CN108768660B - Internet of things equipment identity authentication method based on physical unclonable function - Google Patents

Internet of things equipment identity authentication method based on physical unclonable function Download PDF

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CN108768660B
CN108768660B CN201810523739.9A CN201810523739A CN108768660B CN 108768660 B CN108768660 B CN 108768660B CN 201810523739 A CN201810523739 A CN 201810523739A CN 108768660 B CN108768660 B CN 108768660B
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user
authentication
access
server
puf
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CN108768660A (en
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关振宇
秦煜瑶
刘建伟
李云浩
赵莹
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Beihang University
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Beihang University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/101—Access control lists [ACL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H04L9/3221—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs interactive zero-knowledge proofs

Abstract

The invention relates to an identity authentication method of Internet of things equipment based on a physical unclonable function, which can be used for identity authentication of multiple equipment and a user in an Internet of things network by combining the property characteristics of the physical unclonable function and the content of zero knowledge proof, and belongs to the field of Internet of things safety in information safety. The authentication method comprises four entities of a server, a user, an access device and an accessed device, and comprises the following main contents: a registration stage: the server needs to store the response value of the specific challenge and the user password in a power form of a discrete logarithm group generating element for equipment registration; in the authentication stage, the server sends registered challenges to perform secondary response, and at the moment, the access equipment and the equipment as a whole perform zero-knowledge proof with the user and the server; and simultaneously, the access equipment, the equipment and the server perform another zero-knowledge proof, and the identity authentication of the user, the preliminary authentication of the legality of the access equipment and the final authentication are completed for the server.

Description

Internet of things equipment identity authentication method based on physical unclonable function
Technical Field
The invention relates to an identity authentication method of Internet of things equipment based on a physical unclonable function, which can be used for identity authentication of multiple equipment and users in an Internet of things network and belongs to the field of Internet of things safety in information safety.
Background
In the era of intersection and convergence of big data and the Internet of Things, the Internet of Things (IoT) is used as an extension and extension of the Internet, and communication between objects is established. The internet of things is a network taking 'things' as data sources. With the development of various sensing devices and information technologies, the coverage range of the internet of things is wider, information sources and information sinks contributed by a sensing layer of the internet of things to the whole information network are more and more, and the data volume generated by interactive interaction of various roles in an information space is expanding continuously, and is becoming a main information source of big data beyond the internet.
The development of the internet of things is built on the basis of information technology and is driven by social demands. With the invention of intelligent equipment in various industries and the proposal of intelligent modes, the Internet of things can be widely applied to the fields of industry, agriculture, commerce, medical health, security, environmental protection, aerospace national defense and the like. The development of internet of things network resources is related to the control of future network technologies and information resources. Modern social life work is established on a complex internet, the internet of things enables people to be in interactive contact with things, things and things, and the concept intelligent life and working modes such as computable, credible, cloud and big data are promoted, and people are bound to rely on the internet of things more and more. At that time, the network security of the internet of things inevitably becomes one of the important factors influencing the social stability and the national security.
The security issues in the internet of things are more complex than in traditional internet network security. The communication of the internet of things network not only covers the exchange of data and information under various conditions in the internet, but also includes a sensor with huge data volume in the sensing layer of the internet of things, and the data is generated and exchanged in a radio frequency network and a wireless sensor network. How to guarantee the integrity and authenticity of information between objects and people and between objects is one of important research contents of the internet of things network security technology.
The information security exchange and transmission in the network are closely related to the identity authentication technology. Traditionally, identity authentication refers to a process of confirming identity authenticity of a user/user in network communication, such as simple identity authentication through a password, a token and a fingerprint representing identity, and through identity authentication, access of the user to information and use permission of resources can be confirmed. In the internet of things network, "identity" is given more meaning: not only the identity of the user needs to be authenticated to be real and reliable, but also the credibility and the legality of equipment in the network need to be verified. In a hardware device system, authentication refers to the process of confirming the identity and authenticity of chips, circuit boards, and system components (e.g., RFID tags, smart cards, etc.). In the internet of things, higher requirements are put forward on the authentication of the equipment: (1) in a typical network, a plurality of access devices and accessed devices exist, and how to effectively manage and distinguish the access devices and the accessed devices is an important problem to avoid internal attacks; (2) data multivariate development is required; (3) the authenticity and integrity of the information of the data source are guaranteed.
