CN109190725A - A kind of RFID mutual authentication method - Google Patents
A kind of RFID mutual authentication method Download PDFInfo
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- CN109190725A CN109190725A CN201810792139.2A CN201810792139A CN109190725A CN 109190725 A CN109190725 A CN 109190725A CN 201810792139 A CN201810792139 A CN 201810792139A CN 109190725 A CN109190725 A CN 109190725A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K17/00—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations
- G06K17/0022—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations arrangements or provisious for transferring data to distant stations, e.g. from a sensing device
- G06K17/0029—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations arrangements or provisious for transferring data to distant stations, e.g. from a sensing device the arrangement being specially adapted for wireless interrogation of grouped or bundled articles tagged with wireless record carriers
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
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Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of RFID mutual authentication method.Method includes: the first parameter C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and the reader account address RAddress for receiving reader and sending；It is stored with label account address TAddress in the block chain of self maintained if knowing, according to label account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and random number N, generates the second parameter C2；If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, then determine this reader to smart-tag authentication success, and according to label account balance balanceBC and random number N, it generates third parameter C3 and label is sent to by reader, so that label is based on third parameter C3, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader.Block chain technology is combined with RFID technique, since block chain is substantially by the distributed account book of each node maintenance in network, method provided by the invention can guarantee privacy of each label in the case where no database and trusted third party while completing safety certification.
Description
Technical field
The present embodiments relate to technical field of RFID more particularly to a kind of RFID mutual authentication methods.
Background technique
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is quickly grown in recent years, is widely used in stock control, supply chain, tracking of products,
Transport, the various applications such as logistics and self-service supermarket.RFID system is usually by one or more RFID readers, large quantities of RFID marks
Label and a back-end server composition.Each label is attached on a physical object, reader can by with it is corresponding
Label is communicated to identify or track object.Since the communication between label and reader is wirelessly transferred by radiofrequency signal
, attacker can be implemented eavesdrop, reset, distorting, the attack of the types such as Dos, with this get sensitive tags information or
Influence the normal work of entire RFID system.In order to solve these problems, many certification security protocols are suggested.
Earliest RFID authentication protocol is the Hash-Lock agreement that Sarma et al. is proposed.The verification process of this agreement is as schemed
Shown in 1, Fig. 1 is Hash-Lock protocol authentication process figure.Each tag memory stores up { metaID, the ID } field of oneself, wherein
MetaID is that hash Function Mapping label key key is obtained.Store n item { metaID, ID, key } note in background server
Record, respectively corresponds n label.After verification process starts, reader sends a Request inquiry first and starts to communicate.Label
After receiving this message, the metaID that oneself is stored is sent to reader.After reader receives, metaID is continued after sending to
Hold server.After server receives, check that metaID therein is consistent with what is received with the presence or absence of a record in database,
If it exists, corresponding ID and key are just issued into reader, otherwise authentification failure stops.Reader is sent receiving server
{ ID, key } after, key is sent to label, after label receives, calculate hash (key) whether with oneself storage metaID mono-
It causes, smart-tag authentication reader passes through if consistent, and ID is then sent to reader, and otherwise, authentification failure stops.Reader
After receiving the ID that label sends over, compared with the ID that server sends over, it is identical if then reader authenticating tag
Success, otherwise authentification failure stops.
It is subsequent that a large amount of RFID protocols have continuously emerged in order to improve every safety of initial RFID protocol.Such as it is random
The Hash-Lock agreement of change, Hash chain agreement, the ID variation agreement based on Hash, digital library's RFID protocol of David and
Distributed RFID challenge-response authentication protocol etc..These agreements all improve some or certain several aspects on the basis of original
Safety, keep the application of RFID more and more mature.For example the Hash-Lock agreement being randomized introduces the concept of random number,
The random number that one changes all is added in hash calculating by the interaction of every secondary label and reader, to be further ensured that label
The privacy of ID.And digital library's RFID protocol of David not only introduces random number, is also applied to encryption and decryption technology
It is a kind of RFID protocol that the pseudo random number based on pre-shared secret is realized in agreement, the design of this agreement does not occur ratio
Obvious security breaches.
