CN109308579A - A kind of probability theory method for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening - Google Patents
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Abstract
A kind of probability theory method for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening, it include: to promote equivalent to the risk increment that system introduces when nuclear power plant operator executes certain behavior in extreme circumstances Step 1: defining for personnel's behaviorist risk, the risk in join probability safety evaluation promotes equivalent and obtains the calculation formula that human behavior risk promotes equivalent: Step 2: promoting two limits values of equivalent using probabilistic safety target computing staff's behaviorist risk；Step 3: being screened respectively using the limits value that the limits value and personnel risk of cut set different degree promote equivalent to human behavior, comprehensive judgement everyone's behavior is belonging respectively to which risk zones in high, medium and low three risk zones, obtains the filter list of safety-related human behavior.The safety-related human behavior result accuracy screened using the present invention is high, is conducive to analysis personnel and correctly identifies the key personnel's behavior having an important influence to npp safety operation.
Description
Technical field
It is especially a kind of for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening the present invention relates to Human Engineering technical field
Probability theory method.
Background technique
In order to guarantee the safety and reliability of nuclear power plant, the design and operation of nuclear power plant have to comply with the phase of Human Engineering
Close criterion.The a large amount of human behavior as involved in the design and operational process in nuclear power plant, and the type of these human behaviors
It is different, it needs to expend a large amount of manpower and material resources if on the whole analyzing these human behaviors one by one, therefore, very
It is necessary to first screen to these human behaviors, risk class is divided, it is then, therein heavy according to the selection result selective analysis
Want human behavior.
Human behavior screening is needed by probabilistic safety assessment (probabilistic safety assessment, PSA)
In different degree concept, different degree magnitude be commonly applied to critical component selection, maintenance key point etc..Typical different degree magnitude
Risky enhancement equivalent (Risk Achievement Worth, RAW), cut set different degree (Fussell-Vesely, FV), risk
It reduces equivalent (Risk Reduction Worth, RRW), carries out the screening of human behavior probability theory, it is important to choose suitable weight
Want metric as risk separation, to guarantee that the selection result is sufficiently conservative.In the past when carrying out human behavior screening, risk
Separation refers to applied magnitude when critical component selection more.For example, nuclear energy research institute of the U.S. (Nuclear Energy
Institute, NEI) and EPRI-Electric Power Research Institute (Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI) think RAW
Greater than 2 or component of the FV greater than 0.005 is critical component, which has also obtained International Atomic Energy Agency (International
Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA) approval.In fact, since there are essential differences between people and component, in work
In Cheng Yingyong by the standard by critical component selection extend to Security Officer's behavior screening and it is inappropriate.
In this regard, Westinghouse Electric adjusts cut off value when designing AP600 and AP1000 unit and carrying out human behavior screening
It is whole, benchmark PSA (baseline PSA) choose RAW > 3 or RRW > 0.1, focus PSA (focused PSA) choose RAW > 2 or
The human behavior of RRW > 0.05 is key personnel's behavior, but Westinghouse Electric does not provide the scientific basis for choosing the magnitude.
James etc. is also studied human behavior screening, using abnormal important determining program (Significance
Determination Process, SDP) human behavior screening technique is established, but this method rests on theoretical research rank always
Section, is not examined really in practice.In terms of comprehensive, in the prior art, different nuclear power plants can use different analyses
Method and standard carry out human behavior screening, however the reliability of these standards is not high, so that the accuracy of screening can not obtain
Guarantee to good.
Summary of the invention
The present invention provides a kind of probability theory method for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening, this method is comprehensive
Human behavior risk promotes the limits value of equivalent and cut set different degree, and human behavior is divided into high, medium and low three risk areas,
The result accuracy screened using this method is high, is conducive to analysis personnel and correctly identifies have emphatically to npp safety operation
The key personnel's behavior to be influenced.
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problem, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme: a kind of be used for npp safety relevant people
The probability theory method of member's behavior screening, comprising:
Step 1: the risk increment introduced when definition nuclear power plant operator executes certain behavior in extreme circumstances to system is
Human behavior risk promotes equivalent, and the risk in join probability safety evaluation promotes equivalent and obtains human behavior risk enhancement equivalent
Calculation formula；
Wherein, RAW indicates that risk promotes equivalent, and CDF indicates that reactor core probability of damage, Ri+ are to assume that equipment or component i can not
Used time calculated reactor core probability of damage, i.e. CDF when Pi=1, HRAW indicate that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, △ R=Ri
+-CDF, o (α) represent operator under extreme conditions successful execution behavior i a possibility that.
