causes the top level event to occur is:
p (e) ═ P (d) + P (bc) + P (a1) + P (a2) ═ P (a1) + P (a2) + P (b) × P (c) + P (d) formula 2
Compared with the formula 1, the formula 2 shows that the method of the invention has the same result as the step-by-step analysis method modeled by the standard fault tree, but the structure and the modeling process of the fault tree are greatly simplified.
S4, connecting an OR gate under the top event, wherein the event of each device on the series loop is used as the input of the OR gate;
s5, determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement until the column is written to the basic event level, and finally building a fault tree;
according to the explanation of the above step S3, in step S5, the corresponding middle event is analyzed according to the processing manner of the top event until the column is written to the basic event hierarchy.
And when each module structure is analyzed, determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement. Specifically, the granularity of analysis is an aspect of important consideration when constructing the fault tree by any method. Theoretically, the application effect of the fine fault tree model is higher than that of the rough fault tree model, and more applications can be generated. However, the fine model needs to occupy more resources, and the input-output ratio is not necessarily better. Therefore, the granularity of the fault tree needs to be considered in important terms in developing the fault tree model, and the granularity is related to the scale and the efficiency of the fault tree, so that the quality of the whole project is influenced. The determination of the granularity of the fault tree is mainly determined from the following two aspects: firstly the purpose of the application of the fault tree and secondly the availability of the device failure data. The granularity of the fault tree in the invention is combined with the two points to consider the failure state level of the equipment, and not consider the failure and the human factor failure of the passive equipment; wherein the equipment failure state stage comprises: the shunting of meters, control devices and meter manifolds.
In addition, the modeling quality of the fault tree is controlled based on the following six principles in the process of building the fault tree:
1) determining the occurrence condition and the occurrence fault state of the event;
for example: when the power is on (a condition occurs), the motor is not started (a fault state);
for example: when the coil is energized (a condition occurs), the normally closed node of the relay is not open (a fault condition).
2) Judging whether the fault state of the event is caused by equipment fault, if so, classifying the event as the equipment state fault, and if not, classifying the event as the system state fault; if the event is classified as a device status fault, adding an OR gate below the event, and then performing primary failure, secondary failure and demand failure mode analysis; if the event is classified as a system fault, performing direct cause analysis;
3) if the normal functioning of the device causes a fault sequence, assuming that the functioning of the device is normal;
4) before further analysis, all inputs of a logic gate must be defined to completion; the rule means that the fault tree should be developed according to the hierarchy, and the analysis of the hierarchy should be completed before the next level of analysis is performed.
5) The doors can not be directly connected; the direct connection of the gates to the gates indicates that the analysis process is not rigorous, which may not be a problem in fault tree quantification, but the direct connection of the gates to the gates may cause logical confusion in building the fault tree or indicate that the developer has not fully understood the system being analyzed.
6) The "direct cause" principle, or the principle known as "small-scale thinking": no jumps in the analysis step can occur during the analysis and a step-by-step analysis is required up to the underlying event.
And S6, performing simulation analysis on the established fault tree.
Preferably, the step S6 further includes: the real-time state data of the equipment is obtained through the PIAF, the name of the event and the associated fault model are modified through the development of the interface program according to the real-time state data of the equipment, and the simulation calculation is carried out again according to the modified model, so that the complexity of the fault tree model can be greatly reduced, and the workload is reduced by more than 50%.
Based on the same invention concept, the invention also discloses a system for establishing the analysis model of the trip and stack jump equipment, which comprises the following steps:
the device comprises a preparation unit, a fault analysis unit and a fault analysis unit, wherein the preparation unit is used for determining fault models of all equipment and event lists related to the fault models;
the top event determining unit is used for defining an unexpected top event and describing the occurrence condition and the fault state of the top event;
the system boundary determining unit is used for determining the analysis boundary of the system in a unit system mode;
the fault tree building unit is used for performing the following modular processing on the loop according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event is located: converting the equipment with the parallel structure into a module structure; connecting an OR gate under the top event, wherein the event of each device on the series loop is used as the input of the OR gate; determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement, and analyzing the corresponding intermediate event of each module structure according to the processing mode of the top event until the column is written to the basic event level, and finally building a fault tree;
and the fault tree simulation unit is used for carrying out simulation analysis on the established fault tree. Preferably, the fault tree simulation unit is further configured to obtain real-time state data of the device through the PIAF, modify the fault model associated with the event according to the real-time state data of the device, and perform simulation calculation again according to the modified model.
Wherein the determining an analysis boundary of the system in a manner of a unit system comprises: the analytical boundaries of the system need to comply with the principle of "influencing only the operation of the system".
The granularity of the fault tree considers the equipment failure state level, and does not consider the failure and the human factor failure of the passive equipment; wherein the equipment failure state stage comprises: the shunting of meters, control devices and meter manifolds.
The event codes are coded in a mode of combining power station equipment function position codes with failure modes, and the event description is described in a mode of combining equipment function positions, equipment names, operating conditions and event codes; in addition, the fault state of the top event is defined as that a certain unit cannot be kept in the power mode for operation.
In summary, the implementation of the method and the system for establishing the analysis model of the trip and pile skip equipment has the following beneficial effects: the invention can realize the establishment of a double failure fault tree model of the trip and pile skip equipment, and in the modeling process, the following modular processing is carried out on the loop, so that the structure becomes simple and clear, and the possibility of missing events is greatly reduced; the analysis boundary of the system is effectively determined by the unit system mode, and the defect that repeated fault tree modeling is caused, so that the quality and the overall control of the project are adversely affected is avoided; furthermore, the real-time state of the equipment is introduced into the fault tree model, the actual running state of the power station is reflected through the fault tree model, the real-time risk of the power station can be accurately reflected, the risk that the equipment quits running can be evaluated, and the equipment maintenance plan and the isolation operation are further optimized.
While the present invention has been described with reference to the embodiments shown in the drawings, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments, which are illustrative and not restrictive, and it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.
Claims (10)
1. A method for establishing an analysis model of a trip and pile skip device is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s0, determining fault models of all equipment and event lists related to the fault models;
s1, defining an unexpected top event, describing the occurrence condition and the fault state of the top event;
s2, determining the analysis boundary of the system by adopting a unit system mode;
s3, according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event is located, performing the following modular processing on the loop: converting the equipment with the parallel structure into a module structure;
s4, connecting an OR gate under the top event, wherein the event of each device on the series loop is used as the input of the OR gate;
s5, determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement until the column is written to the basic event level, and finally building a fault tree;
and S6, performing simulation analysis on the established fault tree.
2. The trip and skip pile device analysis model building method according to claim 1, wherein said step S6 further comprises: and acquiring real-time state data of the equipment through PI AF, modifying the fault model associated with the event according to the real-time state data of the equipment, and carrying out simulation calculation again according to the modified model.
3. The method for establishing an analysis model of a trip and skip pile device according to claim 1, wherein in step S5, for each module structure, the corresponding intermediate event is analyzed according to the processing mode of the top event until the column is written to the basic event level.
4. The trip-machine and trip-pile equipment analysis model building method according to claim 1, characterized in that the granularity of the fault tree takes into account equipment failure state level and does not take into account failure and human factor failure of passive equipment; wherein the equipment failure state stage comprises: the shunting of meters, control devices and meter manifolds.
5. The trip and skip pile device analysis model building method according to claim 1, wherein said determining the analysis boundary of the system in a unit system manner in step S2 comprises: the analytical boundaries of the system need to comply with the principle of "influencing only the operation of the system".
6. The trip and pile skip equipment analysis model building method according to claim 1, wherein the event codes are coded in a mode of combining power station equipment function position codes with failure modes, and the event description is described in a mode of combining equipment function positions, equipment names, operation conditions and event codes; the fault state of the top event is defined as that a certain unit can not keep operating in a power mode.