Original RFID protocol more or less can all have loophole of certain attack, such as in Hash-Lock agreement, random
In the Hash-Lock agreement of change, Hash chain agreement, tag ID is with plaintext transmission, cannot resist Replay Attack, personation is attacked
Hit, track attack etc..In the ID variation agreement based on Hash, since back-end server updates label information and tag update
Time irreversibility causes electronic tag to can not receive partial authentication message so if attacker carries out data jamming or interference
If, it will result in server and store the failure that label data is asynchronous with label data, causes authenticate next time.Even safety
Property higher agreement, such as digital library's RFID protocol of David, because label must complete generating random number machine encryption and decryption behaviour
Make, therefore increase the complexity of label design, improves design cost, be not suitable for the RFID system of small cost.
The common fault of one existing RFID protocol is exactly that the process of authentication needs the concentration of storage in the server
Database is supported, therefore this authentication process itself is easy to be attacked by SQL.Once this integrated data store is attacked,
Entire RFID system all may paralysis.And the framework of this centralization is suitable for application in distributed system, Wu Fabao
The privacy requirement of each subdivision in card system.Even if existing for the RFID protocol of Distributed system design, and uses and draw
Enter the mode of trusted third party, this further increases the communications cost of system.
Summary of the invention
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of RFID mutual authentication method, to solve the association of RFID two-way authentication in the prior art
View safety is insufficient and is not suitable for the defect of distributed system, improves the safety of certification, also, is suitable for distributed system
System.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of RFID mutual authentication method, comprising:
With receiving the first parameter C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and the reader account that reader is sent
Location RAddress；
Label account address TAddress is stored in the block chain of self maintained if knowing, according to label account address
TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and random number N generate the second parameter C2；
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, determines that this reader is successful to smart-tag authentication, and root
According to label account balance balanceBC and random number N, generates third parameter C3 and label is sent to by reader, so that
Label is based on third parameter C3, obtains label to the authentication result of reader；
Wherein, the first parameter C1 is label according to label account address TAddress, label remaining sum balance and reader
The random number N of transmission generates, and label account address TAddress is that block chain is generated according to tag ID, reader account address
RAddress is that block chain is generated according to reader ID.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of RFID mutual authentication method, comprising:
If the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, the third parameter C3 of server transmission is received；
Based on third parameter C3, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader；
Wherein, third parameter C3 is generated according to label account balance balanceBC and random number N, and the first parameter C1 is by reading
Write device and be sent to server, the second parameter C2 according to label account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and with
Machine number N is generated.
A kind of RFID mutual authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present invention, by mutually tying block chain technology with RFID technique
It closes, since block chain is substantially by the distributed account book of each node maintenance in network, the embodiment of the present invention is provided
Method can guarantee each label in the case where no database and trusted third party while completing safety certification
Privacy.
Detailed description of the invention
In order to more clearly explain the embodiment of the invention or the technical proposal in the existing technology, to embodiment or will show below
There is attached drawing needed in technical description to be briefly described, it should be apparent that, the accompanying drawings in the following description is this hair
Bright some embodiments for those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts, can be with root
Other attached drawings are obtained according to these attached drawings.
Fig. 1 is Hash-Lock protocol authentication process figure；
Fig. 2 is according to a kind of RFID mutual authentication method flow chart provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
According to Fig. 3 another embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of RFID mutual authentication method flow chart；
Fig. 4 is according to a kind of multi-sector cooperation distributed RFID system tray based on block chain provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Composition；
Fig. 5 is to be mutually authenticated RFID protocol figure according to one kind provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 6 is according to a kind of structural block diagram of server provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 7 is according to a kind of structural block diagram of label provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the object, technical scheme and advantages of the embodiment of the invention clearer, below in conjunction with the embodiment of the present invention
In attached drawing, technical scheme in the embodiment of the invention is clearly and completely described, it is clear that described embodiment is
A part of the embodiment of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.Based on the embodiments of the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art
Every other embodiment obtained without creative efforts, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Reader in RFID technique can by being communicated with the label being arranged on target object, and then identify or
Track object.Reader can be written and read label, since the communication between label and reader is believed by radio frequency
Number wireless transmission, attacker can be implemented eavesdrop, reset, distorting, the attack of the types such as Dos, sensitivity is got with this
Label information or the normal work for influencing entire RFID system, therefore, many RFID two-way authentication security protocols are suggested.RFID
The purpose of two-way authentication is exactly to prevent some or all of storage information in unauthorized reader browsing label, and authorize legal read
Read the ability that device distinguishes legitimate tag and illegal label.It should be noted that in following embodiment, RFID mutual authentication method
It can be described as RFID bidirectional identification protocol, i.e. method and agreement has same meaning.
