CN109302392A - Authentication method based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint - Google Patents
Authentication method based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint Download PDFInfo
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- CN109302392A CN109302392A CN201811138093.9A CN201811138093A CN109302392A CN 109302392 A CN109302392 A CN 109302392A CN 201811138093 A CN201811138093 A CN 201811138093A CN 109302392 A CN109302392 A CN 109302392A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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Abstract
The authentication method based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint that the invention discloses a kind of.This method eliminates influence of the radio channel characteristic to extract equipment physical fingerprint feature using channel reciprocity, and devise a kind of communication mechanism of double certifications of Receiver And Transmitter, the uniqueness that device-fingerprint can be effectively utilized realizes the authentication of communicating pair, and resists man-in-the-middle attack.Method includes: receiver to transmitter transmission certification request, and receiver returns pilot tone after receiving request.After receiver receives pilot signal, the machine finger print information is added and is returned.Transmitter is verified according to return path signal and receives identity.Then transmitter status is verified by above-mentioned similar step.This method can effectively eliminate the influence that channel characteristics extract equipment physical features, and safely and efficiently realize the certification of Receiver And Transmitter both sides' identity.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to information security fields more particularly to a kind of based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint
Authentication method.
Background technique
Equipment physical fingerprint feature refers to the work difference of equipment internal hardware element, when equipment emits and receives signal, gives
Signal bring slight distortion.Since there are unique work differences for each electronic component, so the physics of each equipment is special
Sign is also unique.The physical features have uniqueness and are difficult to the characteristic cloned, therefore just as " fingerprint " of equipment
This feature is also referred to as physical fingerprint feature or radio-frequency fingerprint feature.And with equipment physical fingerprint relation technological researching
Deeply, physical fingerprint feature is generally considered the unique feature of wireless device, so as to be used for the body of electromagnetic radiation source
Part identification and authentication.And equipment is in transmitting signal and to receive signal be to use different hardware circuits, equipment
Physical fingerprint can be divided into the transmitting fingerprint of equipment and receive fingerprint.Specifically, the equipment identification based on physical fingerprint feature
Technology can be distinguished accurately even if the wireless device for using identical frequency, bandwidth, modulation system, have extraordinary practical valence
Value.Therefore, the Verification System based on physical fingerprint feature can be carried out in one's own side's wireless device of the physical signal level to access
Certification.Compared to traditional equipment identities authentication method, physical layer fingerprint technique can effectively resist forgery, distort etc. and to attack
It hits, with the unclonable characteristic of physics.
However, in the context of wireless communication, radio channel characteristic can also cause the distortion of signal.This distortion and equipment
Distorted signals caused by physical fingerprint is difficult to separate, and has a significant impact to the extraction of equipment physical fingerprint feature.It is mutual using channel
Easy property can effectively eliminate the influence of channel bring, but the premise of channel reciprocity is that there are the transmitting-receivings of active for communicating pair
Communication.However actively transmitting-receiving communication can not fight man-in-the-middle attack.Lack in existing disclosed device-fingerprint feature extracting method
Research to the problem.How to eliminate the channel characteristics certainly existed in practical communication influences, and at the same time can effectively antagonize
Man-in-the-middle attack is the practical problem for needing to solve.Therefore a kind of to be based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint
Authentication method be urgent need.
Summary of the invention
Goal of the invention: in view of the problems of the existing technology the present invention, realizes and is effectively removing radio channel characteristic to setting
While standby physical features influence, man-in-the-middle attack is effectively antagonized, is provided a kind of based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physics
The authentication method of fingerprint.
