CN108650214B - Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device - Google Patents

Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN108650214B
CN108650214B CN201810216827.4A CN201810216827A CN108650214B CN 108650214 B CN108650214 B CN 108650214B CN 201810216827 A CN201810216827 A CN 201810216827A CN 108650214 B CN108650214 B CN 108650214B
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
data
transaction
page
user
domain
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
CN201810216827.4A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN108650214A (en
Inventor
戴凯宇
谢家凯
郑小强
司媛媛
薛志文
梁建威
王涵
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Bank of Communications Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Bank of Communications Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Bank of Communications Co Ltd filed Critical Bank of Communications Co Ltd
Priority to CN201810216827.4A priority Critical patent/CN108650214B/en
Publication of CN108650214A publication Critical patent/CN108650214A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN108650214B publication Critical patent/CN108650214B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0457—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply dynamic encryption, e.g. stream encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/067—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using one-time keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/14—Session management

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a method and a device for preventing dynamic page encryption from being unauthorized, wherein the method comprises the following steps: when a user opens a page for the first time, an encryption key is generated and stored in a session; encrypting the data returned to the page by using the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data; returning the data of the unencrypted returned page and the encrypted domain data to the page; receiving a transaction request submitted by a user, wherein the transaction request carries encrypted domain data and plaintext transaction data; decrypting the encrypted domain data with the key stored in the session; and controlling the transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain. The invention can solve the problem of form tampering and unauthorized access of a transaction system using a dynamic page technology, such as electronic banking, electronic commerce and the like, and ensure that data returned to a page by the system is not tampered when being submitted again, thereby preventing unauthorized attack, occupying no more memory expenditure and not influencing the system performance.

Description

Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of data security, in particular to a dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and a dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized device.
Background
Banks, e-commerce companies typically use dynamic page technology to create transaction websites, such as e-banking, e-commerce shopping websites, and the like. The method comprises the steps that transaction information is submitted on a website page through a form, and a website background receives the information submitted by a user and then inquires user information or other information in a database according to the input of the user to generate a related page.
Fig. 1 is a diagram illustrating a transaction flow of a dynamic page transaction website in the prior art, and as shown in fig. 1, the transaction flow of a dynamic page generally includes: 11. a user inputs information on a page; 12. the system queries data according to user input; 13. displaying the query data on the page in a reverse mode; 14. and the user operates the related data to carry out transaction.
Fig. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a transaction flow for inquiring an electronic bank account in the prior art, and as shown in fig. 2, the transaction flow for inquiring an electronic bank account generally includes: 21. a user inputs a user name and a password for logging in; 22. the system checks the card number held by the user after verifying the identity; 23. reversely displaying the card number on the page; 24. the user selects the card number to submit the inquiry transaction; 25. and displaying the account query result on the page.
Fig. 3 is an exemplary diagram of a transfer transaction process of an electronic bank in the prior art, and as shown in fig. 3, the transfer transaction process of the electronic bank generally includes: 31. a user inputs a user name and a password for logging in; 32. after the system verifies the identity, the system inquires the card number held by the user and displays the card number on a page; 33. a user selects a card number and inputs information such as an account number, amount and the like of the other party; 34. the information of the own account, the account of the opposite party, the amount and the like is displayed on the page; 35. the user authenticates and confirms the transaction; 36. and submitting a transfer request, and transferring by the system.
An attacker can attack websites such as electronic banks and electronic commerce, and tamper data retrieved from a background or data input in a previous step on a page when a form is submitted, so that the unauthorized use is realized.
Fig. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of an attack flow of an attacker tampering with a form in the prior art, and as shown in fig. 4, the attack flow generally includes: 41. a user inputs information on a page; 42. the system queries data according to user input; 43. displaying the query data on the page in a reverse mode; 44. and the attacker tampers with the data retrieved from the background or the data input in the previous step for submission.