Fig. 2 is according to a kind of RFID mutual authentication method flow chart provided in an embodiment of the present invention, the execution master of this method
Body is server, as shown in Fig. 2, this method comprises:
Step 201: receiving the first parameter C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and read-write that reader is sent
Device account address RAddress.
Step 202: label account address TAddress is stored with if knowing in the block chain of self maintained, according to label
Account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and random number N generate the second parameter C2.
Step 203: if knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, determine this reader to smart-tag authentication at
Function, and according to label account balance balanceBC and random number N, it generates third parameter C3 and label is sent to by reader,
So that label is based on third parameter C3, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader.
Wherein, the first parameter C1 is label according to label account address TAddress, label remaining sum balance and reader
The random number N of transmission generates, and label account address TAddress is that block chain is generated according to tag ID, reader account address
RAddress is that block chain is generated according to reader ID.
It should be noted that the hardware device being related in the embodiment of the present invention are as follows: server, reader and label.Its
In, server assists label to obtain for obtaining reader to the authentication result of label, and when authentication result is to authenticate successfully
Label is to the authentication result of reader, to complete the two-way authentication of reader and label.
Wherein, the detailed process of step 201 are as follows: server receives reader and sends the first parameter C1, random number N, label
Account address TAddress and reader account address RAddress.
The detailed process of step 202 are as follows: the block chain of self maintained is traversed, if being stored with label account address in block chain
TAddress then takes out label account balance balanceBC from block chain, and is based on XOR operation and one-way hash function operation,
According to label account address TAddress, account balance balanceBC and the random number N received, calculates and generate the second parameter
C2, specific formula for calculation are as follows:
C2=H (TAddress ⊕ balanceBC ⊕ N)；
Wherein, ⊕ is XOR operation, and H () is one-way hash function operation.
The detailed process of step 203 are as follows: the first parameter C1 and the second parameter C2 are compared by server, if comparison result
It is equal for the two, then determine this reader to smart-tag authentication success.And it is based on XOR operation and one-way hash function operation, according to mark
Account balance balanceBC and random number N are signed, calculates and generates third parameter C3, and third parameter C3 is sent to reader, with
So that third parameter C3 is transmitted to label by reader, and then so that label obtains mark based on the third parameter C3 received
Sign the authentication result to reader.Wherein, the specific formula for calculation of third parameter C3 is as follows:
C3=H (balanceBC ⊕ N)；
Wherein, ⊕ is XOR operation, and H () is one-way hash function operation.
It should be noted that the embodiment of the present invention combines block chain technology with RFID technique, by the service in RFID
Device is run as the node in block chain, and all nodes (namely server) in block chain safeguard block chain jointly.For one
The label that can be accessed for a server it comprises all nodes of a batch and the relevant account of reader.
The generating process of label account address TAddress is as follows: using tag ID as password, being generated using block chain public
Key address, and using the public key address as label account address.The generating process of reader account address RAddress is as follows: with
Reader ID generates public key address as password, using block chain, and using the public key address as reader account address.Each
Label stores { TAddress, the balance } of itself, and each reader stores the RAddress of itself.Each mark in block chain
The account balance balanceBC of label is initialized to the random number between (0,10), and store remaining sum value in the label namely
Label remaining sum balance is initialized to balanceBC+M.Wherein, M is the gold of label account and the every transaction of reader account
Volume.
Method provided in an embodiment of the present invention combines block chain technology with RFID technique, substantially due to block chain
It is by the distributed account book of each node maintenance in network, therefore method provided in an embodiment of the present invention can complete safety
Guarantee privacy of each label in the case where no database and trusted third party while certification.To common attack (such as
Replay Attack, active attack, Dos attack, desynchronization attack) fully against, and do not use any Additional Protection technology
Under the premise of eradicate all potential database attacks；The communications records of each RFID tag and reader be all it is traceable and
It is not revisable；Also, each subsystem in distributed system has the secret label information of oneself, these information do not include
In the server.Insensitive label information is shared between subsystem to carry out subsequent operation, is not necessarily to central server or trust
Third party.