The invention designs an identity authentication protocol in the Internet of things based on a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). A PUF can provide hardware-specific strings depending on the unique characteristics of the physical hardware on which it is implemented, and provides two valuable functions for devices in networks of the internet of things: (1) sensitive information is dynamically regenerated by using the determined information without storage; (2) tamper resistance. PUFs can exploit the random differences that physical entities cause during the manufacturing process, which differences are extracted via certain rules in the form of digital information. On the premise that the entity inputs an excitation, an unpredictable response is output as a key or unique Identification ID (ID) required for encryption. Instead of storing secret information in memory, PUFs derive secret information from complex physical characteristics of an entity. The PUF is used for bearing authentication information, so that the robustness and the practicability of hardware equipment can be ensured; the PUF is bound with the device, is determined by the random difference of physical manufacture on the chip, cannot be reproduced on other devices, and has uniqueness; any attempt to tamper with the device will affect the PUF, destroying the original PUF and having the property of being non-tamperable.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an identity authentication method of equipment in the Internet of things based on a physical unclonable function. The invention utilizes the physical unclonable function correlation technique as the technical basis of hardware equipment authentication, combines zero knowledge proof theory design protocol in cryptography, and provides strong safety guarantee for users.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows: an Internet of things equipment identity authentication method based on a physical unclonable function comprises four main entities:central server
Figure GDA0002827760180000021
The system is also a database of the system network and represents an entity for carrying out identity authentication and data management on the user; user' s
Figure GDA0002827760180000022
Representing the user; reading device
Figure GDA0002827760180000023
And apparatus
Figure GDA0002827760180000024
User passes through reader
Figure GDA0002827760180000025
(Access device) to device
Figure GDA0002827760180000026
Access is performed. Prior to proceeding with the authentication protocol, the reader
Figure GDA0002827760180000027
And apparatus
Figure GDA0002827760180000028
Built-in PUF (physical unclonable function) in the system participates in the server
Figure GDA0002827760180000029
Once the registration process is completed and the authentication process is performed, the user
Figure GDA00028277601800000210
Can be used in
Figure GDA00028277601800000211
To authenticate and reasonably access devices with the help of
Figure GDA00028277601800000212
Thus, two processes are defined:
registering: is that
Figure GDA00028277601800000213
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000214
protocol between, users
Figure GDA00028277601800000215
In that
Figure GDA00028277601800000216
With the help of which the server is registered. If the registration is successful, the server obtains and stores a token T that can be used for subsequent authenticationu。
And (3) authentication: is that
Figure GDA00028277601800000217
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000218
in which a protocol is used
Figure GDA00028277601800000219
Is/are as follows
Figure GDA00028277601800000220
And use of the storage certificate TuIs/are as follows
Figure GDA00028277601800000221
To decide whether to accept or reject the user; is also that
Figure GDA00028277601800000222
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000223
the protocol (c) of (a) is,
Figure GDA00028277601800000224
the authentication process can prove each other that the other is a legitimate (access) device.
Assuming a small Internet of things environment containing a plurality of intelligent devices
Figure GDA0002827760180000031
In this environment there is a management service center
Figure GDA0002827760180000032
Figure GDA0002827760180000033
Meanwhile, the system can be used as a database to store various authentication information and users
Figure GDA0002827760180000034
As a user, a reading device (or access device) is required
Figure GDA0002827760180000035
By passing
Figure GDA0002827760180000036
To devices in the network
Figure GDA0002827760180000037
And performing data access. The authentication process is required to satisfy the following properties:
1) even if the adversary has access to the device
Figure GDA0002827760180000038
Nor can it be successfully verified by the system. This security concept is essential in practice and the access device may be a mobile terminal which is easily present in the hands of the user at a certain moment. To ensure that the device itself does not reveal any sensitive information, the scheme does not store such information on the device.
2) A legitimate user cannot authenticate successfully without a device. This is also important in that it ensures that a device must be available for successful login, and that the adversary, being aware of the stored information in the server as well as the user information, cannot create a clone of the corresponding device.
3) The property of the PUF ensures that the equipment is unclonable and cannot be tampered, and any tampering can make the PUF become a brand-new PUF', so that a legal user is ensured to have to own the original equipment for authentication to successfully pass the authentication.
In this solution (protocol flow diagram as in fig. 4), we assume a server
Figure GDA0002827760180000039
Establishing and declaring discrete logarithm problem prime order q group
Figure GDA00028277601800000310
And its generator g0. That is to say that the position of the first electrode,
Figure GDA00028277601800000311
may be a multiplicative group of prime numbers p
Figure GDA00028277601800000312
A subgroup of (a). Assuming that the PUF is constructed to use
Figure GDA00028277601800000313
Or when challenging the PUF, the user submits the group to the PUF.
A registration stage:
the method comprises the following steps: server
Figure GDA00028277601800000314
To the user
Figure GDA00028277601800000315
Sending challenge c and group
Figure GDA00028277601800000316
Is described by
Figure GDA00028277601800000317
Indicating that it can be composed of a pair of (p, q) and its generator g0And (4) forming.
Step two: user' s
Figure GDA00028277601800000318
Directional device
Figure GDA00028277601800000319
H (c | | pwd) is sent,
Figure GDA00028277601800000320
g0where pwd is the user password for the modified Gen protocol.
Among these, the Gen protocol is two protocols from fuzzy extraction: gen and Rep protocols. A fuzzy extractor is set to have parameters (m, l, t, ε).
Gen protocol: used in the enrolment phase, the output is a set (R, P), R being the value to be regenerated and P being a common helper string for recovering the response of the PUF at a given access C. The error correction code ECC is used to eliminate up to t errors in the PUF output for a given access. Satisfies the following conditions: at any distribution of C of minimum entropy m, if (R, P) ← gen (C), then (R, P) and (U)lAnd R) is epsilon.