Technical solution: the authentication side of the present invention based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint
Method includes:
(1) receiver X to be verified sends certification request to transmitter j to be verified, and j ∈ Θ, Θ are transmitter collection to be verified
It closes；
(2) after transmitter j to be verified receives certification request, pilot tone P is sent to receiver X to be verified；
(3) receiver X to be verified receives the signal that transmitter j to be verified is sent, and the signal that will be receivedInverseWith the Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in the machine fingerprint unitX0Transmitter j to be verified is back to after multiplication；Wherein,Shaped like F*TThe transmitting fingerprint for indicating equipment *, shaped likeThe reception fingerprint for indicating equipment *, shaped like
Indicate equipment * to the radio channel characteristic between equipment；
(4) transmitter j to be verified receives the signal of receiver X passback to be verified, and calculates the signal receivedWith lead
The product of frequency PWherein,
(5) transmitter j to be verified willWith the Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in the machine fingerprint unitj0It carries out
It compares, if the two is equal, determines receiver X authentication success to be verified, and authenticate successfully to receiver X to be verified transmission
Message；Otherwise determine receiver X authentication failure to be verified, and send authentification failure message to receiver X to be verified, terminate
Communication；
(6) after the receiver X having verified that receives certification success message, the machine fingerprint list is sent to transmitter j to be verified
The Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in memberX0；
(7) transmitter j to be verified receives the signal that receiver X is sent, and the signal that will be receivedInverse
It is back to receiver X；Wherein,
(8) signal for the receiver X receiver/transmitter j passback having verified that, and calculate the signal receivedInverseWherein,
(9) the receiver X having verified that willWith transmitter equivalents all in locally stored transmitter fingerprint base
Manage finger print information { Ci0| i=1 ..., N } it is compared, if there is some transmitter Equivalent Physical finger print informationThen determine transmitter j authentication success, carry out subsequent communications, otherwise determines authentication failure, terminate
Communication, wherein N is the transmitter finger print information sum stored in transmitter fingerprint base.
Further, step (1) further includes the finger print data establishment process before certification before, specifically includes the following steps:
Legitimate device i sends pilot tone P to root device 0, wherein i ∈ Ω, Ω are legitimate device set；
Root device 0 receives the signal that legitimate device i is sent, and the signal Y that will be received01/Y reciprocal0It is legal to return to
Equipment i；Wherein, Y0=PFiTF0RHi0；
Legitimate device i receives the signal that root device 0 returns, and according to the signal Y receivediThe equivalent of the machine is calculated
Physical fingerprint information Ci0, whereinHi0And H0iMeet reciprocity；
Equipment i is receiver if legal, then its Equivalent Physical finger print information is stored in the machine fingerprint unit, if hair
Machine is penetrated, then its Equivalent Physical finger print information is stored in the machine fingerprint unit, the transmitter fingerprint base being concurrently incident upon in receiver
In stored.
Further, the root device 0 is fixed and secrecy.
Further, the legitimate device is by the equipment of certification, including all Receiver And Transmitters, if subsequent
There is newly-increased equipment, then repeats the finger print data establishment process before authenticating, and update the transmitter fingerprint base of all receivers.
Further, the radio channel characteristic should be the channel frequency amplitude response feature that measurement obtains, or survey
The channel time domain shock response feature measured
Further, the root device 0 is returned, to guarantee H after receiving signal being less than in preset time periodi0
And H0iMeet reciprocity, the preset time period is specially the coherence time of dissemination channel.
Further, in step (3) and step (7), passback be less than preset time period in carry out, the preset time period
The specially coherence time of dissemination channel.
The utility model has the advantages that compared with prior art, the present invention its remarkable advantage is: it is mutual based on channel that invention describes one kind
The easy channel characteristics of property and the separation method of equipment physical fingerprint feature.This method eliminates wireless channel spy using channel reciprocity
The influence to equipment physical fingerprint feature extraction is levied, and devises a kind of communication mechanism that Receiver And Transmitter is mutually authenticated,
The authentication of both devices can be realized in the uniqueness for effectively utilizing equipment physical fingerprint, and resist go-between and attack
It hits.Method includes the following two stage, and in the stage one, all legitimate devices pass through and the interaction of root device 0, obtains equivalent set
Standby physical fingerprint information is simultaneously stored in " the machine fingerprint " unit.Confirmation request is sent to transmitter in two receiver of stage, is connect
Receipts machine receive request after to receiver send pilot tone.After receiving pilot signal, the machine finger print information is added and is returned, sends out
The legitimacy of receiver device can be verified according to return path signal by penetrating machine.Receiver authentication success after, return confirmation at
Function frame.Then transmitter status is verified by above-mentioned similar step.It can set effectively eliminating channel characteristics using this method
Influence in standby physical features extraction process, and safely and efficiently realize the certification of Receiver And Transmitter both sides' identity.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow chart of the invention；
Fig. 2 is one equipment of stage interaction schematic diagram of the invention；
Fig. 3 is two equipment of stage interaction schematic diagram of the invention.