Fig. 5 is an exemplary diagram illustrating a process of attacking an electronic banking account inquiry transaction by a falsified form in the prior art, and as shown in fig. 5, the process of attacking an electronic banking account inquiry transaction generally includes: 51. a user inputs a user name and a password for logging in; 52. the system checks the card number held by the user after verifying the identity; 53. reversely displaying the card number on the page; 54. the attacker tampers the card number in the form and submits the card number; 55. and displaying the query result of the account submitted by the attacker on the page.
Fig. 6 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary flow of attacking an electronic bank transfer transaction by tampering a form in the prior art, and as shown in fig. 6, the flow of attacking the electronic bank transfer transaction generally includes: 61. a user inputs a user name and a password for logging in; 62. after the system verifies the identity, the system inquires the card number held by the user and displays the card number on a page; 63. a user selects a card number and inputs information such as an account number, amount and the like of the other party; 64. the information of the own account, the account of the opposite party, the amount and the like is displayed on the page; 65. the user authenticates and confirms the transaction; 66. and (4) the attacker tampers the account number, the amount and other data in the form and submits a transfer request, and the system transfers money.
Almost all inquiry and dynamic account type transactions of electronic banks and e-commerce transaction websites can be attacked by unauthorized use of the method, so that an attacker can inquire user information, held product information and transaction information of a non-self and use an account or a product of the non-self to carry out transactions.
Generally, an electronic bank controls the transaction authority by comparing background data, namely, data input by a user in the previous step and data retrieved from the background are stored in the transaction process, and the comparison and verification authority is performed when the transaction is submitted in the last step; or initiating the query again in the last transaction step, and comparing the data submitted by the user. Because the data of the form related to transaction and capable of being tampered is too much, the protection mode is almost impossible to prevent, and the transaction information of the last step of each user is stored in the memory of the server, so that the storage space of the system is occupied, and the performance of the system is influenced.
Disclosure of Invention
The embodiment of the invention provides a dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method, which is used for improving the transaction safety protection effect under the condition of not influencing the performance of a server and comprises the following steps:
when a user opens a page for the first time, an encryption key is generated and stored in a session;
encrypting the data returned to the page by using the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
returning the data of the unencrypted returned page and the encrypted domain data to the page;
receiving a transaction request submitted by a user, wherein the transaction request carries encrypted domain data and plaintext transaction data;
decrypting the encrypted domain data with the key stored in the session;
controlling the transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain;
and transmitting the secret domain data back to the page, comprising: putting the encrypted domain data in the hidden field and transmitting the encrypted domain data back to the page;
the controlling transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain comprises the following steps:
checking the plaintext transaction data by using the data in the encryption domain, checking the consistency of a field in the plaintext transaction data and a field in the encryption domain if the field submitted by a user in the plaintext transaction data exists in the encryption domain, and stopping the transaction if the field is inconsistent;
the data of the return page is a group of enumeration values;
the encrypting the data of the returned page by the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data comprises: taking the set of enumeration values as a list, and encrypting and storing the list by using an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the plaintext transaction data comprises an enumerated value selected by a user in the set of enumerated values;
the checking of the consistency of the field in the plaintext transaction data with the field in the encrypted domain comprises: and checking whether the enumeration value selected by the user in the plaintext transaction data is in an enumeration value list of an encryption domain, and if not, stopping the transaction.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized device, which is used for improving the transaction safety protection effect under the condition of not influencing the performance of a server, and comprises the following components:
the key generation module is used for generating an encryption key and storing the encryption key in a session when a user opens a page for the first time;
the encrypted domain generating module is used for encrypting the data returned to the page by using the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the data returning module is used for returning the data of the unencrypted returned page and the encrypted domain data to the page;
the transaction receiving module is used for receiving a transaction request submitted by a user, wherein the transaction request carries encrypted domain data and plaintext transaction data;
the encrypted domain decryption module is used for decrypting the encrypted domain data by using the secret key stored in the session;
the transaction control module is used for controlling transaction according to the decrypted data in the encryption domain;
the data returning module is specifically configured to: putting the encrypted domain data in the hidden field and transmitting the encrypted domain data back to the page;
the transaction control module is specifically used for:
checking the plaintext transaction data by using the data in the encryption domain, checking the consistency of a field in the plaintext transaction data and a field in the encryption domain if the field submitted by a user in the plaintext transaction data exists in the encryption domain, and stopping the transaction if the field is inconsistent;
the data of the return page is a group of enumeration values;
an encrypted domain generating module, specifically configured to:
taking the set of enumeration values as a list, and encrypting and storing the list by using an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the plaintext transaction data comprises an enumerated value selected by a user in the set of enumerated values;
the transaction control module is specifically used for:
and checking whether the enumeration value selected by the user in the plaintext transaction data is in an enumeration value list of an encryption domain, and if not, stopping the transaction.
