CN109121134B - Privacy protection and integrity detection method suitable for multi-application data fusion of wireless sensor network - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a privacy protection and integrity detection method suitable for multi-application data fusion of a wireless sensor network, and belongs to the technical field of information security and Internet of things application. According to the invention, the problems that the privacy data is stolen and tampered in the fusion and transmission processes are solved by carrying out privacy protection and integrity detection on the collected and fused multi-application data in the multi-application environment of the sensing network. The invention realizes the privacy protection of the fusion data by using a homomorphic Paillier encryption method, detects the integrity of the fusion data at a base station by using a homomorphic MAC method, and finally separates different application data from the fusion ciphertext by the base station through Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Analysis shows that the method has higher safety and lower energy consumption while having error tolerance to node failure or data loss, and is simple to implement, low in cost and easy to popularize.

Description

Privacy protection and integrity detection method suitable for multi-application data fusion of wireless sensor network

Technical Field

The invention relates to a privacy protection and integrity detection method for resisting attack in the process of fusion and transmission of multiple application data of a sensor network, and belongs to the technical field of information security and Internet of things application.

Background

The wireless sensor network is an important component of a sensing layer of the Internet of things, and information sensing, acquisition and transmission can be carried out on a target by utilizing the sensor nodes, so that a data source is provided for application of the Internet of things. Data fusion is one of the important technologies for energy conservation of the wireless sensor network, but in the data acquisition and fusion process, the data privacy leakage and tampering are easy to occur, and many applications have high requirements on data security and privacy, such as smart power grids, smart homes, telemedicine and the like, so that privacy protection and integrity detection are performed on the acquired and fused data, the data is prevented from being stolen and tampered in the fusion and transmission process, a base station is ensured to acquire safe and reliable data, and finally an application layer of the internet of things makes a correct decision.

In actual application of the internet of things, application environments and sensing equipment types are diverse, and the existing data privacy protection and integrity detection technology is mainly designed in a data fusion scene of a single application environment and sensing nodes of the same type of a sensing network, so that data fusion of hybrid nodes based on multiple applications in the sensing network cannot be effectively supported. The recoverable data fusion scheme proposed by the existing latest document does not consider the data fusion of a multi-application environment and a hybrid node of a sensor network, the length of the transmitted fusion data is in direct proportion to the number of nodes, and the communication traffic and the calculation amount are large. Although the method such as CDAMA considers the fusion data privacy under the multi-application environment of the sensor network, the integrity protection of the fusion data is not considered, the communication overhead linearly increases along with the increase of application groups, and the communication traffic is large.

Aiming at the defects in the method, the invention provides a lightweight privacy protection and integrity detection method suitable for hybrid data fusion in a sensor network multi-application environment.

Disclosure of Invention

Technical problem to be solved by the invention

The invention provides a privacy protection and integrity detection method for lightweight multi-application data fusion and transmission, which ensures the privacy and integrity of hybrid data acquired by different types of sensor nodes in the fusion and transmission processes in a sensor network multi-application environment and can tolerate node errors and data loss.

Technical scheme

In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:

a privacy protection and integrity detection method suitable for multi-application data fusion of a wireless sensor network is characterized by comprising the following steps:

step S1, initializing the wireless sensor network system;

step S2, key distribution;

step S3, generating a node data homomorphic MAC;

step S4, node data encryption transmission;

step S5, fusing multi-application data;

step S6, the base station decrypts the data;

step S7, the base station splits the multi-application data;

in step S8, the base station analyzes the integrity of the data.