Specific embodiment
A kind of authentication method based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint is present embodiments provided,
As shown in Figure 1, this method includes two stages, finger print data establishment process when first stage before certification, when second stage
Verification process.
As shown in Fig. 2, the first stage the following steps are included:
Legitimate device i sends pilot tone P to root device 0, wherein i ∈ Ω, Ω are legitimate device set；It is solid for stating root device 0
It is fixed and secrecy；
Root device 0 receives the signal that legitimate device i is sent, and the signal Y that will be received01/Y reciprocal0It is legal to return to
Equipment i；Wherein, Y0=PFiTF0RHi0；Root device 0 be less than preset time period in returned, to guarantee Hi0And H0iMeet mutual
Yi Xing, the preset time period are specially the coherence time of dissemination channel；
Legitimate device i receives the signal that root device 0 returns, and according to the signal Y receivediThe equivalent of the machine is calculated
Physical fingerprint information Ci0, whereinHi0And H0iMeet reciprocity；
Equipment i is receiver if legal, then its Equivalent Physical finger print information is stored in the machine fingerprint unit, if hair
Machine is penetrated, then its Equivalent Physical finger print information is stored in the machine fingerprint unit, the transmitter fingerprint base being concurrently incident upon in receiver
In stored.
As shown in figure 3, second stage the following steps are included:
(1) receiver X to be verified sends certification request to transmitter j to be verified, and j ∈ Θ, Θ are transmitter collection to be verified
It closes；
(2) after transmitter j to be verified receives certification request, pilot tone P is sent to receiver X to be verified；
(3) receiver X to be verified receives the signal that transmitter j to be verified is sent, and the signal that will be receivedInverseWith the Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in the machine fingerprint unitX0Transmitter j to be verified is back to after multiplication；Wherein,Shaped like F*TThe transmitting fingerprint for indicating equipment *, shaped likeThe reception fingerprint for indicating equipment *, shaped like
Indicate equipment * to the radio channel characteristic between equipment；Passback be less than preset time period in carry out, the preset time period
The specially coherence time of dissemination channel；
(4) transmitter j to be verified receives the signal of receiver X passback to be verified, and calculates the signal receivedWith lead
The product of frequency PWherein,
(5) transmitter j to be verified willWith the Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in the machine fingerprint unitj0It carries out
It compares, if the two is equal, determines receiver X authentication success to be verified, and authenticate successfully to receiver X to be verified transmission
Message；Otherwise determine receiver X authentication failure to be verified, and send authentification failure message to receiver X to be verified, terminate
Communication；
(6) after the receiver X having verified that receives certification success message, the machine fingerprint list is sent to transmitter j to be verified
The Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in memberX0；
(7) transmitter j to be verified receives the signal that receiver X is sent, and the signal that will be receivedInverse
It is back to receiver X；Wherein,Passback be less than preset time period in carry out, the preset time
Section is specially the coherence time of dissemination channel；
(8) signal for the receiver X receiver/transmitter j passback having verified that, and calculate the signal receivedInverseWherein,
(9) the receiver X having verified that willWith transmitter Equivalent Physicals all in locally stored transmitter fingerprint base
Finger print information { Ci0| i=1 ..., N } it is compared, if there is some transmitter Equivalent Physical finger print informationThen determine transmitter j authentication success, carry out subsequent communications, otherwise determines authentication failure, terminate
Communication, wherein N is the transmitter finger print information sum stored in transmitter fingerprint base.
Wherein, the radio channel characteristic should be the channel frequency amplitude response feature that measurement obtains, or measure
The channel time domain shock response feature arrived, legitimate device is the equipment by authenticating, including all Receiver And Transmitters, if
It is subsequent to have newly-increased equipment, then the finger print data establishment process before authenticating is repeated, and update the transmitter fingerprint of all receivers
Library.
Using the inventive method can using equipment physical fingerprint carry out authentication during effectively eliminate letter
The influence of road feature, and man-in-the-middle attack can be resisted.
