CN108985566A - Power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving - Google Patents
Power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN108985566A CN108985566A CN201810616403.7A CN201810616403A CN108985566A CN 108985566 A CN108985566 A CN 108985566A CN 201810616403 A CN201810616403 A CN 201810616403A CN 108985566 A CN108985566 A CN 108985566A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- node
- route
- layer
- factor
- attack
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 36
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 24
- 230000009466 transformation Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 239000011159 matrix material Substances 0.000 claims description 36
- 238000013468 resource allocation Methods 0.000 claims description 23
- 230000007123 defense Effects 0.000 claims description 12
- 238000005457 optimization Methods 0.000 claims description 11
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000006378 damage Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000003014 reinforcing effect Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- NAWXUBYGYWOOIX-SFHVURJKSA-N (2s)-2-[[4-[2-(2,4-diaminoquinazolin-6-yl)ethyl]benzoyl]amino]-4-methylidenepentanedioic acid Chemical compound C1=CC2=NC(N)=NC(N)=C2C=C1CCC1=CC=C(C(=O)N[C@@H](CC(=C)C(O)=O)C(O)=O)C=C1 NAWXUBYGYWOOIX-SFHVURJKSA-N 0.000 claims description 3
- IXKSXJFAGXLQOQ-XISFHERQSA-N WHWLQLKPGQPMY Chemical group C([C@@H](C(=O)N[C@@H](CC=1C2=CC=CC=C2NC=1)C(=O)N[C@@H](CC(C)C)C(=O)N[C@@H](CCC(N)=O)C(=O)N[C@@H](CC(C)C)C(=O)N1CCC[C@H]1C(=O)NCC(=O)N[C@@H](CCC(N)=O)C(=O)N[C@@H](CC(O)=O)C(=O)N1CCC[C@H]1C(=O)N[C@@H](CCSC)C(=O)N[C@@H](CC=1C=CC(O)=CC=1)C(O)=O)NC(=O)[C@@H](N)CC=1C2=CC=CC=C2NC=1)C1=CNC=N1 IXKSXJFAGXLQOQ-XISFHERQSA-N 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012512 characterization method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000013210 evaluation model Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000000977 initiatory effect Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 229940029329 intrinsic factor Drugs 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 239000002245 particle Substances 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012163 sequencing technique Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000015572 biosynthetic process Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000003786 synthesis reaction Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000004335 scaling law Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 abstract description 10
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 abstract description 5
- 230000006978 adaptation Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 230000010485 coping Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 abstract description 2
- 230000001568 sexual effect Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 21
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000005611 electricity Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000009885 systemic effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004870 electrical engineering Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004927 fusion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000010977 jade Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001394 metastastic effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 206010061289 metastatic neoplasm Diseases 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000000465 moulding Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012552 review Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
- G06Q10/06—Resources, workflows, human or project management; Enterprise or organisation planning; Enterprise or organisation modelling
- G06Q10/063—Operations research, analysis or management
- G06Q10/0637—Strategic management or analysis, e.g. setting a goal or target of an organisation; Planning actions based on goals; Analysis or evaluation of effectiveness of goals
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
- G06Q50/06—Energy or water supply
Landscapes
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Human Resources & Organizations (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Economics (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Entrepreneurship & Innovation (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Educational Administration (AREA)
- Marketing (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Tourism & Hospitality (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Public Health (AREA)
- Primary Health Care (AREA)
- Water Supply & Treatment (AREA)
- Development Economics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Game Theory and Decision Science (AREA)
- Operations Research (AREA)
- Quality & Reliability (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving; route, node enhanced transformation scheme are formulated by upper layer electric network protection model; middle layer power grid challenge model is intended to maximize system loss; bottom power grid resists purpose of model and is to minimize system loss; the attacking and defending game of electric power dynamic is carried out to the model by traversal, may finally obtain that the smallest track remodelling scheme of attacker's prospective earnings and node is made to strengthen scheme.Power grid elasticity is divided into " resist and absorb ", " response and adaptation " and " recovery " three phases, the present invention can instruct power engineering personnel to be transformed before calamity to critical circuits and to nodal information system configuration information security technology appropriate, the system performance in " resist and absorb " stage, the redundancy ability of lifting system can be optimized.When system response time does not change with failure change and the resume speed of different elements is identical, it is able to ascend elasticity of the electric system when coping with disaster sexual assault.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the crossing domains of a kind of mathematical computations and information security, in particular to a kind of rich based on dynamic attacking and defending
The power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving played chess.
Background technique
In the 1st safe leader's summit of China Internet that Beijing is held, the information-based specially committee of China Electrical Engineering Society
Meeting deputy managing director concerns safely electric power CPS system, claims " if American electricity Grids are by the loss of network attack most serious
1 trillion dollars will be surpassed ".(Tang Yi, Chen Qian, Li Mengya wait the network attack in power information physics emerging system environment to Tang Yi
Review Study [J] Automation of Electric Systems, 2016,40 (17): 59-69.) et al. publish an article and point out modern power systems
Through being no longer only adjusted and controlling according to internal system information, more and more external informations are direct by various businesses approach
Or electric power system control decision is influenced indirectly.
As China's power grid is increasingly intelligent, most of grid nodes introduce data acquisition and monitoring control (SCADA)
System, this not only facilitates dispatching of power netwoks personnel and carries out load prediction, long-range grid switching operation etc., while also burying for hacker attacks
Huge hidden danger.(Zhao Junhua, deck-molding fine jade, Wen Fushuan wait the enlightenment of Ukraine event: prevention is directed to the false number of power grid to Zhao Junhua
According to injection attacks [J] Automation of Electric Systems, 2016,40 (7): 1-3.) et al. research article summarize and analyze false number
According to the principle and its influence of injection SCADA system.Therefore, upgrading is carried out to the node and route most possibly attacked in advance to change
It makes, and then the importance for raising electric power CPS system disaster tolerance ability is more prominent.