The embodiment of the invention also provides computer equipment which comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program which is stored on the memory and can run on the processor, wherein the processor realizes the dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method when executing the computer program.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a computer readable storage medium, and the computer readable storage medium stores a computer program for executing the dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method.
The embodiment of the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the embodiment of the invention can ensure that the data retrieved from the background by the dynamic website system is not submitted by an attacker after the attacker tampers the data at the user side so as to realize unauthorized attack.
2. The embodiment of the invention can utilize the data stored in the encryption domain to control the transaction flow and prevent the step-by-step transaction attack.
3. The embodiment of the invention only needs to store one symmetric key for each session at the server end, and the server does not need to store data additionally. Since the key exists only at the server side and is regenerated every time a session is generated, an attacker cannot deduce the plaintext from the ciphertext at the user side.
4. The embodiment of the invention does not influence the normal transaction flow and has little workload for reinforcing the prior system.
5. In the embodiment of the invention, because the encrypted domain data is transmitted to the user side and submitted again, the security check depends on the encrypted domain data submitted by the user, and even if the user operates a plurality of transactions simultaneously, the security protection can be realized for each transaction.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary transaction flow of a dynamic page transaction website in the prior art;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a transaction flow of an electronic bank account inquiry in the prior art;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary process of an electronic bank transfer transaction in the prior art;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of an attack flow of an attacker tampering with a form in the prior art;
FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an example of a transaction flow of an electronic bank account inquiry process under attack of a tampered form in the prior art;
FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an example of a prior art process for attacking electronic bank transfer transactions with a tampered form;
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment of an anti-unauthorized method for encrypting a dynamic page;
FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating an example of an encryption anti-unauthorized scheme according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 9 is a diagram of an apparatus for dynamic page encryption and anti-unauthorized access in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention more apparent, the embodiments of the present invention are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The exemplary embodiments and descriptions of the present invention are provided to explain the present invention, but not to limit the present invention.
Technical terms to which embodiments of the present invention may be related are briefly described below.
Static page: the page code is fixed, and the information on the same page seen by all users is completely consistent.
Dynamic page: in contrast to static pages, page codes are generated with user transactions, different users may see different information on the same page (including user personalized information), and electronic transaction systems such as electronic banks are all dynamic pages.
And (3) unauthorized attack: the method refers to that an attacker tampers with form submission data in an electronic transaction system so as to realize the transaction exceeding the authority of an account. For example, an attacker tampers with the card number in the submission form in the account inquiry transaction to inquire the transaction information of other users.
Step attack: the attacker uses a tool or a script to skip the first few steps of normal transaction and directly initiate the last step so as to bypass the attack mode controlled by identity verification.
Session (session): the user data in the memory is that the user opens the website for the first time, and the website system will open up a data field in the memory to store the user information.
Symmetric encryption: the same key is used for encryption and decryption, and a proper algorithm is selected to ensure that the key is not leaked, so that the plaintext cannot be derived from the ciphertext.
Encryption domain: the system combines the data to be transmitted back to the page and then encrypts the data into a field to be transmitted back to the user side. This encrypted field is the encrypted domain. The embodiment of the invention stores the data input by the user in the previous step and the data retrieved by the background by using the encryption domain, and the data in the encryption domain is used for comparing when the user submits the transaction, thereby preventing the unauthorized attack.
Fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of a dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 7, the method may include:
step 71, when a user opens a page for the first time, generating an encryption key and storing the encryption key in a session;
step 72, encrypting the data of the returned page by using the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
step 73, returning the data of the unencrypted returned page and the encrypted domain data to the page;
step 74, receiving a transaction request submitted by a user, wherein the transaction request carries encrypted domain data and plaintext transaction data;
step 75, decrypting the encrypted domain data with the key saved in the session;
and step 76, controlling the transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain.
It can be known from the flow shown in fig. 7 that the embodiment of the present invention can solve the problem of form tampering and unauthorized access of a transaction system using a dynamic page technology, such as electronic banking and electronic commerce, that is, it is ensured that data returned to a page by the system is not tampered when being re-submitted, so as to prevent unauthorized attack, and background data storage is not added (only one symmetric key needs to be stored for each online user). By applying the scheme of the embodiment of the invention and formulating the corresponding system development specifications and system components, the anti-unauthorized reinforcement can be comprehensively and simply realized for each transaction, the safety inspection of codes is convenient, and omission is not easy to occur.
As mentioned above, in the prior art, the transaction anti-unauthorized access is generally implemented by storing the transaction data of the previous step in the memory and comparing the transaction data of the previous step with the transaction data of the next step. The mode of storing and comparing the data in the memory occupies more memory overhead, is easy to omit protection, and is difficult to deal with the scene that a user operates several transactions simultaneously, because the data of only one transaction can be stored in the memory, otherwise, the data is difficult to manage and clear.
Compared with the existing memory strengthening scheme, the embodiment of the invention basically does not increase the memory overhead, can be carried out in a common component mode, and has simpler development and more comprehensive protection. Because the encrypted domain is transmitted to the user side and submitted again, the security protection can be carried out on a plurality of transactions operated by one user at the same time.
In the embodiment, when a user opens a website page for the first time, an encryption key is randomly generated and stored in a session (session). The data of the returned page is encrypted using this key, resulting in encrypted domain data. The encrypted domain data may be placed in a hidden field back onto the page. While the data is encrypted, the clear text, namely the data returned to the page without encryption, is still returned to the page, so that the normal transaction flow is not influenced. The user submits the transaction while the encrypted field is presented with normal, clear text transaction data. And after the transaction is submitted, decrypting the encrypted domain data by using the key stored in the session, and controlling the transaction according to the decrypted encrypted domain data.
In an embodiment, controlling the transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain may include: and checking the plaintext transaction data by using the data in the encryption domain, checking the consistency of the field in the plaintext transaction data and the field in the encryption domain if the field submitted by the user in the plaintext transaction data exists in the encryption domain, and stopping the transaction if the field is inconsistent. For example, the data in the encryption domain is used for checking the plaintext transaction data, if a field is submitted in the plaintext transaction data and the encryption domain also stores the field, the consistency of the two fields is checked, and if the two fields are not consistent, the transaction is stopped, so that the user end can be prevented from tampering or partially tampering the checked data, and further unauthorized attack behaviors can be prevented.
In an embodiment, when the data of the returned page is a set of enumerated values, encrypting the data of the returned page with an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data may include: taking the set of enumeration values as a list, and encrypting and storing the list by using an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data; the plaintext transaction data includes an enumerated value selected by the user in the set of enumerated values; checking the field in the plaintext transaction data for correspondence with the field in the encrypted domain may include: and checking whether the enumeration value selected by the user in the plaintext transaction data is in the enumeration value list of the encryption domain, and if not, stopping the transaction. For example, for background data returned to a set of enumerated values on a page, a user selects a transaction sent on a certain value on the page, such as a transaction in which the user queries an account list on an electronic bank and then selects one of the account for querying details, all enumerated values are stored in an encryption field as a list, and the name of the enumerated value list is consistent with the name of a field submitted by the transaction. After the transaction is submitted, whether the value submitted by the user side is in the enumeration value list of the field in the encryption domain can be checked according to the field name, if the comparison is successful, the transaction is normally carried out, and if the comparison is failed, the transaction is stopped.