Based on the above embodiment, method provided in this embodiment further include:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, and it is abnormal to determine last verification process, and is recorded in certainly
In the block chain of body maintenance；Wherein, verification process is certification information drop-out or is intercepted extremely.
Specifically, if server knows that the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, determine this reader to label
It authenticates successfully, also, determines that last verification process is abnormal, and be recorded in the block chain of self maintained.
Based on the above embodiment, method provided in this embodiment further include:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 and the second parameter C2 are unequal, according to label account address TAddress, label account
Family remaining sum balanceBC, transaction amount M and random number N generate the 4th parameter C4.
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the 4th parameter C4, determines that this reader is successful to smart-tag authentication, and on
One time verification process is normal, and is updated according to transaction amount M to label account balance balanceBC, and according to update after
Label account balance balanceBC and random number N, generate the 5th parameter C5 simultaneously label is sent to by reader so that
Label is based on the 5th parameter C5, obtains label to the authentication result of reader.
Specifically, if server knows that the two is unequal by comparing the first parameter C1 and the second parameter C2, the is generated
Four parameter C4, and reader is obtained to the authentication result of label result volume based on the 4th parameter C4.Wherein, the meter of the 4th parameter C4
Calculate formula are as follows:
C4=H (TAddress ⊕ (balanceBC ⊕ M) ⊕ N)
Wherein, ⊕ is XOR operation, and H () is one-way hash function operation.
After server generates the 4th parameter C4, the first parameter C1 is compared with the 4th parameter C4, if the two is equal,
Determine that reader is sent to reader to smart-tag authentication success, and after generating the 5th parameter C5, so that reader is joined the 5th
Number C5 is forwarded to label, and then so that label obtains label to the authentication result of reader based on the 5th parameter C5.Wherein,
The calculation formula of five parameter C5 are as follows:
C5=H (balanceBC' ⊕ N)
Wherein, ⊕ is XOR operation, and H () is one-way hash function operation, and balanceBC' is according to transaction amount M to label account
The updated label account balance that family remaining sum balanceBC is obtained after being updated.
Based on the above embodiment, method provided in this embodiment further include:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, and label account balance balanceBC is remained unchanged.
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the 4th parameter C4, according to transaction amount M to account balance balanceBC into
Row updates.
Specifically, if server knows that the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2 or the first parameter C1 and the 4th parameter C4
It is equal, then determine reader to smart-tag authentication success.Wherein, if C1==C2, balanceBC are remained unchanged, if C1==
C4, then updating balanceBC is balanceBC'=balanceBC+M.
Based on the above embodiment, method provided in this embodiment further include:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 and the 4th parameter C4 are unequal, determine that reader fails to smart-tag authentication.
Based on the above embodiment, method provided in this embodiment further include:
If know it is not stored in block chain have label account address TAddress, determine reader to smart-tag authentication lose
It loses.
According to Fig. 3 another embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of RFID mutual authentication method flow chart, executing subject
For label, as shown in figure 3, this method comprises:
301: if the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, receiving the third parameter C3 of server transmission.
302: being based on third parameter C3, obtain label to the authentication result of reader.
Wherein, third parameter C3 is generated according to label account balance balanceBC and random number N, and the first parameter C1 is by reading
Write device and be sent to server, the second parameter C2 according to label account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and with
Machine number N is generated.
Specifically, if server sends third parameter C3 to reader, third parameter C3 is transmitted to label by reader.
If label receives third parameter C3, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader based on third parameter C3, authentication result is
Label is to the certification success of reader or authentification failure.It should be noted that each parameter is in the present embodiment or above-mentioned implementation
It is illustrated in example, details are not described herein again.
Based on the above embodiment, method provided in this embodiment further include:
If the first parameter C1 is equal with the 4th parameter C4, the 5th parameter C5 of server transmission is received；
Based on the 5th parameter C5, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader；
Wherein, the 5th parameter C5 is generated according to updated label account balance balanceBC and random number N, the 4th ginseng
Number C4 is generated according to label account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC, transaction amount M and random number N.