In view of the above problems, (Ye Xiaming, Zhao Junhua, Wen Fu are fastened and are believed based on the electric power of adjacency matrix Zhejiang University Ye Xiaming
Ceasing system vulnerability and [J] Automation of Electric Systems, 2013,37 (22): 41-46. be quantitatively evaluated) research team proposes and is based on
The power information system fragility quantitative evaluating method of adjacency matrix will be directed to power information system from the angle of attacker
The attack process of system is divided into 2 stages and is described attacker using metastatic potential index between node and attacked against each other the intelligence of beat time point
Selective power.The document can obtain the maximum node of fragility from topology, can upgrade in advance to gained node
Transformation, but the problem of how reducing system vulnerability is not illustrated, do not provide actual operation scheme yet.
Summary of the invention
The present invention be directed to lack the problem of instructing network operation personnel to formulate track remodelling and node reinforcing scheme now,
A kind of power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving is proposed, can accurately determine protection resource distribution side
Case, and using this allocation plan as power information emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy, optimization system redundancy ability improves system bullet
Property.
The technical solution of the present invention is as follows: a kind of power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving, specifically
Include the following steps:
1) obtain power network topology, rack, load data, including capacity of trunk, generator position and capacity, load position and
Load key parameter；
2) letter that can be used for being promoted node data acquisition and supervisor control redundancy ability is calculated by analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
Cease protection resource corresponding to safe practice:
Steps are as follows for calculating:
2.1) it establishes hierarchy Model: information system defence capability will be improved as destination layer；In order to promote the target
Four rule layers can be divided into, " hardware and software platform safety ", " data safety ", " network access security " and " safety are respectively as follows:
Control and management "；There is respectively different safety approach for different criterion, forms solution layer；
2.2) Judgement Matricies: message request security fields expert evaluates all kinds of safety approach, is marked by 1-9
Degree method obtains any two lower layer factors to the quantitative description of degree relatively superior the factor of Mr. Yu upper layer, and scale 1 refers under two kinds
Layer factor is of equal importance to certain upper layer factor, the former is higher with respect to the higher scale of the latter's significance level between two lower layer factors；If
Lower layer factors a is more important than lower layer factors b, and scale is 2, then it is 1/2 to the scale of a that a, which is 2, b to the scale of b,；
For three layer model, judgment matrix include rule layer to destination layer and solution layer to rule layer, if mesh in model
Mark layer has 1 factor, rule layer to have α factor, solution layer to have β factor, then rule layer is gone in the judgment matrix of destination layer
It is some criterion factor in rule layer with column, is α × α matrix, what value was obtained between two criterion factors by expert estimation
Scale；Due to destination layer factor only 1, therefore rule layer only has 1 to the judgment matrix of destination layer；In addition, solution layer is to criterion
Layer has α judgment matrix, if having λ under γ criterion factorγA improved scheme factor, then factor of judgment is to γ standard
Then the judgment matrix of factor is λγ×λγDimension, the scale that value is obtained between two scheme factors by expert estimation；
2.3) Mode of Level Simple Sequence is carried out, i.e., each factor of each level is ranked up:
Firstly, to each column element b of the judgment matrix B obtained by expert estimationijIt is normalized respectively:
Then, judgment matrix of each column after normalized is added by row, obtains vectorW i:
Finally, to vectorW iIt is normalized, the characteristic vector W of this layer of each factor can be arrivedi, pass through WiCan carry out
Each Mode of Level Simple Sequence, normalized are as follows:
In formula, n be certain level intrinsic factor number, for rule layer to n in the judgment matrix of destination layer be criterion it is total because
Plain α is total factor number β that scheme is corresponded under certain criterion factor to n in the judgment matrix of rule layer for solution layer；
2.4) consistency check is carried out after each factor sequence of each level, passes through random consistency ratio CR inspection result logic
On it is whether consistent, when CR < 0.1 thinks that result meets logical consistency, calculation method are as follows:
In formula, CI is coincident indicatorB be expert estimation obtained by judgment matrix, RI be with
Machine coincident indicator can table look-up to obtain；
2.5) total hierarchial sorting: using the calculated result of Mode of Level Simple Sequence, all certain layers all factors are found out, promotion is believed
The sequencing weight process of systemic defence ability relative importance is ceased, result is as defence resource, value corresponding to the program
Interior, the calculation method for [0,1] are as follows:
In formula, α is the total number of rule layer factor, and β is the total number of solution layer factor, WγFor rule layer γ feature to
Amount,For the feature vector of the tec kind scheme for rule layer γ, restecFor the money of defence corresponding to tec kind scheme
Source；
3) dynamic attacking and defending betting model is established:
Dynamic attacking and defending model defends three parts to constitute by protection resource allocation, power grid attack and power grid, constitutes dynamic and attacks
Anti- game upper, middle and lower three layer model；
In formula, g is that the objective function of each section is system expected loss, and h is the constraint condition of each section, and u refers to protection
The constraint of resource allocation part, s refer to the constraint of power grid attack part, and l refers to the constraint of power grid defence part, and d is protection resource point
With scheme, atFor attacker's attack strategies, inside is the node number attacked and the line attacked respectively comprising two elements
Lu Hao, f be defender's defence policies, inside be all load bus make the smallest optimal cutting load value of system loss and in order to
Optimal Power Flow is distributed the line number that defender actively cuts off, and subscript * is the optimal case under this layer；
In computing system loss, actually damaged caused by system after establishing the probability and consequence-destruction that fragility-is destroyed
The dual factors loss evaluation model of mistake, obtaining system expected loss g is
Only when random number is greater than br articles of route or n-th d node fragility parameter, just it is destroyed, it is crisp
Weak property will likely influence Ploss.br-nd, it is by the available their own fragility of the protection resource of route and node
In formula, VbrFor the fragility of the br articles route, VndFor the fragility of n-th d node, Ploss.br-ndTo attack simultaneously
The practical burden with power loss of system, N after route br and node ndndFor node total number, NbrFor route sum, route here and
Node refers to route and node in power network topology；
It calculates at currently known defence policies f and protection resource allocation d, makes the maximum attack strategies of system loss
