CN109063490A - A kind of method, device and equipment detecting host name loophole - Google Patents
A kind of method, device and equipment detecting host name loophole Download PDFInfo
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- CN109063490A CN109063490A CN201811014463.8A CN201811014463A CN109063490A CN 109063490 A CN109063490 A CN 109063490A CN 201811014463 A CN201811014463 A CN 201811014463A CN 109063490 A CN109063490 A CN 109063490A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/577—Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1433—Vulnerability analysis
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Abstract
This application discloses a kind of methods for detecting host name loophole, to solve the problems, such as that traditional technique in measuring host name loophole is inefficient.Method includes: to obtain the decompiling of application program to be measured as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration；If it is determined that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, the configuration information of safety examination is not carried out to access host name, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.Disclosed herein as well is a kind of devices and equipment for detecting host name loophole.
Description
Technical field
This application involves computer software technical field more particularly to it is a kind of detect host name loophole method, apparatus and
Equipment.
Background technique
Due to the open source of Android system, so that malicious attacker is easy to be attacked for the application under Android system,
Wherein, malicious attack often initiates man-in-the-middle attack by the way of forging host name, with this steal information or is destroyed,
Therefore it treats online application and carries out host name inspection Hole Detection as an indispensable link.
The inspection host name loophole of the prior art, usually by the way of exhaustive attack, this mode is inefficient.Cause
This, it is expected that a kind of method for detecting host name loophole is obtained, to improve the efficiency of detection host name loophole.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the embodiment of the present application is to provide a kind of method for detecting host name loophole, exists to solve the prior art
The inefficient problem of host name Hole Detection.
The embodiment of the present application adopts the following technical solutions:
In a first aspect, proposing a kind of method for detecting host name loophole, comprising:
The decompiling of application program to be measured is obtained as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration；
If it is determined that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, confidence is not matched to access host name progress safety examination
Breath, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
Second aspect proposes a kind of detection device, which includes:
Analytical unit, for obtaining the decompiling of application program to be measured as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration；
Determination unit, however, it is determined that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, does not carry out safety inspection to access host name
The configuration information tested, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
The third aspect provides a kind of equipment for detecting host name loophole, comprising: memory, processor and be stored in institute
The computer program that can be run on memory and on the processor is stated, when the computer program is executed by the processor
The step of realizing the method for detection host name loophole.
As can be seen from the technical scheme provided by the above embodiments of the present application, the embodiment of the present application scheme at least has following one kind
Technical effect:
Due to entering ginseng configuration using acquisition SSLSession, enter to join configuration determination with the presence or absence of host according to SSLSession
The detection method of name loophole, realizes the technical effect of the detection host name loophole of direction, effectively increases detection host name
The speed of loophole improves detection efficiency under the premise of guaranteeing detection effect.
Detailed description of the invention
In order to illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or in the prior art more clearly, to embodiment or will show below
There is attached drawing needed in technical description to be briefly described, it should be apparent that, the accompanying drawings in the following description is only this
The some embodiments recorded in application, for those of ordinary skill in the art, in the premise of not making the creative labor property
Under, it is also possible to obtain other drawings based on these drawings.
Fig. 1 is a kind of method idiographic flow schematic diagram for detecting host name loophole provided by the embodiments of the present application；
Fig. 2 is a kind of concrete structure schematic diagram of device for detecting host name loophole provided by the embodiments of the present application；
Fig. 3 is a kind of concrete structure schematic diagram of equipment for detecting host name loophole provided by the embodiments of the present application.
Specific embodiment
In order to make those skilled in the art better understand the technical solutions in the application, below in conjunction with the application reality
The attached drawing in example is applied, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the application is clearly and completely described, it is clear that described implementation
Example is merely a part but not all of the embodiments of the present application.Based on the embodiment in the application, this field is common
The application protection all should belong in technical staff's every other embodiment obtained without creative efforts
Range.
To solve the problems, such as that detection host name loophole existing in the prior art is inefficient, the embodiment of the present application provides one
The method of kind detection host name loophole.
The specific implementation flow schematic diagram of this method is as shown in Figure 1, the specific implementation of this method mainly includes the following steps:
The decompiling of application program to be measured is obtained as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration；
Decompiling can be the process that the executable file that application program to be measured is included is converted to source code, by upper
State process, can clearly check that the source code of application program to be measured writes details, so for detect vulnerability of application program to be measured,
It rewrites and provides support with side application program.
