CN109005040A - Dynamic multi-secrets key obscures PUF structure and its authentication method - Google Patents
Dynamic multi-secrets key obscures PUF structure and its authentication method Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of dynamic multi-secrets keys to obscure PUF structure, including PUF, nonvolatile memory, True Random Number Generator and register；The excitation generated during nonvolatile memory authentication storage；True Random Number Generator generates random number；What is generated during register authentication storage obscures key.The invention also discloses the authentication methods that dynamic multi-secrets key obscures PUF structure, including registration phase and authentication phase.This dynamic multi-secrets key provided by the invention obscures PUF structure and its authentication method, all types of machine learning attack methods can be resisted, avoid the occurrence of the limitation to available excitation response pair number, the stability of PUF is not influenced suitable for existing all strong PUF and, such as error correction unit, hash circuit hardware are eliminated simultaneously, to greatly reduce the hardware realization expense of PUF.
Description
Technical field
Present invention relates particularly to a kind of dynamic multi-secrets keys to obscure PUF structure and its authentication method.
Background technique
Internet of Things (IoT) is connection physical equipment, vehicle, household electrical appliance and other embedded electronics, software, sensor etc.
The network of article, connectivity enable these objects to connect and exchange data.It is predicted according to IHS, the Internet of Things of whole world installation
Equipment will increase to the 30700000000 of the year two thousand twenty from 15,400,000,000 in 2015, and by 2025, this number was up to 75,400,000,000.
In the early stage of Internet of Things development, principal concern all concentrates on basic theory and application study.However, with
The fast development of Internet of Things, safety problem are concerned and become to be particularly acute.2017, Internet of Things security study report referred to
Out, the global safe totle drilling cost of Internet of Things in 2016 is 3.48 hundred million dollars, reaches 4.34 hundred million dollars within 2017, it is contemplated that by 2018,
About 5.47 hundred million dollars of this number.Safety problem has become one of the critical issue for restricting Internet of Things sustainable development.
In Internet of Things safety, key storage and equipment certification are two key technologies.Core system is safety safely
Basis, be to realize one of the important means of privacy information protection.Authentication is most direct defense technique, and can be Internet of Things
Net safety provides the defence of forefront.Traditional security mechanism is by key storage in electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
(EEPROM) or in the Nonvolatile static random access memory (SRAM) of battery back.Unfortunately, this mode is in object
Very fragile in face of reason attack, attacker is easy to clone the close of storage using physical attacks or half intrusive attack means
Key.In order to realize the physical security of greater degree, it usually needs add anti-tamper circuit, and this structure for needing persistently to be powered
It not only involves great expense but also power consumption.Moreover, in the resource-constrained Internet of Things application such as RFIDs, sensor, due to CPU,
The resources such as memory and battery capacity are limited, the cryptosecurity solution of unbearable classics, even realizing simple add
Decryption oprerations can also generate the cost of opposite great number.Furthermore if not disposing necessary defensive measure, some computer virus classes
Software even can arbitrarily be read in the case where user knows nothing and transmission key.Therefore, seek a suitable light weight
Grade solution is very urgent for Internet of Things safety.
Physics unclonable function (PUF) be used as a kind of very promising hardware security primitive, be it is a kind of well it is low at
This key generates and the substitution solution of device authentication.PUF is a physical entity, utilizes circuit itself physical structure itself
Characteristic, generate be easy to assess but it is difficult to predict key, and do not need the hardware of above-mentioned EEPROM and other valuableness.This
Outside, single PUF embedded device is easily fabricated but hardly reproducible in practice, produces the definite of the PUF equipment even if grasping
Manufacturing process.In the past ten years, researcher has made intensive studies on PUF, and proposes many PUF structures, such as
Arbiter PUF, SRAM PUF and ring oscillator (RO) PUF.Current PUF can be divided into strong PUF and weak PUF.Weak PUF is only
A small amount of CRPs (excitation response pair) be provided, can be used as the equipment unique key or legacy encryption system of conventional encryption system
Random seed.SRAM PUF and ring oscillator PUF is typical weak PUF.And for strong PUF, even duplicate set
Meter, when inputting identical input signal (excitation), due to the technique and material deviation in chip manufacturing proces, can make its generation
Different output (response), this characteristic make it be difficult to be predicted and clone, and are very suitable in Internet of Things safety based on CRPs
Lightweight Identify Authentication.Arbiter PUF is a typical strong PUF.However, strong PUF is easily by machine learning at present
Attack, attacker can simulate (clone) PUF by collecting the cocommutative a certain number of CRPs of communication channel.It clones and
Software PUF can show the exciter response behavior almost the same with hardware PUF.For example, for 64x64's
Arbiter PUF, when collecting about 650 pairs of CRPs (training time are about 0.01s on common PC), the model prediction trained is quasi-
True rate can be more than 95%；When collecting 18050 pairs of CRPs (training time are about 0.6s on common PC), model prediction accuracy rate
Up to 99.9%.
In order to resist machine learning attack, a variety of defense techniques are proposed that they are divided into structural nonlinear in succession
Change and CRP obscures two classes.Structural nonlinear method is excitation and response are realized by designing non-linear PUF structure non-thread
Sexual intercourse is to resist modeling attack.However, such methods can be greatly reduced PUF response stability, as long as and PUF size
It is fixed with complexity, they successfully can be modeled (clone).CRP obscures, and is by hiding reflecting between excitation and response
It penetrates relationship and models (clone) PUF to prevent attacker from collecting excitation response pair (CRPs) effective enough, such methods can be with
Effectively resist the traditional machine learning algorithm attack of such as logistic regression, support vector machines.However, they be not highly resistant to as
CMA-ES etc. is attacked based on the heuristic machine learning of evolution strategy, and the structure of obscuring added will lead to very high hardware and open
Pin.In addition, some of them defense technique such as XOR Arbiter PUF equally will affect the stability of strong PUF.
Summary of the invention
One of the objects of the present invention is to provide one kind can resist machine learning attack, suitable for all strong PUF and subtracts
The dynamic multi-secrets key of small hardware realization expense obscures PUF structure.
The second object of the present invention is to provide the authentication method that a kind of dynamic multi-secrets key obscures PUF structure.
This dynamic multi-secrets key provided by the invention obscures PUF structure, including PUF, further includes nonvolatile memory, true
Random number generator and register；Register and nonvolatile memory are connect with PUF, True Random Number Generator and register
Connection；Excitation of the nonvolatile memory for being generated during authentication storage；True Random Number Generator is for generating random number；
Register obscures key for what is generated during authentication storage.
The present invention also provides the authentication method that a kind of dynamic multi-secrets key obscures PUF structure, including registration phase and
Authentication phase:
Registration phase:
S1. equipment picks out several pairs of stable excitation response pairs, and by the excitation of exciter response centering be stored in it is non-easily
In the property lost memory, and on the server by stable excitation response pair storage；The equipment is mixed with dynamic multi-secrets key
The equipment for PUF structure of confusing；
S2. after the starting of PUF chip, PUF, which is read, to be motivated and generates corresponding response, and response is stored in register
In；
S3. the stable excitation response pair of server by utilizing equipment storage on the server, constructs the parameter model of equipment；
Authentication phase:
A. when equipment needs to authenticate, equipment sends certification request to server；
B. random to generate an excitation after server receives device identifier, and the excitation is sent to and needs to authenticate
Equipment；
C. after equipment receives excitation, generating device end second is responded, and the response of equipment end second is sent to server；
D. after excitation is sent to the equipment for needing to authenticate by server, server is raw according to the excitation response pair being previously stored
It is responded at several server ends second；
E. after the equipment end second that server receives equipment transmission responds, the server end second obtained with itself is responded
It is compared, and when comparison result meets and imposes a condition, definition apparatus is authenticated successfully, otherwise definition apparatus authentification failure.
