CN109005031A - A kind of key management method for railway signal system - Google Patents
A kind of key management method for railway signal system Download PDFInfo
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- CN109005031A CN109005031A CN201810906841.7A CN201810906841A CN109005031A CN 109005031 A CN109005031 A CN 109005031A CN 201810906841 A CN201810906841 A CN 201810906841A CN 109005031 A CN109005031 A CN 109005031A
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- key management
- key
- random number
- management system
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of key management methods for railway signal system, comprising: logins key management system after completing authentication to operator；The key management system is that each equipment in its compass of competency generates configuration data, wherein the configuration data includes random number and mailing address；According to actual operation demand, pass through Key Management Center module interfaces editor's cipher key operation order in key management system；Key management system generates the random number；Equipment and the key management system establish on-line joining process；Command context is sent to vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC by Key Management Center module；Vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC execute the command context, and commands in return implementing result is to the Key Management Center module, to notify operator.
Description
Technical field
It is securely communicated the present invention relates to railway signal system more particularly to vehicle-mounted ATP equipment and trackside RBC equipment
Key management.
Background technique
There are many defects for online key managing project in the prior art for ETCS.For example, all vehicle-mounted ATPs
The authentication key of equipment and trackside RBC deployed with devices is to being identical；Transmission key can not online updating；Key uses module
Algorithm generates, and key strength is weak.
In order to improve the safety of key file transmission process, a kind of new key pipe for railway signal system is needed
Reason method.
Summary of the invention
In order to improve the safety of key file transmission process, the present invention provides a kind of for the close of railway signal system
Key management method, which is characterized in that the key management method includes:
Key management system is logined after completing authentication to operator；
The key management system is that each equipment in its compass of competency generates configuration data, wherein the configuration number
According to including random number and mailing address；
According to actual operation demand, pass through Key Management Center module interfaces editor's cipher key operation in key management system
Order；
Key management system generates the random number；
Equipment and the key management system establish on-line joining process；
Command context is sent to vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC by Key Management Center module；
Vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC execute the command context, and commands in return implementing result is to the Key Management Center
Module, to notify operator.
In one embodiment, the step of logining key management system after the completion authentication to operator packet
It includes:
Carry out authentication operation personnel using both static password and authentication medium；
When operator logs in, if continuous 3 authentification failures, lock the operator, need super keepe solution
It could be logged in after lock；
After operator logs in, if continuous a period of time does not operate, system is automatically exited from；
Regular mandatory modification password, to improve the safety of Actor password.
In one embodiment, the initial configuration data of each equipment are 10 groups of 192 random numbers, which is kind
Sub- random number；Configuration data is installed by operator to new equipment.
In one embodiment, the mailing address is key management system IP address.
In one embodiment, Key Management Center module interfaces editor's key by key management system is grasped
The step of ordering include:
In Key Management Center module interfaces, selection receives the equipment of cipher key command and the type and root of selection cipher key command
Command information is supplemented according to command type；
The cipher key command content of input is verified, and is committed to Key Management Center module；
Key Management Center module verifies cipher key command legitimacy.
In one embodiment, the random number is to be used to generate high quality height using physical equipment by random number generator
The random of intensity applies key.
In one embodiment, the key management system is connect with the random number generator using cable；It is described with
Machine number generator includes active and standby each one, to realize two-node cluster hot backup.
In one embodiment, the random number generator forms linear feedback by multiple d type flip flops 301 and XOR gate and moves
Bit register (LFSR), the every jump of clock once one different sequence of output, and adjustable feedback factor, obtains different shapes
State transfer figure.
In one embodiment, the step of equipment establishes on-line joining process with the key management system include:
The equipment reads IP address and key management system in the configuration data and establishes TCP connection；
The TCP connection completes authentication, session key generates and seed random number supplement, wherein the identity is recognized
Card uses predefined random number；After completing the authentication, both sides generate session key simultaneously, thus two main bodys it
Between establish a safe encryption channel；After the encryption channel is established, the key management system calls random number generator raw
At one group of new random number, and it is sent to supplement of the counterpart device as predefined random number online；
Wherein, every group of random number fails after completing primary connection, and deletes from the equipment of communicating pair, wherein just
In normal communication process, a group key is lost every time, and supplement a group key.If after the completion of authentication, new key pair
It is abnormal before reception, then a group key is lost；All predefined password then needs to reset Configuration Data to being lost.