Step 2: probabilistic safety target is assigned to Ri+ and probabilistic safety target is reduced assignment after an order of magnitude
△ R is given, the resulting human behavior risk of step 1 is substituted into and promotes in the calculation formula of equivalent, takeFor medium or high risk cut off value,For medium to low-risk cut off value, two limits values that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, described two limits values are obtained
For human behavior to be divided into high, medium and low three risk zones；
Step 3: promoting equivalent using personnel risk obtained in the limits value of cut set different degree and step 2 respectively
Limits value screens human behavior, which comprehensive judgement everyone's behavior is belonging respectively in high, medium and low three risk zones
A risk zones obtain the filter list of safety-related human behavior.
Further, in the probability theory method for being previously used for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening further include:
Step 4: filter list obtained in step 3, which is committed to expert group, carries out uncertain qualitative analysis, obtain
The selection result of final npp safety related personnel's behavior.
In abovementioned steps one, the calculation formula that the human behavior risk promotes equivalent solves institute by the following method
:
Firstly, choosing core damage frequency as the index for calculating different degree magnitude in probabilistic safety assessment, and true respectively
Determine risk and promote the calculation formula of equivalent, cut set different degree and risk reduction equivalent about core damage frequency:
CDF and Ri+ can be respectively indicated with Ri- and Ri are as follows:
CDF=Ri+Ri-
Ri+=Ri(Pi=1)+Ri-
Wherein, FV is cut set different degree, and RRW is that risk reduces equivalent, and Ri- is its cosecant not comprising equipment or component i
Collect the core damage frequency of contribution；Ri is the core damage frequency contributed comprising the minimal cut set of equipment or component i；
Secondly, the risk increment when personnel of definition execute certain behavior i in extreme circumstances to system introducing is human behavior
Risk promotes equivalent, and under extreme conditions, the probability of failure of people tends to 1, therefore, promotes equivalent, human behavior wind in conjunction with risk
The calculation formula that equivalent is promoted in danger is as follows:
Finally, comprehensive all calculation formula, simplify the calculation formula that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, obtain:
Wherein, o (α) represent operator under extreme conditions successful execution behavior i a possibility that.
Further, two the step of being previously used for the probability theory method of npp safety related personnel's behavior screening
In, the integer-bit of calculated result is taken when calculating two limits values of medium or high risk cut off value and medium to low-risk cut off value.
Further, three the step of being previously used for the probability theory method of npp safety related personnel's behavior screening
In, the limits value of cut set different degree is applied numerical value when critical component selects, and 0.1 is medium or high risk cut off value, and 0.005 is
Medium to low-risk cut off value.
In addition, for same human behavior, using the limits value and personnel's wind of cut set different degree respectively in step 3
After the limits value screening of equivalent is promoted in danger, if locating risk subregion is different, it should determine for the human behavior to be divided to two kinds of sieves
It selects in result in higher risk zones.
The present invention proposes human behavior risk and promotes equivalent on the basis of probabilistic safety assessment risk promotes equivalent
Concept, collator's behaviorist risk promote the limits value of equivalent and cut set different degree, establish a kind of for npp safety phase
The probability theory screening technique of human behavior is closed, in the method, human behavior is divided into high, medium and low three risk areas, passes through
This method can accurately determine which kind of risk zones locating for human behavior, have convenient for analysis personal identification to npp safety operation
Key personnel's behavior of great influence.The mistake of people in extreme circumstances has been fully considered through theoretical and practical proof, this method
Irritability possessed by probability and people is missed, human behavior risk promotes risk employed in the previous analysis method of equivalent proportion
Promote equivalent to be more suitable for screening safety-related human behavior, can effectively improve the accuracy of screening.In addition, should
Method can also enhance versatility, can be widely used in different types of nuclear power plant, while applicability can be enhanced, both fit
For the design phase of nuclear power plant, it is also applied for evaluating personnel in the stage for carrying out safety evaluation to nuclear power plant, there are also very crucial
A bit, this method is simple, greatly reduces the workload of analysis personnel, improves work efficiency.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the structural block diagram of the probability theory method for npp safety related personnel behavior screening in the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the first Risk zone division figure in the present invention；
Fig. 3 is second of Risk zone division figure in the present invention.
