CN108833082A - A kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization - Google Patents
A kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization Download PDFInfo
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- CN108833082A CN108833082A CN201810662953.2A CN201810662953A CN108833082A CN 108833082 A CN108833082 A CN 108833082A CN 201810662953 A CN201810662953 A CN 201810662953A CN 108833082 A CN108833082 A CN 108833082A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C13/00—Voting apparatus
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization, which includes：Information registering and module is announced, for registering voter's number, candidate number, disclosing and promise to undertake latest time, select gold to retract latest time and announce, voter's number, candidate number are the natural number more than or equal to 1；Threshold Signature address generation module interacts for voter and generates Threshold Signature address；Vote anonymously module, selects candidate for voter and obscures；Transaction modules execute for voter and claim transaction, the transaction of ballot promise is constructed by a random voter and reimbursement trades and is sent to all voters and successively signs, transaction of winning is executed when having decided victor, the execution reimbursement transaction when not decided victor and being more than that gold is selected to retract latest time.Using system provided by the invention while protecting voter's privacy, the ballot of multiple candidates can be supported small-scale and in the case where have permission limitation.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of information security technology, in particular to a kind of secret protection based on block chain decentralization is thrown
Bill system.
Background technique
The concept of bit coin (BitCoin) was initially proposed by middle acute hearing in 2009, designed hair according to middle clever thinking
The P2P network of the open source software of cloth and construction thereon.Bit coin is a kind of digital cash of P2P form.Point-to-point transmission
Mean the payment system of a decentralization.Bit coin is public in ballot, design as the digital cash of novel decentralization
The fields such as flat exchange agreement also have a wide range of applications.
Threshold Signature, (t, a n) Threshold Group Signature refer among the group of n member composition, any no less than t at
Member's cooperation can generate signature, can not generate signature as long as being less than t member.
Confounding issues are one of the hot and difficult issue of cryptography research in recent years.Obscure and obscure from program, most starts
The intellectual property in order to protect software, prevent software by static analysis, distort or reverse-engineering attack.The purpose obscured exists
In making original program become " not can recognize " by certain technological means, but keep the function of original program constant simultaneously.
P2SH (Pay-to-Script-Hash) is in 2012 by as a kind of novel, powerful and can greatly simplify complexity
Trade script type of transaction and introduce.Bit coin address with 3 beginning of number is the address P2SH, they trade at designated bit coin
Script of the middle beneficiary as Hash, rather than the owner of public key.Currently, the most common realization of P2SH function is for multiple
Signature address script.Therefore all complexity of P2SH address hiding will not see foot with the people that it is paid
This.
In ballot field, Zhao and Chan are put forward for the first time and are voted with carrying out privacy using bit coin, and the purpose of agreement is n
Voter respectively possesses 1 bit coin, votes 2 candidates, and victor can obtain all n bit coin, still
Agreement only supports that 2 select 1.Silvia et al. proposes circle shuffle technology to carry out bit coin ballot, but the party
Case needs the manager of a centralization.CoinShuffle carries out address using decryption mixnets to obscure realization
Anonymity to internal staff, but the output address of oneself is put into specified position by the last one possibility obscured.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of secret protection ballot systems based on block chain decentralization, can be in small rule
Mould and in the case where having permission limitation, while protecting voter's privacy, supports the ballot of multiple candidates.
To achieve the above object, the present invention provides following schemes：
A kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization, the secret protection ballot system include：Letter
Breath registration and announcement module, Threshold Signature address generation module, the module that votes anonymously and transaction modules；
The information registering and announce module for registered on bulletin board determining voter's number, candidate number,
It discloses and promises to undertake latest time and gold is selected to retract latest time, and announced on bulletin board；Wherein, voter's number, institute
Stating candidate number is the natural number more than or equal to 1；
Threshold Signature address generation module be used for using decentralization (t, n) threshold signature protocol, voter into
Row interaction, generates Threshold Signature address T；Wherein, the corresponding private key of each voter, each private key are a ballot paper；
Protection is thrown while the module that votes anonymously selects candidate and obscured to realize ballot for voter
The privacy of ticket person；
The transaction modules are used for after the completion of operation is obscured in ballot, and voter executes and claims transaction, then by random one
A voter constructs the transaction of ballot promise and reimbursement trades and is sent to all voters and successively signs, and obtains when having decided victor
Victor executes transaction of winning；The execution reimbursement transaction when not decided victor and being more than that gold is selected to retract latest time；Wherein, described
Ballot promises to undertake that transaction is published in bit coin network, and reimbursement transaction is retained in local, when being more than that gold is selected to retract latest time
When, reimbursement transaction is published in bit coin network.