In one embodiment, realization body is mutually authenticated before Handshake Protocol completes transmission application layer data, and raw
At session key.Recording layer is completed to verify the MAC of application layer data.
The key file of train-ground communication is transmitted to by online mode using object by key management method of the invention,
It reduces cipher key deployment and updates the cost of work, improve the safety of key file transmission process, specific beneficial effect is such as
Under:
Firstly, the present invention uses the entity in predefined keys authentication key management interaction, and introduce communication abnormality loss
Counter mechanism avoids invader's forged identity from obtaining key；
Secondly, key is generated by hardware random number generator, compared to such as Software Create random number, avoiding key is weak key
Or semiweak key and be easy to be cracked by invader；
Again, key management system administrator introduces identity authorization system, and invader is avoided to destroy system.
Detailed description of the invention
The above summary of the invention of the invention and following specific embodiment can obtain more preferably when reading in conjunction with the drawings
Understanding.It should be noted that attached drawing is only used as the example of claimed invention.In the accompanying drawings, identical appended drawing reference
Represent same or similar element.
Fig. 1 shows key management system schematic diagram according to an embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 2 shows the flow charts of key management system online management key according to an embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 3 shows random number generator schematic diagram according to an embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 4 shows authentication protocol model according to an embodiment of the invention.
Specific embodiment
Describe detailed features and advantage of the invention in detail in a specific embodiment below, content is enough to make any
Skilled in the art realises that technology contents of the invention and implementing accordingly, and according to specification disclosed by this specification, power
Benefit requires and attached drawing, skilled person readily understands that the relevant purpose of the present invention and advantage.
The present invention manages key used in train-ground communication, improvements in railway signal system by online mode and exists
In: each authentication uses different key pairs；It introduces communication abnormality and counter mechanism is lost, predefined keys are to being lost then
It need to be by manually reinitializing equipment；Strong encryption keys are generated using hardware device；Authentication medium (IC card) manages cipher key operation
Personnel.
Fig. 1 shows key management system schematic diagram according to an embodiment of the invention.Key management system packet of the invention
Include random number generator 102, Key Management Center module 101.Vehicle-mounted ATP (AutomaticTrainProtection) equipment and
Trackside RBC equipment is the application entity of key file, receives its key file of the online order management of key management system；Behaviour
It is responsible for as personnel according to actual operation scene, it is close to vehicle-mounted ATP equipment and trackside RBC equipment management by key management system
Key；Random number generator is responsible for generating key random number for the use of Key Management Center module.
In one embodiment, active and standby two random number generators can be used, to realize two-node cluster hot backup.
Fig. 2 shows the flow charts of key management system online management key according to an embodiment of the invention.Whole flow process
Include, but are not limited to following steps:
Step 201: operator logins key management system after completing authentication.
Step 202: key management system is that each equipment in its compass of competency generates configuration data.
Step 203: according to actual operation demand, passing through Key Management Center module interfaces editor's cipher key operation order.
Step 204: key management system generates random number.
Step 205: equipment and key management system establish on-line joining process.
Step 206: command context is sent to vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC by Key Management Center module；
Step 207: vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC execute order, and commands in return implementing result；
Step 208: Key Management Center module receives implementing result, notifies operator；
Step 209: equipment connection is normal to be disconnected, and operator logs off.
The realization of each step is described in detail individually below.
For step 201 comprising but it is not limited to following sub-step:
For step 201 comprising but it is not limited to following characteristics:
A. static password+authentication media authentication operator is used.
B. after operator logs in, if continuous a period of time does not operate, system is automatically exited from.The purpose for the arrangement is that
After operator does not log off and leaves in order to prevent, criminal is engaged in illegal operation using operating terminal.
C. when operator logs in, if continuous 3 authentification failures, lock the operator, super keepe are needed to unlock
After could log in.In this way, can prevent criminal from obtaining the password of operator by repeatedly logging in experiment, exhaustion.
