CN109040132A - One kind being based on the randomly selected encryption communication method of shared key - Google Patents
One kind being based on the randomly selected encryption communication method of shared key Download PDFInfo
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- CN109040132A CN109040132A CN201811124840.3A CN201811124840A CN109040132A CN 109040132 A CN109040132 A CN 109040132A CN 201811124840 A CN201811124840 A CN 201811124840A CN 109040132 A CN109040132 A CN 109040132A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of based on the randomly selected encryption communication method of shared key.The described method includes: initiator sends link request message to recipient；Receive the request response message from the recipient；The request response message is that the recipient is built-up based on communication key, and the communication key is the group key that the recipient randomly selects from shared key group；Decrypt the request response message；Verify the request response message；The consensus property of the communication key is verified based on the request response message；Coded communication is carried out with the communication key and the recipient.The present invention is by way of arranging shared key group, under the negotiation authentication mechanism based on random number, it realizes by way of random selection initial key and negotiation communication key, it realizes communication every time and uses different symmetric keys, and the communication means that key is randomly assigned by communication receiver, with exempting to configure, simple, the high feature of encryption efficiency is used.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to coded communication fields, and in particular to one kind is based on the randomly selected coded communication side of shared key
Method.
Background technique
In the communication protocol that electric system tool uses, frequently with standard or privately owned plaintext protocol communication.It is logical in plain text
Letter, be particularly based on communication standard plaintext communication facilitate tool in use to exceptional communication the problem of analysis and fixed
Position, but plaintext communication also brings the risk of information leakage, and there are certain information security hidden danger.
In electric system instrument communications, relatively common coded communication is the coded communication side based on shared symmetric key
Method.This method is arranged communication encryption algorithm and symmetric key in advance by communicating pair to realize coded communication.Shared symmetric key
Method using simple, encryption efficiency is high, and security intensity with higher.But this method is in the communication of tool and other equipment
In use same communication key pair, exist by by malicious attacker by obtain mass communication sample progress conversed analysis cracked
Risk.
Another common coded communication is the coded communication based on unsymmetrical key, and this method is led in communication process
The method that unsymmetrical key carries out symmetric key negotiation is crossed, solves the problems, such as that communication uses identical shared key every time；But it is non-
Symmetric key is computationally intensive, and working efficiency is low, needs periodically to be managed update to digital certificate, there are working service costs to compare
High problem.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the embodiment of the present invention is that provide it is a kind of based on the randomly selected encryption communication method of shared key, by with
Machine overcomes common shared key method and uses in the communications from one group of the shared key group selection method as communication key
The problem that same key tape comes improves the privacy and safety of communication by the random selection mode of key.
The embodiment of the invention provides one kind to be based on the randomly selected encryption communication method of shared key, comprising:
Initiator sends link request message to recipient；
Receive the request response message from the recipient；The request response message is that the recipient is based on communication
Key is built-up, and the communication key is the group key that the recipient randomly selects from shared key group；
Decrypt the request response message；
Verify the request response message；
The consensus property of the communication key is verified based on the request response message；
Coded communication is carried out with the communication key and the recipient.
Further, the initiator sends signature message to recipient, comprising:
Initiator generates initial key and verifies random number；
Initial key is calculated based on initial key verifying random number；
Signature is carried out to initial key verifying random number with the initial key and forms linking request message；
The linking request message is sent to recipient.
Further, the request response message is that the recipient is built-up based on communication key, comprising:
The request response message be the recipient be based on the initial key, the initial key verifying random number,
Communication key is built-up from verification information, communication key verifying random number, communication key group number；
Wherein, the communication key is that the recipient is based on the communication key and the communication key from verification information
It is built-up to verify random number.
Further, the communication key verifying random number is that the recipient randomly selects a group key from key group
As what is generated after the communication key, the communication key group number is number of the communication key in key group.
Further, the communication key group number is number of the communication key in the shared key group.
Further, after the decryption request response message, decryption initial key verifying random number is obtained, decryption is led to
Believe key authentication random number, decryption communication key group number.