at；
4) pass through traversal solution procedure 3) dynamic attacking and defending betting model, carry out protection resource allocation:
5) after protection resource is all assigned, introducing threat parameter for two-parameter expected loss model conversation is three parameters
Comprehensive expected loss model:
Calculate system expected loss when only attack route does not attack node, and it is normalized to by maximum-minimum [0,
1] the threat parameter T in section, as routebranch；
For node, the maximum loss under being combined by attack between attack node and each route is taken out, calculates each section one by one
The expected loss after being destroyed is put, and it is normalized in [0,1] section by maximum-minimum, the threat as node is joined
Number Tnode；
6) the comprehensive expected loss of system before and after protection resource allocation is calculated by formula (15) respectivelyTo its compare
Compared with analysis, elastic Promotion Strategy is obtained,
In formula, TbrIt is the threat parameter of the br articles route；TndIt is the threat parameter of n-th d node；VbrFor the br bars line
The fragility on road；VndFor the fragility of n-th d node；Ploss.br-ndIt is practical to attack system after route br and node nd simultaneously
Burden with power loss；NndFor node total number；NbrFor route sum；Here route and node is in power network topology；
7) elastic Promotion Strategy is exported, i.e., defends resource allocation to export from big to small by route, node and needs emphasis strong
The node serial number that the circuit number of change or transformation and output need to configure information security technology answers the specific name of configuration technology with it
Claim.
The step 4) pass through traversal solution procedure 3) dynamic attacking and defending betting model, carry out protection resource allocation it is specific
Realize that steps are as follows:
4.1) 1 node and 1 route, as the 1st kind of attack option, initiating line and node institute, are attacked in order
The protection resource of distribution is 0；
4.2) it, generates random number and is compared with the fragility value of node obtained by formula (8), formula (9), route, if at random
Number is larger, destroys the node or route；It is disconnected in network topology by attack route, if node is broken if route is destroyed
Load bad then that node institute band can not be cut off during defence；If route forms isolated network after disconnecting, generator in isolated network is taken
Capacity is maximum to be used as balance nodes；
4.3), do not cut off out-of-limit maximum route first, by particle swarm algorithm using each load bus cutting load value as
Optimized variable, with route it is not out-of-limit under conditions of, the minimum optimization aim of system expected loss calculates, most by DC power flow
The optimum defense scheme under the attack option can be obtained eventuallyThen out-of-limit maximum route is cut off, finds out the phase with same method
Hope the defense schemes of loss reductionAfter comparing two schemes, retain the smaller defense schemes of expected loss as the attacker
Optimal defense schemes under case；
4.4) it, checks whether the calculating for completing all attack options, is returned 4.1) if not completing；
4.5) maximum value of all attack options in the minimum expectation loss after defence optimization, can be obtained by formula (7), and
Know the optimal attack scheme corresponding to it
4.6), judge whether node and route can distribute protection resource:
In formula, DbranchAnd DnodeIt is the defence total resources of route and node；It can be right if meeting formula (10) or formula (11)
Node or route the distribution defence resource attacked in gained attack option；
4.7), for it may cause the maximum route br of expected loss, according to precision KaccRoute defence resource is total
Measure DbranchIt is divided into KaccPart, portion protection resource allocation is given to the route by formula (12)；
For node nd, all attack options containing the node are extracted, taking out maximum be used as of expected loss should
Node be destroyed after expected loss, according to the guarantor as corresponding to various information safe practice obtained by analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in step 2)
Resource is protected, it is every for each information security technology according to formula (13), formula (14) from small to large to node configuration information safe practice
A node can only at most configure once；
αnd-tec∈ { 0,1 }, (nd=1,2 ..., NndTec=1,2......, β) (14)
In formula, β is the number of information security technology, the i.e. total number of solution layer factor；dbrIt is the protection of route br distribution
Resource；dndIt is the defence resource of node nd distribution；αnd-tecInformation security technology tec whether is distributed for characterization node nd, for 0,
1 } variable；
4.8) it, is returned 4.1) if node or route always protect stock number still and have residue, under new protection resource distribution
New attacking and defending game is carried out, configuration next round protects resource.
The beneficial effects of the present invention are: power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving of the present invention,
The weak route reversed by protection resource and key node list can be provided to power engineering personnel, for each key node
Corresponding information system can also provide its particular technique title for needing to configure information security technology to power engineering personnel.It can
It instructs power engineering personnel to be transformed before calamity to weak route while the information system configuration for being directed to key node is most appropriate
Information security technology, improve electric system physical message fusion attack under redundancy ability, thus reduce disaster occur when
Performance loss.When system response time does not change with failure change and the resume speed of different elements is identical, energy
Enough improve the elasticity of the electric system.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving schematic diagram of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is mentioned information security technology hierarchy Model schematic diagram by the present invention；
Fig. 3 is that the present invention uses elasticity promotion schematic diagram after the elastic Promotion Strategy of present invention gained.
Specific embodiment
It is strong to formulate route, node by upper layer electric network protection model for power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy
Change modification scheme, middle layer power grid challenge model is intended to maximize system loss, and bottom power grid, which resists purpose of model and is to make, is
Minimization of loss of uniting may finally obtain keeping attacker pre- by traversal to model progress electric power CPS dynamic attacking and defending game
The smallest track remodelling scheme of phase income and node strengthen scheme.Power grid elasticity is divided into " resist and absorb ", " response and adaptation "
" recovery " three phases, the present invention can instruct power engineering personnel to be transformed before calamity to critical circuits and believe to node
System configuration information security technology appropriate is ceased, the system performance in " resist and absorb " stage, the appearance of lifting system can be optimized
Calamity ability.When system response time does not change with failure change and the resume speed of different elements is identical, it is able to ascend electricity
Elasticity of the Force system when coping with disaster sexual assault.