Step S1 includes the following steps:

step S11, the base station initializes the security parameters of the system by adopting a homomorphic Paillier encryption method, which comprises the following steps:

given a safety parameter k₀K ', l, the base station randomly selects two security large prime numbers p and q, and calculates n ═ pq assuming that p ' and q ' are arbitrary prime numbers that make p ═ 2p ' +1 and q ═ 2q ' +1,

calculating the least common multiple λ of p-1 and q-1, expressed as λ lcm (p-1, q-1) ═ 2p 'q', and defining l (x) 1/n;

step S12, each sensing node sends the sensing data to the adjacent fusion node, and N sensing nodes are shared in the sensing network

r fusion nodes containing k application groups

Each application group

(j is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to k) the transmitted data range is |0, M_j|，M_jDefining maximum M ═ max { M ] of all data of the wireless sensor network for maximum data in jth application group₁,M₂,…M_kWhere the binary bit length of M is denoted as | M | ═ l_M；

Step S13, detecting the integrity of the fusion data by using a homomorphic information verification code method, and detecting the sensing data m of each node i_iSplitting into d components (m)_i1,m_i2,…m_id) And make

The maximum value of each component is set as b, b<M, perception data M_iAvailable finite field

To represent;

step S14, the base station uses Chinese remainder theorem to extract the fusion result of each application from the multi-application fusion data, the base station selects beta₀,q₁,q₂,…q_kA total of k +1 prime numbers, each prime number q_iThe binary bit lengths of (i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to k) are all k',

calculating Q ═ Q₁×q₂×…q_k，

β_i＝Q_i·y_i；

In the step of S15,

is provided with h₁And h₂For two hash functions, the base station selects a random number k_iAs shared key of node i and fusion node, combined with key k_iAnd a time parameter t_xCalculating k_ix＝h₁(k_i||t_x)，

The base station distributes a random key { sk ] to each node₁,sk₂And (4) calculating homomorphic MAC by using two pseudo-random function generators G and F, and finally setting a system public key pms:

pms＝{n,q_i:i＝1,2…k,β_j:j＝0,1,2…k,h₁,h₂,L(x)}

step S2 includes the following steps:

step S21, the base station assigns the MAC key { sk ] through the secure channel₁,sk₂}, random key k_iAnd public keypms to each node S_iEach node S_iRespectively generate random numbers r_iCarrying out random encryption;

step S22, the base station is distributed to the jth fusion node DA_jIt and node S_iShared random key k_iAnd a secret key shared by the base station and the fusion node

And a public key pms;

step S23, the MAC key { sk shared by the deployment nodes at the base station end₁,sk₂Key shared by base station and fusion node

Public key pms and private key λ generated in step S11;

step S3 includes the following steps:

step S31, the node i collects the data m_iSplitting into d pieces with maximum length of l_MComponent (m) of_i1,m_i2,…m_id) At time t_xInternal use random function generator G and key sk₁Generating a random number vector u-G (sk)₁)；

Step S32, using the random function generator F and the key sk₂Node ID ID_iGenerating random number v with packet ID rid_i＝F(sk₂,id_i,rid)；

Step S33, using the generated random number vector u and random number v_iAnd a plaintext m_iGenerating node data m_iIs expressed as T_iThe generation method comprises the following steps:

(symbol)

representing vectors u and m_iIn a limited domain

Inner product of；

Step S34, the generated homomorphic MAC is connected with the original plaintext, and the connected plaintext

Comprises the following steps:

step S4 includes the following steps:

step S41, for belonging to application set

Sensing node S_iN in step S11 and β in step S14 are used₀And beta_iThe hash function h in step S15₂Random number r in step S21_iT in step S33_iIn step S34

And a time parameter t_xComputing the ciphertext c_ixThe method comprises the following steps:

step S42, using the key k in step S15_ixAnd a hash function h₁Computing the ciphertext c_ixMAC value of (d): mac_ix＝h₁(c_ix||k_ix)；

Step S43, node S_iTransmission (c)_ix,mac_ix) To the fusion node.