Further, the verifying request response message, comprising:
It verifies the decryption initial key verifying random number and whether initial key verifying random number is consistent, unanimously then
Determine that the request response message is correct.
Further, the consensus property that the communication key is verified based on the request response message, comprising:
Decryption communication key is determined based on the decryption communication key group number；
New traffic key authentication random number is generated based on the decryption communication key；
It verifies the new traffic key authentication random number and whether decryption communication key verifying random number is consistent, unanimously
Then determine that the decryption communication key is exactly the communication key.
Further, the shared key group includes 2048 groups for one that the initiator and the recipient share
The key group of 256 keys.
Further, described to be carried out in coded communication with the communication key and the recipient, the coded communication is adopted
With AES-256 Encryption Algorithm.
The technical solution that the embodiment of the present invention provides, by way of arranging shared key group, based on random number
Negotiate under authentication mechanism, realizes by way of random selection initial key and negotiation communication key, realize each communication
Using different symmetric keys, and the communication means that key is randomly assigned by communication receiver, it is logical to solve conventional symmetrical key
Letter uses the problem of same key every time, and has and exempt to configure, and uses simple, the high feature of encryption efficiency.
Detailed description of the invention
To describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention more clearly, make required in being described below to embodiment
Attached drawing is briefly described, it should be apparent that, drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the invention, for
For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, it can also be obtained according to these attached drawings other
Attached drawing.
Fig. 1 is that one kind that one embodiment of the invention provides is shown based on the randomly selected encryption communication method process of shared key
It is intended to；
Fig. 2 is that one kind of Fig. 1 embodiment is based on the randomly selected encryption communication method flow chart of shared key；
Fig. 3 be another embodiment of the present invention provides one kind be based on 2048 groups of 256 randomly selected encryptions of shared key
Communication means flow diagram.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the object, technical scheme and advantages of the embodiment of the invention clearer, below with reference to drawings and examples,
The specific embodiment progress of technical solution of the present invention in further detail, is clearly illustrated.However, specific implementations described below
Mode and embodiment are for illustrative purposes only, rather than limiting the invention.It only contains a part of the invention and implements
Example, instead of all the embodiments, the other embodiments that those skilled in the art obtain various change of the invention all belong to
In the scope of protection of the invention.
Communicating pair includes initiator and recipient, shares the key group K comprising N group keyG, wherein N >=2；It is close
Key KiIt is KGI-th (1≤i≤N) group key；Communicating pair arranges identical Encryption Algorithm E (Ki, x), corresponding decipherment algorithm
For D (Ki, x), and meet x=D (Ki, E (Ki, x)), wherein KiFor key, x is clear data；Communicating pair arranges identical Kazakhstan
Uncommon algorithm Hash (x) and the initial key Algorithms of Selecting K (x) according to random number cryptographic Hash, wherein K (x) is to each input value
With unique calculated result.
Fig. 1 is that one kind that one embodiment of the invention provides is shown based on the randomly selected encryption communication method process of shared key
It is intended to, Fig. 2 is that one kind of Fig. 1 embodiment is based on the randomly selected encryption communication method flow chart of shared key, the method packet
Include following steps.
In step s 110, initiator sends link request message to recipient.Step S110 includes following sub-step
S111、S112、S113、S114。
Step S111, initiator generate initial key verifying random number R firstd。
Step S112, initiator are based on initial key verifying random number and initial key K are calculatedI。
According to formula HR=Hash (Rd) calculate initial key verifying random number RdCryptographic Hash HR, then with cryptographic Hash HRMake
For input, foundation formula KI=K (HR) unique initial key K is calculatedI。
Step S113, initiator is with initial key KIRandom number R is verified to initial keydIt carries out signature and forms linking request
Message TReq。
Initiator passes through SHR=E (KI, HR) it is calculated as initial key verifying random number RdSignature value SHR, wherein HRIt is first
Beginning key authentication random number RdCryptographic Hash, KIFor initial key.Then linking request message T is constructedReq, TReq=(Rd, SHR)。
Step S114, initiator send link request message TReqTo recipient.