Power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving, first acquisition power grid relevant information, pass through layer
Fractional analysis obtains the corresponding defence resource of various information safe practice, then establish Dynamic Game Model and by traversal into
Row solves.Finally, export from big to small according to the protection resource that different routes and node need and need emphasis reinforcing or be transformed
Circuit number, while output needs the node serial number of nodal information system configuration information safe practice and its answers the tool of configuration technology
Body title.The emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving schematic diagram of power information physics shown in Fig. 1, the specific steps are as follows:
Step 1, obtain power network topology, rack, load data, including and be not limited only to capacity of trunk, generator position and
The key parameters such as capacity, load position and load.
Step 2 can be used for being promoted node data acquisition and supervisor control redundancy ability by analytic hierarchy process (AHP) calculating
Information security technology corresponding to protection resource.Steps are as follows for calculating:
1) mentioned information security technology hierarchy Model schematic diagram shown in Fig. 2, establishes hierarchy Model.Believe improving
Systemic defence ability is ceased as destination layer；Four rule layers can be divided into order to promote the target, are respectively as follows: " hardware and software platform
Safety ", " data safety ", " network access security " and " security control and management "；There is respective difference for different criterion
Safety approach, formed solution layer；As included under hardware and software platform safety criterion and being not limited only to " credible password module ", " electricity
Power special firewall " scheme.
2) Judgement Matricies.Message request security fields expert evaluates all kinds of safety approach, passes through 1-9 scale
Method obtains any two lower layer factors to the quantitative description of degree relatively superior the factor of Mr. Yu upper layer.1 Zhi Liangzhong lower layer of scale
Factor is of equal importance to certain upper layer factor, the former is more important between scale 3 refers to two lower layer factors, and scale 2 is then scale 1 and scale
It is then scale 2 that 3 compromise, i.e. significance level, which compare not as good as scale 3, the former is with respect to the latter's significance level between two lower layer factors
Higher scale is higher, and so on.If lower layer factors a is more important than lower layer factors b, and scale is 2, then a is 2, b to the scale of b
Scale to a is 1/2.
For three layer model, judgment matrix include rule layer to destination layer and solution layer to rule layer.If mesh in model
Mark layer has 1 factor, rule layer to have α factor, solution layer to have β factor, then rule layer is gone in the judgment matrix of destination layer
It is some criterion factor in rule layer with column, is α × α matrix, what value was obtained between two criterion factors by expert estimation
Scale.Due to destination layer factor only 1, therefore rule layer only has 1 to the judgment matrix of destination layer.In addition, solution layer is to criterion
Layer has α judgment matrix, if having λ under γ criterion factorγA improved scheme factor, then factor of judgment is to γ standard
Then the judgment matrix of factor is λγ×λγDimension, the scale that value is obtained between two scheme factors by expert estimation.Institute according to fig. 2
5 judgment matrixs can be constructed by showing hierarchy Model, including 1 destination layer to rule layer and 4 rule layers to solution layer
Judgment matrix.
3) Mode of Level Simple Sequence is carried out.Each factor of each level is ranked up.
Firstly, to each column element b of the judgment matrix B obtained by expert estimationijIt is normalized respectively:
Then, judgment matrix of each column after normalized is added by row, obtains vectorW i:
Finally, to vectorW iIt is normalized, the characteristic vector W of this layer of each factor can be arrivedi, pass through WiCan carry out
Each Mode of Level Simple Sequence.Normalized is as follows:
In formula, n be certain level intrinsic factor number, for rule layer to n in the judgment matrix of destination layer be criterion it is total because
Plain α is total factor number β that scheme is corresponded under certain criterion factor to n in the judgment matrix of rule layer for solution layer.
4) consistency check is carried out after each factor sequence of each level.Pass through random consistency ratio (CR) inspection result logic
On it is whether consistent, when CR < 0.1 thinks that result meets logical consistency, calculation method are as follows:
In formula, CI is coincident indicatorB be expert estimation obtained by judgment matrix, RI be with
Machine coincident indicator can table look-up to obtain.
5) total hierarchial sorting.Using the calculated result of Mode of Level Simple Sequence, all certain layers all factors are found out to promotion information
The sequencing weight process of systemic defence ability relative importance, result are as defence resource, value corresponding to the program
In [0,1], calculation method are as follows:
In formula, α is the total number of rule layer factor, and β is the total number of solution layer factor, WγFor rule layer γ feature to
Amount,For the feature vector of the tec kind scheme for rule layer γ, restecFor the money of defence corresponding to tec kind scheme
Source.
Step 3 establishes dynamic attacking and defending betting model.
Dynamic attacking and defending model defends three parts to constitute by protection resource allocation, power grid attack and power grid, constitutes dynamic and attacks
Anti- game upper, middle and lower three layer model.
In formula, g is that the objective function of each section is system expected loss, and h is the constraint condition of each section, and u refers to protection
The constraint of resource allocation part, s refer to the constraint of power grid attack part, and l refers to the constraint of power grid defence part, and d is protection resource point
With scheme, atFor attacker's attack strategies, inside is the node number attacked and the line attacked respectively comprising two elements
Lu Hao, f be defender's defence policies, inside be all load bus make the smallest optimal cutting load value of system loss and in order to
Optimal Power Flow is distributed the line number that defender actively cuts off, and subscript * is the optimal case under this layer, such as f*For optimal defender
Case.