Fig. 8 is an exemplary diagram of an encryption anti-unauthorized scheme in an embodiment of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 7, an implementation process may include: 81. a user opens a website page for the first time; 82. the server creates a session and generates an encryption key; 83. the user logs in and enters the transaction; 84. the server encrypts the data obtained by the background inquiry and the data input by the user in the previous step, and places the data into a hidden field (an encryption domain) of the page; 85. a user inputs, confirms and submits transactions on a page, and submits an encrypted domain field; 86. the server compares whether the data submitted by the user exists in the encrypted domain, if so, compares whether the data and the encrypted domain are consistent, and if not, judges that unauthorized attack occurs and blocks the transaction.
In the embodiment, if the field names of the returned pages of the original system are consistent with the field names submitted again, the system can be reinforced according to the embodiment, all the fields of the returned pages can be encrypted only by developing a common encryption and verification component, verification is carried out when the transaction is submitted, and the specific transaction is not required to be modified. Alternatively, a configuration may be written for each transaction, maintained in a configuration file, containing the fields to be cryptographically verified for that transaction.
In the embodiment, the transaction number and the transaction step number related to the business process are added into the encrypted data field, and the transaction number and the transaction step are checked when the transaction is submitted, so that a user side can be prevented from randomly calling a certain step of the transaction, and the step-by-step attack is prevented. Such as sending an attack to the server directly to complete the transfer for the last step of the transfer.
The security verification process of the embodiment of the invention can also adopt another embodiment, namely, the data submitted in the clear text is ignored, and the transaction is carried out based on the data in the encryption domain. For the enumeration value list, a user can select a plaintext to submit an enumeration value serial number on a page, and then the enumeration value is taken out from the encryption domain according to the serial number to obtain data selected by the user. That is, when the data returned to the page is a set of enumerated values, the plaintext transaction data includes the serial number of the enumerated value selected by the user in the set of enumerated values; controlling the transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain may include: according to the serial number of the enumerated value in the plaintext transaction data, taking out the corresponding enumerated value from the enumerated value list of the encryption domain to obtain the enumerated value selected by the user; the transaction is executed according to the enumerated value selected by the user.
The following provides a specific example of the dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method in the embodiment of the invention.
Example one, securing an Account query transaction for an electronic Bank
In this example, when the user enters the electronic bank, the encryption key is generated and stored in the session, and when the account inquiry transaction is made, the system displays the account list back to the page, at this time, an encryption domain is generated, and the encryption domain contains the account information of the user and transmits the account information to the page. When a user submits a query transaction, the plaintext account number field and the encryption domain are simultaneously uploaded, the system compares whether the plaintext account number exists in an account number list of the encryption domain, if so, the transaction is normally completed, and if not, the transaction is terminated.
Example two, protection of electronic Bank transfer transactions
In this example, when the user enters the electronic bank, the encryption key is generated and stored in the session, and when the account is inquired, the system displays the account list back to the page, at this time, an encryption domain is generated, and the encryption domain contains the account information of the user and transmits the account information to the page. The user selects the own account on the page and enters the account and amount of the other party, and then submits the transaction and encrypted fields. The system compares whether the own account in the clear text exists in the account list of the encrypted domain, if so, the system continues, and if not, the system terminates the transaction. And under the continuous condition, the system encrypts the own account number, the amount, the opposite account number and the next transaction step, stores the encrypted information in an encryption domain, displays the information on the page in a reflecting mode, transmits the encryption domain to a hidden field of the page, confirms the transaction by the user, inputs a transaction password and authentication, submits the transaction again, compares whether the submitted own account number, the amount and the opposite account number are consistent with the data stored in the encryption domain, checks whether the transaction step in the encryption domain is a transfer result step, terminates the transaction if the transaction steps are inconsistent, and completes the transfer if the transaction steps are consistent.
The embodiment of the invention can protect the data retrieved from the background by the dynamic website system from being submitted by an attacker after the attacker tampers the data at the user side, so as to realize the unauthorized attack. In the embodiment, the transaction number and the transaction step stored in the encryption domain, particularly the information of the next transaction step and the like can be utilized, and the system can judge the transaction flow and prevent the step-by-step transaction attack. When the method is implemented, only one symmetric key needs to be stored for each session at the server side, and the server does not need to store data additionally. Since the key exists only at the server side and is regenerated every time a session is generated, an attacker cannot deduce the plaintext from the ciphertext at the user side. The embodiment of the invention can be developed in a public security component mode, does not influence the normal transaction flow, and has small workload for reinforcing the existing system. Since the encrypted domain is transmitted to the user side and submitted again, the security check only depends on the encrypted domain submitted by the user and the security configuration of the transaction, and even if the user operates a plurality of transactions simultaneously, the security protection can be realized for each transaction.
Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present invention further provides an anti-unauthorized device for dynamic page encryption, as described in the following embodiments. Because the principle of the device for solving the problems is similar to that of the dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method, the implementation of the device can refer to the implementation of the dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method, and repeated parts are not described again.
Fig. 9 is a schematic diagram of a dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized device according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 9, the device may include:
the key generation module 91 is configured to generate an encryption key and store the encryption key in a session when a user opens a page for the first time;
an encrypted domain generating module 92, configured to encrypt data of the returned page with an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the data returning module 93 is used for returning the data of the unencrypted returned page and the encrypted domain data to the page;
a transaction receiving module 94, configured to receive a transaction request submitted by a user, where the transaction request carries encrypted domain data and plaintext transaction data;
an encrypted domain decryption module 95 for decrypting the encrypted domain data with the key saved in the session;
a transaction control module 96 for controlling the transaction based on the decrypted data in the encrypted domain.
In one embodiment, the data backhaul module 93 may be further configured to: the encrypted domain data is placed in the hidden field back onto the page.
In one embodiment, the transaction control module 96 may be further configured to:
and checking the plaintext transaction data by using the data in the encryption domain, checking the consistency of the field in the plaintext transaction data and the field in the encryption domain if the field submitted by the user in the plaintext transaction data exists in the encryption domain, and stopping the transaction if the field is inconsistent.
In one embodiment, the data of the return page may be a set of enumerated values;
the encrypted domain generating module 92 may be further configured to: taking the set of enumeration values as a list, and encrypting and storing the list by using an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the plaintext transaction data may include an enumerated value selected by a user in the set of enumerated values;
the transaction control module 96 may be further operable to: and checking whether the enumeration value selected by the user in the plaintext transaction data is in an enumeration value list of an encryption domain, and if not, stopping the transaction.
In one embodiment, the data of the return page may be a set of enumerated values;
the plaintext transaction data may include a sequence number of an enumerated value selected by a user in the set of enumerated values;
the transaction control module 96 may be further operable to:
according to the serial number of the enumerated value in the plaintext transaction data, taking out the corresponding enumerated value from the enumerated value list of the encryption domain to obtain the enumerated value selected by the user; the transaction is executed according to the enumerated value selected by the user.
The embodiment of the invention also provides computer equipment which comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program which is stored on the memory and can run on the processor, wherein the processor realizes the dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method when executing the computer program.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a computer readable storage medium, and the computer readable storage medium stores a computer program for executing the dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method.
In summary, the embodiments of the present invention can ensure that the data retrieved from the background by the dynamic website system is not submitted by an attacker after the attacker tampers with the data at the user side, so as to implement the unauthorized attack. The embodiment of the invention can utilize the data stored in the encryption domain to control the transaction flow and prevent the step-by-step transaction attack. The embodiment of the invention only needs to store one symmetric key for each session at the server end, and the server does not need to store data additionally. Since the key exists only at the server side and is regenerated every time a session is generated, an attacker cannot deduce the plaintext from the ciphertext at the user side. The embodiment of the invention does not influence the normal transaction flow and has little workload for reinforcing the prior system. In the embodiment of the invention, because the encrypted domain data is transmitted to the user side and submitted again, the security check depends on the encrypted domain data submitted by the user, and even if the user operates a plurality of transactions simultaneously, the security protection can be realized for each transaction.
As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The above-mentioned embodiments are intended to illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention in further detail, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are only exemplary embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. A dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
when a user opens a page for the first time, an encryption key is generated and stored in a session;
encrypting the data returned to the page by using the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
returning the data of the unencrypted returned page and the encrypted domain data to the page;
receiving a transaction request submitted by a user, wherein the transaction request carries encrypted domain data and plaintext transaction data;
decrypting the encrypted domain data with the key stored in the session;
controlling the transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain;
and transmitting the secret domain data back to the page, comprising: putting the encrypted domain data in the hidden field and transmitting the encrypted domain data back to the page;
the controlling transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain comprises the following steps:
checking the plaintext transaction data by using the data in the encryption domain, checking the consistency of a field in the plaintext transaction data and a field in the encryption domain if the field submitted by a user in the plaintext transaction data exists in the encryption domain, and stopping the transaction if the field is inconsistent;
the data of the return page is a group of enumeration values;
the encrypting the data of the returned page by the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data comprises: taking the set of enumeration values as a list, and encrypting and storing the list by using an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the plaintext transaction data comprises an enumerated value selected by a user in the set of enumerated values;
the checking of the consistency of the field in the plaintext transaction data with the field in the encrypted domain comprises: and checking whether the enumeration value selected by the user in the plaintext transaction data is in an enumeration value list of an encryption domain, and if not, stopping the transaction.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the data of the return page is a set of enumerated values;
the plaintext transaction data comprises serial numbers of enumerated values selected by the user from the set of enumerated values;
the controlling transaction according to the decrypted data in the encrypted domain comprises the following steps:
according to the serial number of the enumerated value in the plaintext transaction data, taking out the corresponding enumerated value from the enumerated value list of the encryption domain to obtain the enumerated value selected by the user; the transaction is executed according to the enumerated value selected by the user.
3. A dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized device, comprising:
the key generation module is used for generating an encryption key and storing the encryption key in a session when a user opens a page for the first time;
the encrypted domain generating module is used for encrypting the data returned to the page by using the encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the data returning module is used for returning the data of the unencrypted returned page and the encrypted domain data to the page;
the transaction receiving module is used for receiving a transaction request submitted by a user, wherein the transaction request carries encrypted domain data and plaintext transaction data;
the encrypted domain decryption module is used for decrypting the encrypted domain data by using the secret key stored in the session;
the transaction control module is used for controlling transaction according to the decrypted data in the encryption domain;
the data returning module is specifically configured to: putting the encrypted domain data in the hidden field and transmitting the encrypted domain data back to the page;
the transaction control module is specifically used for:
checking the plaintext transaction data by using the data in the encryption domain, checking the consistency of a field in the plaintext transaction data and a field in the encryption domain if the field submitted by a user in the plaintext transaction data exists in the encryption domain, and stopping the transaction if the field is inconsistent;
the data of the return page is a group of enumeration values;
an encrypted domain generating module, specifically configured to:
taking the set of enumeration values as a list, and encrypting and storing the list by using an encryption key to generate encrypted domain data;
the plaintext transaction data comprises an enumerated value selected by a user in the set of enumerated values;
the transaction control module is specifically used for:
and checking whether the enumeration value selected by the user in the plaintext transaction data is in an enumeration value list of an encryption domain, and if not, stopping the transaction.
4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the data of the return page is a set of enumerated values;
the plaintext transaction data comprises serial numbers of enumerated values selected by the user from the set of enumerated values;
the transaction control module is further to:
according to the serial number of the enumerated value in the plaintext transaction data, taking out the corresponding enumerated value from the enumerated value list of the encryption domain to obtain the enumerated value selected by the user; the transaction is executed according to the enumerated value selected by the user.
5. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the method of any of claims 1 to 2 when executing the computer program.
6. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program for executing the method of any one of claims 1 to 2.
CN201810216827.4A 2018-03-16 2018-03-16 Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device Active CN108650214B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201810216827.4A CN108650214B (en) 2018-03-16 2018-03-16 Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201810216827.4A CN108650214B (en) 2018-03-16 2018-03-16 Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN108650214A CN108650214A (en) 2018-10-12
CN108650214B true CN108650214B (en) 2021-09-17

Family

ID=63744236

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN201810216827.4A Active CN108650214B (en) 2018-03-16 2018-03-16 Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN108650214B (en)

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN109600377B (en) * 2018-12-13 2022-11-22 平安科技（深圳）有限公司 Method and device for preventing unauthorized use computer device and storage medium
CN111709803B (en) * 2020-06-12 2023-09-05 北京思特奇信息技术股份有限公司 Method and system for preventing unauthorized business handling
CN113395269B (en) * 2021-06-04 2023-02-17 上海浦东发展银行股份有限公司 Data interaction method and device

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101067358A (en) * 2007-03-20 2007-11-07 姜君凯 Trick lock mechanism
CN101770619A (en) * 2008-12-31 2010-07-07 中国银联股份有限公司 Multiple-factor authentication method for online payment and authentication system
CN105591746A (en) * 2014-12-11 2016-05-18 中国银联股份有限公司 Processing method and processing system for binding acceptance terminal online
CN105989482A (en) * 2015-02-04 2016-10-05 成都天地网信息科技有限公司 Data encryption method

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8041646B2 (en) * 2005-06-15 2011-10-18 E. E. System Corporation Method and system for real time online debit transactions
US8769304B2 (en) * 2011-06-16 2014-07-01 OneID Inc. Method and system for fully encrypted repository

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101067358A (en) * 2007-03-20 2007-11-07 姜君凯 Trick lock mechanism
CN101770619A (en) * 2008-12-31 2010-07-07 中国银联股份有限公司 Multiple-factor authentication method for online payment and authentication system
CN105591746A (en) * 2014-12-11 2016-05-18 中国银联股份有限公司 Processing method and processing system for binding acceptance terminal online
CN105989482A (en) * 2015-02-04 2016-10-05 成都天地网信息科技有限公司 Data encryption method

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN108650214A (en) 2018-10-12

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN100487715C (en) Date safety storing system, device and method
US7526649B2 (en) Session key exchange
CN110036613A (en) The system and method for authentication for decentralization application are provided
CN106936588B (en) Hosting method, device and system of hardware control lock
US20130042111A1 (en) Securing transactions against cyberattacks
US20040044739A1 (en) System and methods for processing PIN-authenticated transactions
US20080216172A1 (en) Systems, methods, and apparatus for secure transactions in trusted systems
CN103051451A (en) Encryption authentication of security service execution environment
CN111460525B (en) Block chain-based data processing method, device and storage medium
US9235702B2 (en) Personal identification number security enhancement
KR20140099325A (en) System and method for key management for issuer security domain using global platform specifications
KR20030057565A (en) Anti-spoofing password protection
CA2071771A1 (en) Cryptographic facility environment backup/restore and replication in a public key cryptosystem
CN111160908B (en) Supply chain transaction privacy protection system, method and related equipment based on blockchain
US11711213B2 (en) Master key escrow process
CN108650214B (en) Dynamic page encryption anti-unauthorized method and device
CN108496323B (en) Certificate importing method and terminal
CN111210287A (en) Tax UKey-based invoicing method and system
CN113015991A (en) Secure digital wallet processing system
CN101924734A (en) Identity authentication method and authentication device based on Web form
CN200993803Y (en) Internet banking system safety terminal
CN107835075A (en) The processing method and processing device of local password
CN110992034A (en) Supply chain transaction privacy protection system and method based on block chain and related equipment
US20040105547A1 (en) Software protection
CN117063174A (en) Security module and method for inter-app trust through app-based identity

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant