CN108737100B - 基于标识的证书认证体制fxb - Google Patents
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
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Abstract
本发明基于标识的证书认证体制FXB,属于信息安全技术领域,涉及密钥认证体制。随着网络规模的急剧扩张,证书认证越来越难以满足高速度、低消耗的需求。标识认证也存在着不能保护用户个人隐私的缺点。鉴于上述两种认证体制的不足,我们发明了基于标识的证书认证体制FXB。基于标识的证书认证体制FXB理论上是可证明安全的、应用中是满足统计零知识交互的、可满足自认证,其扩展证书可以防止重放攻击。
Description
技术领域
本发明属于信息安全技术领域,涉及密钥认证体制。
背景技术
当前的正在应用的认证体制主要有PKI、IBC认证体制。PKI是证书认证体制,IBC是标识认证体制。
证书认证中,用户的工作公钥PK与用户标识ID无关。要把用户标识ID与工作公钥PK绑定,需由可信第三方(如认证中心CA)签名的证书给予证明。可信第三方签名的证书的申请、签发、验证、废止、更新等环节需要多层次的认证中心和巨大的计算资源的支持。随着网络规模的急剧扩张,证书认证越来越难以满足高速度、低消耗的需求。
标识认证中,用户标识ID和工作公钥PK是一体化的。用户标识ID自身或它的函数就是工作公钥PK。密钥管理中心KMC掌控的系统主密钥MSK。KMC以标识ID和主密钥MSK为函数的自变量,计算出用户的私钥SK。因此,用户对私钥没有完全的私有权。而在开放的网络中,用户对私钥的私有权有强烈的需求,这是现有标识认证难以满足的。
鉴于上述两种认证体制的不足,我们发明了基于标识的证书认证体制FXB。
发明内容
本发明目的是给出一种新的基于标识的证书认证体制FXB。本发明的目的是提供一种安全度高、认证速度快、计算资源消耗低、能保护用户私密的认证体制。本体制混合使用证书认证和标识认证体制,其基础密钥对,由标识密钥对和随机密钥对组成,以用户的标识密钥对为证书签名和验证密钥对,为用户自主生成的随机密钥对提供证书的签名与验证,形成了一种具有自认证功能的证书认证体制,整个验证过程无需可信第三方的介入。
设安全椭圆曲线为E,其周期为素数P,基点为G。密钥管理中心KMC的主密钥为r,其对应的公钥为r·G=P,并发布。
基于标识的证书认证体制FXB包括步骤:
(1)用户生成自己真实的标识ID;
(2)用户生成一组随机的公钥私钥密钥对(RAPK,RASK),其中
(3)用户利用安全椭圆曲线E签名算法SIGN,对ID进行签名,即计算
sign1=SIGNRASK(ID||RAPK);
并将IDu=ID||RAPK||sign1提交给密钥管理中心KMC;
(4)KMC审查用户提交的IDu,并验证sign1,且确保ID的真实性和唯一性;
(5)将ID||RAPK输入Hash函数H,得h=H(ID||RAPK);
(6)计算r+h为该用户的FXB证书签名私钥,生成标识私钥IDSK;
(7)用户FXB证书的签名公钥为(r+h)·G=P+h·G;
(8)以IDSK为密钥,对ID||RAPK||IKMC||T进行签名,计算
sign2=SIGNIDSK(ID||RAPK||IKMC||T),
其中,IKMC为密钥管理中心的信息,T为发证时间;
(9)将该用户的FXB证书ID||RAPK||sign1||IKMC||T||sign2颁发给用户;
(10)用户在使用FXB证书时,使用RASK,对ID||RAPK||IKMC||T||TS进行签名,得sign3,其中TS为时间戳,生成扩展证书ID||RAPK||sign1||IKMC||T||sign2||TS||sign3;
(11)公众方利用RAPK验证sign1;
(12)公众方将ID||RAPK输入H,得h;
(13)根据h,生成标识公钥IDPK=P+h·G;
(14)以IDPK作为验证算法的公钥,验证sign2;
(15)以RAPK验证sign3。
基于标识的证书认证体制FXB安全性分析:
命题1 基于标识的证书认证体制FXB理论上是可证明安全的。
命题2 FXB证书在应用中是满足统计零知识交互的。
命题3 基于标识的证书认证体制FXB可满足自认证,即验证方在验证FXB证书时,可以自主生成该用户的标识公钥IDPK=P+h·G。
命题4 FXB扩展证书可以保证证书在应用中的新鲜性,从而可以防止重放攻击。
Claims (1)
1.一种基于标识的证书认证方法,其特征在于包括:
基于标识的证书认证体制FXB包括步骤:
(1)用户生成自己真实的标识ID;
(2)用户生成一组随机的公钥私钥密钥对(RAPK,RASK),其中
(3)用户利用安全椭圆曲线E签名算法SIGN,对ID及RAPK进行签名,
即计算sign1=SIGNRASK(ID||RAPK);
并将IDu=ID||RAPK||sign1提交给密钥管理中心KMC;
(4)KMC审查用户提交的IDu,并验证sign1,且确保ID的真实性和唯一性;
(5)将ID||RAPK输入Hash函数H,得h=H(ID||RAPK);
(6)选择随机数r,计算r+h为该用户的FXB证书签名私钥,生成标识私钥IDSK;
(7)用户FXB证书的签名公钥为(r+h)·G=P+h·G;
(8)以IDSK为密钥,对ID||RAPK||IKMC||T进行签名,计算
sign2=SIGNIDSK(ID||RAPK||IKMC||T),
其中,IKMC为密钥管理中心的信息,T为发证时间;
(9)将该用户的FXB证书ID||RAPK||sign1||IKMC||T||sign2颁发给用户;
(10)用户在使用FXB证书时,使用RASK,对ID||RAPK||IKMC||T||TS进行签名,得sign3,其中TS为时间戳,生成扩展证书ID||RAPK||sign1||IKMC||T||sign2||TS||sign3;
(11)公众方利用RAPK验证sign1;
(12)公众方将ID||RAPK输入Hash函数H,得h;
(13)根据h,生成标识公钥IDPK=P+h·G;
(14)以IDPK作为验证算法的公钥,验证sign2;
(15)以RAPK验证sign3。
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CN102891856A (zh) * | 2012-10-18 | 2013-01-23 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | 一种多元实体与多元实体身份依赖方之间的安全访问方法 |
CN102957536A (zh) * | 2011-08-29 | 2013-03-06 | 陈华平 | 基于标识的证书认证体制cfl |
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US8707031B2 (en) * | 2009-04-07 | 2014-04-22 | Secureauth Corporation | Identity-based certificate management |
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CN101420300A (zh) * | 2008-05-28 | 2009-04-29 | 北京易恒信认证科技有限公司 | 双因子组合公钥生成和认证方法 |
CN102215111A (zh) * | 2011-07-06 | 2011-10-12 | 北京中兴通数码科技有限公司 | 一种结合标识密码体制和传统公钥密码体制的方法 |
CN102957536A (zh) * | 2011-08-29 | 2013-03-06 | 陈华平 | 基于标识的证书认证体制cfl |
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