In computing system loss, establishes fragile (probability being destroyed) and consequence is (practical caused by system after destruction
Loss) dual factors loss evaluation model, obtaining system expected loss g is
Only when random number is greater than br articles of route or n-th d node fragility parameter, just it is destroyed, it is crisp
Weak property will likely influence Ploss.br-nd.It is by the available their own fragility of the protection resource of route and node
In formula, VbrFor the fragility of the br articles route, VndFor the fragility of n-th d node, Ploss.br-ndTo attack simultaneously
The practical burden with power loss of system, N after route br and node ndndFor node total number, NbrFor route sum, route here and
Node is in power network topology.
The optimization aim of different piece is identical, but it is different to optimize direction.For attacker, its purpose is utmostly broken
Bad system, therefore its optimization direction is calculated at currently known defence policies f and protection resource allocation d, makes to big optimization
The maximum attack strategies a of system losst。
Step 4, the dynamic attacking and defending betting model by traversal solution procedure 3.
It respectively mutually covers, influences each other between three layer model, calculate complicated.The present invention will be solved by traversal, accurately
Property it is high.Since attacker's attack strategies are limited, the defence policies that defender copes with the different attack strategies of attacker are only
One, so protection resource allocation policy is also unique.In the case that attacking and defending both sides are rational bubbles, there are Nash Equilibriums only
One solution.Solution procedure is as follows:
One, 1 node and 1 route are attacked in order, as the 1st kind of attack option.(initiating line and node divide
0) the protection resource matched is
Two, it generates random number and is compared with the fragility value of node obtained by formula (8), formula (9), route, if random number
It is larger, destroy the node or route.It is disconnected in network topology by attack route, if node is destroyed if route is destroyed
The load of node institute band can not be then cut off during defence.If route forms isolated network after disconnecting, generator in isolated network is taken to hold
It measures maximum as balance nodes.
Three, out-of-limit maximum route is not cut off first, by particle swarm algorithm using each load bus cutting load value as excellent
Change variable, with route it is not out-of-limit under conditions of, the minimum optimization aim of system expected loss calculates, finally by DC power flow
The optimum defense scheme under the attack option can be obtainedThen out-of-limit maximum route is cut off, finds out expectation with same method
The defense schemes of loss reductionAfter comparing two schemes, retain the smaller defense schemes of expected loss as the attack option
Under optimal defense schemes.
Four, it checks whether the calculating for completing all attack options, returns to one if not completing.
Five, maximum value of all attack options in the minimum expectation loss after defence optimization can be obtained by formula (7), and can
Know the optimal attack scheme corresponding to it
Six, judge whether node and route can distribute protection resource.
In formula, DbranchAnd DnodeIt is the defence total resources of route and node.It can be right if meeting formula (10) or formula (11)
Node or route the distribution defence resource attacked in gained attack option.
Seven, for it may cause the maximum route br of expected loss, according to precision KaccRoute is defendd into total resources
DbranchIt is divided into KaccPart, portion protection resource allocation is given to the route by formula (12).
For node nd, all attack options containing the node are extracted, taking out maximum be used as of expected loss should
Node be destroyed after expected loss, according to the guarantor as corresponding to various information safe practice obtained by analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in step 2
Resource is protected, it is every for each information security technology according to formula (13), formula (14) from small to large to node configuration information safe practice
A node can only at most configure once.
αnd-tec∈ { 0,1 }, (nd=1,2 ..., NndTec=1,2......, β) (14)
In formula, β is the number of information security technology, the i.e. total number of solution layer factor；dbrIt is the protection of route br distribution
Resource；dndIt is the defence resource of node nd distribution；αnd-tecInformation security technology tec whether is distributed for characterization node nd, for 0,
1 } variable.
Eight, one is returned to if node or route always protect stock number still and have residue, is carried out under new protection resource distribution
New attacking and defending game, configuration next round protect resource.
After step 5, protection resource are all assigned, introduce and parameter (probability attacked) is threatened to damage two-parameter expectation
Mistake model conversation is three parametric synthesis expected loss models.
Calculate system expected loss when only attack route does not attack node, and it is normalized to by maximum-minimum [0,
1] the threat parameter T in section, as routebranch。
For node, the maximum loss under being combined by attack between attack node and each route is taken out, calculates each section one by one
The expected loss after being destroyed is put, and it is normalized in [0,1] section by maximum-minimum, the threat as node is joined
Number Tnode。
Step 6 passes through the comprehensive expected loss of system before and after formula (15) calculating protection resource allocation respectivelyIt can be right
It is compared analysis, and can obtain elasticity promotion schematic diagram after the elastic Promotion Strategy of gained shown in Fig. 3.
In formula, TbrIt is the threat parameter of the br articles route, TndIt is the threat parameter of n-th d node.