Above disclosed is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and the right model of the present invention cannot be limited with this
It encloses, therefore equivalent changes made in accordance with the claims of the present invention, is still within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. a kind of authentication method based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint, characterized by comprising:
(1) receiver X to be verified sends certification request to transmitter j to be verified, and j ∈ Θ, Θ are collection of transmitters to be verified；
(2) after transmitter j to be verified receives certification request, pilot tone P is sent to receiver X to be verified；
(3) receiver X to be verified receives the signal that transmitter j to be verified is sent, and the signal that will be receivedInverseWith the Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in the machine fingerprint unitX0Transmitter j to be verified is back to after multiplication；Wherein,Shaped like F*TThe transmitting fingerprint for indicating equipment *, shaped like F*RThe reception fingerprint for indicating equipment *, shaped like H*.Table
Show equipment * to the radio channel characteristic between equipment；
(4) transmitter j to be verified receives the signal of receiver X passback to be verified, and calculates the signal receivedWith pilot tone P's
ProductWherein,
(5) transmitter j to be verified willWith the Equivalent Physical finger print information C stored in the machine fingerprint unitj0It is compared,
If the two is equal, receiver X authentication success to be verified is determined, and send certification success message to receiver X to be verified；
Otherwise determine receiver X authentication failure to be verified, and send authentification failure message to receiver X to be verified, terminate communication；
(6) it after the receiver X having verified that receives certification success message, is sent in the machine fingerprint unit to transmitter j to be verified
The Equivalent Physical finger print information C of storageX0；
(7) transmitter j to be verified receives the signal that receiver X is sent, and the signal that will be receivedInversePassback
To receiver X；Wherein,
(8) signal for the receiver X receiver/transmitter j passback having verified that, and calculate the signal receivedInverseWherein,
(9) the receiver X having verified that willWith transmitter Equivalent Physical fingerprints all in locally stored transmitter fingerprint base
Information { Ci0| i=1 ..., N } it is compared, if there is some transmitter Equivalent Physical finger print informationThen
Determine transmitter j authentication success, carry out subsequent communications, otherwise determine authentication failure, terminate communication, wherein N is hair
Penetrate the transmitter finger print information sum stored in machine fingerprint base.
2. the authentication method according to claim 1 based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint,
It is characterized by: further include the finger print data establishment process before certification before step (1), specifically includes the following steps:
Legitimate device i sends pilot tone P to root device 0, wherein i ∈ Ω, Ω are legitimate device set；
Root device 0 receives the signal that legitimate device i is sent, and the signal Y that will be received01/Y reciprocal0Return to legitimate device
i；Wherein, Y0=PFiTF0RHi0；
Legitimate device i receives the signal that root device 0 returns, and according to the signal Y receivediThe Equivalent Physical of the machine is calculated
Finger print information Ci0, whereinHi0And H0iMeet reciprocity；
Equipment i is receiver if legal, then its Equivalent Physical finger print information is stored in the machine fingerprint unit, if transmitting
Its Equivalent Physical finger print information is then stored in the machine fingerprint unit by machine, is concurrently incident upon in the transmitter fingerprint base in receiver
It is stored.
3. the authentication method according to claim 2 based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint,
It is characterized by: the root device 0 is fixed and secrecy.
4. the authentication method of wireless channel reciprocity according to claim 2 and equipment physical fingerprint, special
Sign is: the legitimate device is by the equipment of certification, including all Receiver And Transmitters, if subsequent have newly-increased set
It is standby, then the finger print data establishment process before authenticating is repeated, and update the transmitter fingerprint base of all receivers.
5. the authentication side according to claim 1 or 2 based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint
Method, it is characterised in that: the radio channel characteristic should be the channel frequency amplitude response feature that measurement obtains, or measure
The channel time domain shock response feature arrived.
6. the authentication method according to claim 2 based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint,
It is characterized by: the root device 0 after receiving signal, is returned, to guarantee H being less than in preset time periodi0And H0iIt is full
Sufficient reciprocity, the preset time period are specially the coherence time of dissemination channel.
7. the authentication method according to claim 1 based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint,
It is characterized by: in step (3) and step (7), passback is carried out being less than in preset time period, and the preset time period is specially
The coherence time of dissemination channel.
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| CN201811138093.9A CN109302392B (en) | 2018-09-28 | 2018-09-28 | Equipment identity verification method based on wireless channel reciprocity and equipment physical fingerprint |
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| CN111565383A (en) * | 2020-05-18 | 2020-08-21 | 江苏电力信息技术有限公司 | Method for eliminating channel characteristics and extracting radio frequency fingerprint of ZigBee device |
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