Step S5 includes the following steps:

step S51, the fusion node calculates k_ix＝h₁(k_i||t_x) And then calculating MAC value MAC 'of received ciphertext'_ix＝h₁(c_ix||k_ix) Comparing the received MAC value with the received MAC value, if the two MAC values are equal, receiving the ciphertext, otherwise refusing to receive;

step S52, fusing the nodes DA_jReceivingAfter all the ciphertext data of the child nodes are obtained, accumulating and multiplying all the received ciphertext data, and accumulating and multiplying the result with n²Performing modular search to obtain the final fusion ciphertext C_jxThen combined with that in step S22

And a time parameter t_xComputing the fused ciphertext C_jxMAC value MAC of_jxThe method comprises the following steps:

and step S53, after all the fusion nodes complete the data fusion operation, uploading the fusion result and the MAC value thereof to the base station.

Step S6 includes the following steps:

step S61, the base station at time t_xReceiving a fusion value (C) sent by a fusion node j_jx,mac_jx) Then through

Calculating MAC value MAC of data'_jxJudging whether the calculated MAC value is the same as the received MAC value, if so, receiving the fusion value, otherwise, discarding;

and step S62, decrypting the data by using the property of homomorphic Paillier encryption.

Step S62 includes the following steps:

step S621, the base station at time t_xCalculating fused ciphertexts C 'of k application environments by using private key lambda after receiving fused values uploaded by all r fused nodes'_xThe method comprises the following steps:

in step S622, define the function L as

The base station is according to a fusion value C'_xCalculating fusion results Y of k application environments:

where n is calculated in step S11 and Q is calculated in step S14.

Step S7 includes the following steps:

step S71, the base station calculates each application group using the nature of Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)

Fusion result of (2)_jThe method comprises the following steps:

step S72, the base station extracts the fusion plaintext from the fusion result

And its fused homomorphic MAC values

The method comprises the following steps:

step S8 includes the following steps:

step S81, the base station uses (sk)₁,sk₂,rid,id_i) Calculating homomorphic MAC parameters u 'and v':

step S82, the base station uses the parameters u 'and v' to pass

Calculating a homomorphic MAC;

in step S83, the base station compares the calculated homomorphic MAC value with the received MAC value, i.e., determines

If the two values are equal, the base station receives the fusion result, otherwise, the fusion result is discarded.

Advantageous effects

The invention has the significance that a privacy protection and integrity detection method is provided for a multi-application data fusion environment of a wireless sensor network, and the problems that privacy data is stolen and tampered in the fusion and transmission process are solved by carrying out privacy protection and integrity detection on collected and fused multi-application data in the multi-application environment of the sensor network.

The invention integrates the homomorphic Paillier encryption, homomorphic MAC, the unidirectionality of HASH functions, Chinese remainder theorem and other technologies and methods, simultaneously realizes the privacy protection and integrity detection of the fused data aiming at the multi-application data fusion environment of the sensor network for the first time, and has the advantages of high system safety and low energy consumption.

Drawings

FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a multi-application data fusion method according to the present invention.

Detailed Description

For a further understanding of the invention, reference should be made to the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

As shown in fig. 1, the method adopted by the present invention is divided into 8 steps of system initialization, key distribution, node data homomorphic MAC generation, node data encryption transmission, multi-application data fusion, base station data decryption, base station multi-application data splitting, and data integrity analysis.

1. System initialization

System setting safety parameter k₀K ', l, the base station randomly selects a security large prime number p, q so that p ═ 2p ' +1, q ═ 2q ' +1, | p | ═ q | ═ k₀Then, n ═ pq, λ ═ lcm (p-1, q-1) ═ 2p 'q' is calculated, and l (x) ═ x-1)/n is defined.

According to the technical scheme, the specific parameters are set as follows:

parameter(s)	Value taking
		k0,p,q	|p|＝|q|＝k0
n,n2	n＝pq,|n|＝2k0＝1024,|n2|＝4k0＝2048
		k',qi	|qi|＝k'＝60
β0	β0＝30
		N,Nj,k,r	N＝1000,Nj＝100,k＝10,r＝4
lM,l,d	lM＝|M|＝16,|l|＝160,|d|＝3

Assuming that a sensor network needs to collect 3 environmental data of temperature, luminosity and smoke, the sensor network has 1000 nodes

Comprising 10 application groups

Each sensor node will send sensed data to its neighboring fusion node, each application group