In the step s 120, initiator receives the request response message I from recipientRsp；Request response message is to receive
Side is built-up based on communication key, and communication key is the group key that recipient randomly selects from shared key group.
Request response message IRspIt is that recipient is based on initial key KI, initial key verify random number Rd', communication key are certainly
Verification information PT, communication key verify random number RT, communication key group number T it is built-up.Communication key is from verification information PTIt is to connect
Debit is based on communication key KTRandom number R is verified with communication keyTBuilt-up, PT=(RT, E (KT, RT))。
Wherein, initial key verifies random number Rd' is that recipient's parsing link request message obtains.
The correctness of recipient's verified link request message, first parsing link request message TReq=(Rd', SHR'),
Middle Rd' is the initial key verifying random number that parsing obtains, SHR' is its signature value, passes through HR'=Hash (Rd') calculate Rd''s
Cryptographic Hash HR', after pass through KI'=K (HR') obtain initial key KI', if SHR'=E (KI', HR'), then it is determined as linking request report
Literary TReqCorrectly, and KI=KI'.
Communication key KTIt is to be randomly selected from shared key group after the correctness of recipient's verified link request message
One group key, communication key group number are T, wherein KT≠KI。
Communication key verifies random number RTIt is recipient after randomly selecting a group key in key group as communication key
It generates, key group number T is number of the communication key in key group.Communication key is from verification information PTIt is that recipient is based on leading to
Believe key KTRandom number R is verified with communication keyTBuilt-up, PT=(RT, E (KT, RT)。
Recipient constructs request response message IRsp, structure IRsp=E (KI, (Rd', T, RT, E (KT, RT))), wherein KIFor
Initial key, Rd' is that initial key verifies random number, and T is communication key KTCorresponding key group group number, RTIt is tested for communication key
Demonstrate,prove random number, KTFor communication key.
Then recipient sends request response message IRspTo initiator, initiator is received.
In step s 130, initiator's decoding request response message.
After decoding request response message, obtain decryption initial key verifying random number, decryption communication key verifying random number,
Decrypt communication key group number.
Initiator passes through (Rd' ', T ', RT', Evalue)=D (KI, IRsp) decoding request response message IRsp, wherein Rd' ' is
It decrypts initial key and verifies random number, T ' is decryption communication key group number, RT' is that decryption communication key verifies random number, Evalue
To correspond to E (K after decryptionT, RT) secret value.
In step S140, initiator's checking request response message.
Initiator verifies decryption initial key and verifies random number Rd' ' and initial key verify random number RdIt is whether consistent, one
Cause then decision request response message IRspCorrectly.
In step S150, initiator is consensus based on request response message verifying random number verification communication key
Property.Step S150 includes sub-step S151, S152, S153.
Step S151 determines decryption communication key K based on decryption communication key group number T 'T'.
Step S152 generates new traffic key authentication random number R based on decryption communication keyT' '.
Pass through RT' '=D (KT', Evalue) decryption Evalue, obtain new traffic key authentication random number RT″。
Step S153, verifying decryption communication key verify random number RT' and new traffic key authentication random number RT' ' whether one
It causes, unanimously then determines the decryption communication key K receivedT' is exactly the communication key K of recipient's selectionT。
If RT' '=RT', then KT'=KT。
In step S160, initiator carries out coded communication with communication key and recipient.
Fig. 2 be another embodiment of the present invention provides one kind be based on 2048 groups of 256 randomly selected encryptions of shared key
Communication means flow diagram.
In the present embodiment, shared key group includes 2048 groups of 256 keys, and coded communication is calculated using AES-256 encryption
Method, key length are 256 (32 byte).The ciphering process of Encryption Algorithm AES-256 is labeled as EAES-256(Ki, x), decryption
Process markup is DAES-256(Ki, x), wherein KiFor 256bit (position) key, x is by the clear data of encryption and decryption；Using SHA256
As the hash algorithm of communicating pair, it is labeled as Hashsha-256(x)；Using the last 12Bit of random number cryptographic Hash as key group
Group number choose initial key, i.e. key Algorithms of Selecting K (x).
