CN109257388A - Pseudo-wire encryption method in a kind of MPLS-TP - Google Patents
Pseudo-wire encryption method in a kind of MPLS-TP Download PDFInfo
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- CN109257388A CN109257388A CN201811386848.7A CN201811386848A CN109257388A CN 109257388 A CN109257388 A CN 109257388A CN 201811386848 A CN201811386848 A CN 201811386848A CN 109257388 A CN109257388 A CN 109257388A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/68—Pseudowire emulation, e.g. IETF WG PWE3
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/50—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks using label swapping, e.g. multi-protocol label switch [MPLS]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0485—Networking architectures for enhanced packet encryption processing, e.g. offloading of IPsec packet processing or efficient security association look-up
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Pseudo-wire encryption method in a kind of MPLS-TP can solve the technical issues of lacking the solution exclusively for the End to End Encryption of pseudo-wire design in existing network.The following steps are included: S100: establishing pseudo-wire PW between two PE equipment；S200: association channel IKE-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；S300: transmitting ike negotiation message on association channel IKE-Channel, generates Security Association parameter SEC SA by ike negotiation；S400: association channel SEC-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；S500: with the algorithm and key negotiated in SEC SA, carrying out the encryption of service message and integrity verification in pseudo-wire, the transmission encryption message on association channel SEC-Channel.The present invention can be in existing MPLS-TP network equipment, realization encrypts the flow of the pseudo-wire in existing network, the safety of network is improved, and can be used in combination with novel quantum cryptography, national secret algorithm, can be flexibly deployed in existing network.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to fields of communication technology, and in particular to pseudo-wire encryption method in a kind of MPLS-TP.
Background technique
MPLS-TP is a kind of connection-oriented packet switching network technology, is the transmission proposed by ITU-T and IETF joint
The expansible MPLS architecture of demand realizes that these extensions are referred to as Transport Profile for MPLS (i.e. MPLS-TP).
MPLS-TP carries the business such as IP, Ethernet, ATM, TDM by pseudo-wire (PW, Pseudo Wire), and existing puppet line technology can
The circuit switching of good simulation end to end, but message plaintext transmission in pseudo-wire, lack a kind of encryption method.
IPSEC (Internet Protocol Security internet protocol secure) is a kind of frame knot of open standard
Structure ensures to be maintained secrecy on ip networks and the communication of safety by using the security service of encryption.IPSEC passes through ISAKMP
Protocol negotiation security alliance SA.ISAKMP(Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol) it is ipsec key management agreement, improves authentication and Internet Key Exchange for IPSEC.Security alliance SA
(Security Association) is the basis of IPSec, is a kind of agreement that communicating pair is established, determines for protecting number
According to the tunneling of packet, encryption and integrity verification algorithm, key and key validity period etc..IPSEC has ESP and two kinds of AH envelopes
Agreement is filled, ESP provides data encryption and integrity verification, and AH only carries out integrity verification without encryption.IPSEC general work
In network layer, and pseudo-wire active link layer, IPSEC cannot directly work on link layer, design so lacking exclusively for pseudo-wire
End to End Encryption solution.
Summary of the invention
Pseudo-wire encryption method in a kind of MPLS-TP proposed by the present invention can solve to lack in existing network exclusively for pseudo-wire
The technical issues of solution of the End to End Encryption of design.
To achieve the above object, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
Pseudo-wire encryption method in a kind of MPLS-TP, comprising the following steps:
S100: pseudo-wire PW is established between two PE equipment；
S200: association channel IKE-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；
S300: transmitting ike negotiation message on association channel IKE-Channel, generates Security Association ginseng by ike negotiation
Number SEC SA；
S400: association channel SEC-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；
S500: with the algorithm and key negotiated in SEC SA, carrying out the encryption of service message and integrity verification in pseudo-wire,
The transmission encryption message on association channel SEC-Channel.
Further, the pseudo-wire that step S100 can choose the pseudo-wire of static configuration or protocol dynamic is established.
Further, step S200 the following steps are included:
S201:IKE-Channel uses PW-ACH (PW Associated Channel as IKE protocol interaction channel
Header) format defines the association channel encapsulation format of pseudo-wire, and the value of the Channel Type of IKE-Channel can flexibly match
It sets, recommendation 99；
The complete package format of the upper transmitting message of S202:IKE-Channel is successively from the bottom to the outer: outer layer MPLS mark
Label, internal layer MPLS label, PW-ACH, IP, UDP, ISAKMP and ISAKMP load, wherein IP addresses are both ends
The interface IP address of PE equipment or the address loopback.