SSLSession, i.e. Secure Sockets LayerSession can be used to describe to communicate institute in safe level
The a series of encryption parameter and code key used is responsible for saving the setting information for ensureing communication process safety and confidentiality.
SSLSession enters ginseng configuration, can be used to verify the information type communicated with application program to be measured, information
The parameters such as feature, data area, cipher mode, host name, to protect application program to be measured from malicious attack.
When acquisition application program SSLSession to be measured enters ginseng configuration, it specifically can be and to be measured answer obtained by decompiling
With the smali code of program, the smali code of application program to be measured is analyzed, is inherited in the smali code
HostnameVerifier file traverses the code in the HostnameVerifier file, obtains SSLSession and enters ginseng
Configuration.
For example, obtaining application program to be measured, decompiling is carried out by apktool, obtains the smali in application program to be measured
Code analyzes the smali code of application program to be measured, passes through .implements Ljavax/net/ssl/
HostnameVerifier finds in path HostnameVerifier file and is inherited, and checks public
verifypublic verify(Ljava/lang/String；Ljavax/net/ssl/SSLSession；) Z, it obtains
SSLSession enters ginseng configuration.
Step 12, however, it is determined that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, does not carry out safety examination to access host name
Configuration information, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
Host name can be used to distinguish difference in network between host and host, and under can be convenient between host mutually
It accesses, host name is often made of the combination of character string, numeric string or both, by included in the identification communication information
Host name, it is known which platform host is the information come from.
For example, including code :/etc/hosts/192.168.1.195fujian in certain host-confg file.Then
" 192.168.1.195 " is the IP address where the host, and " fujian " is the host name of the host.
In one embodiment, the safety examination, including following at least one:
Examine access host name prefix character string；
Examine access host name suffix character string；
Examine the other types host name equivalent with access host name.
For example, the host name prefix character string of setting denied access are as follows: abc.Obtain application program to be measured
SSLSession enters ginseng configuration, if there are codes for host name inspection module: startWith (" abc ").The then application program to be measured
It is on the contrary then there are loopholes there is no host name loophole.
For example, the host name suffix character string of setting denied access are as follows: abc.Obtain application program to be measured
SSLSession enters ginseng configuration, if there are codes for host name inspection module: endWith (" abc ").Then the application program to be measured is not
It is on the contrary then there are loopholes there are host name loophole.
For example, the equivalent host name of host name of setting denied access are as follows: abc.Obtain application program to be measured
SSLSession enters ginseng configuration, if there are codes for host name inspection module: equals (" abc ").Then the application program to be measured is not
It is on the contrary then there are loopholes there are host name loophole.
It, can be with after the decompiling result for obtaining application program to be measured in one or more embodiments of the application
Judged according to the decompiling result, if the application program HostnameVerifier to be measured enters in ginseng configuration, includes
The configuration information of receiving portion or whole host name, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
In one embodiment, the configuration information of receiving portion or whole host name, specifically includes: ALLOW_ALL_
HOSTNAME_VERIFIER。
For example, obtaining application program to be measured, decompiling is carried out, obtains source code, search key
SSLSocketFactory；SetHostnameVerifier judges whether its parameter is ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_
If the determination result is YES then there is host name loophole in VERIFIER.
The method provided using the embodiment of the present application 1, due to entering ginseng configuration using acquisition SSLSession, according to
SSLSession, which enters to join configuration determination, whether there is the detection method of host name loophole, realize the detection host name leakage of direction
The technical effect in hole effectively increases the speed of detection host name loophole, improves detection under the premise of guaranteeing detection effect
Efficiency.
To solve the problems, such as that detection host name loophole existing in the prior art is inefficient, the embodiment of the present application provides one
The device of kind detection host name loophole.
The concrete structure schematic diagram of the device is as shown in Fig. 2, include analytical unit 21, determination unit 22.
Wherein, analytical unit 21, for obtaining the decompiling of application program to be measured as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng
Configuration；
Determination unit 22, however, it is determined that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, does not carry out safety to access host name
The configuration information of inspection, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
In one embodiment, determination unit 22 are also used to:
According to the decompiling as a result, including if the application program HostnameVerifier to be measured enters in ginseng configuration
The configuration information of receiving portion or whole host name, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
In one embodiment, the configuration information of the receiving portion or whole host name, specifically includes: ALLOW_
ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER。
In one embodiment, the safety examination, including following at least one:
Examine access host name prefix character string；
Examine access host name suffix character string；
Examine the other types host name equivalent with access host name.