The Rep protocol: this is a recovery algorithm, given that P, (R, P) ← Gen (C), R can be re-output with the common helper string and the misinterpretation algorithm if the distance of the output O 'of the PUF from the output O at enrollment, dist (O, O') ≦ t: rep (O', P) ═ R.
Step three: device
Figure GDA0002827760180000041
One challenge d ═ H (c | | pwd) is calculated,<Gq>,g0) And run Gen on this value to obtain the response r, P. Then the
Figure GDA0002827760180000042
Sending to the user (g)0 r,P)。
Step four: the user will (g)0 rP) forwarding to a server
Figure GDA0002827760180000043
Server
Figure GDA0002827760180000044
The information c, g0，
Figure GDA0002827760180000045
Are stored together.
And (3) an authentication stage:
the method comprises the following steps: server
Figure GDA0002827760180000046
To the user
Figure GDA0002827760180000047
The challenge c is sent out and,
Figure GDA0002827760180000048
g0p and a random number N.
Step two:
Figure GDA0002827760180000049
mixing (H (c | | pwd),
Figure GDA00028277601800000410
g0p, N) to the access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000411
The Rep protocol is performed.
Step three: access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000412
Computational challenge d ═ H (c | | pwd), g0P) then runs Rep on this value to obtain the response r.
Figure GDA00028277601800000413
Random selection
Figure GDA00028277601800000414
And calculate out
Figure GDA00028277601800000415
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000416
and w ═ v-C' r mod q.
Figure GDA00028277601800000417
C' and w are temporarily saved. In addition, the first and second substrates are,
Figure GDA00028277601800000418
generating random numbers
Figure GDA00028277601800000419
And are provided with
Figure GDA00028277601800000420
And g1、p1For parameter calculation
Figure GDA00028277601800000421
Then the
Figure GDA00028277601800000422
Will be provided with
Figure GDA00028277601800000423
As inquiry information to the accessed device
Figure GDA00028277601800000424
Step four: device
Figure GDA00028277601800000425
Preliminary authentication access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000426
Receive from
Figure GDA00028277601800000427
After the query message has been transmitted,
Figure GDA00028277601800000428
first in the access control list
Figure GDA00028277601800000429
In retrieving whether an identifier exists
Figure GDA00028277601800000430
To perform preliminary authentication
Figure GDA00028277601800000431
If it is not
Figure GDA00028277601800000432
Absence, proof of
Figure GDA00028277601800000433
The authentication process stops if it is not a legitimate device in the initialization phase. If it is not
Figure GDA00028277601800000434
Presence, apparatus
Figure GDA00028277601800000435
To pair
Figure GDA00028277601800000436
The rounding operation is carried out to obtain D,
Figure GDA00028277601800000437
then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure GDA00028277601800000438
finding Auth in memoryijDivide it into Authl||AuthrWherein the high order is AuthlWhat remains is Authr. The dummy bits are padded with zeros at the time of partitioning, taking underflow into account.
Figure GDA00028277601800000439
Computing
Figure GDA00028277601800000440
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000441
and will be
Figure GDA00028277601800000442
Is sent as a response to
Figure GDA00028277601800000443
Wherein f ispseudo(. cndot.) is a pseudorandom function. AuthijIs about
Figure GDA00028277601800000444
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000445
setting a specific input c0，
Figure GDA00028277601800000446
AuthijStored in a device
Figure GDA00028277601800000447
Each device stores only authentication information associated with itself.
Step five: access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000448
Preliminary authentication device
Figure GDA00028277601800000449
When receiving
Figure GDA00028277601800000450
After the information has been transmitted, the user may,
Figure GDA00028277601800000451
first in the access control list
Figure GDA00028277601800000452
In retrieving whether an identifier exists
Figure GDA00028277601800000453
To perform preliminary authentication
Figure GDA00028277601800000454
If it is not
Figure GDA00028277601800000455
If not, the authentication process stops. Otherwise, the access device performs preliminary authentication
Figure GDA00028277601800000456
Then will be
Figure GDA00028277601800000457
And C' and w stored in the step three are sent to the user together
Figure GDA00028277601800000458
The user sends these values to the servers
Figure GDA00028277601800000459
Wherein, in the fourth step and the fifth step,
Figure GDA00028277601800000460
respectively, are legitimate access devices
Figure GDA00028277601800000461
And apparatus
Figure GDA00028277601800000462
Is determined by both its own PUFs, and is the result of processing the response of the respective PUFs to a particular input. Present in respective access control lists, e.g. access devices
Figure GDA00028277601800000463
Access control list of
Figure GDA00028277601800000464
Therein are provided with a plurality of devices
Figure GDA00028277601800000465
An identifier of (a); in the same way, the method for preparing the composite material,
Figure GDA00028277601800000466
present in equipment
Figure GDA00028277601800000467
Contains identifiers of various access devices.
Step six: server
Figure GDA0002827760180000051
First of all, calculate
Figure GDA0002827760180000052
And if C ═ C', accepting user authentication while granting access to the device
Figure GDA0002827760180000053
And if the equipment is legal, otherwise, the authentication is stopped.