The data range of transmission is |0, M_j| define M ═ max { M₁,M₂,…M₁₀}. To detect data integrity, sense data m_iSplitting into 8 components (m)_i1,m_i2,…m_i8) So that

The base station selects 11 prime numbers: beta is a₀,q₁,q₂,…q₁₀Each prime number q_iAre 60 bits in length, i.e. | q_iI is equal to or more than 1 and is equal to or less than 10, and the following calculation is carried out:

in order to ensure that the sensing data can be fused into a ciphertext, the parameters all satisfy the following conditions:

the method sets the data space to [0, M ═ 2¹⁶]The number of sensors is N-2¹⁰，|β₀30 to satisfy the condition N.M.ltoreq.beta₀(ii) a Setting | q_iK' 60 and d 3 to satisfy the condition N · ((d +1) · M · β)₀+M)<q_i(ii) a Passing condition log₂k+k'(k+1)<| n | the number k of application groups to be set is 15 at maximum, where k is set to 10.

The method uses two hash functions h₁And h₂Generating a secret key and a random number, h₁:{0,1}^*→{0,1}^lAnd

base station selects random number k_iK is calculated as a shared key of the node i and the fusion node thereof_ix＝h₁(k_i||t_x)，k_ix∈{0，1}^lAnd the MAC value is used for generating the MAC value of the perception data so as to avoid the illegal nodes from implementing error data injection attacks.

The base station distributes a secret key { sk ] to each node₁,sk₂Two pseudo-random function generators

And

the method is used for calculating homomorphic MAC (media access control) so as to carry out integrity detection on fused data, and finally, a system public key pms is set to { n, q ═ n, q }_i:i＝1,2…k,β_j:j＝0,1,2…k,h₁,h₂,L(x)}。

2. Key distribution

A sensing node end: base station distributes MAC key { sk through secure channel₁,sk₂}, random key k_iAnd a public key pms to each node S_iEach node S_iRespectively generate random numbers r_iRandom encryption is performed.

A fusion node end: distribution of the fusion node DA by the base station_jAnd node S_iShared random key k_iBase station and fusion node DA_jShared secret key

And a public key pms.

A base station end: deploying a MAC Key { sk shared with a node₁,sk₂}, secret key shared with the fusion node

Public key pms and private key λ.

3. Generating node data homomorphic MAC

Data m collected by the node i_iSplit into 8 components (m) of length 16 bits_i1,m_i2,…m_i8)，

b<M。

At each time period t_xEach node generates a node data homomorphic MAC by:

using a random function generator F, a secret key sk₂Node ID ID_iGenerating random number v with packet ID rid_i＝F(sk₂,id_i,rid)

Using the previously generated random number vector u, random number v_iAnd a plaintext m_iGenerating node data m_iIs expressed as T_iThe generation method comprises the following steps:

(symbol)

representing vectors u and m_iIn a limited domain

Inner product of (d).

Connecting the generated homomorphic MAC with the original plaintext, and obtaining the connected plaintext

Comprises the following steps:

4. node data encrypted transmission

(1) If sensing node

Then S_iUsing a random number r_iAnd (beta)₀,β_j) The ciphertext is calculated as follows:

(2)S_iusing a secret key k_ixCalculating mac_ix＝h₁(c_ix||k_ix)。

(3)S_iTransmission (c)_ix,mac_ix) To the fusion node.

5. Multi-application data fusion, as shown in figure 2,

(1) fusion node calculation k_ix＝h₁(k_i||t_x) And then calculating MAC value MAC 'of received ciphertext'_ix＝h₁(c_ix||k_ix) Detects whether it is equal to the received MAC value

If they are equal, the cipher text is received, otherwise the reception is refused.

(2) Fusion node DA_jAfter receiving the sensing data of all the child nodes, performing the following fusion operation:

and after all the fusion nodes (r nodes in total) finish the data fusion operation, uploading the fusion result and the MAC value thereof to the base station.