Step 7 exports elastic Promotion Strategy, i.e., defends resource allocation to export from big to small by route, node and need weight
The node serial number that the circuit number and output of point reinforcing or transformation need to configure information security technology answers the tool of configuration technology with it
Body title.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving, which is characterized in that specifically include following step
It is rapid:
1) power network topology, rack, load data, including capacity of trunk, generator position and capacity, load position and load are obtained
Measure key parameter；
2) the information peace that can be used for being promoted node data acquisition with supervisor control redundancy ability is calculated by analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
Protection resource corresponding to full technology:
Steps are as follows for calculating:
2.1) it establishes hierarchy Model: information system defence capability will be improved as destination layer；It can be drawn to promote the target
It is divided into four rule layers, is respectively as follows: " hardware and software platform safety ", " data safety ", " network access security " and " security control
With management "；There is respectively different safety approach for different criterion, forms solution layer；
2.2) Judgement Matricies: message request security fields expert evaluates all kinds of safety approach, passes through 1-9 scaling law
Any two lower layer factors are obtained between the quantitative description of degree relatively superior the factor of Mr. Yu upper layer, 1 Zhi Liangzhong lower layer of scale because
Element is of equal importance to certain upper layer factor, the former is higher with respect to the higher scale of the latter's significance level between two lower layer factors；If lower layer
Factor a is more important than lower layer factors b, and scale is 2, then it is 1/2 to the scale of a that a, which is 2, b to the scale of b,；
For three layer model, judgment matrix include rule layer to destination layer and solution layer to rule layer, if destination layer in model
There are 1 factor, rule layer to there is α factor, solution layer to have β factor, then rule layer is in the judgment matrix of destination layer, row and column
It is some criterion factor in rule layer, is α × α matrix, the scale that value is obtained between two criterion factors by expert estimation；
Due to destination layer factor only 1, therefore rule layer only has 1 to the judgment matrix of destination layer；In addition, solution layer has α to rule layer
A judgment matrix, if having λ under γ criterion factorγA improved scheme factor, then factor of judgment to γ criterion because
The judgment matrix of element is λγ×λγDimension, the scale that value is obtained between two scheme factors by expert estimation；
2.3) Mode of Level Simple Sequence is carried out, i.e., each factor of each level is ranked up:
Firstly, to each column element b of the judgment matrix B obtained by expert estimationijIt is normalized respectively:
Then, judgment matrix of each column after normalized is added by row, obtains vectorW i:
Finally, to vectorW iIt is normalized, the characteristic vector W of this layer of each factor can be arrivedi, pass through WiIt can carry out each layer
Secondary single sequence, normalized are as follows:
In formula, n is the number of certain level intrinsic factor, is the total factor of alpha of criterion to n in the judgment matrix of destination layer for rule layer,
It is total factor number β that scheme is corresponded under certain criterion factor to n in the judgment matrix of rule layer for solution layer；
2.4) consistency check is carried out after each factor sequence of each level, is in logic by random consistency ratio CR inspection result
It is no consistent, when CR < 0.1 thinks that result meets logical consistency, calculation method are as follows:
In formula, CI is coincident indicatorB is judgment matrix obtained by expert estimation, and RI is random one
Cause property index, can table look-up to obtain；
2.5) using the calculated result of Mode of Level Simple Sequence, all certain layers all factors total hierarchial sorting: are found out to promotion information system
Unite defence capability relative importance sequencing weight process, result be used as defence resource corresponding to the program, value for [0,
1] in, calculation method are as follows:
In formula, α is the total number of rule layer factor, and β is the total number of solution layer factor, WγFor the feature vector of rule layer γ,For the feature vector of the tec kind scheme for rule layer γ, restecFor defence resource corresponding to tec kind scheme；
3) dynamic attacking and defending betting model is established:
Dynamic attacking and defending model defends three parts to constitute by protection resource allocation, power grid attack and power grid, and it is rich to constitute dynamic attacking and defending
Play chess upper, middle and lower three layer model；
In formula, g is that the objective function of each section is system expected loss, and h is the constraint condition of each section, and u refers to protection resource
The constraint of distribution portion, s refer to the constraint of power grid attack part, and l refers to the constraint of power grid defence part, and d is protection resource allocation side
Case, atFor attacker's attack strategies, internal comprising two elements is the node number attacked and the line number attacked respectively,
F be defender's defence policies, inside be that all load bus make the smallest optimal cutting load value of system loss and in order to optimize
Trend is distributed the line number that defender actively cuts off, and subscript * is the optimal case under this layer；
In computing system loss, the actual loss caused by system after the probability and consequence-destruction that fragility-is destroyed is established
Dual factors loss evaluation model, obtaining system expected loss g is
Only when random number is greater than br articles of route or n-th d node fragility parameter, just it is destroyed, fragility
It will likely influence Ploss.br-nd, it is by the available their own fragility of the protection resource of route and node
In formula, VbrFor the fragility of the br articles route, VndFor the fragility of n-th d node, Ploss.br-ndTo attack route simultaneously
The practical burden with power loss of system, N after br and node ndndFor node total number, NbrFor route sum, route and node here
Refer to the route and node in power network topology；
It calculates at currently known defence policies f and protection resource allocation d, makes the maximum attack strategies a of system losst；
4) pass through traversal solution procedure 3) dynamic attacking and defending betting model, carry out protection resource allocation:
5) after protection resource is all assigned, introducing threat parameter for two-parameter expected loss model conversation is three parametric synthesis
Expected loss model:
System expected loss when only attack route does not attack node is calculated, and it is normalized into [0,1] area by maximum-minimum
In, the threat parameter T as routebranch；
For node, the maximum loss under being combined by attack between attack node and each route is taken out, calculates each node quilt one by one
Expected loss after destruction, and it is normalized in [0,1] section by maximum-minimum, the threat parameter as node
Tnode；
6) the comprehensive expected loss of system before and after protection resource allocation is calculated by formula (15) respectivelyIt is compared point
Analysis, obtains elastic Promotion Strategy,
In formula, TbrIt is the threat parameter of the br articles route；TndIt is the threat parameter of n-th d node；VbrFor the br articles route
Fragility；VndFor the fragility of n-th d node；Ploss.br-ndFor simultaneously attack route br and node nd after system it is actually active
Load loss；NndFor node total number；NbrFor route sum；Here route and node is in power network topology；
7) export elastic Promotion Strategy, i.e., by route, node defend resource allocation export from big to small need emphasis reinforcing or
The node serial number that the circuit number and output of transformation need to configure information security technology answers the specific name of configuration technology with it.
