CN109379341A - A kind of Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection method of Behavior-based control analysis - Google Patents

A kind of Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection method of Behavior-based control analysis Download PDF

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Publication number
CN109379341A
CN109379341A CN201811117592.XA CN201811117592A CN109379341A CN 109379341 A CN109379341 A CN 109379341A CN 201811117592 A CN201811117592 A CN 201811117592A CN 109379341 A CN109379341 A CN 109379341A
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flow
session
trojan
model
network
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CN109379341B (en
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朱宏宇
田建伟
田峥
乔宏
黎曦
刘洁
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Hunan Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Hunan Electric Power Co Ltd
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Hunan Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Hunan Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/145Countermeasures against malicious traffic the attack involving the propagation of malware through the network, e.g. viruses, trojans or worms

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Virology (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection methods of Behavior-based control analysis, after carrying out TCP session recombination, session characteristics extraction and session tokens to training sample first, it will words feature and session tokens input random forest detection model.By comparing the index performance of different parameters drag, model is adjusted, and finally determine the trojan horse detection model after optimization.Then TCP session recombination is carried out for the real-time original data on flows acquired on probe and session characteristics extracts, it will in the trojan horse detection model after words feature input first stage optimization, model is classified as wooden horse flow or regular traffic flow.The technical effects of the invention are that, the traffic characteristic caused by the wooden horse own characteristic, directly flow file is detected by model, therefore the present invention does not depend on existing Trojan characteristics library, also it is able to detect unknown novel remote control Trojan, additionally it is possible to detect the wooden horse that communication flows is encrypted.

Description

A kind of Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection method of Behavior-based control analysis
Technical field
The present invention relates to network safety filed, in particular to a kind of Recall remote control Trojan network flow of Behavior-based control analysis Quantity measuring method.
Background technique
Since hacker can steal enterprise's sensitive data, monitoring key user's behavior by remotely controlling wooden horse and execute malice Operation, remote control Trojan have become one of the important information security threat that enterprise faces.Remote control Trojan program is by independent two parts Composition --- control terminal and controlled terminal, this two parts carry out data interaction by internet.Controlled terminal program passes through fishing The modes secret such as mail or USB flash disk ferry-boat is mounted on infected computer, and remotely receives the order of hacker.Control terminal program It is grasped by hacker, and sends and order to infected computer.Remote control Trojan can be divided into two classes according to the direction that wooden horse connects: Forward direction remote control Trojan and rebound remote control Trojan.In the connection of forward direction remote control Trojan, controlled terminal opens service interface, control terminal master Dynamic connection controlled terminal, but in rebound remote control Trojan is that controlled terminal actively connects port in control terminal.
Forward direction remote control Trojan can pass through the ports filter strategy combination enterprise open end spoken parts in an opera in firewall or interchanger The mode of list is taken precautions against, but this security strategy is invalid to rebound remote control Trojan, because only cannot be distinguished from port anti- Play the network flow of wooden horse and regular traffic.Carrying out remote control Trojan detection using depth data packet inspection technical is a kind of master in the industry Flow Technique direction, main thought are to load network flow packet to be compared with Trojan characteristics library, but the method can not be to encryption Data packet is detected, and computation complexity is high, it is difficult to accomplish the real-time trojan horse detection of enterprise-level.Another trojan horse detection skill Art is Intrusion Detection based on host behavioral value, but it needs the installation detection program on every host, it is more difficult to be promoted.In addition, part is high Grade wooden horse can perceive safety detection program, and hide wooden horse process and escaped detection.
From the angle of user's behaviors analysis, rebound there will necessarily be between remote control type wooden horse and regular traffic behavior difference it Place, but at present there has been no open source literature propose a kind of method can intellectual analysis network behavior, efficiently and accurately detect to rebound The network flow of remote control Trojan.
Summary of the invention
The invention proposes the rebound remote control Trojan network flow detection methods of Behavior-based control analysis.This method extract real-time Behavioural characteristic in network flow, and using the method for machine learning training trojan horse detection model, to realize to the remote control of rebound The accurate detection of wooden horse.