Optionally, corresponding address is generated with each voter announced in module in the information registering and public key is private
Key is to (pki, ski)；Include at least y+z bit coin in the address, wherein y indicates for the bit coin voted, z be for
Guarantee fund when promising to undertake.
Optionally, corresponding address, public key private are generated with each candidate announced in module in the information registering
Key is to (PKi, SKi) and candidate serial number id.
Optionally, in the generation module of the Threshold Signature address each private key be Threshold Signature address T a part.
Optionally, ballot is successively carried out in the module that votes anonymously and is obscured up to all voters completion ballot,
Specially after voter obtains the public key of remaining voter by bulletin board, No. 1 voter determines ballot selection, construction first
Ballot paperWherein, vote1Represent the ballot paper of No. 1 voter, the candidate of x vote by proxy person selection,Representative is encrypted using the public key of candidate x, | | connection is represented,Represent the private key of No. 1 voter, idxIt represents and waits
The candidate serial number of the person of choosing x；To ballot paper vote1Using pk2, pk3..., pknSuccessively encryption obtainsWherein π (1) is that No. 1 voter obscures ballot paper, and construction first obscures setAnd it is sent to No. 2 voters or No. 1 voter's selection abandoning ticket；
Secondly, No. 2 voters receive described first obscure set after, No. 2 voters are decrypted using corresponding private key
It arrivesIt determines ballot selection, constructs ballot paperEncryption generation pair
It answersConstruction second obscures setIt is sent to No. 3 voters；With
This analogizes, and obtains n-th and obscures setThen according to word
Canonical ordering is sent to all voters；
Each voter obtains H (i) to the information progress Hash operation received and broadcasts, and judges H (1), H
(2) ..., whether H (n) is consistent equal, if equal, using pseudo-random sequence generator, generates π (n+1) with H (i)；Wherein, n is
The number of voter.
Optionally, the ballot promises to undertake that the input of transaction is the address containing z+y bit coin, exports and is
It is describedIt indicates
There are 2 kinds of modes to obtain z bit coin, one is promising to undertake in latest time to disclose ballot paper in defined exposure, candidate is taken away；
Another kind is not promise to undertake to disclose ballot paper in latest time in defined exposure, and guarantee fund promises to undertake that latest time is moved back with gold is selected in exposure
Return between latest time takes away or selects gold to retract the time won after latest time by the transaction of all voter's combined structures
The person of choosing takes away.
Optionally, it is described claim transaction be all voters disclose promise to undertake latest time in disclose voter's ballot paper, obtain
Z bit coin of guarantee fund is obtained, while the candidate being voted-for uses the transaction of corresponding private key decrypted ballots.
Optionally, the transaction of winning is that after candidate receives t different ballot papers, ny bit coin is transferred to candidate
In person's corresponding address, the transaction of ballot triumph is won.
Optionally, to select gold to retract in latest time, voting results fail to generate for reimbursement transaction, and by each throwing
The bit coin of ticket person returns to the transaction of original address.
The specific embodiment provided according to the present invention, the invention discloses following technical effects：
The present invention provides a kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization, which includes：Information
Registration and announcement module, Threshold Signature address generation module, the module that votes anonymously and transaction modules；The information registering and public affairs
Cloth module on bulletin board for registering determining voter's number, candidate number, disclosing and promise to undertake latest time and choosing gold
Latest time is retracted, and is announced on bulletin board；Wherein, voter's number, the candidate number are more than or equal to 1
Natural number；Threshold Signature address generation module be used for using decentralization (t, n) threshold signature protocol, voter into
Row interaction, generates Threshold Signature address T；Wherein, the corresponding private key of each voter, each private key are a ballot paper；
Protection voter's is hidden while the module that votes anonymously selects candidate and obscured to realize ballot for voter
It is private；The transaction modules are used for after the completion of operation is obscured in ballot, and voter executes and claims transaction, are then voted by random one
Person constructs the transaction of ballot promise and reimbursement trades and is sent to all voters and successively signs, and when having decided victor, victor is held
Row, which is won, trades；The execution reimbursement transaction when not decided victor and being more than that gold is selected to retract latest time.It is provided using the present invention
System while protecting voter's privacy, can support multiple candidates small-scale and in the case where have permission limitation
Ballot.