It further includes following steps that the dynamic multi-secrets key, which obscures the authentication method of PUF structure:
F. the certification number of server statistics equipment；
If G. the number of equipment certification reaches the threshold value of setting, server issues key updating instruction, equipment to equipment
Key is updated with server；
H. after server sends key updating instruction, after only server and equipment update key,
The certification request of server ability accepting device.
The threshold value of setting described in step G, the threshold value specially set have to be larger than attacker and construct a prediction error
Rate is the quantity of minimum excitation response pair required for the PUF model of ε.
Equipment described in step A sends certification request to server, and specially equipment sends the device identifier of itself
To server.
The response of generating device end second described in step C, after specially equipment receives excitation, is generated by true random number
Device generates the first random number and the second random number: equipment according to the first random number in a register selected equipment end first key with
Excitation carries out exclusive or, and the result of exclusive or is input to PUF circuit obtains equipment end first and respond；Meanwhile equipment is according to second
The second key of selected equipment end and the response of equipment end first carry out exclusive or to obtain equipment end second to random number in a register
Response.
Server described in step D generates the response of several server ends second according to the excitation response pair being previously stored,
Specially several server end keys are calculated according to the excitation response pair being previously stored in server, by Servers-all end
Key and excitation obtain several server end initial excitations after carrying out exclusive or, and server end initial excitation is input to equipment
Corresponding several server ends first response is calculated in parameter model；Then several server ends first are responded again
Exclusive or, which is carried out, with several server end keys obtains the response of several server ends second.
Setting condition described in step E, specially using following formula as setting condition:
In formulaFor the response of equipment end second, R is the response of server end second, and τ is the verification threshold being previously set,ForWith the average Hamming distance of R.
This dynamic multi-secrets key provided by the invention obscures PUF structure and its authentication method, can resist all types of machines
Device learning attack method avoids the occurrence of the limitation to available excitation response pair number, suitable for existing all strong PUF and
The stability of PUF is not influenced, while eliminating such as error correction unit, hash circuit hardware, to greatly reduce the hardware of PUF
Realize expense.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the structural schematic diagram that dynamic multi-secrets key of the invention obscures PUF structure.
Fig. 2 is the method flow diagram of the registration phase for the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key of the invention obscures PUF structure.
Fig. 3 is the method flow diagram of the authentication phase for the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key of the invention obscures PUF structure.
Specific embodiment
The structural schematic diagram of PUF structure is obscured for dynamic multi-secrets key of the invention as shown in Figure 1: provided by the invention this
Dynamic multi-secrets key obscures PUF structure, including PUF, further includes nonvolatile memory (NVM), True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
With register (Register)；Register and nonvolatile memory are connect with PUF, and True Random Number Generator and register connect
It connects；Excitation of the nonvolatile memory for being generated during authentication storage；True Random Number Generator is for generating random number；It posts
Storage obscures key for what is generated during authentication storage.
Be illustrated in figure 2 dynamic multi-secrets key of the invention obscure PUF structure authentication method registration phase method stream
Cheng Tu: registration phase mainly includes the following steps
S1. equipment picks out several pairs of stable excitation response pairs, and by the excitation of exciter response centering be stored in it is non-easily
In the property lost memory NVM, and on the server by stable excitation response pair storage；The equipment is with dynamic multi-secrets key
Obscure the equipment of PUF structure；
S2. after the starting of PUF chip, PUF, which is read, motivates and generates corresponding response, and response is deposited as key keys
Storage is in a register；
S3. the stable excitation response pair of server by utilizing equipment storage on the server, constructs the parameter model of equipment.