It the described method comprises the following steps.
In step S210, initiator sends link request message to recipient.Step S110 includes following sub-step
S211、S212、S213、S214。
Step S211, initiator generate initial key verifying random number R firstd。
In the present embodiment, initial key verifies random number RdFor 1024bit.
Step S212, initiator are based on initial key verifying random number and initial key K are calculatedI。
According to formula HR=Hashsha-256(Rd) calculate initial key verifying random number RdCryptographic Hash HR, then with Hash
Value HRLast 12bit as key group KGGroup number choose initial key KI。
Step S213, initiator is with initial key KIRandom number R is verified to initial keydIt carries out signature and forms linking request
Message TReq。
Initiator passes through SHR=EAES-256(KI, HR) calculate initial key verifying random number RdSignature value SHR, wherein HR
Random number R is verified for initial keydCryptographic Hash, KIFor initial key.Then linking request message T is constructedReq, TReq=(Rd,
EAES-256(KI, HR))。
Step S214, initiator send link request message to recipient.
In step S220, initiator receives the request response message from recipient；Request response message is recipient
Built-up based on communication key, communication key is the group key that recipient randomly selects from shared key group.
Request response message IRspIt is that recipient is based on initial key KI, initial key verify random number Rd', communication key are certainly
Verification information PT, communication key verify random number RT, communication key group number T it is built-up, communication key is from verification information PTIt is
Recipient is based on communication key KTRandom number R is verified with communication keyTBuilding, PT=(RT, EAES-256(KT, RT)。
The correctness of recipient's verified link request message, first parsing link request message TReq=(Rd', SHR'),
Middle Rd' is the initial key verifying random number that parsing obtains, SHR' is its signature value, passes through HR'=Hashsha-256(Rd') calculate
RdThe cryptographic Hash H of 'R' chooses HRThe last 12bit of ' chooses initial key K as key group group numberI', if SHR'=EAES-256
(KI', HR'), then it is determined as linking request message TReqCorrectly, and KI=KI'.
Communication key KTIt is to be randomly selected from shared key group after the correctness of recipient's verified link request message
One group key, communication key group number are T, wherein KT≠KI。
Wherein, initial key verifies random number Rd' is that recipient's parsing link request message obtains.The communication of 256bit
Key authentication random number RTIt is recipient from a group key is randomly selected in key group as being generated after communication key, key group
Number T is communication key KTNumber in key group.Communication key is from verification information PTIt is that recipient is based on communication key KTWith it is logical
Believe key authentication random number RTBuilding, PT=(RT, EAES-256(KT, RT)。
Recipient constructs request response message IRsp, structure IRsp=EAES-256(KI, (Rd', T, RT, EAES-256(KT,
RT))), wherein KIFor initial key, Rd' is that initial key verifies random number, and T is communication key KTCorresponding key group group number, RT
Random number, K are verified for communication keyTFor communication key.
Then recipient sends request response message IRspTo initiator, initiator is received.
In step S230, initiator's decoding request response message.
After decoding request response message, obtain decryption initial key verifying random number, decryption communication key verifying random number,
Decrypt communication key group number.
Initiator passes through (Rd' ', T ', RT', Evalue)=DAES-256(KI, IRsp) decoding request response message IRsp, wherein
Rd' ' is that decryption initial key verifies random number, and T ' is decryption communication key group number, RT' is that decryption communication key verifies random number,
EvalueTo correspond to E after decryptionAES-256(KT, RT) secret value.
In step S240, initiator's checking request response message.
Initiator verifies decryption initial key and verifies random number Rd' ' and initial key verify random number RdIt is whether consistent, one
Cause then decision request response message IRspCorrectly.
In step s 250, consensus property of the initiator based on request response message verifying communication key.Step S250
Including sub-step S251, S252, S253.
Step S251 determines decryption communication key K based on decryption communication key group number T 'T'.
