CN109359464B - Wireless security authentication method based on block chain technology - Google Patents
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
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- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/45—Structures or tools for the administration of authentication
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Abstract
The application discloses a wireless security authentication method based on a block chain technology, which utilizes a common recognition mechanism combining workload certification and longest chain extension to record user information generation transaction in a block chain account book which is not falsifiable and decentralized, and user registration stage and user login and authentication stage protocols are respectively designed. Common attack modes such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack and the like can be effectively avoided, so that a user can safely identify network equipment in a wireless network environment and cannot be attacked by malicious users. And the method uses less computation workload, and can effectively reduce the overhead of computation cost.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to an information security technology, in particular to a wireless security authentication method based on a block chain technology.
Background
With the rapid development of information security technology and wireless network devices, users can enter the network through the wireless network devices at will. However, as the wireless network is opened, the network environment is full of uncertainty, and unsafe factors such as various network attacks and disguise means also come along. Network security issues are receiving increasing attention from people. The first line of defense line for ensuring network communication and data security is that the user identity can be accurately identified in a plurality of wireless network devices. Identity authentication is the basis for information security in network systems.
In 1981, Lamport first proposed a password authentication scheme to solve the security problem of communication in an insecure channel, however, this scheme has some disadvantages: (1) inability to resist replay attacks; (2) the Hash is computationally expensive. In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a smart card remote user authentication protocol based on public key encryption. According to the scheme, the server side can complete the identity authentication process without storing the password list of the user, and common network attacks are effectively avoided. However, Chan and Cheng find that this scheme may be vulnerable to masquerading attacks. In 2003, Shen et al pointed out a disadvantage of the Hwang and Li scheme, in that a malicious but valid user can obtain another user's password, the malicious user can impersonate another user to access a remote server, and then they propose an enhancement scheme. Unfortunately, Leung et al found that the scheme of Shen et al also failed to resist counterfeiting attacks. In 2004, Das et al first proposed a smart card remote user authentication scheme based on dynamic identity. The scheme utilizes dynamic identity to satisfy user hiding, and the user can freely select and update the password. Many have subsequently proposed improvements to address the above-mentioned security issues. In 2009, in order to solve the security vulnerability existing in the scheme of Das et al, Wang et al proposed a safer and more efficient identity authentication scheme and proved that the scheme is safer and more efficient than the original scheme. In 2011, Khan and the like analyze the scheme of Wang and the like, and find that a user cannot freely select a password, and the smart card cannot be logged out after being stolen or lost and cannot resist internal attack. In 2014, Xiong et al proposed an improved smart card based remote user password authentication scheme to address the previous security shortcomings. In 2017, Lin Yi Kun proposed a P2P authentication scheme for preventing man-in-the-middle attacks. The scheme has the advantages that the Hash algorithm is well realized through the public key cryptographic algorithm, and man-in-the-middle attack can be effectively prevented. In 2018, Chenge et al proposed a heterogeneous mechanism identity authentication scheme based on dynamic passwords. The scheme provides a dynamic password heterogeneous mechanism authentication scheme based on a challenge response/response mechanism, reduces the overhead of an operation process, shortens the operation time, and can effectively resist various attacks such as replay attack and the like. By combining the research results, a plurality of problems still exist in the traditional wireless security certification.
The block chain technology is originally presented in Bitcoin a peer-to-peer electronic case system published by the Ministry of China, and by utilizing the characteristics of decentralization, point-to-point transmission, a consensus mechanism, a cryptography technology and the like, the block chain technology is expected to thoroughly reshape the human social activity form and is applied to the Internet of things, artificial intelligence and identity authentication.
In 2016, the development of the block chain technology has greatly promoted the development and application of the certification. In 2017, arm spread faithfully explains how to solve the problem of identity certification by constructing an identity authentication system through a block chain technology. In 2018, Pengyongyong and the like propose a new identity authentication technical implementation scheme based on a block chain application mode. The scheme utilizes the non-tamper-proof shape of the block chain storage information as the authenticity guarantee for the information of the digital identity authentication. But the cost is higher and the expenditure is larger because the biological recognition technology is combined. In 2018, Chenyuxiang and the like analyze the advantages of the identity management scheme based on the block chain compared with the traditional identity management system, and research is carried out on the identity authentication technology of a mainstream block chain identity management company.