The device provided using the embodiment of the present application 2, due to entering ginseng configuration using acquisition SSLSession, according to
SSLSession, which enters to join configuration determination, whether there is the detection method of host name loophole, realize the detection host name leakage of direction
The technical effect in hole effectively increases the speed of detection host name loophole, improves detection under the premise of guaranteeing detection effect
Efficiency.
A kind of hardware structural diagram of Fig. 3 mobile terminal of each embodiment to realize the present invention.
In Fig. 3, which includes but is not limited to: radio frequency unit 301, network module 302, audio output list
First 303, input unit 304, sensor 305, display unit 306, user input unit 307, interface unit 308, memory
309, the components such as processor 310 and power supply 311.It will be understood by those skilled in the art that terminal device knot shown in Fig. 3
Structure does not constitute the restriction to terminal device, and terminal device may include components more more or fewer than diagram, or combine certain
A little components or different component layouts.In embodiments of the present invention, terminal device include but is not limited to mobile phone, tablet computer,
Laptop, palm PC, car-mounted terminal, wearable device and pedometer etc..
Processor 310, for obtaining the decompiling of application program to be measured as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration；If
It determines that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, the configuration information of safety examination is not carried out to access host name, it is determined that
There are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
Using the method for detecting host name loophole provided by the embodiment of the present invention, due to being entered using acquisition SSLSession
Ginseng configuration, entering to join configuration determination according to SSLSession whether there is the detection method of host name loophole, realize direction
The technical effect for detecting host name loophole effectively increases the speed of detection host name loophole, in the premise for guaranteeing detection effect
Under improve detection efficiency.
It should be understood that the embodiment of the present invention in, radio frequency unit 301 can be used for receiving and sending messages or communication process in, signal
Send and receive, specifically, by from base station downlink data receive after, to processor 310 handle；In addition, by uplink
Data are sent to base station.In general, radio frequency unit 301 includes but is not limited to antenna, at least one amplifier, transceiver, coupling
Device, low-noise amplifier, duplexer etc..In addition, radio frequency unit 301 can also by wireless communication system and network and other set
Standby communication.
Terminal device provides wireless broadband internet by network module 302 for user and accesses, and such as user is helped to receive
It sends e-mails, browse webpage and access streaming video etc..
Audio output unit 303 can be received by radio frequency unit 301 or network module 302 or in memory 309
The audio data of storage is converted into audio signal and exports to be sound.Moreover, audio output unit 303 can also provide and end
The relevant audio output of specific function that end equipment 300 executes is (for example, call signal receives sound, message sink sound etc.
Deng).Audio output unit 303 includes loudspeaker, buzzer and receiver etc..
Input unit 304 is for receiving audio or video signal.Input unit 304 may include graphics processor
(Graphics Processing Unit, GPU) 3041 and microphone 3042, graphics processor 3041 capture mould in video
The image data of the static images or video that are obtained in formula or image capture mode by image capture apparatus (such as camera) carries out
Processing.Treated, and picture frame may be displayed on display unit 306.It can be with through treated the picture frame of graphics processor 3041
It is stored in memory 309 (or other storage mediums) or is sent via radio frequency unit 301 or network module 302.Wheat
Gram wind 3042 can receive sound, and can be audio data by such acoustic processing.Treated audio data can be with
The format output that mobile communication base station can be sent to via radio frequency unit 301 is converted in the case where telephone calling model.
Terminal device 300 further includes at least one sensor 305, such as optical sensor, motion sensor and other biographies
Sensor.Specifically, optical sensor includes ambient light sensor and proximity sensor, wherein ambient light sensor can be according to environment
The light and shade of light adjusts the brightness of display panel 3061, and proximity sensor can close when terminal device 300 is moved in one's ear
Display panel 3061 and/or backlight.As a kind of motion sensor, accelerometer sensor can detect in all directions (general
For three axis) size of acceleration, it can detect that size and the direction of gravity when static, can be used to identify terminal device posture (ratio
Such as horizontal/vertical screen switching, dependent game, magnetometer pose calibrating), Vibration identification correlation function (such as pedometer, tap)；It passes
Sensor 305 can also include fingerprint sensor, pressure sensor, iris sensor, molecule sensor, gyroscope, barometer, wet
Meter, thermometer, infrared sensor etc. are spent, details are not described herein.