Specific embodiment
For the ease of the understanding of those skilled in the art, the present invention is made further below with reference to embodiment and attached drawing
Bright, the content that embodiment refers to not is limitation of the invention.
A kind of probability theory method for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening, comprising:
Step 1: the risk increment introduced when definition nuclear power plant operator executes certain behavior in extreme circumstances to system is
Human behavior risk promotes equivalent, and the risk in join probability safety evaluation promotes equivalent and obtains human behavior risk enhancement equivalent
Calculation formula；
Wherein, RAW indicates that risk promotes equivalent, and CDF indicates that reactor core probability of damage, Ri+ are to assume that equipment or component i can not
Used time calculated reactor core probability of damage, i.e. CDF when Pi=1, HRAW indicate that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, △ R=Ri
+-CDF, o (α) represent operator under extreme conditions successful execution behavior i a possibility that.
Step 2: probabilistic safety target is assigned to Ri+ and probabilistic safety target is reduced assignment after an order of magnitude
△ R is given, the resulting human behavior risk of step 1 is substituted into and promotes in the calculation formula of equivalent, takeFor medium or high risk cut off value,For medium to low-risk cut off value, two limits values that human behavior risk promotes equivalent are obtained, which uses
In human behavior is divided into high, medium and low three risk zones；
Step 3: promoting equivalent using personnel risk obtained in the limits value of cut set different degree and step 2 respectively
Limits value screens human behavior, which comprehensive judgement everyone's behavior is belonging respectively in high, medium and low three risk zones
A risk zones obtain the filter list of safety-related human behavior.
Above embodiment proposes the enhancement of human behavior risk on the basis of probabilistic safety assessment risk promotes equivalent
The concept of equivalent, collator's behaviorist risk promote the limits value of equivalent and cut set different degree, establish a kind of for nuclear power plant
The probability theory screening technique of safety-related human behavior, in the method, human behavior are divided into high, medium and low three risks
Which kind of risk zones locating for human behavior can be accurately determined by this method for area, is pacified convenient for analysis personal identification to nuclear power plant
Key personnel's behavior that row for the national games has an important influence.
It is further elaborated on involved by present embodiment from theoretical side for npp safety related personnel row below
For probability theory screening technique content.
In the step of about the probability theory method for being previously used for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening one, nuclear power is defined
Promote equivalent, knot to the risk increment that system introduces when factory operator executes certain behavior in extreme circumstances for personnel's behaviorist risk
The risk enhancement equivalent closed in probabilistic safety assessment obtains the calculation formula that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, specific as follows:
Core damage frequency (Core Damage Frequency, CDF) and early stage a large amount of radio frequency (Large
Early Release Frequency, LERF) it is the guiding value for assessing design of nuclear power plant level of security.CDF and LERF is logical
It crosses PSA method to obtain, in order to obtain the two values, it is necessary first to accident sequence is established according to nuclear power plant's origination event, further according to
Event occurrence frequency, operator human reliability analysis data accident sequence is quantified, be finally calculated CDF and
LERF.CDF is that level-one PSA calculates gained magnitude, and LERF is that second level PSA calculates gained magnitude.CDF and LERF is in important persons row
Similar for function in probability theory screening, herein, present embodiment is chosen CDF and is analyzed.
In probabilistic safety assessment, through the size for measuring risk input frequently with different degree index.Different different degrees refer to
Its definition and symbolical meanings also different from are marked, specifically, risk, which promotes equivalent RAW characterization, prevents equipment during thrashing
Or the contribution of component, can RAW be referred to as security-critical degree, it is defined as:
Wherein, Ri+ is to assume equipment or when component i unavailable calculated reactor core probability of damage, i.e. CDF when Pi=1.
Cut set different degree FV and risk reduce the risk accounting of equivalent RRW characterization equipment or component failure, therefore are also referred to as this
Two values are risk different degree.Their definition is respectively as follows:
Wherein, Ri- is not comprising equipment or component i, the core damage frequency of remaining cut set contribution；Ri be comprising equipment or
The core damage frequency of the minimal cut set contribution of component i.