Detailed description of the invention
It in order to more clearly explain the embodiment of the invention or the technical proposal in the existing technology, below will be to institute in embodiment
Attached drawing to be used is needed to be briefly described, it should be apparent that, the accompanying drawings in the following description is only some implementations of the invention
Example, for those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, can also obtain according to these attached drawings
Obtain other attached drawings.
Fig. 1 is the structural schematic diagram of secret protection ballot system of the embodiment of the present invention based on block chain decentralization；
Fig. 2 is the general frame figure of secret protection ballot system of the embodiment of the present invention based on block chain decentralization；
Schematic diagram is obscured in the ballot of Fig. 3 embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 transactional stage schematic diagram of the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts every other
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of secret protection ballot systems based on block chain decentralization, can be in small rule
Mould and in the case where having permission limitation, while protecting voter's privacy, supports the ballot of multiple candidates.
In order to make the foregoing objectives, features and advantages of the present invention clearer and more comprehensible, with reference to the accompanying drawing and specific real
Applying mode, the present invention is described in further detail.
Embodiment one
Fig. 1 is the structural schematic diagram of secret protection ballot system of the embodiment of the present invention based on block chain decentralization, such as
Shown in Fig. 1, the secret protection ballot system provided in an embodiment of the present invention based on block chain decentralization include information registering with
Announce module 100, Threshold Signature address generation module 200, the module that votes anonymously 300 and transaction modules 400.
1, information registering and announcement module 100
It determines the number of voter and candidate and is registered in bulletin board；It is set with n voter Vi(i∈{1,2,
3 ... n }, n is the natural number more than or equal to 1) and m candidate Ci(i ∈ { 1,2,3 ... m }, m are the natural number more than or equal to 1).
Wherein, each voter ViGenerate the address address of oneselfi, abbreviation Ui, include at least y+z bit coin, wherein y is indicated
For the bit coin voted, z is for the guarantee fund in promise.Voter generates the public, private key of oneself to (pki, ski)。
Each candidate CiGenerate the address address of oneselfiEnsure to obtain bit coin after winning, and announces oneself public key
Private key is to (PKi, SKi), the candidate serial number id of candidate is set.
All voters, which negotiate to determine to disclose, promises to undertake latest time t1Gold is selected to retract most when can not generate with voting results
Late time t2。
All of above information is published among bulletin board.
2, Threshold Signature address generation module 200
The embodiment of the present invention uses the threshold signature protocol of decentralization, and each voter interacts, and generates t-of-n
Threshold Signature address T.Shared n part of the Threshold Signature address T, signature can be restored more than or equal to t parts when obtaining, when being less than
T parts can not just restore signature.Each voter ViA corresponding private keyEach private keyIt is Threshold Signature address T
A part, and as an effective ticket.Voter votes to supported candidate, and receives the candidate of t ticket as victory
Person obtains and has the reward of nx bit coin altogether.
3, the module that votes anonymously 300
No. 1 voter V1The public key pk of remaining voter is obtained by bulletin boardi, determine the ballot selection of oneself, constructionvote1Represent No. 1 voter V1Ballot paper, x vote by proxy person selection candidate,Generation
Table is encrypted using the public key of candidate x, | | connection is represented,Represent No. 1 voter V1Private key, idxRepresent candidate x
Candidate serial number.At this point, voter can choose abandoning ticket.To ballot paper vote1Use pk2, pk3..., pknSuccessively encryption obtainsWherein π (1) is No. 1 voter V1Ballot paper is obscured,After representative is obscured
Value, construction first obscure setIt is sent to No. 2 voter V2。
No. 2 voter V2It receives first and obscures setThe private key sk of oneself is used afterwards2Decryption obtainsThe ballot paper of oneself is constructed simultaneouslyIt generates correspondingConstruction second obscures setIt is sent to No. 3 voter V3。
And so on, it obtains n-th and obscures set
Then all voters are sent to according to lexcographical order.
Each voter obtains H (i) to the information progress Hash operation received and broadcasts, and judges H (1), H
(2) ..., whether H (n) is consistent equal, if equal, generates π (n+1) using existing pseudo-random sequence generator and H (i).It should
The purpose of the module that votes anonymously 300 is voter V in order to preventiThe ballot paper of oneself can be put into specific position.
4, transaction modules 400
After operation is obscured in completion, voter is disclosing promise latest time t1Transaction is claimed in interior completion, later by random one
A voter constructs ballot and promises to undertake that transaction and reimbursement transaction are sent to all voters and successively sign, and transaction then is promised to undertake in ballot
Be published in bit coin network, reimbursement transaction be retained in local, when be more than select gold to retract latest time t2When, reimbursement transaction publication
Into bit coin network.