Be illustrated in figure 3 dynamic multi-secrets key of the invention obscure PUF structure authentication method authentication phase method stream
Cheng Tu: authentication phase mainly includes the following steps:
A. when equipment needs to authenticate, equipment sends certification request to server；For example, equipment is by the device identification of itself
Symbol is sent to server；
B. after server receives device identifier, an excitation C is generated at random, and the excitation is sent to and needs to authenticate
Equipment；
C. after equipment receives excitation C, the first random number i and the second random number j is generated by True Random Number Generator: being set
It is standby according to the first random number selected equipment end first key key in a registeriExclusive or is carried out with excitation, and by the result of exclusive or
C' is input to PUF circuit and obtains the response of equipment end first R'；Meanwhile equipment is by the second random number j selected equipment in a register
Hold the second key keyjR' is responded with equipment end first and carries out exclusive or to obtain equipment end second and respond R, and by equipment end the
Two responses are sent to server；
D. according to the excitation response pair being previously stored m server end key keys is calculated, by all clothes in server
Business device end key and excitation obtain m C' of several server end initial excitations after carrying out exclusive orf, by server end initial excitation
C'fIt is input in the parameter model of equipment and m R' of corresponding several server ends first response is calculatedf；If then again will
The dry response of server end first carries out exclusive or with several server end keys and obtains m2A server end second responds Rf；
E. after the equipment end second that server receives equipment transmission responds, the server end second obtained with itself is responded
It is compared, and when comparison result meets and imposes a condition, definition apparatus is authenticated successfully, otherwise definition apparatus authentification failure；Tool
Body is using following formula as setting condition:
FHD(R,Rf)≤τ
R is the response of equipment end second, R in formulafFor the response of server end second, τ is the verification threshold being previously set,ForWith the average Hamming distance of R；
For example, for example, CMOS PUF (n=64) for one 64 × 64, it is assumed that obscure key's in cipher key sets K
Number is 8 (m=8), and server is sent to the excitation C=1010 ... 11 of verifying equipment, and TRNG selects keyi=0110 ... 01 He
keyj=1010 ... 10 respectively the excitation to strong PUF and response carry out xor operation.At this point, C and keyiIt is generated after exclusive orIt is input into strong PUF circuit and generates R'=f (C')=f
(1100...10), is then responding to R' and keyjCarry out exclusive or generation
Finally, the R that CMOS PUF is generated is sent to server and carries out matching certification；
F. the certification number of server statistics equipment；
If G. the number of equipment certification reaches the threshold value of setting, server issues key updating instruction, equipment to equipment
Key is updated with server；
The selection of threshold value, preferably threshold value have to be larger than attacker and construct needed for the PUF model that a prediction error rate is ε
The quantity for the minimum excitation response pair wanted；The machine learning attacker that its specific size is selected by the type of strong PUF and attacker
Method determines；
For example, for n-stage Arbiter a PUF, NminThe relationship of (minimum value of the threshold value of setting) and ε are as follows:
Specifically:
According to above formula, successfully to model the 64-stage Arbiter PUF that a predictablity rate is 95%, attack is needed
The minimum number of the excitation response pair to be collected is NCRP,0.05≈ 650, however, for CMOS PUF (for this application involves adopt
The PUF circuit authenticated with the method for the present invention, abbreviation CMOS PUF mean that dynamic multi-secrets key obscures structure PUF), as setting m
When a key is obscured, the logarithm for authenticating issuable excitation response pair every time is m2, so, if attacker wants to establish
The dynamic multi-secrets key that one prediction error rate is ε obscures PUF structural model, and the quantity for the minimum excitation response pair for needing to collect is
Nmin≈m2×NArbiter, speciallyAttacker is from N at this timeminA exciter response centering extraction has
The N of effectArbiterThe probability of a CRPs isAs can be seen that when m increases, NminAlso it will increase；For
64-stage CMOS Arbiter PUF, as setting m=2, ε=5%, NminIt is 2600, attacker is from 2600 at this time
It is about 10 that the probability of 650 effective CRPs is extracted in CRPs-630；In addition, reaching N when attacker collects CRPsmin,εWhen, server
Key updating instruction just is sent to equipment, to realize the synchronized update of the key of PUF die terminals and server end, while and will note
The CRP calculator Counter of record certification number is initially 0；In this way, it is organic can to resist existing institute by CMOS PUF
Device learning attack；
H. after server sends key updating instruction, after only server and equipment update key,
The certification request of server ability accepting device.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of dynamic multi-secrets key obscures PUF structure, including PUF, it is characterised in that further include nonvolatile memory, truly random
Number generator and register；Register and nonvolatile memory are connect with PUF, and True Random Number Generator and register connect
It connects；Excitation of the nonvolatile memory for being generated during authentication storage；True Random Number Generator is for generating random number；It posts
Storage obscures key for what is generated during authentication storage.