D. regular imperative operation person's Modify password, to improve the safety of Actor password.
For step 202 comprising but it is not limited to following characteristics:
A. configuration data is made of random number and mailing address；
B. each equipment initial configuration data are 10 groups of 192 random numbers, which is seed random number；
C. random number calls random number generator to generate by key management system；
D. mailing address is key management system IP address；
E. configuration data is installed by operator to new equipment；
For step 203 comprising but it is not limited to following characteristics:
A. for operator at key management module interface, selection receives the equipment of cipher key command and the class of selection cipher key command
Type simultaneously supplements command information (validity period of such as key) according to command type；
B. operator verifies the cipher key command content of input, and is committed to Key Management Center module；
C. Key Management Center module verifies cipher key command legitimacy.
For step 204 comprising but it is not limited to following characteristics:
A. random number generator generates the random of high quality high intensity using physical equipment and applies key；
B. key management system and random number generator are connected using cable；
C. system connects two random number generators and realizes two-node cluster hot backup；
In one embodiment, also Software Create random number can be used to replace random number when key management system generates key
Generator equipment.
Fig. 3 shows random number generator structure chart according to an embodiment of the invention.In one embodiment, random number is raw
Growing up to be a useful person can be made of linear feedback shift register (LFSR) 30 d type flip flops 301 and XOR gate, the primary output of the every jump of clock
One different sequence, and adjustable feedback factor gn, obtain different state transition diagrams.In another embodiment, D can be increased
The number of trigger, the more multimode of generation enhance randomness.
For step 205, referred in conjunction with Fig. 4 comprising but it is not limited to following characteristics:
A. equipment reads IP address and key management system in configuration data and establishes TCP connection；
B. authentication is completed in connection, session key generates and seed random number supplement；
C. authentication uses predefined random number, for example, symmetric key；
D. after completing authentication, both sides generate session key simultaneously, to establish a safety between two main bodys
Encryption channel；
E. after encryption connection is established, key management system calls random number generator to generate 192 new random numbers,
And it is sent to supplement of the counterpart device as predefined random number online；
F. every group of random number fails after completing primary connection, and (normal communication stream is deleted from the equipment of communicating pair
A group key is lost every time, and supplements a group key by Cheng Zhong.If new key pair occurs before receiving after the completion of authentication
It is abnormal then a group key is lost.10 groups of predefined passwords need again to being lost by operator's configuration data)；
G. as detailed below, realization body is mutually authenticated authentication protocol before Handshake Protocol completes transmission application layer data,
And generate session key.Recording layer is completed to verify the MAC of application layer data.
Wherein, the basic step of authentication protocol is as follows:
(1) ATP-- → KMC:NATP
⑵ATP<---KMC: NKMC,NATP,H3(S,NKMC,NATP)
⑶ATP--→KMC: H2(S,NKMC,NATP)
Session key information are as follows: SKM=H (S, NKMC,NATP)
Note: Hn(M)=H (Hn-1(M)) (n≥2)
H1(M)=H (M) (n=1)
Above-mentioned symbol description is as follows:
ATP, KMC: communication agent, the replaceable ATP of RBC, step are identical；
M: message；
M1 | | the bit of M2: message M1 and M2 couple；
Nx: main body x 192 random numbers generated at random；
S: the predefined symmetric key of agreement both sides (192)
SKM: session key.
High intensity hash algorithm disclosed in H: one
The key file of train-ground communication is transmitted to by online mode using object by key management method of the invention,
It reduces cipher key deployment and updates the cost of work, improve the safety of key file transmission process, specific beneficial effect is such as
Under:
Firstly, the present invention uses the entity in predefined keys authentication key management interaction, and introduce communication abnormality loss
Counter mechanism avoids invader's forged identity from obtaining key；
Secondly, key is generated by hardware random number generator, compared to such as Software Create random number, avoiding key is weak key
Or semiweak key and be easy to be cracked by invader；
Again, key management system administrator introduces identity authorization system, and invader is avoided to destroy system.
Here the term and form of presentation used is only intended to describe, and the present invention should not be limited to these terms and table
It states.It is not meant to exclude the equivalent features of any signal and description (or in which part) using these terms and statement, should recognize
Knowing various modifications that may be present should also be included in scope of the claims.Other modifications, variations and alternatives are also likely to be present.
Correspondingly, claim should be regarded as covering all these equivalents.For example, key management system of the invention can when generating key
Random number generator equipment is replaced using Software Create random number；Public Key Infrastructure technology can be used in key management system
(PKI) predefined keys technology (PSK) is replaced to realize that the communicating pair in online communication authenticates.