7. The trip and skip pile equipment analysis model building method according to claim 1, wherein the modeling quality of the fault tree is controlled based on the following six principles in the process of building the fault tree:
determining the occurrence condition and the occurrence fault state of an event;
judging whether the fault state of the event is caused by equipment fault, if so, classifying the event as the equipment state fault, and if not, classifying the event as the system state fault; if the event is classified as a device status fault, adding an OR gate below the event, and then performing primary failure, secondary failure and demand failure mode analysis; if the event is classified as a system fault, performing direct cause analysis;
if the normal functioning of a device causes a fault sequence, it is assumed that the functioning of this device is normal;
before further analysis, all inputs of a logic gate must be defined to completion;
the doors cannot be directly connected;
no jumps in the analysis step can occur during the analysis and a step-by-step analysis is required up to the underlying event.
8. A system for establishing an analysis model of a trip and pile-jump device is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the device comprises a preparation unit, a fault analysis unit and a fault analysis unit, wherein the preparation unit is used for determining fault models of all equipment and event lists related to the fault models;
the top event determining unit is used for defining an unexpected top event and describing the occurrence condition and the fault state of the top event;
the system boundary determining unit is used for determining the analysis boundary of the system in a unit system mode;
the fault tree building unit is used for performing the following modular processing on the loop according to the process flow diagram of the system where the top event is located: converting the equipment with the parallel structure into a module structure; connecting an OR gate under the top event, wherein the event of each device on the series loop is used as the input of the OR gate; determining the analysis depth of each module structure according to the granularity requirement until the column is written to the basic event level, and finally building a fault tree;
and the fault tree simulation unit is used for carrying out simulation analysis on the established fault tree.
9. The system for establishing a trip and pile skip equipment analysis model according to claim 8, wherein the fault tree simulation unit is further configured to obtain real-time status data of the equipment through the PIAF, modify the fault model associated with the event according to the real-time status data of the equipment, and perform simulation calculation again according to the modified model.
10. The trip and skip pile equipment analysis model building system of claim 8,
analyzing the corresponding intermediate event of each module structure according to the processing mode of the top event until the column is written to the basic event level;
the granularity of the fault tree considers the failure state level of the equipment and does not consider the failure and the human factor failure of the passive equipment; wherein the equipment failure state stage comprises: shunting of the instrument, the control equipment and the instrument branch pipe;
the determining the analysis boundary of the system by adopting the unit system mode comprises the following steps: the analysis boundary of the system is required to accord with the principle of 'only influencing the operation of the system';
the event codes are coded in a mode of combining power station equipment function position codes with failure modes, and the event description is described in a mode of combining equipment function positions, equipment names, operating conditions and event codes; the fault state of the top event is defined as that a certain unit can not keep operating in a power mode.
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| KR101271156B1 (en) * | 2011-03-16 | 2013-06-04 | 한국수력원자력 주식회사 | PSA Model Modification Script of nuclear power plant and PSA Model Mapping Algorithm using thereof |
| CN103955616A (en) * | 2014-05-04 | 2014-07-30 | 兰州交通大学 | Method for estimating reliability of ATP (Automatic Train Protection) system of CTCS-3 (Chinese Train Control System of Level 3) based on dynamic fault tree |
| CN104063586B (en) * | 2014-06-11 | 2017-03-01 | 西北工业大学 | Bayesian network failure prediction method based on polymorphic fault tree |
| CN104898636A (en) * | 2015-03-15 | 2015-09-09 | 国家电网公司 | Safety and stability control device reliability analysis method in consideration of multistate operation |
| CN104795113B (en) * | 2015-04-08 | 2017-03-01 | 苏州热工研究院有限公司 | A kind of chaser to nuclear power station unit station jumps the method and system that heap carries out risk assessment |
| US20160327607A1 (en) * | 2015-05-06 | 2016-11-10 | Airbus Operations Limited | Methods and systems for transforming fault tree diagrams of engineering systems |
| EP3151122A1 (en) * | 2015-10-02 | 2017-04-05 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and apparatus for generating a fault tree |
| CN106168797B (en) * | 2016-05-25 | 2018-08-31 | 哈尔滨工程大学 | A kind of method that modularization obtains the useful item failure probability of nuclear power station fault tree |
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