At the same time, the server also needs to correct the received
Figure GDA0002827760180000054
The information is processed and the information is processed,
Figure GDA0002827760180000055
computing
Figure GDA0002827760180000056
Auth for retrieving authentication informationijAnd split it into Authl||AuthrContinue to calculate
Figure GDA0002827760180000057
And
Figure GDA0002827760180000058
by making a judgment
Figure GDA0002827760180000059
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000510
whether or not to equal to confirm the devices
Figure GDA00028277601800000511
The validity of (2). If it is
Figure GDA00028277601800000512
Then the equipment
Figure GDA00028277601800000513
Is legally given access to the device
Figure GDA00028277601800000514
The final authentication of (1).
Reaching step six, the user is verified to be a legal user, and the device is accessed
Figure GDA00028277601800000515
Is a legal original equipment, and
Figure GDA00028277601800000516
is legally given access to the device
Figure GDA00028277601800000517
The final authentication of (1).
3. The advantages and the effects are as follows:
the invention relates to an identity authentication scheme of Internet of things equipment based on a physical unclonable function, which can be used for identity authentication of multiple equipment and users in an Internet of things network and has the advantages and effects that:
1) according to the scheme, a hardware information security technology is applied to the internet of things network equipment for the first time, and a specific authentication scheme is provided by combining identity authentication and a zero-knowledge proof theory in the information security technology, so that strong security guarantee is provided for a user.
2) The scheme uses double-factor authentication, so that identity authentication and information access can be performed only under the condition that a legal user has legal equipment, and the user password and the legal equipment are not available.
3) Based on the property of a physical unclonable function, the devices cannot be copied and cloned, the uniqueness of the identity of each device is guaranteed, meanwhile, the protocol process is proved by zero knowledge, the challenge is responded by the PUF immediately, and the devices do not need extra space to store sensitive information.
4) The scheme avoids internal attacks in multi-entity systems.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention.
Figure 2 is a block diagram of a PUF predictive response game flow.
Figure 3 is a block diagram of a PUF response indistinguishable game flow.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart of an identity authentication protocol of an internet of things device based on PUF.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described with reference to the following figures and detailed description.
1. PUF model
(1) PUF predictive response game
As in previous PUF documents, we made a standard assumption that without a physical device, the PUF behavior is unpredictable. Let UκRepresents a number from {0,1}κA randomly selected set of strings. Let PUF be a function
Figure GDA0002827760180000061
At a length of κ1Generates a length k on the input2The string of (2). Before giving a definition, let us first define the following PUF prediction response game (as in fig. 2):
stage one: enemy
Figure GDA0002827760180000062
For any selected ci，
Figure GDA0002827760180000063
Wherein the challenge sets
Figure GDA0002827760180000064
Is all challenge spaces
Figure GDA0002827760180000065
Requesting to obtain a PUF response ri。
And a second stage: PUF device
Figure GDA0002827760180000066
Will respond to
Figure GDA0002827760180000067
Is returned to
Figure GDA0002827760180000068
Stage three-challenge:
Figure GDA0002827760180000069
selecting a challenge c that has not been queried so far, i.e.
Figure GDA00028277601800000610
Device not allowing direction
Figure GDA00028277601800000611
The PUF submits a challenge c.
And a fourth stage: enemy
Figure GDA00028277601800000612
A new set of polynomial challenges may be issued again
Figure GDA00028277601800000613
At the same time
Figure GDA00028277601800000614
Still not allowing to the device
Figure GDA00028277601800000615
The PUF submits a challenge c.
And a fifth stage: device
Figure GDA00028277601800000616
PUF of (1) returns a response
Figure GDA00028277601800000617
To give
Figure GDA00028277601800000618
Responding:
Figure GDA00028277601800000619
outputting PUF responses
Figure GDA00028277601800000620
Guess r' of (c). If r ═ r', then
Figure GDA00028277601800000621
And (6) winning. Order to
Figure GDA00028277601800000622
To represent
Figure GDA00028277601800000623
Guess correctly
Figure GDA00028277601800000624
Probability of winning in response to c. That is, when
Figure GDA00028277601800000625
Is equal to
Figure GDA00028277601800000626
Actual response to challenge c
Figure GDA00028277601800000627
The adversary wins.
(2) PUF response indistinguishable games
PUF response indistinguishable games (e.g., FIG. 3) require an adversary
Figure GDA00028277601800000628
Distinguishing the output R and from {0,1} of a fuzzy extractor (m, l, t, epsilon) -fuzzy extra of a PUFlA randomly selected set of strings. The game is defined as follows, let UκRepresents a number from {0,1}κA set of randomly selected strings.
Stage one-registration: enemy
Figure GDA00028277601800000629
For the challenge
Figure GDA00028277601800000630
A registration procedure is performed.
And a second stage: device D returns the corresponding helper string P from the Gen's outputi，(Ri,Pi)←Gen(ri＝PUFD(ci) Let CP be these (c)i,Pi) A set of pairs.
And a third stage: for any
Figure GDA00028277601800000631
Figure GDA00028277601800000632
Requesting and receiving its PUF response Ri。
Stage four-challenge:
Figure GDA00028277601800000633
one challenge c is selected, c being registered in the registration phase, but not in phase three, i.e.