Step S252, based on decryption communication key KT' generates new traffic key authentication random number RT″。
Pass through RT' '=DAES-256(KT', Evalue) decryption Evalue, obtain new traffic key authentication random number RT' '.
Step S253, verifying decryption communication key verify random number RT' and new traffic key authentication random number RT' ' whether one
It causes, unanimously then determines the decryption communication key K receivedT' is exactly the communication key K of recipient's selectionT。
If RT' '=RT', then KT'=KT。
In step S260, initiator carries out coded communication with communication key and recipient.
It should be noted that each embodiment above by reference to described in attached drawing is only to illustrate the present invention rather than limits this
The range of invention, those skilled in the art should understand that, it is right under the premise without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention
The modification or equivalent replacement that the present invention carries out, should all cover within the scope of the present invention.In addition, signified unless the context
Outside, the word occurred in the singular includes plural form, and vice versa.In addition, unless stated otherwise, then any embodiment
All or part of in combination with any other embodiment all or part of come using.
Claims (10)
1. one kind is based on the randomly selected encryption communication method of shared key, comprising:
Initiator sends link request message to recipient；
Receive the request response message from the recipient；The request response message is that the recipient is based on communication key
Built-up, the communication key is the group key that the recipient randomly selects from shared key group；
Decrypt the request response message；
Verify the request response message；
The consensus property of the communication key is verified based on the request response message；
Coded communication is carried out with the communication key and the recipient.
2. the method according to claim 1, wherein the initiator sends signature message to recipient, comprising:
Initiator generates initial key and verifies random number；
Initial key is calculated based on initial key verifying random number；
Signature is carried out to initial key verifying random number with the initial key and forms linking request message；
The linking request message is sent to recipient.
3. according to the method described in claim 2, it is characterized in that, the request response message is that the recipient is based on communication
Key is built-up, comprising:
The request response message is that the recipient is based on the initial key, initial key verifying random number, communication
Key is built-up from verification information, communication key verifying random number, communication key group number；
Wherein, the communication key is that the recipient is based on the communication key and the communication key is verified from verification information
Random number is built-up.
4. according to the method described in claim 3, it is characterized in that, communication key verifying random number be the recipient from
A group key is randomly selected in key group as what is generated after the communication key, the communication key group number is that the communication is close
Number of the key in key group.
5. according to the method described in claim 4, it is characterized in that, the communication key group number is the communication key described
Number in shared key group.
6. according to the method described in claim 5, it is characterized in that, being decrypted after the decryption request response message
Initial key verifies random number, decryption communication key verifying random number, decryption communication key group number.
7. according to the method described in claim 6, it is characterized in that, the verifying request response message, comprising:
It verifies the decryption initial key verifying random number and whether initial key verifying random number is consistent, unanimously then determine
The request response message is correct.
8. the method according to the description of claim 7 is characterized in that described verify the communication based on the request response message
The consensus property of key, comprising:
Decryption communication key is determined based on the decryption communication key group number；
New traffic key authentication random number is generated based on the decryption communication key；
It verifies the new traffic key authentication random number and whether decryption communication key verifying random number is consistent, unanimously then sentence
The fixed decryption communication key is exactly the communication key.
9. the method according to claim 1, wherein the shared key group is the initiator and the reception
The just shared one key group comprising 2048 groups of 256 keys.
10. the method according to claim 1, wherein described carried out with the communication key and the recipient
In coded communication, the coded communication uses AES-256 Encryption Algorithm.
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| CN113726502A (en) * | 2021-06-11 | 2021-11-30 | 华帝股份有限公司 | Encryption and decryption method suitable for cigarette machine |
| CN114710282A (en) * | 2022-05-10 | 2022-07-05 | 北京紫光展锐通信技术有限公司 | Identity authentication method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN116340954A (en) * | 2023-03-24 | 2023-06-27 | 合芯科技有限公司 | Data security channel establishment method, system control processor and starting firmware |
| CN116340954B (en) * | 2023-03-24 | 2024-01-23 | 合芯科技有限公司 | Data security channel establishment method, system control processor and starting firmware |
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