6. Base station deciphered data

Base station in time window t_xReceiving a fusion node j (1)<j is less than or equal to r) transmitted fusion value (C)_jx,mac_jx) Then, calculate

Determine if the calculated MAC value is the same as the received MAC value, i.e.

If the two are the same, the fused value is received, otherwise, the fused value is discarded.

And (3) decrypting the data after detection is finished:

(1) base station in time window t_xCalculating C 'after receiving all fused values'_x：

(2) And the base station calculates:

further, it is possible to obtain:

7. base station splitting multi-application data

The base station calculates each application group

The fusion result and homomorphic MAC thereof:

8. data integrity analysis

Base station usage (sk)₁,sk₂,rid,id_i) Calculating u 'and v'

The base station calculates a homomorphic MAC using u 'and v', compares it with the received MAC, i.e., determines

If the equation is true, the base station receives the result, otherwise discards the fusion result.

The present invention and its embodiments have been described above schematically, without limitation, and what is shown in the drawings is only one of the embodiments of the present invention, and the actual structure is not limited thereto. Therefore, if the person skilled in the art receives the teaching, without departing from the spirit of the invention, the person skilled in the art shall not inventively design the similar structural modes and embodiments to the technical solution, but shall fall within the scope of the invention.

Claims (1)

1. A privacy protection and integrity detection method suitable for multi-application data fusion of a wireless sensor network is characterized by comprising the following steps:

step S1, initializing the wireless sensor network system, the method includes:

firstly, a base station initializes the security parameters of a system by adopting a homomorphic Paillier encryption method, and the method comprises the following steps:

given a safety parameter k₀K ', l, the base station randomly selects two security large prime numbers p and q, and let p ' and q ' be arbitrary prime numbers that make p 2p ' +1 and q 2q ' +1 hold, calculates n pq, calculates the least common multiple λ of p-1 and q-1, expressed as λ lcm (p-1, q-1) ═ 2p ' q ', and defines l (x) -1)/n;

secondly, each sensing node sends sensing data to adjacent fusion nodes, and N sensing nodes are shared in the sensing network

r fusion nodes containing k application groups

Each application group

The data range of transmission is |0, M_j|，M_jDefining maximum M ═ max { M ] of all data of the wireless sensor network for maximum data in jth application group₁,M₂,…M_kWhere the binary bit length of M is denoted as | M | ═ l_M；

Thirdly, detecting the integrity of the fusion data by using a homomorphic information verification code method, and enabling the sensing data m of each node i_iSplitting into d components (m)_i1,m_i2,…m_id) And make

The maximum value of each component is set as b, b<M, perception data M_iAvailable finite field

To represent;

fourthly, the base station applies Chinese remainder theorem to respectively extract the fusion result of each application from the multi-application fusion data, and selects beta₀,q₁,q₂,…q_kA total of k +1 prime numbers, each prime number q_i(1. ltoreq. i. ltoreq.k)The bit lengths are all k',

calculating Q ═ Q₁×q₂×…q_k，

β_i＝Q_i·y_i；

The fifth step is to set h₁And h₂For two hash functions, the base station selects a random number k_iAs shared key of node i and fusion node, combined with key k_iAnd a time parameter t_xCalculating k_ix＝h₁(k_i||t_x) The base station distributes a random key { sk ] to each node₁,sk₂And (4) calculating homomorphic MAC by using two pseudo-random function generators G and F, and finally setting a system public key pms: pms ═ n, q_i:i＝1,2…k,β_j:j＝0,1,2…k,h₁,h₂,L(x)}；

Step S2, key distribution, the method is:

first, the base station assigns the MAC key { sk in step S1 through a secure channel₁,sk₂}, random key k_iAnd a public key pms to each node S_iEach node S_iRespectively generate random numbers r_iCarrying out random encryption;

secondly, the base station distributes to the jth fusion node DA_jIt and node S_iShared random key k_iAnd a secret key shared by the base station and the fusion node

And a public key pms;

thirdly, the base station terminal deploys the MAC key { sk shared by the nodes₁,sk₂Key shared by base station and fusion node