Equally, it should be pointed out that although the present invention is described with reference to current specific embodiment, this technology neck
Those of ordinary skill in domain it should be appreciated that more than embodiment be intended merely to illustrate the present invention, in no disengaging present invention
Various equivalent change or replacement can be also made in the case where spirit, therefore, as long as right in spirit of the invention
The variation, modification of above-described embodiment will all be fallen in the range of following claims.
Claims (9)
1. a kind of key management method for railway signal system, which is characterized in that the key management method includes:
Key management system is logined after completing authentication to operator；
The key management system is that each equipment in its compass of competency generates configuration data, wherein the configuration data packet
Include random number and mailing address；
According to actual operation demand, ordered by Key Management Center module interfaces editor's cipher key operation in key management system
It enables；
Key management system generates the random number；
Equipment and the key management system establish on-line joining process；
Command context is sent to vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC by Key Management Center module；
Vehicle-mounted ATP or trackside RBC execute the command context, and commands in return implementing result is to the Key Management Center mould
Block, to notify operator.
2. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that described to operator
The step of logining key management system, includes: after member completes authentication
Carry out authentication operation personnel using both static password and authentication medium；
When operator logs in, if continuous 3 authentification failures, lock the operator, after needing super keepe to unlock
It could log in；
After operator logs in, if continuous a period of time does not operate, system is automatically exited from；
Regular mandatory modification password, to improve the safety of Actor password.
3. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that at the beginning of each equipment
Beginningization configuration data is 10 groups of 192 random numbers, which is seed random number；Configuration data is installed by operator to new
Equipment.
4. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the mailing address
For key management system IP address.
5. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that described to pass through key
The step of Key Management Center module interfaces editor's cipher key operation order in management system includes:
In Key Management Center module interfaces, selection receives the equipment of cipher key command and the type of selection cipher key command and according to life
Type is enabled to supplement command information；
The cipher key command content of input is verified, and is committed to Key Management Center module；
Key Management Center module verifies cipher key command legitimacy.
6. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the random number is
It is used by random number generator and generates the random using key of high quality high intensity using physical equipment.
7. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as claimed in claim 6, which is characterized in that the key management
System is connect with the random number generator using cable；The random number generator includes active and standby each one, to realize two-shipper
It is hot standby.
8. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as claimed in claim 6, which is characterized in that the random number is raw
It grows up to be a useful person and is made of linear feedback shift register (LFSR) multiple d type flip flops 301 and XOR gate, the primary output one of the every jump of clock
A different sequence, and adjustable feedback factor, obtain different state transition diagrams.
9. being used for the key management method of railway signal system as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the equipment and institute
Stating the step of key management system establishes on-line joining process includes:
The equipment reads IP address and key management system in the configuration data and establishes TCP connection；
The TCP connection completes authentication, session key generates and seed random number supplement, wherein the authentication makes
With predefined random number；After completing the authentication, both sides generate session key simultaneously, to build between two main bodys
Found a safe encryption channel；After the encryption channel is established, the key management system calls random number generator to generate one
The new random number of group, and it is sent to supplement of the counterpart device as predefined random number online；
Wherein, every group of random number fails after completing primary connection, and deletes from the equipment of communicating pair, wherein normal
In communication process, a group key is lost every time, and supplement a group key.If new key pair receives after the completion of authentication
Before be abnormal, then a group key is lost；All predefined password then needs to reset Configuration Data to being lost.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810906841.7A CN109005031A (en) | 2018-08-10 | 2018-08-10 | A kind of key management method for railway signal system |
| PCT/CN2019/081875 WO2020029598A1 (en) | 2018-08-10 | 2019-04-09 | Key management method for railway signal system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810906841.7A CN109005031A (en) | 2018-08-10 | 2018-08-10 | A kind of key management method for railway signal system |
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| CN109005031A true CN109005031A (en) | 2018-12-14 |
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| WO (1) | WO2020029598A1 (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2020029598A1 (en) * | 2018-08-10 | 2020-02-13 | 湖南中车时代通信信号有限公司 | Key management method for railway signal system |
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| WO2020029598A1 (en) | 2020-02-13 |
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Application publication date: 20181214 |