2. the authentication method that a kind of dynamic multi-secrets key described in claim 1 obscures PUF structure, it is characterised in that including registering rank
Section and authentication phase:
Registration phase:
S1. equipment picks out several pairs of stable excitation response pairs, and the excitation of exciter response centering is stored in non-volatile
In memory, and on the server by stable excitation response pair storage；The equipment is to obscure PUF with dynamic multi-secrets key
The equipment of structure；
S2. after the starting of PUF chip, PUF, which is read, to be motivated and generates corresponding response, and response is stored in register；
S3. the stable excitation response pair of server by utilizing equipment storage on the server, constructs the parameter model of equipment；
Authentication phase:
A. when equipment needs to authenticate, equipment sends certification request to server；
B. random to generate an excitation after server receives device identifier, and the excitation is sent to and needs what is authenticated to set
It is standby；
C. after equipment receives excitation, generating device end second is responded, and the response of equipment end second is sent to server；
D. after excitation is sent to the equipment for needing to authenticate by server, if server is generated according to the excitation response pair being previously stored
Dry server end second responds；
E. after the equipment end second that server receives equipment transmission responds, the response of server end second obtained with itself is carried out
It compares, and when comparison result meets and imposes a condition, definition apparatus is authenticated successfully, otherwise definition apparatus authentification failure.
3. the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key according to claim 1 obscures PUF structure, it is characterised in that further include as follows
Step:
F. the certification number of server statistics equipment；
If G. the number of equipment certification reaches the threshold value of setting, server issues key updating instruction, equipment kimonos to equipment
Business device is updated key；
H. after server sends key updating instruction, after only server and equipment update key, service
The certification request of device ability accepting device.
4. the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key according to claim 3 obscures PUF structure, it is characterised in that described in step G
Setting threshold value, the threshold value specially set have to be larger than attacker construct a prediction error rate as needed for the PUF model of ε
The quantity for the minimum excitation response pair wanted.
5. the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key according to claim 2 obscures PUF structure, it is characterised in that described in step A
Equipment send certification request to server, the device identifier of itself is sent to server by specially equipment.
6. the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key according to claim 2 obscures PUF structure, it is characterised in that described in step C
Generating device end second respond, after specially equipment receives excitation, pass through True Random Number Generator generate the first random number
With the second random number: according to the first random number, selected equipment end first key and excitation carry out exclusive or to equipment in a register, and
It the result of exclusive or is input to PUF circuit obtains equipment end first and respond；Meanwhile equipment according to the second random number in a register
The second key of selected equipment end and the response of equipment end first carry out exclusive or to obtain the response of equipment end second.
7. the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key according to claim 2 obscures PUF structure, it is characterised in that described in step D
Server according to the excitation response pair being previously stored generate several server ends second response, specially server is according to thing
Several server end keys are calculated in the excitation response pair first stored, and Servers-all end key and excitation are carried out exclusive or
After obtain several server end initial excitations, server end initial excitation is input in the parameter model of equipment and is calculated
Corresponding several server ends first response；Then several server ends first are responded again close with several server ends
Key carries out exclusive or and obtains the response of several server ends second.
8. the authentication method that dynamic multi-secrets key according to claim 2 obscures PUF structure, it is characterised in that described in step E
Setting condition, specially using following formula as impose a condition:
In formulaFor the response of equipment end second, R is the response of server end second, and τ is the verification threshold being previously set,ForWith the average Hamming distance of R.