Figure GDA00028277601800000634
And is
Figure GDA00028277601800000635
Has PiBut without R to challenge ci. The PUF device randomly selects a bit b, b ∈ {0,1 }.
And a fifth stage: if b is 0, then R is given Rep (PUF)D(c) R, P). Otherwise, if b is 1, then
Figure GDA00028277601800000636
Is given a random string s e {0,1}l。
And a sixth stage: enemy
Figure GDA0002827760180000071
Allowing any c 'to be interrogated to the PUF of device D'i∈CP,c′iNot equal to c, for all c'iNot equal to c challenge, PUF device returns ri′|ri′←PUFD(c′i)}。
Phase seven-response: finally, the process is carried out in a batch,
Figure GDA0002827760180000072
outputting a bit b'. If b is b ═ b
Figure GDA0002827760180000073
And (6) winning. Order to
Figure GDA0002827760180000074
To represent
Figure GDA0002827760180000075
Probability of winning the match. Let us assume that
Figure GDA0002827760180000076
Can be ignored.
Now a physically unclonable function is defined, which satisfies definition 1, whose security is defined by two formalized game PUFs predicting response games and PUFs indistinguishable games.
Definitions 1. physically unclonable functions related to the physical characteristics of the device D itself
Figure GDA0002827760180000077
Is a function with the following properties:
(i) the operation is efficient: PUF (physical unclonable function)DEasy to calculate and evaluate;
(ii) unpredictability:
Figure GDA0002827760180000078
in the kappa2Can be ignored.
(iii) Fuzzy extraction: claim during the enrollment phase of the PUF, given a challenge value c, the PUF calculates (R, P) ← gen (c), where R is the value to be regenerated, R ← PUF (c) is the response value of the PUF, and P is the helper value. The helper string allows subsequent responses R' (separated from the original response R by a distance t) to be restored to R.
(iv) Indistinguishable: requiring that the PUF output be computationally indistinguishable from a random string of the same length, within the PPT
Figure GDA0002827760180000079
Has the advantages of
Figure GDA00028277601800000710
Wherein epsilon1Are negligible.
(v) The noise is bounded: from the same PUF under the same challengeDIs at most t for negligible epsilon2Is provided with
Figure GDA00028277601800000711
(vi) Uniqueness: for each device D, the PUFDIs unique and is suitable for use in PUF of any other device DD′，ε3Small enough:
Figure GDA00028277601800000712
2. detailed description of the invention
In this solution we assume a server
Figure GDA00028277601800000713
Establishing and declaring discrete logarithm problem prime order q group
Figure GDA00028277601800000714
And its generator g0. That is to say that the position of the first electrode,
Figure GDA00028277601800000715
may be a multiplicative group of prime numbers p
Figure GDA00028277601800000716
A subgroup of (a). Assuming that the PUF is constructed to use
Figure GDA00028277601800000717
Or when challenging the PUF, the user submits the group to the PUF.
Preparation work:
let devices in the network be
Figure GDA00028277601800000718
DjJ 1,2,3, a specific input c is set0，
Figure GDA00028277601800000719
Figure GDA00028277601800000720
AuthijStored in a device
Figure GDA00028277601800000721
Each device stores only authentication information associated with itself.
Figure GDA0002827760180000081
Setting another specific input cm，
Figure GDA0002827760180000082
Will make these
Figure GDA0002827760180000083
Store its access control list
Figure GDA0002827760180000084
In the middle, the same process is carried out,
Figure GDA0002827760180000085
will make these
Figure GDA0002827760180000086
Store its access control list
Figure GDA0002827760180000087
In (1).
Figure GDA0002827760180000088
Respectively, are legitimate access devices
Figure GDA0002827760180000089
And apparatus
Figure GDA00028277601800000810
The identifier (c) is determined by the two PUFs themselves, and is the result of processing the response of each PUF to a particular input, and is present in the respective access control lists.
A registration stage:
the method comprises the following steps: server
Figure GDA00028277601800000811
To the user
Figure GDA00028277601800000812
Sending challenge c and group
Figure GDA00028277601800000813
Is described by
Figure GDA00028277601800000814
Indicating that it can be composed of a pair of (p, q) and its generator g0And (4) forming.
Step two: user' s
Figure GDA00028277601800000815
To the access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000816
H (c | | pwd) is sent,
Figure GDA00028277601800000817
g0where pwd is the user password, | | is the join symbol, H (-) is a hash function,
Figure GDA00028277601800000818
these received values are used in the modified Gen protocol.
Step three: device
Figure GDA00028277601800000819
One challenge d ═ H (c | | pwd) is calculated,<Gq>,g0) And run Gen on this value to obtain the response r, P. Then the
Figure GDA00028277601800000820
Sending to the user (g)0 r,P)。
Step four: the user will(g0 rP) forwarding to a server
Figure GDA00028277601800000821
Server
Figure GDA00028277601800000822
The information c, g0，
Figure GDA00028277601800000823
Are stored together.
And (3) an authentication stage:
the method comprises the following steps: server
Figure GDA00028277601800000824
To the user
Figure GDA00028277601800000825
The challenge c is sent out and,
Figure GDA00028277601800000826
g0p and a random number N.
Step two:
Figure GDA00028277601800000827
mixing (H (c | | pwd),
Figure GDA00028277601800000828
g0p, N) to the access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000829
The Rep protocol is performed.
Step three: access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000830
Computational challenge d ═ H (c | | pwd), g0P) then runs Rep on this value to obtain the response r.
Figure GDA00028277601800000831
Random selection
Figure GDA00028277601800000832
And calculate out
Figure GDA00028277601800000833
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000834
and w ═ v-C' r mod q.
Figure GDA00028277601800000835
C' and w are temporarily saved. In addition, the first and second substrates are,
Figure GDA00028277601800000836
generating random numbers
Figure GDA00028277601800000837
And are provided with
Figure GDA00028277601800000838
And g1、p1For parameter calculation
Figure GDA00028277601800000839
Then the
Figure GDA00028277601800000840
Will be provided with
Figure GDA00028277601800000841
As inquiry information to the accessed device
Figure GDA00028277601800000842
Step four: device
Figure GDA00028277601800000843
Preliminary authentication access device
Figure GDA00028277601800000844
Receive from
Figure GDA00028277601800000845
After the query message has been transmitted,
Figure GDA00028277601800000846
first in the access control list
Figure GDA00028277601800000847
In retrieving whether an identifier exists
Figure GDA00028277601800000848
To perform preliminary authentication
Figure GDA00028277601800000849
If it is not
Figure GDA00028277601800000850
Absence, proof of
Figure GDA00028277601800000851
The authentication process stops if it is not a legitimate device in the initialization phase. If it is not
Figure GDA00028277601800000852
Presence, apparatus
Figure GDA00028277601800000853
To pair
Figure GDA00028277601800000854
The rounding operation is carried out to obtain D,
Figure GDA00028277601800000855
then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure GDA00028277601800000856
finding Auth in memoryijDivide it into Authl||AuthrWherein the high order is AuthlWhat remains is Authr. The dummy bits are padded with zeros at the time of partitioning, taking underflow into account.
Figure GDA0002827760180000091
Computing
Figure GDA0002827760180000092
And
Figure GDA0002827760180000093
and will be
Figure GDA0002827760180000094
Is sent as a response to
Figure GDA0002827760180000095
Step five: access device
Figure GDA0002827760180000096
Preliminary authentication device
Figure GDA0002827760180000097
When receiving
Figure GDA0002827760180000098
After the information has been transmitted, the user may,
Figure GDA0002827760180000099
first in the access control list
Figure GDA00028277601800000910
In retrieving whether an identifier exists
Figure GDA00028277601800000911
To perform preliminary authentication
Figure GDA00028277601800000912
If it is not
Figure GDA00028277601800000913
If not, the authentication process stops. Otherwise, the access device performs preliminary authentication
Figure GDA00028277601800000914
Then will be
Figure GDA00028277601800000915
And C' and w stored in the step three are sent to the user together
Figure GDA00028277601800000916
The user sends these values to the servers
Figure GDA00028277601800000917
Step six: server
Figure GDA00028277601800000918
First of all, calculate
Figure GDA00028277601800000919
And if C ═ C', accepting user authentication while granting access to the device
Figure GDA00028277601800000920
And if the equipment is legal, otherwise, the authentication is stopped.
At the same time, the server also needs to correct the received
Figure GDA00028277601800000921
The information is processed and the information is processed,
Figure GDA00028277601800000922
computing
Figure GDA00028277601800000923
Auth for retrieving authentication informationijAnd split it into Authl||AuthrContinue to calculate
Figure GDA00028277601800000924
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000925
by making a judgment
Figure GDA00028277601800000926
And
Figure GDA00028277601800000927
whether or not to equal to confirm the devices
Figure GDA00028277601800000928
The validity of (2). If it is
Figure GDA00028277601800000929
Then the equipment
Figure GDA00028277601800000930
Is legally given access to the device
Figure GDA00028277601800000931
The final authentication of (1).
And reaching the sixth step, ending the protocol and authenticating the user
Figure GDA00028277601800000932
For legitimate users, access to the device
Figure GDA00028277601800000933
Is a legal original equipment, and
Figure GDA00028277601800000934
is legally given access to the device
Figure GDA00028277601800000935
The final authentication of (1).
Wherein, the related foreign language vocabulary list is as follows:
TABLE 1 the present invention relates to a foreign language vocabulary
Figure GDA00028277601800000936

Claims (1)

1. An identity authentication method for equipment of the Internet of things based on a physical unclonable function is characterized in that: the method application scenario includes four main entities: central server
Figure FDA0002827760170000011
The system is also a database of the system network and represents an entity for carrying out identity authentication and data management on the user; user' s
Figure FDA0002827760170000012
Representing the user; reading device
Figure FDA0002827760170000013
And apparatus
Figure FDA0002827760170000014
User passes through reader
Figure FDA0002827760170000015
I.e. access device to device
Figure FDA0002827760170000016
Access is carried out; prior to proceeding with the authentication protocol, the reader
Figure FDA0002827760170000017
And apparatus
Figure FDA0002827760170000018
Built-in PUF (physical unclonable function) in the system participates in the server
Figure FDA0002827760170000019
Once the registration process is completed and the authentication process is performed, the user
Figure FDA00028277601700000110
Can be used in
Figure FDA00028277601700000111
To authenticate and reasonably access devices with the help of
Figure FDA00028277601700000112
Two processes are defined:
registering: is that
Figure FDA00028277601700000113
And
Figure FDA00028277601700000114
protocol between, users
Figure FDA00028277601700000115
In that
Figure FDA00028277601700000116
With the help of (1) register with the server; if the registration is successful, the server obtains and stores a token T that can be used for subsequent authenticationu；
And (3) authentication: is that
Figure FDA00028277601700000117
And
Figure FDA00028277601700000118
in which a protocol is used
Figure FDA00028277601700000119
Is/are as follows
Figure FDA00028277601700000120
And use of the storage certificate TuIs/are as follows
Figure FDA00028277601700000121
To decide whether to accept or reject the user; is also that
Figure FDA00028277601700000122
And
Figure FDA00028277601700000123
the protocol (c) of (a) is,
Figure FDA00028277601700000124
the other party can be proved to be legal access equipment in the authentication process;
a small Internet of things environment comprising a plurality of intelligent devices
Figure FDA00028277601700000125
In this environment there is a management service center
Figure FDA00028277601700000126
Figure FDA00028277601700000127
Meanwhile, the system can be used as a database to store various authentication information and users
Figure FDA00028277601700000128
As a user, a reading device or an access device is required
Figure FDA00028277601700000129
By passing
Figure FDA00028277601700000130
To devices in the network
Figure FDA00028277601700000131
Data access is performed, requiring that the authentication process can satisfy the following attributes:
1) even if the adversary has access to the device
Figure FDA00028277601700000132
The system cannot be successfully verified; this security concept is essential in practical situations where the access device may be a mobile terminal, which is easily present in the hands of the user at a certain moment; in order to ensure that the device itself does not reveal any sensitive information, the device in the scheme will not store such information;
2) the method has the advantages that the legal user can not successfully authenticate without equipment, which is also important, the method ensures that equipment is required to be provided when the legal user successfully logs in, and simultaneously, an adversary knows the storage information and the user information in the server and can not create the clone of the corresponding equipment;
3) the property of the PUF ensures that the equipment cannot be cloned and tampered, and any tampering can make the PUF become a brand-new PUF', so that a legal user is ensured to have to own the original equipment for authentication and can pass the authentication successfully;
server
Figure FDA00028277601700000133
Establishing and declaring discrete logarithm problem prime order q group
Figure FDA00028277601700000134
And its generator g0(ii) a That is to say that the position of the first electrode,
Figure FDA00028277601700000135
may be a multiplicative group of prime numbers p
Figure FDA00028277601700000136
A subgroup of (a); the PUF is constructed to use
Figure FDA00028277601700000137
Or when the PUF is challenged, the user submits the group to the PUF;
a registration stage:
the method comprises the following steps: server
Figure FDA0002827760170000021
To the user
Figure FDA0002827760170000022
Sending challenge c and group
Figure FDA0002827760170000023
Is described by
Figure FDA0002827760170000024
Indicating that it can be composed of a pair of (p, q) and its generator g0Composition is carried out;
step two: user' s
Figure FDA0002827760170000025
Directional device
Figure FDA0002827760170000026
H (c | | pwd) is sent,
Figure FDA0002827760170000027
g0wherein pwd is a user password for modifying the Gen protocol;
among these, the Gen protocol is two protocols from fuzzy extraction: gen and Rep protocols, with a fuzzy extractor having parameters
Figure FDA00028277601700000246
Where m is the minimum entropy and t is the maximum number of bits of error in the allowed PUF output;
gen protocol: used in the registration phase, the output is a setAnd (R, P), wherein R is a value to be regenerated, P is a common helper string used for recovering the response of the PUF under the given access C, and the error correction code ECC is used for eliminating t errors in the output of the PUF under the given access, and the following conditions are satisfied: at any distribution of C of minimum entropy m, if (R, P) ← Gen (C), then (R, P) and
Figure FDA00028277601700000247
has a maximum difference of epsilon;
the Rep protocol: this is a recovery algorithm, given that P, (R, P) ← Gen (C), R can be re-output with the common helper string and the misinterpretation algorithm if the distance of the output O 'of the PUF from the output O at enrollment, dist (O, O') ≦ t: rep (O', P) ═ R;
step three: device
Figure FDA0002827760170000028