CDF and Ri+ can be respectively indicated with Ri- and Ri are as follows:
CDF=Ri+Ri- (4)
Ri+=Ri(Pi=1)+Ri- (5)
It is defined according to RRW and FV, there is mathematical relationship, i.e. FV=1-1/RRW between the two, so applying FV and RRW
When, one is chosen, herein, in present embodiment, selects FV.
For RAW, Ri+ is there are one it is assumed that i.e. equipment or component is unavailable in calculating process.When machine break down or
When person is in service mode, failure probability 1, as assumed condition.Within nuclear power plant's operation period, it may appear that machine maintenance
Or the situation that some period breaks down, so designer will consider the assumed condition in design.And for nuclear power plant
The behavior that operator executes considers the capacity limit of people in design of nuclear power plant, guarantees that personnel are executing any behavior
When, all below the limit.And for the behavior that people cannot complete, it needs to improve equipment or select machine complete accordingly
At.So directly the person's of making us behavior mistakes probability is 1 inappropriate, and the hypothesis is not applicable when carrying out human behavior screening.
Therefore, present embodiment proposes that personnel's behaviorist risk promotes equivalent concept, is applied on the basis of RAW is defined
Human behavior screening, to improve the practicability and accuracy of screening.Human behavior risk promotes equivalent (HRAW) and is defined as personnel
When executing certain behavior i in extreme circumstances, to the risk increment of system introducing.Under extreme condition, although the probability of failure of people compared with
Height, but since people has stronger irritability, so should not assume that its probability of failure is equal to 1, but 1 may be tended to, therefore
HRAW definition is as follows:
HRAW introduces the concept of the limit, and compared with RAW, when carrying out human behavior screening, the value is more appropriate.According to
Definition to Ri+ and Ri-, above formula can be rewritten as:
By comparing the molecule of (5) formula and (7) formula, it is known that, an Equivalent Infinitesimal o (α) is differed between the two, so can
By the further abbreviation of HRAW are as follows:
O (α) represent operator under extreme conditions successful execution behavior i a possibility that.
It is available according to above-mentioned formula (8):
Wherein, △ R=Ri+-CDF.
In the step of about the probability theory method for being previously used for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening two, probability is pacified
Full target is assigned to Ri+ and is assigned to △ R after probabilistic safety target is reduced an order of magnitude, substitutes into the resulting people of step 1
Member's behaviorist risk is promoted in the calculation formula of equivalent, takesFor medium or high risk cut off value,For medium to low-risk boundary
Value obtains two limits values that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, which is divided into human behavior high, medium and low
Three risk zones, specific as follows:
Requirement is made that CDF maximum value in nuclear power plant's regulation file, CDF maximum value is referred to as probabilistic safety target.Probability
Security target is the safe baseline of nuclear power plant, and in-service nuclear power plant CDF < 1E-4/ heap year is required in regulation file.By probabilistic safety
Target 1E-4 is assigned to Ri+ and △ R respectively, then has:
For the ease of analysis, using CDF as abscissa, HRAW+o (α) is ordinate, establishes logarithmic coordinates system, sees Fig. 2 curve
Each of i and curve ii, Fig. 2 coordinate system point, can correspond to a human behavior in nuclear power plant.It observes bent in Fig. 2
Line i and curve ii know, when CDF < 1E-5, two lines are essentially coincided；When 1E-5 < CDF < 1E-4, two curves occur larger
Disagreement.In addition, should be truncated for the part of CDF > 1E-4, because CDF at this time is not able to satisfy wanting for probabilistic safety target
It asks, so not considering.
The meaning of point above curve I are as follows: when executing certain behavior under extreme condition, it is big to will cause power plant's risk increment
In probabilistic safety target, that is to say, that when executing these behaviors under extreme conditions, will cause twice that nuclear power plant CDF is original
More than.Positioned at the point meaning of curve II upper area are as follows: when executing certain behavior under extreme condition, the CDF that will cause nuclear power plant is big
In probabilistic safety target.So the corresponding human behavior of point above curve II should be screened out, and this some of the staff
Behavior is very big to the security threat of nuclear power plant, should give and pay close attention to.
Human behavior probability theory screening technique is completed based on PSA result, so also inheriting the uncertainty of PSA.