2. power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving according to claim 1, which is characterized in that institute
Step 4) is stated by traversal solution procedure 3) dynamic attacking and defending betting model, carry out protection resource allocation specific implementation step such as
Under:
4.1) 1 node and 1 route, are attacked in order, and as the 1st kind of attack option, initiating line and node are distributed
Protection resource be 0；
4.2), generate random number and with formula (8), the fragility value of node, route obtained by formula (9) be compared, if random number compared with
It is big then destroy the node or route；It is disconnected in network topology by attack route, if node is destroyed if route is destroyed
The load of node institute band can not be cut off during defence；If route forms isolated network after disconnecting, generator capacity in isolated network is taken
It is maximum to be used as balance nodes；
4.3) out-of-limit maximum route, is not cut off first, by particle swarm algorithm using each load bus cutting load value as optimization
Variable, with route it is not out-of-limit under conditions of, the minimum optimization aim of system expected loss calculates by DC power flow, finally may be used
Obtain the optimum defense scheme f under the attack option1 *, out-of-limit maximum route is then cut off, finds out expectation damage with same method
Lose the smallest defense schemesAfter comparing two schemes, retain the smaller defense schemes of expected loss as under the attack option
Optimal defense schemes；
4.4) it, checks whether the calculating for completing all attack options, is returned 4.1) if not completing；
4.5) maximum value of all attack options in the minimum expectation loss after defence optimization, can be obtained by formula (7), and is known
Optimal attack scheme corresponding to it
4.6), judge whether node and route can distribute protection resource:
In formula, DbranchAnd DnodeIt is the defence total resources of route and node；It can be to gained if meeting formula (10) or formula (11)
Node or route the distribution defence resource attacked in attack option；
4.7), for it may cause the maximum route br of expected loss, according to precision KaccRoute is defendd into total resources
DbranchIt is divided into KaccPart, portion protection resource allocation is given to the route by formula (12)；
For node nd, all attack options containing the node are extracted, it is maximum as the node to take out expected loss
Expected loss after being destroyed, according to the money of protection corresponding to the various information safe practice as obtained by analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in step 2)
Source, according to formula (13), formula (14) from small to large to node configuration information safe practice, section each for each information security technology
Point can only at most configure primary；
αnd-tec∈ { 0,1 }, (nd=1,2 ..., NndTec=1,2......, β) (14)
In formula, β is the number of information security technology, the i.e. total number of solution layer factor；dbrIt is the protection resource of route br distribution；
dndIt is the defence resource of node nd distribution；αnd-tecInformation security technology tec whether is distributed for characterization node nd, is become for { 0,1 }
Amount；
4.8) it, returns 4.1) if node or route always protect stock number still and have residue, is carried out under new protection resource distribution
New attacking and defending game, configuration next round protect resource.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810616403.7A CN108985566B (en) | 2018-06-14 | 2018-06-14 | Electric power information physical fusion system elastic lifting strategy solving method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810616403.7A CN108985566B (en) | 2018-06-14 | 2018-06-14 | Electric power information physical fusion system elastic lifting strategy solving method |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN108985566A true CN108985566A (en) | 2018-12-11 |
| CN108985566B CN108985566B (en) | 2021-07-13 |
Family
ID=64540486
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810616403.7A Active CN108985566B (en) | 2018-06-14 | 2018-06-14 | Electric power information physical fusion system elastic lifting strategy solving method |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN108985566B (en) |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110766306A (en) * | 2019-10-16 | 2020-02-07 | 大连理工大学 | Reservoir flood control dispatching rule determining method based on elastic theory |
| CN111045334A (en) * | 2019-12-31 | 2020-04-21 | 哈尔滨工业大学 | Active defense elastic sliding mode control method of information physical fusion system |
| CN111314387A (en) * | 2020-03-24 | 2020-06-19 | 东南大学 | Power system information physical double-layer strategy optimization method considering network attack influence |
| CN113991643A (en) * | 2021-09-30 | 2022-01-28 | 国网山东省电力公司武城县供电公司 | Intelligent power grid dispatching system based on traction power model |
Citations (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104361247A (en) * | 2014-11-24 | 2015-02-18 | 国网河南省电力公司电力科学研究院 | Leader-follower game alternating current and direct current hybrid electric power system active defense strategy making method |
| CN105205627A (en) * | 2015-11-05 | 2015-12-30 | 中国南方电网有限责任公司电网技术研究中心 | Power grid electric power operation project determination method and system |
| EP3063545A2 (en) * | 2013-10-29 | 2016-09-07 | C3 Energy, Inc. | Systems and methods for processing data relating to energy usage |
| CN106815687A (en) * | 2017-01-22 | 2017-06-09 | 电子科技大学中山学院 | Micro-grid optimal and elastic energy trading method and system based on double-layer game |
| CN107819785A (en) * | 2017-11-28 | 2018-03-20 | 东南大学 | A kind of double-deck defence method towards power system false data injection attacks |
| CN107909276A (en) * | 2017-11-20 | 2018-04-13 | 广东电网有限责任公司电力调度控制中心 | A kind of vulnerability assessment method of power information physics emerging system |
| CN107944757A (en) * | 2017-12-14 | 2018-04-20 | 上海理工大学 | Electric power interacted system regenerative resource digestion capability analysis and assessment method |
| CN108053116A (en) * | 2017-12-14 | 2018-05-18 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司扬州供电分公司 | A kind of city elasticity distribution network restoration force estimation method |