Transaction is promised to undertake in ballot：
Ballot promises to undertake that the input of transaction is the address address containing z+y bit coini(i ∈ { 1,2,3 ... n }), exports and is
It is describedIt indicates
2 kinds of modes obtain z bit coin, and one is promising to undertake in latest time to disclose ballot paper in defined exposure, candidate is taken away；Separately
One is for not promising to undertake latest time t in defined exposure1Interior exposure, guarantee fund can promise to undertake latest time t disclosing1Choosing gold
Retract latest time t2It is interior to take away or select gold to retract what latest time was won later by the transaction of all voter's combined structures
Candidate is taken away.The purpose that guarantee fund is arranged is not vote in order to prevent, therefore the whereabouts of z guarantee fund can actually be according to tool
Body service design, when candidate obtains t from ballotTriumph transaction can be constructed to go to obtain ballot reward.
Claim transaction：
All voters are disclosing promise latest time t1It is interior, by the ballot paper vote of voteriExposure (is namely exposedZ bit coin of guarantee fund is obtained, while the candidate of corresponding x is adopted after bit coin network sees ballot paper
With corresponding private key SKxIt decrypts
It wins and trades：
When to get t different for candidateShi Faqi, which wins, to trade, and ny bit coin is transferred to candidate and is corresponded to
AddressxUp, the triumph of ballot is won.
Reimbursement transaction：
When selecting gold to retract latest time t2Publication is moved back when interior voting results fail to generate (t parts of thresholding is namely not achieved)
The bit coin of each voter is returned to original address address by moneyi。
The secret protection ballot system that the embodiment of the present invention proposes has n voter and m candidate, each voter's choosing
Select a candidate, can small-scale and in the case where have permission limitation, increase verifying and prevent voter by itself
Ballot is placed on the defect of specific position to protect the privacy of voter.In the case where decentralization, due in bit coin
Block chain technology so that result can not be tampered once cochain, abandon and repeated vote.
Embodiment two
Fig. 2 is the general frame figure of secret protection ballot system of the embodiment of the present invention based on block chain decentralization；
Schematic diagram is obscured in the ballot of Fig. 3 embodiment of the present invention；Fig. 4 transactional stage schematic diagram of the embodiment of the present invention.
Address in Fig. 21... addressnVote by proxy person address, (pki, ski) vote by proxy person public, private key
It is right, (PKi, SKi) represent the public, private key pair of candidate, idiRepresent the candidate serial number of candidate.
V in Fig. 3iVote by proxy person, pkiRepresent public key, skiPrivate key is represented, dextrad key represents encryption, left-hand key generation
Table decryption, π (1) is voter V1To ballot paper vote1Obscure,The value after obscuring is represented, and so on.
U in Fig. 4iVote by proxy person address, T represent Threshold Signature address, and z represents z bit coin as guarantee fund, y generation
Y bit coin of table is as ticket, σ (U1) vote by proxy person address U1Corresponding digital signature, σ (T) represent Threshold Signature address T institute
Corresponding digital signature.
In Fig. 4Wherein
Script OP_HASH160 < Hash (x) > OP_EQUAL representative x value is disclosed, this formula represents time t1It discloses beforeZ bit coin is taken away as punishment by victor after z bit coin or time-out can be fetched.
- Fig. 4 referring to fig. 2, the embodiment of the invention provides a small-scale secret protections based on block chain decentralization
Ballot system has 6 voter V1…V6With 3 candidate C1…C3。
The small-scale secret protection ballot system includes registration phase, generation Threshold Signature address phase, vote anonymously rank
Section and transactional stage.
Registration phase,
S1, each voter ViGenerate the address address of oneselfiWith public, private key to (pki, ski), each address
There is 1+4 bit coin, wherein 1 is the bit coin for voting, 4 be the guarantee fund promised to undertake for assuring decryption.
S2, all voters, which unanimously negotiate to determine to disclose, promises to undertake latest time t1=1 hour, gold is selected to retract latest time t2
=1.5 hours.
S3, each candidate CiGenerate the address address of oneselfiWith public, private key to (PKi, SKi), and time is set
Serial number id is selected, three people are 1,2,3 respectively.
S4, information above is published on bulletin board.
Generate Threshold Signature address phase
S5, the threshold signature protocol using decentralization, voters interact acquisition Threshold Signature address T and make often
One voter ViThere is a corresponding private keyEach private keyIt is a part of Threshold Signature address T.