Aiming at the safety problem existing in the traditional identity authentication, the invention provides a wireless safety authentication method based on a block chain technology, and as the block chain has the advantages of decentralization, point-to-point transmission, a consensus mechanism, a cryptography technology and the like, the user information is ensured to be stored in a block chain distributed account book and cannot be tampered or lost. So that the identity authentication can be effectively performed.
Disclosure of Invention
The present invention is directed to a wireless security authentication method based on a block chain technology, which solves one or more of the above-mentioned problems in the prior art.
According to one aspect of the present invention, a wireless security authentication method based on a block chain technology is provided, which includes a registration phase and a login authentication phase, wherein the registration phase includes the following steps:
a1, block chain server S generates random number n, user inputs with user name IDi and password PWiPerforming registration operation R with the registration information of the random number n;
a2, the block chain server S receives the registration information, processes the input random number n, and generates the user address UaddrAnd the user address U is combinedaddrTransmitting to the user;
a3, the block chain server S encrypts the registration information of the user to generate a digital signature y;
a4, the block chain server S will register information, user address UaddrThe digital signature y and the registration operation R are transmitted to a block chain network node;
a5, after receiving the information, the network nodes of the block chain assemble into transaction and broadcast it to the whole block chain network with transaction number Tx-id, the transaction is recorded in the new block by the consensus mechanism, finally form the new block chain;
the login authentication phase comprises the following steps:
b1, user input with user name IDiPassword PWiAnd user address U'addrPerforming login operation L on the login information;
b2, the blockchain server S receives the login information and stores the user IDiLooking up and user name ID in database of block chain network nodeiCorresponding UaddrAnd judging U'addrWhether or not to be in contact with UaddrSimilarly, if so, perform B3; if not, perform B1;
b3, the blockchain network node will associate the username ID with the user nameiThe corresponding digital signature y is sent to a block chain server S, and the block chain server S decrypts y to obtain registration information;
b4, the blockchain server S verifies whether the login information is consistent with the registration information, if so, the login is successful, and B5 is executed; if not, execute B1;
b5, Block chain Server S registers information, U'addrThe login operation L is transmitted to the block chain network node;
b6, after receiving the information, the network nodes of the block chain assemble the transaction and broadcast it to the whole block chain network with the transaction number Tx-id, the transaction is recorded in the new block by the consensus mechanism, finally forming the new block chain.
In some embodiments: in step A2, the blockchain server S receives the registration information sent by the user, and processes the input random number using the random private key generating function Gen (), to generate the private key KsGenerating a public key K by the private key through an elliptic curve algorithmpCarrying out Hash operation on the public key by using a Hash function to obtain a fixed length which is recorded as HpkAs the user address UaddrAnd the private key Ks anduser address UaddrAnd transmitting to the user.
In some embodiments: step a2 further includes the blockchain server S receiving the ID from the useri、PWiAnd the user address U generated by the blockchain server SaddrChecking if the user's registration information already exists, if the user's IDi、PWiAnd a corresponding user address UaddrIf the registration exists, the registration fails and the registration cannot be carried out; if the user's IDi、PWiAnd a corresponding user address UaddrIf not, registration is possible.
In some embodiments: in step A3, the blockchain server S performs hash operation H on the user' S registration information, records it as summary information x, and uses the private key KsAnd encrypting the summary information x to generate a digital signature, and marking as y.
In some embodiments: u 'is used after the Block chain Server S receives the digital signature y in step B3'addrAnd decrypting y to obtain summary information x', and calculating x through a hash function.
In some embodiments: in step B4, the blockchain server verifies whether x 'is equal to x, and if x', it indicates that the login information entered by the user is consistent with the original information stored in the blockchain database, and the login and authentication are successful; if x' ≠ x, it indicates that the login information input by the user is inconsistent with the original information stored in the block chain database, and the login and authentication fails.
The invention utilizes a common recognition mechanism combining workload certification and longest chain extension to generate transaction records of user information in a non-falsifiable and decentralized block chain account book, and user registration stage and user login and authentication stage protocols are respectively designed. Common attack modes such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack and the like can be effectively avoided, so that a user can safely identify network equipment in a wireless network environment and cannot be attacked by malicious users. And the method uses less computation workload, and can effectively reduce the overhead of computation cost.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a registration phase of a wireless security authentication method based on a block chain technique according to the present invention;
fig. 2 is a flowchart of the login and authentication phase of a wireless security authentication method based on the block chain technology according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
TABLE 1 schemes for symbolic meanings
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the following description of the drawings.
A wireless security authentication method based on block chain technology comprises a registration stage and a login authentication stage.
As shown in fig. 1, the specific steps of the user in the registration phase are as follows:
step 1: user UiInput own user name IDiPassword PWiAnd a random number n (which is automatically assigned when the user performs a registration operation) to perform a registration operation R, and is transmitted to the blockchain server S through a secure channel.
Step 2: the block chain server S receives the information sent by the user, uses a random private key generation function Gen (), processes the input random number and generates a private key KsGenerating a public key K by the private key through an elliptic curve algorithmp＝E(Ks). Since the length of the public key is not fixed at this time, the public key is subjected to hash operation H (K) by using a hash functionp) Obtaining a fixed length, denoted as Hpk. At this time HpkCan also be used as the user address Uaddr。
Step 3: the blockchain server S receives the ID from the useri、PWiAnd the user address U generated by the blockchain server SaddrChecking whether the identity information of the user already exists, wherein the following two situations can occur:
(1) if the user's IDi、PWiAnd a corresponding user address UaddrIf the registration exists, the registration fails and the registration cannot be carried out.
(2) If the user's IDi、PWiAnd a corresponding user address UaddrIf not, registration is possible. And the user address U is sent via a secure channeladdrAnd a private key KsFor transmission to user Ui。
Step 4: user UiReceiving information from the blockchain server S, including the user address UaddrAnd a private key KsThe private key is used as an important identification of the transaction, and the user needs to keep the private key properly.
Step 5: after the registration is successful, the block chain server sends the ID of the useri、PWiPerforming a hash operation H (ID)i||PWi) Denoted x, using a private key KsAnd encrypting the summary information x to generate a digital signature, and marking as y.
Step 6: block chain server S will IDi、UaddrGeneral formula (I), general formula (Y) and general formula (R)The over-secure channel is transmitted to the blockchain network node, which takes two nodes as an example, and both node 1 and node 2 receive the information from the blockchain server S.
Step 7: after receiving the information, the block chain node N1 or N2 assembles the transaction and attaches a transaction number Tx-id to broadcast to the whole block chain network, the transaction is recorded in a new block through a consensus mechanism, and finally a new block chain is formed.
As shown in fig. 2, the specific flow of the user in the login and authentication phase is as follows:
step 1: user UiInput user name ID of successful self registrationiPassword PWiAnd user address U'addrA login operation L is performed and transmitted to the blockchain server S over the secure channel.
Step 2: the blockchain server S receives the information from the user UiTransmitting the information of U'addrSent to any blockchain node N1 or N2, i.e. via a secure channel
Then according to the user name IDiLooking up U stored in database at registrationaddrAnd make a judgment on
At this time, the following two cases occur:
(1) if U'addr＝UaddrIt means that the user address owned by the user is the same as the user address stored in the database, and the operation proceeds to Step 3.
(2) If U'addr≠UaddrThen it indicates that the user hasThe user address is different from the user address stored in the database, so that the login and authentication fail, and the user information is requested to be input again, and Step1 is executed.
Step 3: if Step2 is successful, blockchain server S receives the request from node NiInformation y transmitted over a secure channel.
Step 4: after receiving the signature information y, the block chain server uses U'addrDecrypting y to obtain summary information x', and calculating x ═ H (ID) through a hash functioni||PWi)。
Step 5: the blockchain server verifies that x' and x are equal, and the following two cases occur:
(1) if x ═ x, then user U is representediThe information input by login is consistent with the original information stored in the block chain database, and the login and authentication are successful.
(2) If x' ≠ x, it indicates that user UiIf the information entered by the login is not consistent with the original information stored in the blockchain database, the login and authentication fail, and the user login information is requested to be re-entered, Step1 is executed.
Step 6: if the login and authentication are successful, the blockchain server S gives the user U a secure channeliThe transmission is successful. And Step7 is executed.
If the login and authentication fails, the blockchain server S gives the user U a secure channeliThe transmission fails.
Step 7: block chain server S will IDi、Uaddr、y、L is transmitted to the node of the blockchain network through a secure channel, and in this section, taking two nodes as an example, both node 1 and node 2 will receive information from the blockchain server S.
Step 8: after receiving the information, the block chain node N1 or N2 assembles the transaction and attaches a transaction number Tx-id to broadcast to the whole block chain network, the transaction is recorded in a new block through a consensus mechanism, and finally a new block chain is formed.
The performance analysis for the present invention is as follows:
1. security analysis
The security of the scheme of the present invention will be analyzed and compared with other similar wireless security authentication schemes, in this embodiment, compared with the Das scheme (Das M L, Saxena, Gulati V P.A dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme [ J ]. IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics,2004,50(2): 629) and the Wang scheme (Wang Y, Liu J Y, Xiao F X, et al. A mobile authentication and security dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme [ J ]. Computer Communications,2009,32(4): 583-. Where √ denotes defensible, and x denotes non-defensible.
TABLE 2 safety analysis
| Scheme(s) | Das scheme | Wang scheme | Scheme of the text |
| DDoS attack | × | × | √ |
| Internal attack | √ | × | √ |
| Masquerading attack | × | × | √ |
| Password guessing attack | × | √ | √ |
| Man-in-the-middle attack | √ | √ | √ |
2. Resisting distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
The distributed structure of the block chain is based on a point-to-point network architecture, and if one node fails, the normal work of other nodes cannot be influenced, so that the problem of single-point failure does not exist. It is much more effective against denial of service attacks than a centralized service system architecture. Because once a node fails, a user connected to the failed node cannot enter the system.
3. Internal attack
When the user UiWhen registering, logging in and authenticating, the user UiThe entry of the login password,the server S carries out Hash operation on the user information to obtain x, and supposing that the malicious user C hears the x by stealing, the malicious user C is difficult to push out the user information due to the fact that the Hash function has unidirectionality and collision resistance, and internal attack is effectively prevented.
4. Masquerading attack
In the block chain, because the activities among any nodes are supervised by the whole network, and the database adopts distributed storage, the malicious user C cannot pretend to perform fraudulent activities.
5. Password guessing attack
In the scheme of the invention, when the user U is in the state ofiWhen registering, assume that malicious user C can eavesdrop the IDi,PWiAnd the random number n is automatically distributed by the system when the registration operation is carried out, so that C cannot obtain n and cannot obtain the private key KsAnd user address UaddrInformation; when the user UiWhen login and authentication are performed, a malicious user cannot obtain user address information Uaddr(the only certificate of user login authentication), so login and authentication can not be carried out, login fails, and password guessing attack is effectively resisted.
6. Man-in-the-middle attack
The scheme of the invention is that when the user registers, logs in and authenticates, the user sends the user information and the password PWiAnd carrying out hash operation to obtain a hash value x, and sending the hash value x to the server through a secure channel to ensure that the authentication information cannot be tampered. Transmitting the ID over a secure channel when the server communicates with the nodei,UaddrY and related information, the malicious user C cannot tamper with.
7. Analysis of operation amount
In this section, the computation of the scheme is analyzed and compared with other identity authentication schemes of the same type, such as the Wang scheme and the Lin scheme, and the computation is shown in table 3.
TABLE 3 analysis of the calculated quantities
Compared with the Wang scheme (Wang Y, Liu J Y, Xiao F X, et al. A more effective and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme [ J ]. Computer Communications,2009,32(4): 583-. However, the identity authentication scheme mentioned in the Wang scheme cannot effectively avoid common network attacks such as internal attacks. The scheme uses block chain Technology to generate 2 transactions and attach 2 signatures during user registration, login and authentication, so the scheme uses 2 more signature operations to solve the network attack problem of the Wang scheme (Lin Y K.A P2P identity authentication man-in-the-middle certificates [ J ]. Electronic Technology & Software Engineering,2017, (13): 214-. Compared with the Lin scheme, the scheme has the advantages that 4 times of public key encryption and decryption operations are omitted, 2 times of digital signature and verification are added, 1 time of hash operation and 1 time of elliptic curve algorithm are added. Since the computation speed of the hash algorithm is much higher than that of the public key algorithm, the computation efficiency of the scheme is higher than that of the Lin scheme. Through operand analysis, the scheme is based on the block chain technology, can effectively and safely reduce the calculation expense, and utilizes a consensus algorithm to enable the network nodes to achieve high consistency speed.
The above is only one embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several similar modifications and improvements can be made without departing from the inventive concept of the present invention, and these should also be considered as within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (3)
1. A wireless security authentication method based on a block chain technology is characterized by comprising a registration stage and a login authentication stage, wherein the registration stage comprises the following steps: a1, user inputs user name IDi and password PWiWhen the user performs registration operation, the registration information of the automatically distributed random number n performs registration operation R; a2, the block chain server S receives the registration information, uses the random private key generating function Gen (), processes the input random number n, generates the private key KsGenerating a public key K by the private key through an elliptic curve algorithmpCarrying out Hash operation on the public key by using a Hash function to obtain a fixed length which is recorded as HpkAs the user address UaddrAnd the private key KsAnd user address UaddrTransmitting to the user; a3, the block chain server S processes the hash operation H of the user' S registration information, and records it as the summary information x, and uses the private key KsEncrypting the abstract information x to generate a digital signature, marked as y, A4, the block chain server S sends the registration information and user address UaddrThe digital signature y and the registration operation R are transmitted to a block chain network node; a5, after receiving the information, the network nodes of the block chain assemble into transaction and broadcast it to the whole block chain network with transaction number Tx-id, the transaction is recorded in the new block by the consensus mechanism, finally form the new block chain; the login authentication phase comprises the following steps: b1, inputting user name IDi and password PWiAnd user address U’ addrPerforming login operation L on the login information; b2, the block chain server S receives the login information, searches the database of the block chain network node storing the user name IDi for the U corresponding to the user name IDiaddrAnd judge U’ addrWhether or not to be in contact with UaddrSimilarly, if so, perform B3; if not, perform B1; b3, the blockchain network node sends the digital signature y corresponding to the user name IDi to the blockchain server S, and after receiving the digital signature y, the blockchain server S uses U’ addrDecrypting y to obtain summary information x', and calculating x through a hash function; b4, the blockchain server S verifies whether the summary information x is consistent with the summary information x', if so, the login is successful, and B5 is executed; if not, execute B1; b5, the blockchain server S will register information, U’ addrThe login operation L is transmitted to the block chain network node; b6, after receiving the information, the network nodes of the block chain assemble the transaction and broadcast it to the whole block chain network with the transaction number Tx-id, the transaction is recorded in the new block by the consensus mechanism, finally forming the new block chain.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: step a2 further includes the blockchain server S receiving the ID from the useri、PWiAnd the user address U generated by the blockchain server SaddrChecking if the user's registration information already exists, if the user's IDi、PWiAnd a corresponding user address UaddrIf the registration exists, the registration fails and the registration cannot be carried out; if the user's IDi、PWiAnd a corresponding user address UaddrIf not, registration is possible.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in step B4, the blockchain server verifies whether x 'is equal to x, and if x' = x, it indicates that the login information entered by the user is consistent with the original information stored in the blockchain database, and the login and authentication are successful; if x' ≠ x, it indicates that the login information input by the user is inconsistent with the original information stored in the block chain database, and the login and authentication fails.
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| EP3602457B1 (en) * | 2019-02-28 | 2021-04-07 | Advanced New Technologies Co., Ltd. | System and method for blockchain-based data management |
| CN109905394B (en) * | 2019-03-05 | 2021-10-01 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Anti-counterfeiting method based on block chain, base station, user terminal and user support system |
| CN109756518B (en) * | 2019-03-05 | 2021-06-29 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Anti-counterfeiting method based on block chain, terminal and block chain |
| CN110071937B (en) * | 2019-04-30 | 2022-01-25 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Login method, system and storage medium based on block chain |
| CN110636040B (en) * | 2019-08-05 | 2021-03-26 | 南京中诚区块链研究院有限公司 | Information flow authentication system and method based on block chain communication |
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