The uncertain main source of PSA has following two form: determined one is the randomness by physical process, referred to as with
Machine is uncertain；Another kind be it is relevant to the cognition mobility of personnel, referred to as cognition is uncertain.PSA is general to human behavior
Rate opinion screening bring uncertainty has many aspects, one of them important aspect is the corresponding people of point near curve II
Member's behavior, can also bring biggish risk to nuclear power plant.In addition, the completeness in order to guarantee screening, it should also be in probabilistic safety
The certain safety allowance left on the basis of target.Direct 2 curve II of application drawing, which carries out screening, cannot maximumlly meet these
Condition.So in order to solve these problems, re-starting assignment to △ R, reduce a number on the basis of probabilistic safety target
Magnitude, it may be assumed that
Curve III in Fig. 3 corresponds to aforesaid equation, and in Fig. 3, curve III contains curve II's discussed above
All areas, and there are certain safety allowances, ensure that the abundant conservative of screening, so by curve III wind as a filter
Dangerous boundary, i.e. human behavior above curve III are safety-related human behavior.Furthermore it is also possible to safety-related region
Human behavior further divides: the human behavior risk above curve II is more obvious, can be defined as curve II area above
High risk area；The human behavior in the region among curve II, III has certain threat to npp safety, this part is defined
For apoplexy danger zone.It corresponds, can define the region below curve III is low-risk region.
In the step of about the probability theory method for being previously used for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening three, use respectively
The limits value that personnel risk obtained in the limits value and step 2 of cut set different degree promotes equivalent sieves human behavior
Choosing, the risk zones of comprehensive judgement human behavior obtain the filter list of safety-related human behavior, specific as follows:
In engineer application, the CDF of nuclear power plant is a fixed value, nuclear power plant CDF directly can be substituted into formula (8), (9),
The value of HRAW is obtained, and the value is risk cutoff values.It is also noted that the following in engineer application:
(1) aforesaid equation is with versatility, the probabilistic safety target according to performed by different type nuclear power plant, accordingly
Change Ri+ and △ R assignment, wherein the Ri+ of (8) formula is assigned a value of probabilistic safety target, the △ R of (9) formula is assigned a value of religion probability
The small an order of magnitude of security target；
(2) when choosing HRAW risk cut off value, the integer-bit of calculated result, fractions omitted bit position should only be got.It is rounded
Number is in order to avoid causing unnecessary misunderstanding in engineer application, is not one because the sampling process is established on the basis of PSA
It is a to accurately calculate process.
In order to guarantee that aforementioned entire the selection result has more completeness, in addition to HRAW to screening other than, it is also necessary to answer
Human behavior is screened again with FV.When screening using FV, selected risk cutoff values can directly refer to key portion
Applied numerical value when part selects: being low-risk human behavior when FV is less than 0.005, is when FV is between 0.005 and 0.1
Risk human behavior, and FV be greater than 0.1 when be high risk personnel's behavior.
After respectively screening human behavior using HRAW and FV, need to carry out risk subregion locating for human behavior
Comprehensive judgement.For same human behavior, using HRAW and after applying FV screening, if locating risk subregion is different, should incite somebody to action
The human behavior is divided in the risk subregion of higher (among the two).For example, when being screened to Mr. Yu behavior application HRAW, it is locating
Risk subregion is risk；And after applying FV screening, locating risk subregion is high risk, then can determine that the human behavior is high wind
Dangerous human behavior.After carrying out comprehensive descision subregion to human behavior, available filter list.
In the above-described embodiment, uncertain to screening bring due to PSA in order to more further eliminate, it can be by step
The selection result obtained in rapid three is committed to expert group's audit, and carrying out analysis of uncertainty can be to screening by Expert opinion
Inventory carries out appropriate adjustment, finally formed the selection result, specifically, with " npp safety related personnel's behavior screening report "
It shows.
The knot for the probability theory method for npp safety related personnel behavior screening that Fig. 1 is proposed by present embodiment
Structure block diagram.In general, the technical solution of present embodiment can simplify are as follows: firstly, proposing HRAW's on the basis of RAW
Concept；Then, by theory analysis, join probability security target has selected the limits value of HRAW；Finally, HRAW and FV is tied
It closes, establishes npp safety related personnel's behavior probability by screening technique.This method focuses on choosing suitable HRAW limit
The CDF of nuclear power plant is brought into equation (8) and (9), can be quickly obtained the limits value by value processed.This method not only have compared with
Strong theory support, and it is easy to use, and trackability is strong, can not only be applied in design of nuclear power plant, while can also
Guidance is provided for nuclear power plant's audit crew.
Below again in terms of practice to the validity of the probability theory screening technique for npp safety related personnel's behavior,
Accuracy is verified, specific as follows:
Certain is building nuclear power plant, submitted " preliminary complete analysis report " (Preliminary safety analysis
Report) center is examined to peace.Process is built according to design of nuclear power plant, human behavior is screened and is analyzed at this stage.This
Embodiment screens its human behavior by taking this nuclear power plant as an example.According to " preliminary safety analysis report ", the nuclear power plant
CDF is 4.78E-7/ heap year.Known, probability peace by China statutory standard HAD102/17 " evaluation of nuclear power plant's power safety and verifying "
Full target is CDF < 1E-5/ heap year.
Firstly, determining two limits values of HRAW according to the method in abovementioned steps two.In equation (8), the Ri+ is enabled to be
1E-5, CDF 4.78E-7, we have following equation:
In equation (9), enabling △ R is 1E-6, and CDF 4.78E-7, then we have following equation:
According to calculated result, taking 20 is medium or high risk separation；Taking 3 is medium to low-risk separation.
Then, the safety-related human behavior filter list of this nuclear power plant is obtained according to the method in abovementioned steps three, tied
The following Tables 1 and 2 of fruit:
The selection result of the table 1 according to HRAW value
| Human behavior | HRAW | Explanation |
| It is isolated under diluent source or corrective action operation failure-EBS successful instance manually | 1.52E+01 | Risk |
| Operator's manual switching is to CHR thrashing | 1.29E+01 | Risk |
| Implement charge-discharge operation failure | 1.06E+01 | Risk |
| The cooling failure of secondary side is restarted under shutdown condition | 7.39E+00 | Risk |
| Manually boot the failure of SBO diesel engine | 5.66E+00 | Risk |
| Other column ASG water tank failures are connected manually | 4.22E+00 | Risk |
| Other column ASG water tank failures are connected manually | 4.01E+00 | Risk |
| It manually boots under low pressure peace note-RHR mode | 3.72E+00 | Risk |
| Other column ASG water tank failures are connected manually | 3.51E+00 | Risk |
| Implement charge-discharge operation failure | 3.03E+00 | Risk |
Note: EBS: urgent boronation system；CHR: containment heat-extraction system；SBO: full factory power loss；ASG: auxiliary feedwater system；
RHR: residual heat removal system；
The selection result of the table 2 according to FV value
| Human behavior | FV different degree | Explanation |
| Implement charge-discharge operation failure | 2.21E-01 | It repeats, rises to high risk |
| Implement low pressure cooling failure at full speed manually | 3.34E-02 | Risk |
| Manually boot the failure of SBO diesel engine | 1.01E-02 | It repeats |
| Operator's manual switching is to CHR thrashing | 9.37E-03 | It repeats |
| Implement charge-discharge operation failure | 7.42E-03 | It repeats |
| It is isolated under diluent source or corrective action operation failure-EBS successful instance manually | 6.31E-03 | It repeats |
| Other column ASG water tank failures are connected manually | 6.20E-03 | It repeats |
| Other column ASG water tank failures are connected manually | 6.11E-03 | It repeats |
| Other column ASG water tank failures are connected manually | 5.40E-03 | It repeats |
Method according to the present embodiment filters out 11 kinds of human behaviors altogether, wherein " implementing charge-discharge operation " belongs to height
Risk behavior, remaining 10 kinds of behavior belong to risk behavior.Low-risk behavior is not provided in Tables 1 and 2, because of low-risk behavior
Endangered for nuclear power plant it is smaller, analysis when only need to give with due regard to.In addition, repeatedly going out in Tables 1 and 2
Existing a certain behavior, such as the failure of other column auxiliary feedwater system water tanks is connected manually, RAW, FV importance value is not also identical, makes
It is when being operated to different ASG water tanks at the reason of such case, probability of failure is different, causes importance value different.Cause
This, can merge as the case may be when analyzing this class behavior.
In previous engineering practice, nuclear power plant is answered when selecting when screening to human behavior with reference to critical component
With standard, that is, think that the human behavior as RAW > 2 or FV > 0.005 is safety-related human behavior.It will be based on the standard
The selection result found compared with the result in Tables 1 and 2, have more following two human behavior: 1. operator implement cooling
Decompression reaches Residual heat removal access conditions；2. starting RHR system.
Qualitative analysis is carried out against two behaviors separately below.
1. steam generator tube rupture (Steam Generator Tube Rupture, SGTR) accident is nuclear power plant
One of design basis accident.When analyzing the accident, it is assumed that operator's nonintervention in 30 minutes of early period occurs for accident, by being
System is automatically performed.After 30 minutes, operator's intervention, operator's primary operational is identification, damaged steam generator is isolated, right later
Primary Ioops carry out decrease temperature and pressure, until reaching residual heat removal system connection status, realize safe shutdown.
According to previous screening technique, then " decrease temperature and pressure to waste heat excludes access conditions " this human behavior is in the accident
Under operating condition, it is divided into safety-related human behavior.But in fact, operator executes decrease temperature and pressure under the accident conditions
Operation belongs to post incident, at this point, nuclear power plant is in controllable state.It is assumed that operator does not execute the behavior, reactor still can
Continually and steadily to run a very long time, so the pressure load of operator is compared with when accident occurs at this time, in lower
Level has time enough to complete the operation, so should not will draw to safety-related region the behavior.
2. residual heat removal system generally comes into operation in the second stage of the cold shutdown of reactor, the purpose for starting the system is
The heat that dump power generates is discharged.Shutdown, starting waste heat row are carried out when either going back in normal conditions under accident conditions
Except system belongs to the final stage of accident process.The elementary reaction heap power is low, and operator has time enough progress
Operation, load and pressure load are all lower at heart, so this behavior should not be divided into excessively high risk zones.
By the above qualitative analysis it is found that the two human behaviors belong to low-risk behavior, using traditional method, only
Human behavior is divided into risk and high risk, namely the two human behaviors cannot be filtered out using traditional method.
But in the present embodiment, human behavior can be divided to three risk zones (high, medium and low risk), it also can will be upper
It states two human behaviors to screen to low-risk region, for analysis personnel's reference.The human behavior of high risk transports npp safety
Capable threat is larger, once making a fault, the core damage frequency that will lead to nuclear power plant is higher than probabilistic safety target, at this time nuclear power
Factory and office are in great security risk.Therefore, this some of the staff's behavior is brought forward, it is ensured that designer is in design
Just just these behaviors are paid close attention to.
Through theoretical and practical proof, the human behavior risk used in present embodiment promotes the previous analysis method of equivalent proportion
Employed in risk promote equivalent be more suitable for screening safety-related human behavior, it can effectively increase screening
Accuracy.In addition, this method can also enhance versatility, can be widely used in different types of nuclear power plant, while can
To enhance applicability, it is not only suitable for the design phase of nuclear power plant, is also applied for evaluating personnel to nuclear power plant's progress safety evaluation
Stage, some this method is simple, greatly reduces the workload of analysis personnel there are also very crucial, improves work effect
Rate.
Above-described embodiment is the preferable implementation of the present invention, and in addition to this, the present invention can be realized with other way,
Do not depart from the technical program design under the premise of it is any obviously replace it is within the scope of the present invention.
In order to allow those of ordinary skill in the art more easily to understand the improvements of the present invention compared with the existing technology, this
Some attached drawings of invention and description have been simplified, and for the sake of clarity, present specification is omitted some other members
Element, the element that those of ordinary skill in the art should be aware that these are omitted also may make up the contents of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of probability theory method for npp safety related personnel's behavior screening characterized by comprising
Step 1: defining risk increment when nuclear power plant operator executes certain behavior in extreme circumstances to system introducing is personnel
Behaviorist risk promotes equivalent, and the risk in join probability safety evaluation promotes equivalent and obtains the meter that human behavior risk promotes equivalent
Calculate formula:
Wherein, RAW indicates that risk promotes equivalent, and CDF indicates that reactor core probability of damage, Ri+ are when assuming equipment or component i unavailable
Calculated reactor core probability of damage, i.e. CDF when Pi=1, HRAW indicate that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, △ R=Ri+-
CDF, o (α) represent operator under extreme conditions successful execution behavior i a possibility that.
Step 2: probabilistic safety target is assigned to Ri+ and is assigned to △ after probabilistic safety target is reduced an order of magnitude
R substitutes into the resulting human behavior risk of step 1 and promotes in the calculation formula of equivalent, takesFor medium or high risk cut off value,For medium to low-risk cut off value, two limits values that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, described two limits values are obtained
For human behavior to be divided into high, medium and low three risk zones；
Step 3: promoting the limitation of equivalent using personnel risk obtained in the limits value of cut set different degree and step 2 respectively
Value screens human behavior, and comprehensive judgement everyone's behavior is belonging respectively to which wind in high, medium and low three risk zones
Danger zone domain obtains the filter list of safety-related human behavior.
2. the probability theory method according to claim 1 for npp safety related personnel behavior screening, feature exist
In, further includes:
Step 4: filter list obtained in step 3, which is committed to expert group, carries out uncertain qualitative analysis, obtain final
Npp safety related personnel's behavior the selection result.
3. the probability theory method according to claim 2 for npp safety related personnel behavior screening, feature exist
In in step 1, the calculation formula that the human behavior risk promotes equivalent solves gained by the following method:
Firstly, choosing core damage frequency as the index for calculating different degree magnitude in probabilistic safety assessment, and wind is determined respectively
Equivalent, cut set different degree and risk are promoted in danger reduces calculation formula of the equivalent about core damage frequency:
CDF and Ri+ can be respectively indicated with Ri- and Ri are as follows:
CDF=Ri+Ri-
Ri+=Ri(Pi=1)+Ri-
Wherein, FV is cut set different degree, and RRW is that risk reduces equivalent, and Ri- is remaining cut set tribute not comprising equipment or component i
The core damage frequency offered；Ri is the core damage frequency contributed comprising the minimal cut set of equipment or component i；
Secondly, the risk increment when personnel of definition execute certain behavior i in extreme circumstances to system introducing is personnel's behaviorist risk
Promote equivalent, under extreme conditions, the probability of failure of people tends to 1, therefore, promotes equivalent in conjunction with risk, human behavior risk increases
Calculation formula into equivalent is as follows:
Finally, comprehensive all calculation formula, simplify the calculation formula that human behavior risk promotes equivalent, obtain:
Wherein, o (α) represent operator under extreme conditions successful execution behavior i a possibility that.
4. the probability theory method according to claim 3 for npp safety related personnel behavior screening, feature exist
In taking the integer of calculated result when calculating two limits values of medium or high risk cut off value and medium to low-risk cut off value in step 2
Position.
5. the probability theory method according to claim 4 for npp safety related personnel behavior screening, feature exist
In in step 3, the limits value of cut set different degree is applied numerical value when critical component selects, and 0.1 is medium or high risk point
Dividing value, 0.005 is medium to low-risk cut off value.
6. the probability theory method according to claim 5 for npp safety related personnel behavior screening, feature exist
In in step 3, for same human behavior, respectively using the limits value of cut set different degree and personnel risk enhancement equivalent
Limits value screening after, if locating risk subregion is different, should determine for the human behavior to be divided in two kinds of the selection results compared with
In high risk zones.
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110119878A (en) * | 2019-04-09 | 2019-08-13 | 华能山东石岛湾核电有限公司 | A kind of risk-informed decision-making technique suitable for the provisional change of specific power plant |
| CN113743750A (en) * | 2021-08-20 | 2021-12-03 | 苏州热工研究院有限公司 | Nuclear power plant process system process risk assessment system and method |
| CN114997437A (en) * | 2022-06-13 | 2022-09-02 | 华能核能技术研究院有限公司 | Reactor core damage frequency calculation method and system based on nuclear power plant production task |
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2018
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Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110119878A (en) * | 2019-04-09 | 2019-08-13 | 华能山东石岛湾核电有限公司 | A kind of risk-informed decision-making technique suitable for the provisional change of specific power plant |
| CN113743750A (en) * | 2021-08-20 | 2021-12-03 | 苏州热工研究院有限公司 | Nuclear power plant process system process risk assessment system and method |
| CN114997437A (en) * | 2022-06-13 | 2022-09-02 | 华能核能技术研究院有限公司 | Reactor core damage frequency calculation method and system based on nuclear power plant production task |
| CN114997437B (en) * | 2022-06-13 | 2023-08-29 | 华能核能技术研究院有限公司 | Core damage frequency calculation method and system based on production tasks of nuclear power plant |
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