It votes anonymously the stage
Assuming that owner does not abandon ticket
S6, voter V1The public key pk of remaining voter is obtained by bulletin boardi, voter V1Select candidate C1,To ballot paper vote1Use pk2, pk3..., pknSuccessively encryption obtains
Wherein π (1) is voter V1Ballot paper is obscured, construction first obscures setIt is sent to voter V2。
S7, voter V2Receive first obscure set after use oneself private key sk2Decryption obtains
Voter V2Select candidate C1, while constructing voter V2Ballot paperIt generates correspondingConstruction second obscures setIt is sent to voter V3。
S8, voter V3Receive second obscure set after use oneself private key sk3Decryption obtainsWithVoter V3Select candidate C2, construct simultaneously
Voter V3BallotIt generates correspondingConstruct third
Obscure setIt is sent to voter V4。
S9, voter V4It receives after third obscures set and uses oneself private key sk4Decryption obtainsWithVoter V4Choosing
Select candidate C3, while constructing voter V4BallotIt generates correspondingIt constructs the 4th and obscures setIt is sent to voter V5。
S10, voter V5Receive the 4th obscure set after use oneself private key sk5Decryption obtainsWithVoter
V5Select candidate C1, while constructing voter V5BallotIt generates correspondingIt constructs the 5th and obscures setIt is sent to voter V6。
S11, voter V6Receive the 5th obscure set after use oneself private key sk6Decryption obtainsWithVoter V6Select candidate C1,
Voter V is constructed simultaneously6BallotIt generates correspondingIt constructs the 6th and obscures collection
It closesObscure set for the 6th to broadcast.
S12, each voter receive the 6th and obscure set, obscure set progress hash operation for the 6th and obtain H (i), and
H (i) is broadcasted, each voter receives H (1), H (2) ..., H (6).
S13, voters judge this H (1), and whether H (2) ..., H (6) are consistent, if unanimously, using pseudo-random number generator
Last π (7) is generated with H (i).
Transactional stage
After operation is obscured in S14, completion, into transactional stage is claimed, all voters are determining exposure promise latest time
t1In (1 hour) time, by the ballot paper vote of voteriIt discloses, that is, exposesEnsure to be guaranteed
Golden 4 bit coin.
S15, voter V1It exposes
S16, voter V2It exposes
S17, voter V3It exposes
S18, voter V4It exposes
S19, voter V5It exposes
S20, voter V6It exposes
S21, the candidate being voted-for use the private key SK of oneself after bit coin network sees the ballot paper of exposurexDecryption
Out
S22, candidate C1It decrypts
S23, candidate C2It decrypts
S24, candidate C3It decrypts
S25, final No. 1 candidate obtain 4 tickets, and No. 2 candidates obtain 1 ticket, and No. 3 candidates obtain 1 ticket.
S26, No. 1 candidate C1Be collected into 4 it is differentAfterwards, transaction of winning is initiated, 6 bit coin are transferred to oneself
Address1Up, the triumph of ballot is won.
Compared with prior art, beneficial effect caused by ballot system provided by the invention is：
Correctness, the most basic and most important property of a Protocol of Electronic Voting are to guarantee the correctness of ballot, Neng Goufang
Only the ballot paper of voter is tampered, discarding and repeated vote.
Decentralization, in entire voting process, in addition to voter and candidate, do not need other third-party institutions or
Trust authority assists to complete.
The vote information of secret protection, voter cannot be known by all other men, and in reality, secret protection is ballot
One of most important property of agreement.
Functionality, more ballot forms should be supported, such as office's ballot, large scale election ballot, and 1of2 is waited
The person of choosing votes, multiple candidate ballots etc..
Used herein a specific example illustrates the principle and implementation of the invention, and above embodiments are said
It is bright to be merely used to help understand method and its core concept of the invention；At the same time, for those skilled in the art, foundation
Thought of the invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation manner and application range.In conclusion the content of the present specification is not
It is interpreted as limitation of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. a kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization, which is characterized in that secret protection ballot system
System includes：Information registering and announcement module, Threshold Signature address generation module, the module that votes anonymously and transaction modules；
The information registering and announcement module on bulletin board for registering determining voter's number, candidate number, disclosing
It promises to undertake latest time and gold is selected to retract latest time, and announced on bulletin board；Wherein, voter's number, the time
The person's of choosing number is the natural number more than or equal to 1；
Threshold Signature address generation module is used to hand over using (t, n) threshold signature protocol of decentralization, voter
Mutually, Threshold Signature address T is generated；Wherein, the corresponding private key of each voter, each private key are a ballot paper；
The module that votes anonymously selects candidate and is obscured to protect voter while ballot to realize for voter
Privacy；
The transaction modules are used for after the completion of operation is obscured in ballot, and voter executes and claims transaction, are then thrown by random one
Ticket person constructs the transaction of ballot promise and reimbursement trades and is sent to all voters and successively signs, the victor when having decided victor
Execute transaction of winning；The execution reimbursement transaction when not decided victor and being more than that gold is selected to retract latest time；Wherein, the ballot
Promise to undertake that transaction is published in bit coin network, the reimbursement transaction is retained in local, when being more than that gold is selected to retract latest time, moves back
Money transaction is published in bit coin network.
2. secret protection ballot system according to claim 1, which is characterized in that in the information registering and announce module
In each voter generate corresponding address and public, private key to (pki, ski)；Compare in the address comprising at least y+z
Special coin, wherein y indicates that the bit coin for being used to vote, z are for the guarantee fund when promising to undertake.
3. secret protection ballot system according to claim 1, which is characterized in that in the information registering and announce module
In each candidate generate corresponding address, public, private key to (PKi, SKi) and candidate serial number id.
4. secret protection ballot system according to claim 1, which is characterized in that generate mould in the Threshold Signature address
Each private key is a part of Threshold Signature address T in block.
5. secret protection ballot system according to claim 1, which is characterized in that in the module that votes anonymously successively
It carries out ballot and obscures until all voters complete to vote, specially when voter obtains remaining voter's by bulletin board
After public key, No. 1 voter determines ballot selection first, constructs ballot paperWherein, vote1Represent 1
The ballot paper of number voter, the candidate of x vote by proxy person selection,Representative is encrypted using the public key of candidate x, | | generation
Table connection,Represent the private key of No. 1 voter, idXRepresent the candidate serial number of candidate x；To ballot paper vote1Using pk2,
pk3,…,pknSuccessively encryption obtainsWherein π (1) is No. 1 voter to ballot paper
Obscure, construction first obscures setAnd it is sent to No. 2 voters or No. 1 voter's selection abandoning ticket；
Secondly, No. 2 voters receive described first obscure set after, No. 2 voters decrypt to obtain using corresponding private keyIt determines ballot selection, constructs ballot paperEncryption generation pair
It answersConstruction second obscures setIt is sent to No. 3 voters；
And so on, it obtains n-th and obscures setThen according to
Lexcographical order is sent to all voters；
Each voter obtains H (i) to the information progress Hash operation received and broadcasts, and judges H (1), H (2) ..., H
(n) whether consistent equal, if equal, using pseudo-random sequence generator, π (n+1) is generated with H (i)；Wherein, n is voter's
Number.
6. secret protection ballot system according to claim 5, which is characterized in that the ballot promises to undertake that the input of transaction is to contain z
The address of+y bit coin, exports and is
It is describedIndicate 2 kinds
Mode obtains z bit coin, and one is promising to undertake in latest time to disclose ballot paper in defined exposure, candidate is taken away；It is another
Kind is not promise to undertake to disclose ballot paper in latest time in defined exposure, and guarantee fund is disclosing promise latest time and gold is selected to retract most
Take away or select gold to retract the candidate won after latest time by the transaction of all voter's combined structures between the late time
It takes away.
7. secret protection ballot system according to claim 6, which is characterized in that described to claim transaction as all voters
Promise to undertake that exposure voter's ballot paper in latest time, the candidate for obtaining z bit coin of guarantee fund, while being voted-for use disclosing
The transaction of corresponding private key decrypted ballots.
8. secret protection ballot system according to claim 7, which is characterized in that the triumph transaction is that candidate receives
After the ballot paper different to t, ny bit coin is transferred in candidate corresponding address, wins the transaction of ballot triumph.
9. secret protection ballot system according to claim 8, which is characterized in that the reimbursement transaction is that gold is being selected to retract
In latest time, voting results fail to generate, and the bit coin of each voter is returned to the transaction of original address.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN201810662953.2A CN108833082A (en) | 2018-06-25 | 2018-06-25 | A kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization |
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| CN201810662953.2A CN108833082A (en) | 2018-06-25 | 2018-06-25 | A kind of secret protection ballot system based on block chain decentralization |
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| CN108833082A true CN108833082A (en) | 2018-11-16 |
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