The technical scheme is that
A kind of Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection method of Behavior-based control analysis, comprising the following steps:
Step 1, training trojan horse detection model: acquisition wooden horse flow file and normal network traffic flow file both Different types of flow file;Then the complete network flow of each TCP session is extracted from flow file;Again from TCP session In flow extract include upload and download the ratio between flow packet payload length, flag bit PSH Flag value equal to 1 flow packet ratio, The session behavioural characteristic of the data packet number in conversation initial stage and heartbeat behavior mark;Finally by session behavioural characteristic and flow File type is input in the trojan horse detection model based on random forests algorithm and is trained, and adjusts in model in the training process The quantity of decision tree, until obtaining identification wooden horse flow file and normal network traffic flow file trojan horse detection the most accurate Model.This completes the training for model, can be by the model come automatic identification wooden horse flow and proper network industry Business flow.
Step 2, the trojan horse detection model according to obtained in step 1 are detected: monitoring real-time network flow first, so The complete network flow of each TCP session is extracted from flow afterwards, then extracts session behavioural characteristic from TCP session traffic, most The session behavioural characteristic extracted is input in trojan horse detection model afterwards, each TCP session classification is by model according to input Wooden horse flow or normal network traffic flow.
The method in the step one, extracts the complete network flow packet of each TCP session from flow file Include following steps:
Flow file is reorganized as unit of TCP session, is judged based on the Flag value in flow packet includes SYN Session start judges conversation end comprising RST or FIN, and filters out from all TCP sessions from internal network to extranets The session that network is initiated abandons the TCP session being connected into from external network.
The method in the step one, extracts session behavioural characteristic, is by extraction source IP, source port, purpose This 7 essential attributes of IP, destination port, timestamp, FLAG value, net load byte number simultaneously obtain after being handled.
The method in the step one, in session behavioural characteristic, uploads and downloads the ratio between flow packet payload length Refer to the ratio between the upload total amount of byte and downloading total amount of byte of a TCP session;Flag bit PSH Flag value is equal to 1 flow Packet ratio refers to that the flow packet that the value of flag bit PSH Flag is 1 accounts for the ratio of flow packet in entire session;The conversation initial stage Data packet number refer to the quantity of data packet in the preset time since TCP session establishment;Heartbeat behavior mark refers to meeting It whether there is the mark of heartbeat behavior in words.
The method, in the step one, the step of training trojan horse detection model, includes:
Using the method for 10 folding cross validations, training sample is divided into training set and verifying collects, is carried out on training set Algorithm training, is classified, and calculate accuracy and AUC index with the sample that the algorithm after training concentrates verifying, wherein just True rate refers to the ratio for being classified correct sample number and total sample number, and AUC index refers to for describing classifier in true positives Area between rate and false positive rate under the ROC curve of relationship;After obtaining accuracy and AUC index, adjustment random forest is calculated The number of decision tree in method, and take the optimal decision tree number of integrated value of two indexs of accuracy and AUC index as wood The decision tree number of horse detection model.
The technical effects of the invention are that the traffic characteristic caused by the wooden horse own characteristic, direct by model Flow file is detected, therefore the present invention does not depend on existing Trojan characteristics library, is able to detect unknown novel remote control wood yet Horse, additionally it is possible to detect the wooden horse that communication flows is encrypted.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 be the present invention implement Behavior-based control analysis Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection method frame show It is intended to;
Fig. 2 is flow data collector probe structure figure in Fig. 1;
Fig. 3 is network behavior daily record data cell format.
Specific embodiment
The present embodiment includes the following two stage:
First stage model training stage
The first step collects training sample.370 true Recall remote control Trojan flow texts are had collected from open website Part, wherein about 30% is encrypted flow.2190 normal network traffic flow files are had collected from enterprise switch, just Normal service traffics include the flow of the instant messagings such as Email, QQ, browsing webpage, P2P and other cloud services.By all collections The network flow arrived is labeled as malice wooden horse flow or normal network traffic flow.