Further, step S300 the following steps are included:
S301: both ends PE respectively as IKE originating end and responder, carry out ike negotiation；
S302:IKE protocol version can support that IKEv1, IKEv2, IKE state is close, appointing in four kinds of protocol versions of IKE quantum
What is a kind of；
The IKE message that S303:PE is issued is encapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
The IKE message that S304:PE is received is decapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
S305:PE is issued and is received IKE message, is handled by IKE software module, is completed key exchange and is generated peace
Full alliance parameter SEC SA；
S306: both ends PE can be negotiated according to the fixed period by IKE again, update the key in SEC SA, to guarantee
Long-term safety.
Further, step S400 the following steps are included:
Transmission channel of the S401:SEC-Channel as service message, the association for defining pseudo-wire using PW-ACH format are logical
Road encapsulation format, the value flexibly configurable of the Channel Type of SEC-Channel, recommendation are 50 and 51, respectively indicate ESP
With AH encapsulation format；
The complete package format of the upper transmitting message of S402:SEC-Channel is successively from the bottom to the outer: outer layer MPLS mark
Label, internal layer MPLS label, PW-ACH, ESP or AH, message ciphertext or plaintext, ESP tail.
Further, step S500 the following steps are included:
S501: both ends PE simultaneously as encryption end and decrypting end, right respectively according to the algorithm and key negotiated in SEC SA
The service message of pseudo-wire carrying carries out encryption and decryption and integrity verification；
S502: encryption and decryption can support two kinds of encapsulation format of ESP and AH, the former can encrypt message and integrality is tested
Card, the latter only carry out integrity verification to message；
ESP the or AH message that S503:PE is issued is encapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
ESP the or AH message that S504:PE is received is decapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
S505:PE is issued and is received ESP or AH message, is handled by the encryption/decryption module of system.
Compared with prior art, the method that pseudo-wire encrypts in a kind of MPLS-TP provided by the invention has following beneficial
Effect:
It can realize and the flow of the pseudo-wire in existing network is encrypted in existing MPLS-TP network equipment, improve
The safety of network, and can be used in combination with novel quantum cryptography, national secret algorithm, it can flexibly be deployed to existing
Have in network.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow chart of the method for the present invention；
Fig. 2 is network topological diagram of the invention；
Fig. 3 is the schematic diagram of PW-ACH encapsulation format；
Fig. 4 is the schematic diagram of IKE-Channel encapsulation format；
Fig. 5 is the schematic diagram of SEC-Channel encapsulation format.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the object, technical scheme and advantages of the embodiment of the invention clearer, below in conjunction with the embodiment of the present invention
In attached drawing, technical scheme in the embodiment of the invention is clearly and completely described, it is clear that described embodiment is
A part of the embodiment of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.
As depicted in figs. 1 and 2, pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP described in the present embodiment, comprising the following steps:
S100: pseudo-wire PW is established between two PE equipment；
S200: association channel IKE-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；
S300: transmitting ike negotiation message on association channel IKE-Channel, generates Security Association ginseng by ike negotiation
Number SEC SA；
S400: association channel SEC-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；
S500: with the algorithm and key negotiated in SEC SA, carrying out the encryption of service message and integrity verification in pseudo-wire,
The transmission encryption message on association channel SEC-Channel.
The method that pseudo-wire encrypts in a kind of MPLS-TP, step S100 can choose the pseudo-wire of static configuration, or association
The pseudo-wire that view dynamic is established.
Specifically, step S200 the following steps are included:
S201:IKE-Channel uses PW-ACH (PW Associated Channel as IKE protocol interaction channel
Header) format defines the association channel encapsulation format (see Fig. 3) of pseudo-wire, and the value of the Channel Type of IKE-Channel can
Flexible configuration, recommendation 99；
The complete package format of the upper transmitting message of S202:IKE-Channel is successively from the bottom to the outer: outer layer MPLS mark
Label, internal layer MPLS label, PW-ACH, IP, UDP, ISAKMP and ISAKMP load, wherein IP addresses are both ends
The interface IP address of PE equipment or the address loopback, see Fig. 4.