Based on the above embodiment, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader, further comprises:
According to label remaining sum balance and random number N, the 6th parameter C6 is obtained；
If knowing, third parameter C3 and the 6th parameter C6 are equal, alternatively, the 5th parameter C5 and the 6th parameter C6 are equal, then sentence
Calibration label authenticate successfully reader.Otherwise, it is determined that label is to reader authentification failure, the further communication of label refusal.6th
The specific formula for calculation of parameter C6 is as follows:
C6=H (balance ⊕ N)；
Wherein, ⊕ is XOR operation, and H () is one-way hash function operation.
Based on the above embodiment, method provided in an embodiment of the present invention further include:
If label authenticates successfully reader, according to transaction amount M, label remaining sum balance is updated.Specifically
More new formula are as follows:
Balance'=balance+M
Based on the above embodiment, the third parameter C3 or receive the 5th parameter that server is sent that server is sent are received
C5, before further include:
Receive the random number N that reader is sent；According to label account address TAddress, label remaining sum balance and with
Machine number N generates the first parameter C1；First parameter C1 and label account address TAddress are sent to reader, so that reading
It writes device and the first parameter C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and reader account address RAddress is sent to clothes
Business device.
The scheme of embodiment in order to better illustrate the present invention is illustrated below by way of specific citing:
Fig. 4 is according to a kind of multi-sector cooperation distributed RFID system tray based on block chain provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Composition, as shown in figure 4, applying method provided in an embodiment of the present invention in following field:
A company has multiple departments or branch, especially some of them to be dispersed in different regions, is even distributed through
Different countries, internal network are difficult to be interconnected.By taking personnel's access control system based on RFID as an example, it needs high security,
But real-time and throughput require lower.Each department has one, and sensitive<real object --- tag ID>table, cannot be by
Other departments know.But some information that the operation and management of company requires department to share label were authenticated with completing RFID
Journey.So how while meeting company's actual demand guarantee department privacy be that new RFID system and agreement should be realized
It is required that.Moreover, the stationary problem in distributed RFID system is also urgently when adding new label or every wheel updates certification message
It solves.
In embodiments of the present invention, a privately owned block chain is sufficient for the requirement of RFID system in above-mentioned company.At this
In the case of kind, multiple departments safeguard privately owned block chain together and execute identical authentication protocol process.The system model can
To ensure to share non-sensitive label information to be authenticated, while can be believed by the secret label inside protection department arranged below
Breath:
(1) each department has several servers as the node operation on block chain, and each node includes a collection of institute
The relevant account of label and reader for having node that can access.
(2) using label or reader ID as password, block chain can generate the public key address of 20 bytes as account
Identifier (in ether mill).Each department is respective, and<real object --- ID --- account addresses>mapping table are stored remotely from whole
The secret location of a system, it is impossible to derive the incidence relation of true ID and account addresses.
Mutually the recognizing each other based on block chain of proposition of the embodiment of the present invention is described below in system architecture diagram based on shown in Fig. 4
RFID protocol is demonstrate,proved, wherein the symbol description used such as table 1, as figure 5 illustrates, table 1 is the symbol description table used in agreement to protocol figure,
Fig. 5 is to be mutually authenticated RFID protocol figure according to one kind provided in an embodiment of the present invention.Detailed process is as follows:
(1) initial phase: in initial phase, use label or reader ID as password, block chain generates public key
Address is as account identifier.Each label stores tuple { TAddress, balance }, and each reader stores RAddress.
Since reader is the initiator of entire agreement, so its account must have primary balance, this can be before agreement starts
It is realized by default setting.Each label account real remaining sum (balanceBC) in block chain is initialised in block chain
For the random number between (0,10), and the account balance (balance) stored in label is initialized to balanceBC+M.
(2) authentication phase:
(a) reader: reader generates a random number N and sends it to label.
(b) label: label calculates C1=H (TAddress ⊕ balance ⊕ N), and (C1, TAddress) is sent back to reading
Write device.
(c) reader: reader sends (C1, N, TAddress, RAddress) and carries out smart-tag authentication to server.