| CN108108875A (en) * | 2017-11-29 | 2018-06-01 | 国家电网公司 | A kind of distribution Running State fuzzy synthetic appraisement method based on cooperative game method and trapezoidal cloud model |
| CN108108856A (en) * | 2018-01-12 | 2018-06-01 | 上海大学 | More micro-capacitance sensor multi-user demand response management methods based on Stackelberg theory of games |
-
2018
- 2018-06-14 CN CN201810616403.7A patent/CN108985566B/en active Active
Patent Citations (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP3063545A2 (en) * | 2013-10-29 | 2016-09-07 | C3 Energy, Inc. | Systems and methods for processing data relating to energy usage |
| CN104361247A (en) * | 2014-11-24 | 2015-02-18 | 国网河南省电力公司电力科学研究院 | Leader-follower game alternating current and direct current hybrid electric power system active defense strategy making method |
| CN105205627A (en) * | 2015-11-05 | 2015-12-30 | 中国南方电网有限责任公司电网技术研究中心 | Power grid electric power operation project determination method and system |
| CN106815687A (en) * | 2017-01-22 | 2017-06-09 | 电子科技大学中山学院 | Micro-grid optimal and elastic energy trading method and system based on double-layer game |
| CN107909276A (en) * | 2017-11-20 | 2018-04-13 | 广东电网有限责任公司电力调度控制中心 | A kind of vulnerability assessment method of power information physics emerging system |
| CN107819785A (en) * | 2017-11-28 | 2018-03-20 | 东南大学 | A kind of double-deck defence method towards power system false data injection attacks |
| CN108108875A (en) * | 2017-11-29 | 2018-06-01 | 国家电网公司 | A kind of distribution Running State fuzzy synthetic appraisement method based on cooperative game method and trapezoidal cloud model |
| CN107944757A (en) * | 2017-12-14 | 2018-04-20 | 上海理工大学 | Electric power interacted system regenerative resource digestion capability analysis and assessment method |
| CN108053116A (en) * | 2017-12-14 | 2018-05-18 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司扬州供电分公司 | A kind of city elasticity distribution network restoration force estimation method |
| CN108108856A (en) * | 2018-01-12 | 2018-06-01 | 上海大学 | More micro-capacitance sensor multi-user demand response management methods based on Stackelberg theory of games |
Non-Patent Citations (4)
| Title |
|---|
| ZHAOHONG BIE ETAL.: "Battling the Extreme: A Study on the Power System Resilience", 《PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE》 * |
| 叶夏明 等: "基于邻接矩阵的电力信息系统脆弱性定量评估", 《电力系统自动化》 * |
| 汤奕 等: "电力信息物理融合系统环境中的网络攻击研究综述", 《电力系统自动化》 * |
| 赵俊华 等: "乌克兰事件的启示：防范针对电网的虚假数据注入攻击", 《电力系统自动化》 * |
Cited By (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110766306A (en) * | 2019-10-16 | 2020-02-07 | 大连理工大学 | Reservoir flood control dispatching rule determining method based on elastic theory |
| CN110766306B (en) * | 2019-10-16 | 2022-09-16 | 大连理工大学 | Reservoir flood control dispatching rule determining method based on elastic theory |
| CN111045334A (en) * | 2019-12-31 | 2020-04-21 | 哈尔滨工业大学 | Active defense elastic sliding mode control method of information physical fusion system |
| CN111045334B (en) * | 2019-12-31 | 2022-10-25 | 哈尔滨工业大学 | Active defense elastic sliding mode control method of information physical fusion system |
| CN111314387A (en) * | 2020-03-24 | 2020-06-19 | 东南大学 | Power system information physical double-layer strategy optimization method considering network attack influence |
| CN113991643A (en) * | 2021-09-30 | 2022-01-28 | 国网山东省电力公司武城县供电公司 | Intelligent power grid dispatching system based on traction power model |
| CN113991643B (en) * | 2021-09-30 | 2022-08-26 | 国网山东省电力公司武城县供电公司 | Intelligent power grid dispatching system based on traction power model |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN108985566B (en) | 2021-07-13 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN107819785B (en) | Double-layer defense method for false data injection attack of power system | |
| CN108985566A (en) | Power information physics emerging system elasticity Promotion Strategy method for solving | |
| Wang et al. | Coordinated topology attacks in smart grid using deep reinforcement learning | |
| Lin et al. | Self-healing attack-resilient PMU network for power system operation | |
| Rahman et al. | Impact analysis of topology poisoning attacks on economic operation of the smart power grid | |
| Li | Network Security Evaluation and Optimal Active Defense based on Attack and Defense Game Model | |
| CN112819300A (en) | Power distribution network risk assessment method based on random game network under network attack | |
| Rahman et al. | A formal model for verifying the impact of stealthy attacks on optimal power flow in power grids | |
| Anwar et al. | Anomaly detection in electric network database of smart grid: Graph matching approach | |
| CN105933361A (en) | Big data security protection cloud system based on trusted calculation | |
| Dong et al. | A framework for modeling and structural vulnerability analysis of spatial cyber-physical power systems from an attack–defense perspective | |
| CN107578137A (en) | A kind of Power Grid Vulnerability Assessment method for considering minimum singular value sensitivity entropy | |
| Wu et al. | Research on power communication network planning based on information transmission reachability against cyber-attacks | |
| Liu et al. | Pre-overload-graph-based vulnerable correlation identification under load redistribution attacks | |
| Yang et al. | Identification of vulnerable lines in smart grid systems based on improved agglomerative hierarchical clustering | |
| Fan et al. | Review of cyber physical system and cyber attack modeling | |
| Bian et al. | Network security situational assessment model based on improved AHP_FCE | |
| CN111262856A (en) | Mobile target defense response method guided by economic and safety requirements | |
| Emadi et al. | An efficient computational strategy for cyber-physical contingency analysis in smart grids | |
| Xu et al. | Cyber protection for malware attack resistance in cyber-physical power systems | |
| CN108989335A (en) | A kind of guard method and equipment of power information physics emerging system | |
| CN112434922B (en) | Urban power grid system security control method and device based on zero sum game | |
| Rahdan et al. | Phasor measurement units allocation against load redistribution attacks based on Greedy algorithm | |
| Wang et al. | Distributed secondary control strategy against bounded fdi attacks for microgrid with layered communication network | |
| Wang et al. | Lightweight IT operation and maintenance integrated monitoring method for APP system |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |