CN109412744A - A kind of comprehensive interference system of unmanned plane - Google Patents
A kind of comprehensive interference system of unmanned plane Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/84—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing electromagnetic interference in petrol station, hospital, plane or cinema
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of comprehensive interference systems of unmanned plane, are related to wireless navigation field of communication technology.Including Anneta module, navigation satellite curve generation module, 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power throttle signal generation module；Firstly, carrying out navigation Deceiving interference to the unmanned plane that will be invaded in this shield by navigation satellite curve generation module, cooperation omnidirectional interference Anneta module is used.It is interfered secondly, passing wireless signal to no-manned machine distant control and figure by 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power throttle signal generation module using digital power compacting, cooperation omnidirectional interference Anneta module uses.Comprehensive, real-time, unattended interference function is completed, it is the same which is similar to shield, in 360 ° of target installation point horizontal direction, horizontal force distance radius 1:10 and 30 ° of vertical direction pitching, the disposition system of perpendicular acting distance 1:5.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of wireless navigation communication, in particular to an all-directional interference system of an unmanned aerial vehicle.
Background
Unmanned aerial vehicles are rapidly developed as consumer goods in both appearance and performance, and are more and more pursued by model aircraft enthusiasts in recent years, however, accidents caused by unmanned aerial vehicles are frequently reported, and further foreign relevant reports are about the emergence of news of terrorists who use unmanned aerial vehicles to carry bombs to attack government offices and relevant military requirements. In the face of the unmanned aerial vehicle event of 'wresting', the wild development can be effectively inhibited only by reasonably taking counter measures and perfecting related laws and regulations.
At present, unmanned aerial vehicle interference equipment mainly comprises with power suppression cooperation directional antenna, and most equipment need discover earlier that unmanned aerial vehicle is close to the back, uses interference equipment to drive away or catch again, and efficiency is extremely low, and when attacking in the face of extensive unmanned aerial vehicle bee colony group, just seem can't be for.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an all-directional interference system of an unmanned aerial vehicle, so that the problems in the prior art are solved.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
an all-directional interference system of an unmanned aerial vehicle comprises an antenna module, a navigation satellite deception signal generation module and a 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module;
the navigation satellite signal deception signal generation module generates a navigation satellite deception signal by adopting a satellite signal simulator;
the 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module is used for generating 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signals;
the antenna module adopts an antenna array form and is sequentially divided into four layers from top to bottom, wherein the first layer is a satellite signal directional receiving antenna and is used for ephemeris update of the satellite signal simulator; the second layer is a navigation satellite deception signal omnidirectional transmitting antenna used for transmitting the navigation satellite deception signal; the third layer is a 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna, 6 same directional antennas are symmetrically distributed along the circumference, and each antenna mounting surface inclines by 12.5 degrees to form an omnidirectional antenna array for transmitting a 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal; the fourth layer is a 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna, 6 same directional antennas are symmetrically distributed along the circumference, and each antenna mounting surface inclines by 12.5 degrees to form an omnidirectional antenna array for transmitting 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signals.
Preferably, the navigation satellite spoofing signal is generated as follows:
a1, the satellite signal simulator determines the position of the receiver and the receiving time of the navigation satellite deception signal by the receiver;
a2, calculating the transmitting satellite of the deception signal of the navigation satellite according to the ephemeris data;
a3, calculating the accurate position according to the ephemeris data of the transmitting satellite, further calculating the distance between each transmitting satellite and the receiver, and obtaining the propagation delay of the deception signal of the navigation satellite to the receiver;
a4, subtracting propagation delay from the receiving time of the deception signal of the navigation satellite to obtain the transmitting time of the deception signal of the navigation satellite;
a5, obtaining the initial phase of navigation message, satellite signal carrier and pseudo code at the moment according to the signal transmission moment;
a6, the satellite signal simulator calculates the distance between the transmitting satellite and the receiver once every a period of time, and divides the distance difference obtained twice before and after the distance difference by the time interval to obtain the relative movement speed of the transmitting satellite and the receiver, and further obtain the Doppler frequency shift of the satellite signal carrier and the pseudo code;
a7, generating a deception signal of the navigation satellite according to the star number of the transmitting satellite, the navigation message, the initial phases of the carrier wave and the pseudo code of the satellite signal, and the Doppler frequency shift of the carrier wave and the pseudo code according to the following formula:
wherein,
in the formula,the method comprises the steps of representing a radio frequency signal of a j satellite received by a receiver, wherein t is a signal receiving moment and is represented by GPS system time; a. thej(t) is the amplitude of the jth satellite signal received by the receiver; pseudo-random noise codes and data codes respectively representing signals;the satellite signal time delay caused by the ionized layer has equal influence on the carrier phase and the code phase and opposite signs due to the dispersion effect of the ionized layer;the total time delay of signals caused by other factors except the ionized layer; Δ fj(t) represents a carrier frequency offset due to the doppler effect;representing the carrier phase error;and phij0Respectively representing the phase noise and the clock drift of the satellite-borne atomic clock; n (t) is the thermal noise received by the receiver; rjThe geometric distance from the phase center of the GPS satellite antenna to the GPS receiver antenna; c is the speed of light and c is the speed of light,is the spatial time delay of the signal;is the satellite clock error;errors introduced to the troposphere.
Preferably, the 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power throttle signal is generated according to the following steps:
b1, FPGA generates M sequences: y is x21+x13+x5+x2(ii) a Generating a pseudo-random sequence by the M sequence to be used as data of an output signal;
b2, setting the bandwidth of the signal and the time stepping of the carrier wave in the signal by an ARM;
b3, passing the generated data through a low-pass filter to obtain a baseband interference signal with a required bandwidth; b4, selecting a plurality of bits of a shift register in the M sequence to multiply with the modulation carrier frequency step by step to obtain a hopping carrier frequency;
and B5, multiplying the baseband interference signal after the low-pass filtering by the hopping carrier frequency for modulation to obtain a broadband interference signal.
Preferably, after the 2.4G or 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal is generated, the signal is output in a broadband mode, and enters two parallel power amplifiers after passing through a diplexer, and the signal output from each power amplifier is transmitted to three different directional antennas after passing through a radio frequency one-to-three diplexer.
Preferably, the navigation satellite deception signal omnidirectional transmitting antenna adopts a common omnidirectional microstrip antenna, and the working frequency band of the antenna is GPS L1/BD 2B 1/GLONASS L1 frequency points; the antenna gain is more than or equal to-4.7 dbi (the pitch angle is less than or equal to 30 degrees), and the standing-wave ratio of the antenna is less than or equal to 2.0; the output impedance is 50 Ω.
Preferably, the working frequency band of the 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna is 2400MHz-2500MHz, the antenna gain is greater than or equal to 9.8dbi (the pitch angle is 0 °), the standing-wave ratio of the antenna is less than or equal to 2.0, and the output impedance is 50 Ω.
Preferably, the working frequency band of the 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna is a 5725MHz-5800MHz frequency point, the antenna gain is greater than or equal to 10.5dbi (the pitch angle is 0 °), the antenna standing-wave ratio is less than or equal to 2.0, and the output impedance is 50 Ω.
Preferably, the antenna module is in a shape of a protective cover and comprises a main body and an upright post, the upright post is located in an inner cavity of the main body, 6 directional antennas of the 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna are uniformly distributed on six faces of the outer wall of the main body, 6 directional antennas of the 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna are uniformly distributed on six faces of the outer wall of the main body, the navigation satellite deception signal omnidirectional transmitting antenna is located on the upper portion of the upright post, and the satellite signal directional receiving antenna is located at the top of the upright post.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the invention provides an all-directional interference system of an unmanned aerial vehicle, which comprises an antenna module, a navigation satellite deception signal generation module, and a 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module; firstly, the unmanned aerial vehicle about to invade into the protective cover is subjected to navigation deception jamming through a navigation satellite deception signal generation module, and the unmanned aerial vehicle is matched with an omnidirectional jamming antenna module for use. Secondly, the signal generation module is suppressed through 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power to the unmanned aerial vehicle remote control and the figure transmission wireless signal and digital power is adopted to suppress interference, and the signal generation module is matched with the omnidirectional interference antenna module for use. The system is similar to a protective cover, and can be widely applied to the ground protection and related fields thereof, including government institutions, military plugs, and related areas which are sensitive and easily invaded by slow and small micro unmanned aerial vehicles and similar to oil refineries, gas stations and the like.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of baseband interference signal generation;
fig. 2 is an M-sequence spectrum diagram;
FIG. 3 is a graph of the spectrum of M-sequence data passed through a low pass filter;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a 2.4G frequency band interference signal hardware design;
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a hardware design of a 5.8G frequency band interference signal;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of an interference signal output to an antenna face;
fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of the internal structure of the antenna module;
FIG. 8 is a first view of an antenna module shown in an embodiment;
fig. 9 is a second embodiment of the antenna module.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the detailed description and specific examples, while indicating the invention, are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
The embodiment of the invention provides an all-directional interference system of an unmanned aerial vehicle, which comprises an antenna module, a navigation satellite deception signal generation module and a 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module;
the navigation satellite signal deception signal generation module generates a navigation satellite deception signal by adopting a satellite signal simulator;
the 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module is used for generating 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signals;
the antenna module adopts an antenna array form and is sequentially divided into four layers from top to bottom, wherein the first layer is a satellite signal directional receiving antenna and is used for ephemeris update of the satellite signal simulator; the second layer is a navigation satellite deception signal omnidirectional transmitting antenna used for transmitting the navigation satellite deception signal; the third layer is a 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna, 6 same directional antennas are symmetrically distributed along the circumference, and each antenna mounting surface inclines by 12.5 degrees to form an omnidirectional antenna array for transmitting a 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal; the fourth layer is a 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna, 6 same directional antennas are symmetrically distributed along the circumference, and each antenna mounting surface inclines by 12.5 degrees to form an omnidirectional antenna array for transmitting 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signals.
In the use process, the navigation satellite deception signal generation module block generates a navigation satellite deception signal by adopting a satellite signal simulator, carries out navigation deception jamming on the unmanned aerial vehicle about to invade into the protective cover, and is matched with the omnidirectional jamming antenna module for use.
In addition, the 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module generates 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signals, digital power suppression interference is adopted for unmanned aerial vehicle remote control and image transmission wireless signals, and the interference suppression signals are matched with the omnidirectional interference antenna module for use.
By the two measures, the interference function of omnibearing, real-time and unattended operation can be completed.
Wherein the navigation satellite spoofing signal is generated according to the following steps:
a1, the satellite signal simulator determines the position of the receiver and the receiving time of the navigation satellite deception signal by the receiver;
a2, calculating the transmitting satellite of the deception signal of the navigation satellite according to the ephemeris data;
a3, calculating the accurate position according to the ephemeris data of the transmitting satellite, further calculating the distance between each transmitting satellite and the receiver, and obtaining the propagation delay of the deception signal of the navigation satellite to the receiver;
a4, subtracting propagation delay from the receiving time of the deception signal of the navigation satellite to obtain the transmitting time of the deception signal of the navigation satellite;
a5, obtaining the initial phase of navigation message, satellite signal carrier and pseudo code at the moment according to the signal transmission moment;
a6, the satellite signal simulator calculates the distance between the transmitting satellite and the receiver once every a period of time, and divides the distance difference obtained twice before and after the distance difference by the time interval to obtain the relative movement speed of the transmitting satellite and the receiver, and further obtain the Doppler frequency shift of the satellite signal carrier and the pseudo code;
a7, generating a deception signal of the navigation satellite according to the star number of the transmitting satellite, the navigation message, the initial phases of the carrier wave and the pseudo code of the satellite signal, and the Doppler frequency shift of the carrier wave and the pseudo code according to the following formula:
wherein,
in the formula,the method comprises the steps of representing a radio frequency signal of a j satellite received by a receiver, wherein t is a signal receiving moment and is represented by GPS system time; a. thej(t) is the amplitude of the jth satellite signal received by the receiver; pseudo-random noise codes and data codes respectively representing signals;the satellite signal time delay caused by the ionized layer has equal influence on the carrier phase and the code phase and opposite signs due to the dispersion effect of the ionized layer;the total time delay of signals caused by other factors except the ionized layer; Δ fj(t) represents a carrier frequency offset due to the doppler effect;representing the carrier phase error;and phij0Respectively representing the phase noise and the clock drift of the satellite-borne atomic clock; n (t) is the thermal noise received by the receiver; rjThe geometric distance from the phase center of the GPS satellite antenna to the GPS receiver antenna; c is the speed of light and c is the speed of light,is the spatial time delay of the signal;is the satellite clock error;errors introduced to the troposphere.
In particular, the generation of navigation spoofing signals is briefly described in terms of the generation of GPS-L1 satellite signals.
Let the jth GPS satellite be at tiThe signals transmitted at time (GPS system time) are:
in the formula, AjRepresenting the amplitude of the transmitted signal; cj(ti) A C/a code representing a pseudo random noise code transmitted by a satellite; dj(ti) A navigation message, i.e., a data code, representing a modulation on a signal;for spreading codes, fL1Representing the L1 carrier frequency (1575.42 MHz);indicating the initial phase of the L1 carrier signal.
The jth satellite transmission signal propagates through the space and finally reaches the GPS receiving antenna. The signal has a spatial propagation delay and the signal is changed. These variations mainly include: satellite clock error, delay (ionospheric delay and tropospheric delay) caused by signals passing through the atmosphere, frequency offset caused by Doppler effect, influence caused by relativistic effect and earth rotation, thermal noise and other errors, and in addition, a receiver antenna can be subjected to multipath interference and electromagnetic interference of different degrees when receiving signals. The signal may be expressed as:
wherein,
in the formula,the method comprises the steps of representing a radio frequency signal of a j satellite received by a receiver, wherein t is a signal receiving moment and is represented by GPS system time; a. thej(t) is the amplitude of the jth satellite signal received by the receiver; pseudo-random noise codes and data codes respectively representing signals;the satellite signal time delay caused by the ionized layer has equal influence on the carrier phase and the code phase and opposite signs due to the dispersion effect of the ionized layer;the total time delay of signals caused by other factors except the ionized layer; Δ fj(t) represents a carrier frequency offset due to the doppler effect;representing the carrier phase error;andrepresenting phase noise and clock drift of the satellite-borne atomic clock; n (t) is the thermal noise received by the receiver. RjThe geometric distance from the phase center of the GPS satellite antenna to the GPS receiver antenna; c is the speed of light and c is the speed of light,i.e. the spatial delay of the signal;is the satellite clock error;errors introduced to the troposphere.
In a satellite signal simulator, the parallel generation of signals is based on a clock sourceAndare completely consistent. The doppler shift can be expressed as:
whereinIs the relative velocity vector of the receiver and the user,a unit vector representing a line in which the receiver points to the satellite, soThe relative velocity magnitude of the satellite receiver user in the radial direction is obtained.
The simulator first generates an intermediate frequency signal and then obtains a radio frequency signal by up-conversion, which is the reverse of the signal processing of the receiver. The intermediate frequency signal generated by the simulator is composed of I, Q two paths, and the signal expression is as follows:
in the formulaωLOIs the local oscillator frequency of the up-conversion circuit,represents the intermediate frequency I-path signal;represents the intermediate frequency I-path signal; a. thejRepresenting the amplitude of the transmitted signal;a C/a code representing a pseudo random noise code transmitted by a satellite;a navigation message, i.e., a data code, representing a modulation on a signal; cos (omega)IFt) is a spreading code; sin (omega)IFt) is a spreading code.
The up-conversion circuit adopts a quadrature up-conversion mode, and two paths of signals of intermediate frequency I, Q are multiplied by orthogonal carrier waves respectively and then subtracted to obtain radio-frequency signals.
Assuming that the signal simulator generates N GPS satellite signals simultaneously, there are
The satellite signal simulator simulates the satellite signal arriving at the antenna terminal of the receiver, so the satellite simulation signal is generated according to the time of arrival at the antenna terminal of the receiver. Determining the time of reception and the position of the receiver makes it possible to deduce from the ephemeris data of the satellites which signals of the satellites can be received by the receiver, the simulator only generating the signals of these satellites. And then, calculating the accurate position of the visible star according to the ephemeris data, further calculating the distance between each visible star and the receiver, and obtaining the propagation delay of the satellite signal to the receiver. The signal receiving time minus the propagation delay is the signal transmitting time. It is clear that the signal propagation delays of different satellites are different, so that the signals of the satellites arriving at the receiver at the same time must be transmitted at different times. And according to the signal transmission time, the text content of the time, and the initial phases of the satellite signal carrier and the pseudo code can be obtained. The simulator calculates the distance between the satellite and the receiver once every a period of time (20ms), and the relative movement speed between the satellite and the receiver is obtained by dividing the distance difference obtained twice before and after by the time interval, so as to obtain the Doppler frequency shift of the satellite signal. With the star sign of the visible satellite, the navigation message, the initial phases of the carrier wave and the pseudo code, and the Doppler frequency shift of the carrier wave and the pseudo code, the satellite signal to be simulated can be generated according to the formula (2).
As shown in fig. 1 to 5, the 2.4G and 5.8G band digital power throttle signals are generated according to the following steps:
b1, FPGA generates M sequences: y is x21+x13+x5+x2(ii) a Generating a pseudo-random sequence by the M sequence to be used as data of an output signal;
b2, setting the bandwidth of the signal and the time stepping of the carrier wave in the signal by an ARM;
b3, passing the generated data through a low-pass filter to obtain a baseband interference signal with a required bandwidth;
b4, selecting a plurality of bits of a shift register in the M sequence to multiply with the modulation carrier frequency step by step to obtain a hopping carrier frequency;
and B5, multiplying the baseband interference signal after the low-pass filtering by the hopping carrier frequency for modulation to obtain a broadband interference signal.
As shown in fig. 6, after the 2.4G or 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal is generated, the signal is output in a broadband manner, and after passing through a diplexer, the signal enters two parallel power amplifiers, and after passing through a radio frequency one-to-three diplexer, the signal output from each power amplifier is transmitted to three different directional antennas.
The navigation satellite deception signal omnidirectional transmitting antenna adopts a common omnidirectional microstrip antenna, and the working frequency band of the antenna is GPSL1/BD 2B 1/GLONASS L1 frequency points; the antenna gain is more than or equal to-4.7 dbi (the pitch angle is less than or equal to 30 degrees), and the standing-wave ratio of the antenna is less than or equal to 2.0; the output impedance is 50 Ω.
The antenna test results are shown in the following table:
| frequency (MHz) | Efficiency (%) | Gain (dBi) |
| 1560 | 69.8711 | 4.79212 |
| 1564 | 72.0226 | 4.80492 |
| 1568 | 76.0084 | 5.35076 |
| 1572 | 79.6673 | 5.49657 |
| 1576 | 84.137 | 5.7443 |
| 1580 | 86.5137 | 5.58233 |
| 1584 | 88.5913 | 5.59423 |
| 1588 | 92.4459 | 561984 |
| 1592 | 94.477 | 5.30713 |
| 1596 | 97.4624 | 5.7078 |
| 1600 | 95.007 | 5.64358 |
| 1604 | 95.1785 | 6.00554 |
| 1608 | 93.9942 | 5.82187 |
| 1612 | 94.2201 | 5.83832 |
The working frequency band of the 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna is 2400MHz-2500MHz frequency point, the antenna gain is more than or equal to 9.8dbi (the pitch angle is 0 degree), the antenna standing wave ratio is less than or equal to 2.0, and the output impedance is 50 omega.
Through standard microwave darkroom test, 6 interference antenna surfaces in 2.4G frequency band completely meet the design requirements, and taking one surface as an example, the test results are shown in the following table:
according to the communication principle, the formula of the loss of the electromagnetic wave in the free space is as follows:
los(dB)＝32.45+20LgF(MHz)+20LgD(km)
in the formula
D is the acting distance;
f is the working frequency;
the signal strength P of the interfering signal reaching the interfered device after being emitted by the interference source is:
p＝p1+w+g-los
in the formula
p 1-analog Signal output intensity;
w-power amplifier gain;
g-antenna gain;
when the analog signal output intensity of the circuit board and the power amplifier gain are not changed, the signal intensity of the interference signal reaching the interfered equipment can be improved by increasing the antenna gain, and the interference effect on the interfered equipment is further enhanced.
The working frequency band of the 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna is 5725MHz-5800MHz frequency point, the antenna gain is more than or equal to 10.5dbi (the pitch angle is 0 degree), the antenna standing wave ratio is less than or equal to 2.0, and the output impedance is 50 omega.
Through standard microwave darkroom test, 6 interference antenna surfaces in a 5.8G frequency band completely meet the design requirements, and taking one surface as an example, the test result is as follows:
as shown in fig. 7 to 9, the antenna module is in a shape of a shield, and includes a main body and a column, the column is located in an inner cavity of the main body, 6 directional antennas of the 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna are uniformly distributed on six surfaces of an outer wall of the main body, 6 directional antennas of the 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna are uniformly distributed on six surfaces of an outer wall of the main body, the navigation satellite deception signal omnidirectional transmitting antenna is located on an upper portion of the column, and the satellite signal directional receiving antenna is located on a top portion of the column.
By adopting the technical scheme disclosed by the invention, the following beneficial effects are obtained: the invention provides an all-directional interference system of an unmanned aerial vehicle, which comprises an antenna module, a navigation satellite deception signal generation module, and a 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module; firstly, the unmanned aerial vehicle about to invade into the protective cover is subjected to navigation deception jamming through a navigation satellite deception signal generation module, and the unmanned aerial vehicle is matched with an omnidirectional jamming antenna module for use. Secondly, the signal generation module is suppressed through 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power to the unmanned aerial vehicle remote control and the figure transmission wireless signal and digital power is adopted to suppress interference, and the signal generation module is matched with the omnidirectional interference antenna module for use. The system is similar to a protective cover, and can be widely applied to the ground protection and related fields thereof, including government institutions, military plugs, and related areas which are sensitive and easily invaded by slow and small micro unmanned aerial vehicles and similar to oil refineries, gas stations and the like.
The foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, various modifications and improvements can be made without departing from the principle of the present invention, and such modifications and improvements should also be considered within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. An unmanned aerial vehicle omnibearing jamming system is characterized by comprising an antenna module, a navigation satellite deception signal generation module and a 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module;
the navigation satellite signal deception signal generation module generates a navigation satellite deception signal by adopting a satellite signal simulator;
the 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal generation module is used for generating 2.4G and 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signals;
the antenna module adopts an antenna array form and is sequentially divided into four layers from top to bottom, wherein the first layer is a satellite signal directional receiving antenna and is used for ephemeris update of the satellite signal simulator; the second layer is a navigation satellite deception signal omnidirectional transmitting antenna used for transmitting the navigation satellite deception signal; the third layer is a 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna, 6 same directional antennas are symmetrically distributed along the circumference, and each antenna mounting surface inclines by 12.5 degrees to form an omnidirectional antenna array for transmitting a 5.8G frequency band digital power suppression signal; the fourth layer is a 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signal transmitting antenna, 6 same directional antennas are symmetrically distributed along the circumference, and each antenna mounting surface inclines by 12.5 degrees to form an omnidirectional antenna array for transmitting 2.4G frequency band digital power suppression signals.