Second step extracts the complete network flow of each TCP session from network flow.The flow file that the first step is collected In data packet be sort by arrival time, in local area network all flows set, it is necessary first to by flow with network session For unit reorganization.One TCP session, which refers to, to be located at one between a pair of of source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port Secondary complete TCP session.Under the premise of the given port IP, a TCP session start in TCP three-way handshake, end at TCP tetra- times It waves, can judge whether session starts by the way that whether the Flag value in flow packet includes SYN, whether include RST or FIN To judge whether session terminates.In addition, due to being concerned with Recall wooden horse, so need to also be filtered out from all TCP sessions The session initiated from internal network external network, abandons the TCP session being connected into from external network.
Third step extracts session behavioural characteristic from TCP session traffic.It is mentioned from each flow packet of composition TCP session Take this 7 essential attributes of source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, timestamp, FLAG value, net load byte number, then from one Statistics obtains following 4 behavioural characteristics in the above-mentioned attribute of a session:
1, it uploads and downloads the ratio between flow packet payload length: uploading flow and refer to from the transmission of internal network external network Flow, downloading flow then refer to flow from outside to inside.This feature refers to the upload total amount of byte and downloading of a TCP session The ratio between total amount of byte.
2, the ratio of flow packet of the flag bit PSH Flag value equal to 1: this feature refers to the flag bit PSH in flow packet The flow packet that the value of Flag is 1 accounts for the ratio of flow packet in entire session.
3, the data packet number in conversation initial stage: the conversation initial stage refers to a series of since TCP session establishment Continuous to wrap, adjacent time inter is respectively less than t between these packets, and taking the value of t here is 1 second.This is characterized at the beginning of being located at session The quantity of the packet in stage beginning.
4, heartbeat behavior identify: heartbeat behavior refer to the both ends of TCP connection in the free time for not sending business datum, Send regular length small data packets with confirm other side whether also online mechanism.Here heartbeat behavior is designated as side transmission The data packet that one length is A, another party returns to the data packet that a length is B, and repeat length is the data packet of A and B Transmission behavior 3 times.This is characterized in a Boolean, if this value is very that otherwise this value is there are heartbeat behavior in session It is false.
4th step, wooden horse flow detection model of the training based on random forest.Random forests algorithm is a kind of to be made extensively Machine learning classifiers are suitable for wooden horse flow and identify this two classification problem.Comprehensive following two refers in training process It marks to carry out the adjustment of model key parameter:
1, accuracy: it is classified the ratio of correct sample number and total sample number.
2, AUC: training sample set be it is unbalanced, i.e., the sample number of wooden horse flow be much smaller than normal network traffic sample Number.The algorithm performance on non-equilibrium data collection can not be measured comprehensively according only to accuracy, and AUC this index is able to solve this One problem.It is true positive rate that the abscissa of each point, which is false positive rate, ordinate, in ROC curve, it is to describe classifier true The curve of relationship between positive rate and false positive rate.AUC value is the area under ROC curve.
Training sample is divided into training set and verifying collects, instructed by the method that 10 folding cross validations are used in model training Practice and carry out algorithm training on collection, is classified with the sample that the algorithm after training concentrates verifying, and calculate accuracy and AUC refers to Mark.The number of decision tree in random forests algorithm is manually adjusted, and optimal decision tree number is selected according to algorithm index.By Model training, the present embodiment set 10 for decision tree number, and the accuracy of random forests algorithm is 95.7% at this time, AUC value It is 97.9%.
Second stage: model inspection stage
The first step, on-premise network flow collection probe, acquisition passes through the whole of network boundary switch or router in real time Flow.
Second step, the complete network flow of each TCP session of extract real-time from network flow.Method is the same as the first stage Two steps.
Third step extracts session behavioural characteristic from TCP session traffic.Method is the same as first stage third step.
The session behavioural characteristic of extraction is inputted trained Random Forest model in the 4th step of first stage by the 4th step, Session is classified as Recall remote control Trojan or normal network traffic flow by model.