Display unit 306 is for showing information input by user or being supplied to the information of user.Display unit 306 can
Including display panel 3061, liquid crystal display (Liquid Crystal Display, LCD), organic light-emitting diodes can be used
Forms such as (Organic Light-Emitting Diode, OLED) are managed to configure display panel 3061.
User input unit 307 can be used for receiving the number or character information of input, and generate the use with terminal device
Family setting and the related key signals input of function control.Specifically, user input unit 307 include touch panel 3071 and
Other input equipments 3072.Touch panel 3071, also referred to as touch screen collect the touch operation of user on it or nearby
(for example user uses any suitable objects or attachment such as finger, stylus on touch panel 3071 or in touch panel 3071
Neighbouring operation).Touch panel 3071 may include both touch detecting apparatus and touch controller.Wherein, touch detection
Device detects the touch orientation of user, and detects touch operation bring signal, transmits a signal to touch controller；Touch control
Device processed receives touch information from touch detecting apparatus, and is converted into contact coordinate, then gives processor 310, receiving area
It manages the order that device 310 is sent and is executed.Furthermore, it is possible to more using resistance-type, condenser type, infrared ray and surface acoustic wave etc.
Seed type realizes touch panel 3071.In addition to touch panel 3071, user input unit 307 can also include other input equipments
3072.Specifically, other input equipments 3072 can include but is not limited to physical keyboard, function key (such as volume control button,
Switch key etc.), trace ball, mouse, operating stick, details are not described herein.
Further, touch panel 3071 can be covered on display panel 3061, when touch panel 3071 is detected at it
On or near touch operation after, send processor 310 to determine the type of touch event, be followed by subsequent processing device 310 according to touching
The type for touching event provides corresponding visual output on display panel 3061.Although in Fig. 3, touch panel 3071 and display
Panel 3061 is the function that outputs and inputs of realizing terminal device as two independent components, but in some embodiments
In, can be integrated by touch panel 3071 and display panel 3061 and realize the function that outputs and inputs of terminal device, it is specific this
Place is without limitation.
Interface unit 308 is the interface that external device (ED) is connect with terminal device 300.For example, external device (ED) may include having
Line or wireless head-band earphone port, external power supply (or battery charger) port, wired or wireless data port, storage card end
Mouth, port, the port audio input/output (I/O), video i/o port, earphone for connecting the device with identification module
Port etc..Interface unit 308 can be used for receiving the input (for example, data information, electric power etc.) from external device (ED) simultaneously
And by one or more elements that the input received is transferred in terminal device 300 or it can be used in terminal device 300
Data are transmitted between external device (ED).
Memory 309 can be used for storing software program and various data.Memory 309 can mainly include storing program area
The storage data area and, wherein storing program area can (such as the sound of application program needed for storage program area, at least one function
Sound playing function, image player function etc.) etc.；Storage data area can store according to mobile phone use created data (such as
Audio data, phone directory etc.) etc..In addition, memory 309 may include high-speed random access memory, it can also include non-easy
The property lost memory, a for example, at least disk memory, flush memory device or other volatile solid-state parts.
Processor 310 is the control centre of terminal device, utilizes each of various interfaces and the entire terminal device of connection
A part by running or execute the software program and/or module that are stored in memory 309, and calls and is stored in storage
Data in device 309 execute the various functions and processing data of terminal device, to carry out integral monitoring to terminal device.Place
Managing device 310 may include one or more processing units；Preferably, processor 310 can integrate application processor and modulatedemodulate is mediated
Manage device, wherein the main processing operation system of application processor, user interface and application program etc., modem processor is main
Processing wireless communication.It is understood that above-mentioned modem processor can not also be integrated into processor 310.
Terminal device 300 can also include the power supply 311 (such as battery) powered to all parts, it is preferred that power supply 311
Can be logically contiguous by power-supply management system and processor 310, to realize management charging by power-supply management system, put
The functions such as electricity and power managed.
In addition, terminal device 300 includes some unshowned functional modules, details are not described herein.