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| CN109787761A (en) * | 2019-02-20 | 2019-05-21 | 金陵科技学院 | A kind of equipment certification and key distribution system and method based on physics unclonable function |
| CN109787761B (en) * | 2019-02-20 | 2021-06-29 | 金陵科技学院 | Equipment authentication and key distribution system and method based on physical unclonable function |
| CN110290115A (en) * | 2019-06-04 | 2019-09-27 | 广东元一科技实业有限公司 | A kind of Internet of Things register method and Accreditation System |
| CN112398894B (en) * | 2019-08-19 | 2022-05-24 | 广州汽车集团股份有限公司 | Safety verification method and device for vehicle |
| CN112398894A (en) * | 2019-08-19 | 2021-02-23 | 广州汽车集团股份有限公司 | Safety verification method and device for vehicle |
| CN110752919A (en) * | 2019-10-21 | 2020-02-04 | 湖北工业大学 | Two-party authentication and session key exchange method based on BST-PUF |
| CN111291523A (en) * | 2020-01-16 | 2020-06-16 | 南京航空航天大学 | System and method for realizing PUF (physical unclonable function) based on dynamic reconfigurable technology |
| CN111339576A (en) * | 2020-02-12 | 2020-06-26 | 鹏城实验室 | Three-state physical unclonable function circuit, control method and chip |
| CN111339576B (en) * | 2020-02-12 | 2023-01-24 | 鹏城实验室 | Three-state physical unclonable function circuit, control method and chip |
| CN111371789A (en) * | 2020-03-04 | 2020-07-03 | 鹏城实验室 | Authentication device, server, authentication system, and authentication method based on confusion incentive |
| CN111371789B (en) * | 2020-03-04 | 2022-05-27 | 鹏城实验室 | Authentication device, server, authentication system, and authentication method based on confusion incentive |
| CN111865570A (en) * | 2020-05-25 | 2020-10-30 | 南京理工大学 | Automatic remote certification method adaptive to heterogeneous equipment group in Internet of things |
| CN111865570B (en) * | 2020-05-25 | 2022-06-24 | 南京理工大学 | Automatic remote certification method adaptive to heterogeneous equipment group in Internet of things |
| CN111966329A (en) * | 2020-08-18 | 2020-11-20 | 合肥工业大学 | Physical unclonable function PUF-based true random number generator |
| CN112637249B (en) * | 2021-03-10 | 2021-12-14 | 浙江宇视科技有限公司 | Internet of things node identification authentication method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN112637249A (en) * | 2021-03-10 | 2021-04-09 | 浙江宇视科技有限公司 | Identification authentication method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN113919012B (en) * | 2021-08-31 | 2024-03-19 | 温州大学 | Strong PUF (physical unclonable function) machine learning attack resisting method and circuit based on sequence password |
| CN113919012A (en) * | 2021-08-31 | 2022-01-11 | 温州大学 | Strong PUF (physical unclonable function) anti-machine learning attack method and circuit based on sequence password |
| CN113630255A (en) * | 2021-08-31 | 2021-11-09 | 北京航空航天大学 | Lightweight bidirectional authentication method and system based on SRAM PUF |
| CN114095182A (en) * | 2022-01-20 | 2022-02-25 | 南京航空航天大学 | Dynamic response and security authentication method and system based on strong PUF |
| CN114095182B (en) * | 2022-01-20 | 2022-05-03 | 南京航空航天大学 | Dynamic response and security authentication method and system based on strong PUF |
| CN114422145A (en) * | 2022-01-21 | 2022-04-29 | 上海交通大学 | Internet of things end-to-end dynamic identity authentication method based on PUF and Hash |
| CN114422145B (en) * | 2022-01-21 | 2024-05-28 | 上海交通大学 | End-to-end dynamic identity authentication method of Internet of things based on PUF and Hash |
| CN114374522A (en) * | 2022-03-22 | 2022-04-19 | 杭州美创科技有限公司 | Trusted device authentication method and device, computer device and storage medium |
| CN115357949A (en) * | 2022-10-24 | 2022-11-18 | 南京邮电大学 | Encryption test circuit based on ring oscillator PUF |
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