(d) it server: after server receives (C1, N, TAddress, the RAddress) that reader is sent, first checks for
TAddress whether there is.If TAddress is not present, smart-tag authentication failure, server stops session.Otherwise, it inquires
The remaining sum balanceBC of the corresponding label account of TAddress, then executes following steps.
Judgement: server calculates C2=H (TAddress ⊕ balanceBC ⊕ N).If C1==C2, then it represents that upper one
The last item information drop-out of secondary certification is intercepted by attacker；If C1 ≠ C2, server calculates C4=H (TAddress
(balanceBC⊕M)⊕N).If C1==C4, then it represents that last time certification is complete.If above-mentioned two situations are not
Meet, smart-tag authentication failure, server stops session, and no longer execution following steps are updated, sent, e) and f).
It updates: if comparison result is C1==C2 in previous step, being recorded in block chain related to the label account
Interception record, balanceBC remains unchanged (i.e. balanceBC'=balanceBC).Server calculates C3=H
(balanceBC ⊕ N), and C3 is sent to reader.If comparison result is C1==C4, server can unlock reader
Account, and from reader account to the transmission M of label, and update balanceBC (i.e. balanceBC'=balanceBC+M).
Server calculates C5=H (balanceBC' ⊕ N), and C5 is sent to reader.
(e) reader: reader receives C3 (or C5) and is then forwarded to label.
(f) label: label calculates C6=H (balance ⊕ N), and checks whether equation C6==C3 (or C5) is true.Such as
Fruit is set up, label success identity reader, and updates balance'=balance+M.If not, authentification failure, label are refused
Further communication absolutely.
The symbol description table used in 1 agreement of table
The key point of the embodiment of the present invention is that the embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of novel point based on block chain
Cloth RFID two-way authentication security protocol.Since block chain is substantially by the distributed account of each node maintenance in network
This, therefore agreement provided in an embodiment of the present invention can guarantee each department in no database while completing safety certification
With the privacy in the case where trusted third party.
The embodiment of the present invention has the beneficial effect that:
This agreement ensure that the privacy of each department: address and remaining sum due to pertaining only to label account in agreement, and each
Department<real object --- ID --- account addresses>mapping table can only be stored voluntarily, so sensitivity ID relevant information will not be saturating
It crosses information used in agreement to be leaked, it ensure that the privacy of department.
This agreement ensure that following safety: label anonymity, label availability, forward security, resist Replay Attack,
Resist active attack, part protection label anonymity controlled.Specifically it is analyzed as follows.
(1) label anonymity: in agreement provided in an embodiment of the present invention, the true ID of label is hidden in initial phase
Account addresses (TAddress) on entitled block chain.In verification process, every message is all by the list assisted by random number N
Protection to hash hash function, therefore this agreement can protect the anonymity of label.
(2) label availability: label availability generally includes to resist DoS attack and resists desynchronization attack.In the present invention
In the agreement that embodiment provides, label does not need to have the function of generation random number, thus will not because random number is depleted and
Refusal service.In addition, even if last reader verifying information drop-out or being intercepted by attacker, will not cause label information with
Block chain loses synchronization.This is because server will judge C1 it is whether consistent with C2 or C4, in both cases, no matter label
The message whether is received before, can verify label.
(3) forward security: protocol realization forward security be because label can before hash by TAddress, N,
Balance does XOR operation.Since N and balance can change in each round, so even if attacker knows currently
Balance and N, he will not know previous Hash result, it ensure that forward security.
(4) resist Replay Attack: similar with forward secrecy, reader will generate in each round a new random number N,
BalanceBC and balance can also change.So he can not also lead to even if attacker has intercepted last round of all message
Playback message is crossed to pass through authentication.
(5) resist active attack: consider attacker can with random number N ' actively address inquires to label, then obtain sound from label
Answer { C1'=H (TAddress ⊕ balance ⊕ N'), TAddress }.But since hash is one-way function, he can not
Balance is exported from C1' reverse push.Therefore, when valid reader is addressed inquires to random number N, he can not construct one just
True message returns to reader, also means that he can not pretend to be legitimate tag further to be communicated, i.e., the present invention is real
The agreement of example offer is applied fully against active attack.
(6) label anonymity controlled: strictly speaking, agreement provided in an embodiment of the present invention may suffer from tracking attack.