Specifically, step S300 the following steps are included:
S301: both ends PE respectively as IKE originating end and responder, carry out ike negotiation；
S302:IKE protocol version can support that IKEv1, IKEv2, IKE state is close, appointing in four kinds of protocol versions of IKE quantum
What is a kind of；
The IKE message that S303:PE is issued is encapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
The IKE message that S304:PE is received is decapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
S305:PE is issued and is received IKE message, is handled by IKE software module, is completed key exchange and is generated peace
Full alliance parameter SEC SA；
S306: both ends PE can be negotiated according to the fixed period by IKE again, update the key in SEC SA, to guarantee
Long-term safety.
Specifically, step S400 the following steps are included:
Transmission channel of the S401:SEC-Channel as service message, the association for defining pseudo-wire using PW-ACH format are logical
Road encapsulation format (see Fig. 3), the value flexibly configurable of the Channel Type of SEC-Channel, recommendation are 50 and 51, respectively
Indicate ESP and AH encapsulation format；
The complete package format of the upper transmitting message of S402:SEC-Channel is successively from the bottom to the outer: outer layer MPLS mark
Label, internal layer MPLS label, PW-ACH, ESP or AH, message ciphertext or plaintext, ESP tail, are shown in Fig. 5.
Specifically, step S500 the following steps are included:
S501: both ends PE simultaneously as encryption end and decrypting end, right respectively according to the algorithm and key negotiated in SEC SA
The service message of pseudo-wire carrying carries out encryption and decryption and integrity verification；
S502: encryption and decryption can support two kinds of encapsulation format of ESP and AH, the former can encrypt message and integrality is tested
Card, the latter only carry out integrity verification to message；
ESP the or AH message that S503:PE is issued is encapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
ESP the or AH message that S504:PE is received is decapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
S505:PE is issued and is received ESP or AH message, is handled by the encryption/decryption module of system.
It is the specific example of the present embodiment below:
Negotiate to carry out pseudo-wire encryption using IKEv1；The following steps are included:
Step 1: establishing pseudo-wire PW, detailed step between two PE equipment are as follows: configure MPLS- between two PE equipment
TP, comprising:
1) IP address of equipment and routing are set；
2) VPWS example is defined；
3) port AC is configured；
4) pseudo wire parameter is configured；
Step 2: association channel IKE-Channel, detailed step are established on pseudo-wire PW are as follows: configuration IKE parameter set, packet
It includes:
1) version and mode of IKE, such as IKEv1 holotype；
2) enciphering and deciphering algorithm, such as AES-128；
3) integrity verification algorithm, such as SHA-256；
4) identity identifying method, such as wildcard；5) encapsulation format, such as ESP are selected.Then match on pseudo-wire PW
Association channel IKE-Channel is set, Channel-type value is set as 99, and is associated with and has just configured IKE parameter set；
Step 3: carrying out ike negotiation on association channel IKE-Channel, generate the Security Association parameter SA of SEC, in detail
Step are as follows:
Ike negotiation is carried out on association channel IKE-Channel, for example, by using IKEv1 holotype, the first stage uses 6
A IKE mutual message, carries out SA negotiation, Diffie-Hellman exchange, the authentication of wildcard, and second stage uses
Quick mode totally 3 IKE mutual messages, generate the Security Association parameter SA of SEC；
Step 4: association channel SEC-Channel, detailed step are established on pseudo-wire PW are as follows: be arranged SEC-Channel's
Channel-type is set as 50, encapsulates encryption message using ESP format；
Step 5: on association channel SEC-Channel, the encryption of service message in pseudo-wire is carried out with SEC SA, is walked in detail
Suddenly are as follows:
1) pseudo wire PDU encrypt when, using defined in SEC SA Security Association parameter Encryption Algorithm, key pair message into
Row encryption；
2) it using ciphertext as load, is packaged according to the format of SEC-Channel, is successively outer layer from the bottom to the outer
MPLS label, internal layer MPLS label, PW-ACH, ESP, message ciphertext, ESP tail；
3) when decrypting, MPLS label, PW-ACH head are successively parsed, obtains corresponding pseudo-wire and ESP encapsulated type value, parsing
ESP SPI values are obtained decryption SA parameter and message ciphertext are decrypted using this decipherment algorithm and key of SA parameter,
The service message carried in reduction pseudo-wire；
It can be in existing MPLS-TP net using the method for pseudo-wire encryption in a kind of MPLS-TP provided in an embodiment of the present invention
In network equipment, realization encrypts the flow of the pseudo-wire in existing network, improves the safety of network.