Fig. 1 is the Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection method frame signal for the Behavior-based control analysis that the present invention is implemented Figure, method are made of two stages.First stage is the model training stage for having supervision, carries out TCP session weight to training sample After group, session characteristics extraction and session tokens, it will words feature and session tokens input random forest detection model.Pass through comparison The index performance of different parameters drag adjusts model, and finally determines the trojan horse detection model after optimization.Second stage is anti- The real-time detection stage of bullet type wooden horse carries out TCP session recombination and session for the real-time original data on flows acquired on probe Feature extraction, it will in the trojan horse detection model after words feature input first stage optimization, model is classified as wooden horse flow Or regular traffic flow.
Fig. 2 is the flow chart of TCP session recombination and session characteristics extraction module in Fig. 1.It is filtered from network flow first All flow packets of a reversed TCP session out obtain 7 essential attributes composition flow packet attribute list of each flow packet. By traversing flow packet attribute column, counts PSH Flag value in session and be really packet accounting, upload and download flow packet load length Degree the ratio between, the data packet number in conversation initial stage, with the presence or absence of the mark of heartbeat behavior.
Fig. 3 is the heartbeat behavioral value module in Fig. 2, and module input is the flow attribution list an of session.For stream Every continuous 6 flow packets in attribute list are measured, first determine whether their data transfer direction meets in upload-downloading- Biography-downloading-upload-downloading, if meeting, further wherein whether 3 length for uploading packet are equal, 3 download packages for judgement Whether length is equal, and showing this session if equal, there are heartbeat behaviors, terminates heartbeat behavioral value process.If the entire stream of traversal Amount attribute list does not all find continuous 6 packets for meeting above-mentioned condition, then illustrating this session, there is no heartbeat behaviors, terminates heartbeat Behavioral value process.
Choose the reason of above-mentioned 4 behavioural characteristics are as trojan horse detection mode input feature explanation:
1, the ratio between flow packet payload length is uploaded and downloaded:
It is smaller than downloading data amount that the network service traffic of normal Opposite direction connection usually uploads data volume, for example, browse webpage, File etc. is downloaded, and reversed remote control Trojan is just opposite.
2, the ratio of flow packet of the flag bit PSH Flag value equal to 1:
Flag bit PSH value is equal to 1 and shows data sender in reminder application layer in higher priority processing flow packet Content, remote control Trojan it is generally desirable to which data transmission can be completed as early as possible, therefore wooden horse flow-rate ratio normal discharge is more likely to set Setting this this flag bit is 1.
3, the data packet number in conversation initial stage:
Usually horse back starts automatic transmission data after proper network connection is established, but remote control type wooden horse is connected after establishing and needed Hacker's operation is waited, therefore the conversation initial phase data packet quantity of wooden horse connection is relatively fewer.
4, heartbeat behavior identifies:
After wooden horse connection is established, also tend to keep connection even if operating wooden horse without hacker, and heartbeat mechanism is to maintain A kind of common methods of connection.Therefore, a possibility that there are heartbeat behaviors in the connection of malice wooden horse is greater than regular traffic and connects.

Claims (5)

1. a kind of Recall remote control Trojan network flow detection method of Behavior-based control analysis, which is characterized in that including following step It is rapid:
Step 1, training trojan horse detection model: both are different for acquisition wooden horse flow file and normal network traffic flow file The flow file of type;Then the complete network flow of each TCP session is extracted from flow file;Again from TCP session traffic Middle extract includes uploading and downloading the flow packet ratio of the ratio between flow packet payload length, flag bit PSH Flag value equal to 1, session The session behavioural characteristic of the data packet number of initial stage and heartbeat behavior mark;Finally by session behavioural characteristic and flow file Type is input in the trojan horse detection model based on random forests algorithm and is trained, and adjusts decision in model in the training process The quantity of tree, until obtaining identification wooden horse flow file and normal network traffic flow file trojan horse detection mould the most accurate Type;
Step 2, the trojan horse detection model according to obtained in step 1 are detected: first monitoring real-time network flow, then from The complete network flow of each TCP session is extracted in flow, then extracts session behavioural characteristic from TCP session traffic, finally will The session behavioural characteristic extracted is input in trojan horse detection model, and each TCP session classification is wooden horse according to input by model Flow or normal network traffic flow.