One challenge d ═ H (c | | pwd) is calculated,<Gq>,g0) Run Gen at this value to obtain the response r, P, then
Figure FDA0002827760170000029
Sending to the user (g)0 r,P)；
Step four: the user will (g)0 rP) forwarding to a server
Figure FDA00028277601700000210
Server
Figure FDA00028277601700000211
The information c, g0，
Figure FDA00028277601700000212
Stored together;
and (3) an authentication stage:
the method comprises the following steps: server
Figure FDA00028277601700000213
To the user
Figure FDA00028277601700000214
The challenge c is sent out and,
Figure FDA00028277601700000215
g0p and a random number N;
step two:
Figure FDA00028277601700000216
mixing (H (c | | pwd),
Figure FDA00028277601700000217
g0p, N) to the access device
Figure FDA00028277601700000218
The Rep protocol is carried out;
step three: access device
Figure FDA00028277601700000219
Computational challenge d ═ H (c | | pwd), g0P) then runs Rep on this value to obtain the response r,
Figure FDA00028277601700000220
random selection
Figure FDA00028277601700000221
And calculate out
Figure FDA00028277601700000222
And
Figure FDA00028277601700000223
and w ═ v-C' r mod q,
Figure FDA00028277601700000224
temporarily storing the values of C', w, and, in addition,
Figure FDA00028277601700000225
generating random numbers
Figure FDA00028277601700000226
And are provided with
Figure FDA00028277601700000227
And g1、p1For parameter calculation
Figure FDA00028277601700000228
Then the
Figure FDA00028277601700000229
Will be provided with
Figure FDA00028277601700000230
As inquiry information to the accessed device
Figure FDA00028277601700000231
Step four: device
Figure FDA00028277601700000232
Preliminary authentication access device
Figure FDA00028277601700000233
Receive from
Figure FDA00028277601700000234
After the query message has been transmitted,
Figure FDA00028277601700000235
first in the access control list
Figure FDA00028277601700000236
In retrieving whether an identifier exists
Figure FDA00028277601700000237
To perform preliminary authentication
Figure FDA00028277601700000238
If it is not
Figure FDA00028277601700000239
Absence, proof of
Figure FDA00028277601700000240
If it is not a legitimate device in the initialization phase, the authentication process stops, and if it is not a legitimate device in the initialization phase
Figure FDA00028277601700000241
Presence, apparatus
Figure FDA00028277601700000242
To pair
Figure FDA00028277601700000243
The rounding operation is carried out to obtain D,
Figure FDA00028277601700000244
then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure FDA00028277601700000245
finding Auth in memoryijDivide it into Authl||AuthrWherein the high order is AuthlWhat remains is AuthrIn view of underflow, dummy bits are padded with zeros at the time of partitioning,
Figure FDA0002827760170000031
computing
Figure FDA0002827760170000032
And
Figure FDA0002827760170000033
and will be
Figure FDA0002827760170000034
Is sent as a response to
Figure FDA0002827760170000035
Wherein f ispseudo(. is a pseudorandom function, AuthijIs about
Figure FDA0002827760170000036
And
Figure FDA0002827760170000037
setting a specific input c0，
Figure FDA0002827760170000038
AuthijStored in a device
Figure FDA0002827760170000039
Each device only stores authentication information related to the device;
step five: access device
Figure FDA00028277601700000310
Preliminary authentication device
Figure FDA00028277601700000311
When receiving
Figure FDA00028277601700000312
After the information has been transmitted, the user may,
Figure FDA00028277601700000313
first in the access control list
Figure FDA00028277601700000314
In retrieving whether an identifier exists
Figure FDA00028277601700000315
To perform preliminary authentication
Figure FDA00028277601700000316
If it is not
Figure FDA00028277601700000317
If not, the authentication process is stopped, otherwise, the access device performs preliminary authentication
Figure FDA00028277601700000318
Then will be
Figure FDA00028277601700000319
And C' and w stored in the step three are sent to the user together
Figure FDA00028277601700000320
The user sends these values to the servers
Figure FDA00028277601700000321
Wherein, in the fourth step and the fifth step,
Figure FDA00028277601700000322
respectively, are legitimate access devices
Figure FDA00028277601700000323
And apparatus
Figure FDA00028277601700000324
Are determined by their own PUFs, are the result of processing of the response of the respective PUF to a particular input, and are present in respective access control lists, such as access devices
Figure FDA00028277601700000325
Access control list of
Figure FDA00028277601700000326
Therein are provided with a plurality of devices
Figure FDA00028277601700000327
An identifier of (a); in the same way, the method for preparing the composite material,
Figure FDA00028277601700000328
present in equipment
Figure FDA00028277601700000329
The identifier of each access device is contained;
step six: server
Figure FDA00028277601700000330
First of all, calculate
Figure FDA00028277601700000331
And if C ═ C', accepting user authentication while granting access to the device
Figure FDA00028277601700000332
If the equipment is legal, otherwise, the authentication is stopped;
at the same time, the server also needs to correct the received
Figure FDA00028277601700000333
The information is processed and the information is processed,
Figure FDA00028277601700000334
computing
Figure FDA00028277601700000335
Auth for retrieving authentication informationijAnd split it into Authl||AuthrContinue to calculate
Figure FDA00028277601700000336
And
Figure FDA00028277601700000337
by making a judgment
Figure FDA00028277601700000338
And
Figure FDA00028277601700000339
whether or not to equal to confirm the devices
Figure FDA00028277601700000340
Is valid if
Figure FDA00028277601700000341
Then the equipment
Figure FDA00028277601700000342
Is legally given access to the device
Figure FDA00028277601700000343
The final authentication of (1);
reaching step six, the user is verified to be a legal user, and the device is accessed
Figure FDA00028277601700000344
Is a legal original equipment, and
Figure FDA00028277601700000345
is legally given access to the device
Figure FDA00028277601700000346
The final authentication of (1).
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