The above embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than its limitations；Although with reference to the foregoing embodiments
Invention is explained in detail, those skilled in the art should understand that: it still can be to aforementioned each implementation
Technical solution documented by example is modified or equivalent replacement of some of the technical features；And these modification or
Replacement, the spirit and scope for technical solution of various embodiments of the present invention that it does not separate the essence of the corresponding technical solution.
Claims (8)
1. pseudo-wire encryption method in a kind of MPLS-TP, which comprises the following steps:
S100: pseudo-wire PW is established between two PE equipment；
S200: association channel IKE-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；
S300: transmitting ike negotiation message on association channel IKE-Channel, generates Security Association parameter by ike negotiation
SEC SA；
S400: association channel SEC-Channel is established on pseudo-wire PW；
S500: with the algorithm and key negotiated in SEC SA, the encryption of service message and integrity verification in pseudo-wire is carried out, is being closed
Transmission encryption message on connection road SEC-Channel.
2. pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the puppet in the step S100
Line PW is the pseudo-wire of static configuration or the pseudo-wire that protocol dynamic is established.
3. pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the step S200 includes:
S201:IKE-Channel is encapsulated as IKE protocol interaction channel using the association channel that PW-ACH format defines pseudo-wire
Format；
The complete package format of the upper transmitting message of S202:IKE-Channel is successively from the bottom to the outer: outer layer MPLS label,
Internal layer MPLS label, PW-ACH, IP, UDP, ISAKMP and ISAKMP load, wherein IP addresses are both ends PE
The interface IP address of equipment or the address loopback.
4. pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP according to claim 1, it is characterised in that step S300 includes following step
It is rapid:
S301: both ends PE respectively as IKE originating end and responder, carry out ike negotiation；
S302:IKE protocol version supports that IKEv1, IKEv2, IKE state is close, any one of four kinds of protocol versions of IKE quantum；
The IKE message that S303:PE is issued is encapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
The IKE message that S304:PE is received is decapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
S305:PE is issued and is received IKE message, is handled by IKE software module, is completed key exchange and is generated safety connection
Alliance parameter SEC SA；
S306: both ends PE negotiates again according to the fixed period, by IKE, the key in SEC SA is updated, to guarantee long-term peace
Quan Xing.
5. pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP according to claim 1, it is characterised in that step S400 includes following step
It is rapid:
Transmission channel of the S401:SEC-Channel as service message is sealed using the association channel that PW-ACH format defines pseudo-wire
Fill format；
The complete package format of the upper transmitting message of S402:SEC-Channel is successively from the bottom to the outer: outer layer MPLS label,
Internal layer MPLS label, PW-ACH, ESP or AH, message ciphertext or plaintext, ESP tail.
6. pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP according to claim 1, it is characterised in that step S500 includes following step
It is rapid:
S501: both ends PE simultaneously as encryption end and decrypting end, respectively according to the algorithm and key negotiated in SEC SA, to pseudo-wire
The service message of carrying carries out encryption and decryption and integrity verification；
S502: encryption and decryption supports two kinds of encapsulation format of ESP and AH, the former can encrypt to message and integrity verification, the latter
Integrity verification only is carried out to message；
ESP the or AH message that S503:PE is issued is encapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
ESP the or AH message that S504:PE is received is decapsulated according to PW-ACH format；
S505:PE is issued and is received ESP or AH message, is handled by the encryption/decryption module of system.
7. pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP according to claim 3, which is characterized in that IKE- in step S201
The value of the Channel Type of Channel is 99.
8. pseudo-wire encryption method in MPLS-TP according to claim 5, which is characterized in that step S401SEC-Channel
As the transmission channel of service message, the association channel encapsulation format of pseudo-wire is defined using PW-ACH format, SEC-Channel's
The value of Channel Type is 50 and 51, respectively indicates ESP and AH encapsulation format.
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| CN111404812A (en) * | 2020-03-25 | 2020-07-10 | 新华三信息安全技术有限公司 | Communication method and device |
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Application publication date: 20190122 |