2. the method according to claim 1, wherein being extracted from flow file each in the step one The complete network flow of TCP session the following steps are included:
Flow file is reorganized as unit of TCP session, judges that session is opened based on the Flag value in flow packet includes SYN Begin, conversation end is judged comprising RST or FIN, and filters out from all TCP sessions and initiated from internal network external network Session, abandon the TCP session that is connected into from external network.
3. the method according to claim 1, wherein extracting session behavioural characteristic in the step one, being logical Extraction source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, timestamp, FLAG value, net load byte number this 7 essential attributes are crossed to go forward side by side It is obtained after row processing.
4. the method according to claim 1, wherein in the step one, in session behavioural characteristic, upload with The ratio between downloading flow packet payload length refers to the ratio between upload total amount of byte and downloading total amount of byte of a TCP session;Flag bit The flow packet that flow packet ratio of the PSH Flag value equal to 1 refers to that the value of flag bit PSH Flag is 1 accounts for flow in entire session The ratio of packet;The data packet number in conversation initial stage refers to the number of data packet in the preset time since TCP session establishment Amount;Heartbeat behavior mark refers to the mark that whether there is heartbeat behavior in session.
5. the method according to claim 1, wherein training the step of trojan horse detection model in the step one Suddenly include:
Using the method for 10 folding cross validations, training sample is divided into training set and verifying collects, algorithm is carried out on training set Training is classified with the sample that the algorithm after training concentrates verifying, and calculates accuracy and AUC index, wherein accuracy Refer to the ratio for being classified correct sample number and total sample number, AUC index refer to for describe classifier true positive rate with Area between false positive rate under the ROC curve of relationship;After obtaining accuracy and AUC index, adjust in random forests algorithm The number of decision tree, and take the optimal decision tree number of integrated value of two indexs of accuracy and AUC index as wooden horse inspection Survey the decision tree number of model.
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CN113037646A (en) * 2021-03-04 2021-06-25 西南交通大学 Train communication network flow identification method based on deep learning
CN113591085A (en) * 2021-07-27 2021-11-02 深圳市纽创信安科技开发有限公司 Android malicious application detection method, device and equipment
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CN115134096B (en) * 2021-03-11 2024-08-16 深信服科技股份有限公司 RAT connection detection method, flow auditing equipment and medium
CN113591085B (en) * 2021-07-27 2024-05-14 深圳市纽创信安科技开发有限公司 Android malicious application detection method, device and equipment
CN113591085A (en) * 2021-07-27 2021-11-02 深圳市纽创信安科技开发有限公司 Android malicious application detection method, device and equipment
CN113949531B (en) * 2021-09-14 2022-06-17 北京邮电大学 Malicious encrypted flow detection method and device
CN113949531A (en) * 2021-09-14 2022-01-18 北京邮电大学 Malicious encrypted flow detection method and device
CN114124463A (en) * 2021-10-27 2022-03-01 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 Method and system for identifying hidden network encryption application service based on network behavior characteristics
CN114124463B (en) * 2021-10-27 2023-05-16 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 Method and system for identifying hidden network encryption application service based on network behavior characteristics
CN115002760A (en) * 2022-07-20 2022-09-02 广东南方电信规划咨询设计院有限公司 5G terminal encrypted flow data security detection method and system
CN115277152A (en) * 2022-07-22 2022-11-01 长扬科技(北京)股份有限公司 Network flow security detection method and device
CN115277152B (en) * 2022-07-22 2023-09-05 长扬科技(北京)股份有限公司 Network traffic safety detection method and device
CN116260660B (en) * 2023-05-15 2023-07-25 杭州美创科技股份有限公司 Webpage Trojan backdoor identification method and system
CN116260660A (en) * 2023-05-15 2023-06-13 杭州美创科技股份有限公司 Webpage Trojan backdoor identification method and system

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