2. The unmanned aerial vehicle omni-directional jamming system of claim 1, wherein the navigation satellite spoofing signal is generated by:
a1, the satellite signal simulator determines the position of the receiver and the receiving time of the navigation satellite deception signal by the receiver;
a2, calculating the transmitting satellite of the deception signal of the navigation satellite according to the ephemeris data;
a3, calculating the accurate position according to the ephemeris data of the transmitting satellite, further calculating the distance between each transmitting satellite and the receiver, and obtaining the propagation delay of the deception signal of the navigation satellite to the receiver;
a4, subtracting propagation delay from the receiving time of the deception signal of the navigation satellite to obtain the transmitting time of the deception signal of the navigation satellite;
a5, obtaining the initial phase of navigation message, satellite signal carrier and pseudo code at the moment according to the signal transmission moment;
a6, the satellite signal simulator calculates the distance between the transmitting satellite and the receiver once every a period of time, and divides the distance difference obtained twice before and after the distance difference by the time interval to obtain the relative movement speed of the transmitting satellite and the receiver, and further obtain the Doppler frequency shift of the satellite signal carrier and the pseudo code;
a7, generating a deception signal of the navigation satellite according to the star number of the transmitting satellite, the navigation message, the initial phases of the carrier wave and the pseudo code of the satellite signal, and the Doppler frequency shift of the carrier wave and the pseudo code according to the following formula:
wherein,
in the formula,the method comprises the steps of representing a radio frequency signal of a j satellite received by a receiver, wherein t is a signal receiving moment and is represented by GPS system time; a. thej(t) is the amplitude of the jth satellite signal received by the receiver; pseudo-random noise codes and data codes respectively representing signals;the satellite signal time delay caused by the ionized layer has equal influence on the carrier phase and the code phase and opposite signs due to the dispersion effect of the ionized layer;the total time delay of signals caused by other factors except the ionized layer; Δ fj(t) represents a carrier frequency offset due to the doppler effect;representing the carrier phase error;and phij0Respectively representing the phase noise and the clock drift of the satellite-borne atomic clock; n (t) is the thermal noise received by the receiver; rjThe geometric distance from the phase center of the GPS satellite antenna to the GPS receiver antenna; c is the speed of light and c is the speed of light,is the spatial time delay of the signal;is the satellite clock error;errors introduced to the troposphere.
3. The omni-directional jamming system for unmanned aerial vehicles of claim 1, wherein the 2.4G and 5.8G band digital power throttle signal is generated according to the following steps:
b1, FPGA generates M sequences: y is x21+x13+x5+x2(ii) a Generating a pseudo-random sequence by the M sequence to be used as data of an output signal;
b2, setting the bandwidth of the signal and the time stepping of the carrier wave in the signal by an ARM;
b3, passing the generated data through a low-pass filter to obtain a baseband interference signal with a required bandwidth; b4, selecting a plurality of bits of a shift register in the M sequence to multiply with the modulation carrier frequency step by step to obtain a hopping carrier frequency;
and B5, multiplying the baseband interference signal after the low-pass filtering by the hopping carrier frequency for modulation to obtain a broadband interference signal.
4. An omnidirectional interference system for unmanned aerial vehicles as defined in claim 3, wherein after said 2.4G or 5.8G frequency band digital power suppressing signal is generated, it is outputted in a form of wideband, and after passing through a common divider, it enters two parallel power amplifiers, and after passing through a radio frequency one-to-three common divider, the signal outputted from each power amplifier is transmitted to three different directional antennas.
5. The omni-directional jamming system for unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 1, wherein the omni-directional transmitting antenna for the navigational satellite deception signal employs a common omni-directional microstrip antenna, and its operating frequency band is GPS L1/BD 2B 1/GLONASS L1 frequency points; the antenna gain is more than or equal to-4.7 dbi (the pitch angle is less than or equal to 30 degrees), and the standing-wave ratio of the antenna is less than or equal to 2.0; the output impedance is 50 Ω.
6. The omni-directional interference system for unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 1, wherein the operating frequency band of the 2.4G frequency band digital power suppressing signal transmitting antenna is 2400MHz to 2500MHz, the antenna gain is greater than or equal to 9.8dbi (the pitch angle is 0 °), the standing-wave ratio of the antenna is less than or equal to 2.0, and the output impedance is 50 Ω.
7. The omni-directional interference system for unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 1, wherein the operating frequency band of the 5.8G frequency band digital power suppressing signal transmitting antenna is 5725MHz-5800MHz frequency point, the antenna gain is greater than or equal to 10.5dbi (pitch angle is 0 °), the standing-wave ratio of the antenna is less than or equal to 2.0, and the output impedance is 50 Ω.
8. The omni-directional jamming system for unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 1, wherein the antenna module is in the shape of a protective cover, and comprises a main body and a column, the column is located in an inner cavity of the main body, the 6 directional antennas of the 5.8G frequency band digital power suppressing signal transmitting antenna are uniformly distributed on six faces of the outer wall of the main body, the 6 directional antennas of the 2.4G frequency band digital power suppressing signal transmitting antenna are uniformly distributed on six faces of the outer wall of the main body, the navigation satellite deception signal omni-directional transmitting antenna is located on the upper portion of the column, and the satellite signal directional receiving antenna is located on the top of the column.
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