Public key pms and private key λ generated in the first step of step S1;

step S3, generating a node data homomorphic MAC, the method includes:

in the first step, node i collects data m_iSplitting into d pieces with maximum length of l_MComponent (m) of_i1,m_i2,…m_id) At time t_xInternal use random function generator G and key sk₁Generating a random number vector u-G (sk)₁)；

Second, using random function generator F, key sk₂Node ID ID_iGenerating random number v with packet ID rid_i＝F(sk₂,id_i,rid)；

Thirdly, using the random number vector u and the random number v generated previously_iAnd a plaintext m_iGenerating node data m_iIs expressed as T_iThe generation method comprises the following steps:

(symbol)

representing vectors u and m_iIn a limited domain

Inner product of (d);

fourthly, the generated homomorphic MAC is connected with the original plaintext, and the connected plaintext

Is composed of

Step S4, the node data is encrypted and transmitted, the method includes:

first, for belonging to the application set

Sensing node S_iUsing n in the first step of step S1 and β in the fourth step of step S1₀And beta_iStep S1 fifthHash function h in step₂Random number r in the first step in step S2_iT in the third step in step S3_iIn the fourth step in step S3

And a time parameter t_xComputing the ciphertext c_ixThe method comprises the following steps:

second, using the key k in the fifth step of step S1_ixAnd a hash function h₁Computing the ciphertext c_ixMAC value of (d): mac_ix＝h₁(c_ix||k_ix)；

Third step, node S_iTransmission (c)_ix,mac_ix) Giving the fusion node;

step S5, fusing multi-application data, the method is:

first, the fusion node calculates k_ix＝h₁(k_i||t_x) And then calculating MAC value MAC 'of received ciphertext'_ix＝h₁(c_ix||k_ix) Comparing the received MAC value with the received MAC value, if the two MAC values are equal, receiving the ciphertext, otherwise refusing to receive;

second, the nodes DA are fused_jAfter receiving the ciphertext data of all child nodes, accumulating and multiplying all the received ciphertext data, and accumulating and multiplying the result with n²Performing modular search to obtain the final fusion ciphertext C_jxThen combined with that in the second step of step S2

And a time parameter t_xComputing the fused ciphertext C_jxMAC value MAC of_jxThe method comprises the following steps:

thirdly, after all the fusion nodes complete the data fusion operation, uploading the fusion result and the MAC value thereof to the base station;

step S6, the base station decrypts the data, the method is:

first, the base station at time t_xReceiving a fusion value (C) sent by a fusion node j_jx,mac_jx) Then through

Calculating MAC value MAC of data'_jxJudging whether the calculated MAC value is the same as the received MAC value, if so, receiving the fusion value, otherwise, discarding;

secondly, decrypting the data by using the property of homomorphic Paillier encryption, wherein the method comprises the following steps:

first, the base station is at time t_xCalculating fused ciphertexts C 'of k application environments by using private key lambda after receiving fused values uploaded by all r fused nodes'_xThe method comprises the following steps:

then, define the function L as

The base station is according to a fusion value C'_xCalculating fusion results Y of k application environments:

wherein n is calculated in the first step of step S1, and Q is calculated in the fourth step of step S1;

step S7, the base station splits the multi-application data, the method includes:

in the first step, the base station calculates each application group using the properties of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)

Fusion result of (2)_jThe method comprises the following steps:

secondly, the base station extracts a fusion plaintext from the fusion result

And its fused homomorphic MAC values

The method comprises the following steps:

step S8, the base station analyzes the data integrity, the method includes:

first, base station uses (sk)₁,sk₂,rid,id_i) Calculating homomorphic MAC parameters u 'and v':

second, the base station passes the parameters u' and v

Calculating a homomorphic MAC;

thirdly, the base station compares the calculated homomorphic MAC value with the received MAC value, namely, the judgment is carried out

If the two values are equal, the base station receives the fusion result, otherwise, the fusion result is discarded.

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