Because it uses identical TAddress in each certification.Even if attacker finds identical TAddress twice, he
It can not be inferred to the true ID number of the label, it means that this agreement ensure that label untraceable to a certain extent.
Fig. 6 is according to a kind of structural block diagram of server provided in an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 6, the equipment packet
It includes: processor (processor) 601, memory (memory) 602 and bus 603；Wherein, it the processor 601 and described deposits
Reservoir 602 completes mutual communication by the bus 603；The processor 601 is for calling in the memory 602
Program instruction, to execute method provided by above-mentioned each method embodiment, for example, receive the first parameter that reader is sent
C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and reader account address RAddress；If knowing the block of self maintained
Label account address TAddress is stored in chain, then according to label account address TAddress, label account balance
BalanceBC and random number N generate the second parameter C2；If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, determines this
Reader generates third parameter C3 and leads to smart-tag authentication success, and according to label account balance balanceBC and random number N
It crosses reader and is sent to label, so that label is based on third parameter C3, obtain label to the authentication result of reader.
Fig. 7 is according to a kind of structural block diagram of label provided in an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 7, the equipment includes:
Processor (processor) 701, memory (memory) 702 and bus 703；Wherein, the processor 701 and the storage
Device 702 completes mutual communication by the bus 703；The processor 701 is used to call the journey in the memory 702
Sequence instruction, to execute method provided by above-mentioned each method embodiment, for example, if the first parameter C1 and the second parameter C2 phase
Deng, then receive server transmission third parameter C3；Based on third parameter C3, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader.
The embodiment of the present invention discloses a kind of computer program product, and the computer program product is non-transient including being stored in
Computer program on computer readable storage medium, the computer program include program instruction, when described program instructs quilt
When computer executes, computer is able to carry out method provided by above-mentioned each method embodiment, for example, receives reader hair
The first parameter C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and the reader account address RAddress sent；If knowing certainly
It is stored with label account address TAddress in the block chain of body maintenance, then according to label account address TAddress, label account
Family remaining sum balanceBC and random number N generate the second parameter C2；If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, sentences
This fixed reader generates third parameter to smart-tag authentication success, and according to label account balance balanceBC and random number N
C3 is simultaneously sent to label by reader, so that label is based on third parameter C3, obtains label to the authentication result of reader.
The embodiment of the present invention discloses a kind of computer program product, and the computer program product is non-transient including being stored in
Computer program on computer readable storage medium, the computer program include program instruction, when described program instructs quilt
When computer executes, computer is able to carry out method provided by above-mentioned each method embodiment, for example, if the first parameter C1
It is equal with the second parameter C2, then receive the third parameter C3 of server transmission；Based on third parameter C3, label is obtained to reader
Authentication result.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of non-transient computer readable storage medium, the non-transient computer readable storage
Medium storing computer instruction, the computer instruction make the computer execute side provided by above-mentioned each method embodiment
Method, for example, receive the first parameter C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and reader account that reader is sent
Family address RAddress；Label account address TAddress is stored in the block chain of self maintained if knowing, according to label
Account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and random number N generate the second parameter C2；If knowing the first parameter
C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, then it is successful to smart-tag authentication to determine this reader, and according to label account balance balanceBC
And random number N, it generates third parameter C3 and label is sent to by reader, so that label is based on third parameter C3, obtain
Authentication result of the label to reader.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of non-transient computer readable storage medium, the non-transient computer readable storage
Medium storing computer instruction, the computer instruction make the computer execute side provided by above-mentioned each method embodiment
Method, for example, if the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, receive the third parameter C3 of server transmission；Based on
Three parameter C3 obtain label to the authentication result of reader.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that: realize that all or part of the steps of above method embodiment can pass through
The relevant hardware of program instruction is completed, and program above-mentioned can be stored in a computer readable storage medium, the program
When being executed, step including the steps of the foregoing method embodiments is executed；And storage medium above-mentioned includes: ROM, RAM, magnetic disk or light
The various media that can store program code such as disk.
Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can be understood that each embodiment can
It realizes by means of software and necessary general hardware platform, naturally it is also possible to pass through hardware.Based on this understanding, on
Stating technical solution, substantially the part that contributes to existing technology can be embodied in the form of software products in other words, should
Computer software product may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, such as ROM/RAM, magnetic disk, CD, including several fingers
It enables and using so that a computer equipment (can be personal computer, server or the network equipment etc.) executes each implementation
Method described in certain parts of example or embodiment.
Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than its limitations；Although
Present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that: it still may be used
To modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments or equivalent replacement of some of the technical features；
And these are modified or replaceed, technical solution of various embodiments of the present invention that it does not separate the essence of the corresponding technical solution spirit and
Range.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of RFID mutual authentication method characterized by comprising
Receive the first parameter C1, random number N, label account address TAddress and reader account address that reader is sent
RAddress；
Label account address TAddress is stored in the block chain of self maintained if knowing, according to label account address
TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and random number N generate the second parameter C2；
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, it is successful to smart-tag authentication to determine this reader, and according to mark
Account balance balanceBC and random number N are signed, third parameter C3 is generated and label is sent to by reader, so that label
Based on third parameter C3, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader；
Wherein, the first parameter C1 is that label is sent according to label account address TAddress, label remaining sum balance and reader
Random number N generate, label account address TAddress be block chain generated according to tag ID, reader account address
RAddress is that block chain is generated according to reader ID.
2. the method according to claim 1, wherein further include:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, and it is abnormal to determine last verification process, and is recorded in itself dimension
In the block chain of shield；Wherein, verification process is certification information drop-out or is intercepted extremely.
3. the method according to claim 1, wherein further include:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 and the second parameter C2 are unequal, more than label account address TAddress, label account
Volume balanceBC, transaction amount M and random number N generate the 4th parameter C4；
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the 4th parameter C4, determines that this reader is successful to smart-tag authentication, and last
Verification process is normal, and is updated according to transaction amount M to label account balance balanceBC, and according to updated mark
Account balance balanceBC and random number N are signed, the 5th parameter C5 is generated and label is sent to by reader, so that label
Based on the 5th parameter C5, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader.
4. according to the method described in claim 3, it is characterized by further comprising:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, and label account balance balanceBC is remained unchanged；
If knowing, the first parameter C1 is equal with the 4th parameter C4, is carried out more according to transaction amount M to account balance balanceBC
Newly.
5. according to the method described in claim 3, it is characterized by further comprising:
If knowing, the first parameter C1 and the 4th parameter C4 are unequal, determine that reader fails to smart-tag authentication.
6. the method according to claim 1, wherein further include:
If know it is not stored in block chain have label account address TAddress, determine reader to smart-tag authentication fail.
7. a kind of RFID mutual authentication method characterized by comprising
If the first parameter C1 is equal with the second parameter C2, the third parameter C3 of server transmission is received；
Based on third parameter C3, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader；
Wherein, third parameter C3 is generated according to label account balance balanceBC and random number N, and the first parameter C1 is by reader
It is sent to server, the second parameter C2 is according to label account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC and random number
N is generated.
8. the method according to the description of claim 7 is characterized in that further include:
If the first parameter C1 is equal with the 4th parameter C4, the 5th parameter C5 of server transmission is received；
Based on the 5th parameter C5, label is obtained to the authentication result of reader；
Wherein, the 5th parameter C5 is generated according to updated label account balance balanceBC and random number N, the 4th parameter C4
It is generated according to label account address TAddress, label account balance balanceBC, transaction amount M and random number N.
9. according to the method described in claim 8, it is characterized in that, obtaining label to the authentication result of reader, further packet
It includes:
According to label remaining sum balance and random number N, the 6th parameter C6 is obtained；
If knowing, third parameter C3 and the 6th parameter C6 are equal, alternatively, the 5th parameter C5 and the 6th parameter C6 are equal, then determine to mark
Label authenticate successfully reader.
10. the method according to the description of claim 7 is characterized in that further include:
If label authenticates successfully reader, according to transaction amount M, label remaining sum balance is updated.
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| CN201810792139.2A CN109190725B (en) | 2018-07-18 | 2018-07-18 | RFID bidirectional authentication method |
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| CN111953494A (en) * | 2019-05-15 | 2020-11-17 | 株式会社日立制作所 | Authentication method and device |
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| CN109190725B (en) | 2020-07-07 |
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