Preferably, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of terminal device, including processor 310, and memory 309 is stored in
On memory 309 and the computer program that can run on the processor 310, the computer program are executed by processor 310
Each process of the embodiment of the method for the above-mentioned detection host name loophole of Shi Shixian, and identical technical effect can be reached, to avoid
It repeats, which is not described herein again.
The embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of computer readable storage medium, and meter is stored on computer readable storage medium
Calculation machine program, the computer program realize each mistake of the embodiment of the method for above-mentioned detection host name loophole when being executed by processor
Journey, and identical technical effect can be reached, to avoid repeating, which is not described herein again.Wherein, the computer-readable storage medium
Matter, such as read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, abbreviation ROM), random access memory (Random Access
Memory, abbreviation RAM), magnetic or disk etc..
It should be noted that, in this document, the terms "include", "comprise" or its any other variant are intended to non-row
His property includes, so that the process, method, article or the device that include a series of elements not only include those elements, and
And further include other elements that are not explicitly listed, or further include for this process, method, article or device institute it is intrinsic
Element.In the absence of more restrictions, the element limited by sentence "including a ...", it is not excluded that including being somebody's turn to do
There is also other identical elements in the process, method of element, article or device.
Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can be understood that above-described embodiment side
Method can be realized by means of software and necessary general hardware platform, naturally it is also possible to by hardware, but in many cases
The former is more preferably embodiment.Based on this understanding, technical solution of the present invention substantially in other words does the prior art
The part contributed out can be embodied in the form of software products, which is stored in a storage medium
In (such as ROM/RAM, magnetic disk, CD), including some instructions are used so that a terminal (can be mobile phone, computer, service
Device, air conditioner or network equipment etc.) execute method described in each embodiment of the present invention.
The embodiment of the present invention is described with above attached drawing, but the invention is not limited to above-mentioned specific
Embodiment, the above mentioned embodiment is only schematical, rather than restrictive, those skilled in the art
Under the inspiration of the present invention, without breaking away from the scope protected by the purposes and claims of the present invention, it can also make very much
Form belongs within protection of the invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of method for detecting host name loophole characterized by comprising
The decompiling of application program to be measured is obtained as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration；
If it is determined that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, the configuration information of safety examination is not carried out to access host name,
Then determine that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
2. described the method according to claim 1, wherein after obtaining the decompiling result of application program to be measured
Method further include:
According to the decompiling as a result, if the application program HostnameVerifier to be measured enters in ginseng configuration, comprising receiving
The configuration information of part or all of host name, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
3. according to the method described in claim 2, it is characterized in that, the configuration information of receiving portion or whole host name, specifically
It include: ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER.
4. the method according to claim 1, wherein the safety examination, including following at least one:
Examine access host name prefix character string；
Examine access host name suffix character string；
Examine the other types host name equivalent with access host name.
5. being specifically included the method according to claim 1, wherein obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration:
The smali code for analyzing the application program to be measured inherits the HostnameVerifier text in the smali code
Part traverses the code in the HostnameVerifier file, obtains SSLSession and enters ginseng configuration.
6. a kind of detection device characterized by comprising
Analytical unit, for obtaining the decompiling of application program to be measured as a result, obtaining SSLSession enters ginseng configuration；
Determination unit, however, it is determined that the SSLSession enters in ginseng configuration, does not carry out safety examination to access host name
Configuration information, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
7. device according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the determination unit is also used to:
According to the decompiling as a result, if the application program HostnameVerifier to be measured enters in ginseng configuration, comprising receiving
The configuration information of part or all of host name, it is determined that there are host name loopholes for the application program to be tested.
8. device according to claim 7, which is characterized in that the configuration information of receiving portion or whole host name, specifically
It include: ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER.
9. device according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the safety examination, including following at least one:
Examine access host name prefix character string；
Examine access host name suffix character string；
Examine the other types host name equivalent with access host name.
10. a kind of equipment for detecting host name loophole characterized by comprising memory, processor and be stored in the storage
On device and the computer program that can run on the processor, realized such as when the computer program is executed by the processor
Described in any one of claims 1 to 5 the step of the method for detection host name loophole.
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| CN113852620A (en) * | 2021-09-22 | 2021-12-28 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | Security protocol host name verification module vulnerability analysis method based on model learning |
| CN113852620B (en) * | 2021-09-22 | 2023-07-18 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | Safety protocol host name verification module vulnerability analysis method based on model learning |
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