CN108632030A - A kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE - Google Patents

A kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE Download PDF

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CN108632030A
CN108632030A CN201810241576.5A CN201810241576A CN108632030A CN 108632030 A CN108632030 A CN 108632030A CN 201810241576 A CN201810241576 A CN 201810241576A CN 108632030 A CN108632030 A CN 108632030A
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user
ciphertext
algorithm
private key
data
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CN108632030B (en
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李凯
孙伟
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Guangdong Wuyi Information Technology Co ltd
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Sun Yat Sen University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/06—Protocols specially adapted for file transfer, e.g. file transfer protocol [FTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of fine-grained access control methods efficient and safe based on CP ABE; it is related to data safety storage and fine-granularity access control under cloud environment; it is characterized in that reducing local computing and communication resource consumption using Outsourcing Strategy; support the access structure update under ciphertext state and user property revocation; and in scheme calculating process; data are made to be constantly in blinding state for server; while using server computing resource; protect data safety; explicit data sovereignty, prevent the hiding operation of server.

Description

A kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE
Technical field
The present invention relates to data access control field under cloud environment, more particularly, to one kind based on CP-ABE efficiently and The fine-grained access control method of safety.
Background technology
Currently, data become personal and enterprise most valuable assets, and data assets and its managerial ability will determine to look forward to The victory or defeat of industry competition, becomes the key of personal development.However, under big data and cloud computing environment, when personal data are long-range When storage, the data of storage will be used where, by whom using not being but that user can determine again, data owner's funeral The absolute control to its data especially sensitive data is lost, privacy of user leakage and the data question of sovereign right happen occasionally.
User can determine the whereabouts of its data there is an urgent need to explicit data sovereignty, implement fine granularity access to its data Control strategy.Find that the ciphertext policy ABE base proposed in recent years encryption (CP-ABE) is formulated by data owner by studying The form of access control policy realizes the fine-granularity access control to its data, being capable of preferably explicit data sovereignty, and CP- ABE, which can be realized, to be once all sides encryption rather than is each side's encryption every time, and the use of access control structure attribute collection is only met Family can access data, have the characteristics that rich expressiveness, can implement fine-grained access control to encryption data.
But CP-ABE methods, but there is in operational process, server can steal user data, access control policy Be difficult to update, attribute revocation it is difficult, in local encryption process will consumption it is a large amount of calculate and the communication resource and be difficult to small micro- The problem of equipment, mobile device effectively work.
Invention content
It is an object of the invention to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art and provide a kind of particulates efficient and safe based on CP-ABE Spend access control method.
To solve the above problems, technical solution provided by the invention is：
A kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE, wherein include the following steps：
S1. system initialization and parameter generate, and trusted party TA runs Setup (k) algorithm, to system carry out initialization and Parameter generates, and algorithm is input with security parameter K, generates system public key Pk, master key Mk；
S2. private key generates, and trusted party TA runs KeyGen (Pk, Mk, A) algorithm, according to user property collection, is given birth to for user At private key Sk；
S3. data encryption, trusted party TA run Encrypt (Pk, M, T) algorithm, the access control formulated according to user Tactful T is that data ciphertext M carries out data encryption, generates the ciphertext CT with access control policy；
S4. re-encrypted private key generates, and data owner DO runs ReKeyGen (Pk, T1, Sk) algorithm, is formulated as user When access control policy updates, ciphertext re-encrypted private key Rk is generated for user according to private key for user；
S5. ciphertext re-encryption, decryption service DS runs ReEncrypt (Pk, CT, Rk) algorithm, when the access that user formulates When control strategy updates, ciphertext update is carried out under ciphertext state, generates re-encryption ciphertext CT1；
S6. private key divides, and data requester DR runs DeyDiv (Pk, Sk) algorithm, and private key for user is divided, and generates Ciphertext converts private key Rk and local decruption key Tk；
S7. data deciphering, decryption service DS run Decrypt (Pk, CT, Sk) algorithm, judge whether private key for user meets The access control policy that user formulates when data encryption carries out data deciphering for user, plaintext M is exported if meeting, otherwise defeated Go out for sky；
S8. attribute cancels, and runs AttrRevoke (CT, Sk) algorithm, to update ciphertext and private key for user, belongs to when sending Property revocation when, the user for not being revoked attribute can directly update private key, and the user for being revoked attribute must ask to trusted party TA Seek update private key.
In the present invention, system includes：
Client layer：Including data owner and data requester.The supplier of data owner, that is, data file is uploading When data file, the access control policy of data is defined, and is responsible for safeguarding data；Data requester, that is, data file makes User, server judge whether its private key determines whether it can use data file with decrypted rights.
Computation layer：Including cryptographic services and decryption service, there is larger operational capability.Cryptographic services provide adding for data Close function receives downwards data owner's CIPHERING REQUEST.The decryption function of decrypting service providing data, receives downwards request of data The request of person.
Accumulation layer：It is made of storage service, storage service is provided, there is larger storage capacity, receive encryption clothes downwards Business storage request, and decrypt the access request of service.
Trusted party：Trusted party carries out system initialization and generates the parameter of system.It is two-way with contacting for client layer Contact, provides client layer system common parameter, and private key is generated for user according to the user property collection of client layer；It is with computation layer Vertical linkage, only computation layer provide system common parameter.
In the present invention, initialization algorithm Setup (k) is run by trusted party TA, carries out system initialization and parameter It generates.Algorithm is input, output system master key Mk and public key Pk with security parameter K, which can be that system operation configures Environment and generation security parameter.
Private key generating algorithm KeyGen (Pk, Mk, A) is run by trusted party TA, and attribute private key is generated for user.Input is used Family property set A, output and the relevant attribute private key SK of property set, the algorithm can be that the generation of each validated user is unique private Key.
Encryption Algorithm Encrypt (Pk, M, T) is run by cryptographic services ES, to encrypting plaintext.Input public key Pk, DO system Fixed access structure T and cleartext information M, exports the ciphertext CT with access control policy, which is calculated using server While resource encryption data, data information is kept to keep blinding state for server.
Re-encrypted private key generating algorithm ReKeyGen (Pk, T1, Sk) is run by data owner DO.Public key Pk is inputted, newly Access structure T1 and the current private key of user, key Rk of the algorithm output for ciphertext re-encryption, the algorithm can generate use In the key of ciphertext re-encryption.
Re-encryption algorithm ReEncrypt (Pk, CT, Rk) is by decryption service DS operations.Algorithm is with re-encrypted private key RK, public key PK and original cipher text CT is output, output re-encryption ciphertext CT1.It, can directly will be in access structure T when access structure updates Under encrypted ciphertext be converted to the encrypted ciphertext at access structure T1.
Private key partitioning algorithm KeyDiv (Pk, Sk) is executed by user.Algorithm is input with public key Pk and private key for user Sk, defeated Go out with the relevant ciphertext transition key Rk of private key Sk and local decruption key Tk, private key can be split, ensure server It obtains less than private key for user.
Decipherment algorithm Decrypt (Pk, CT, SK) is by decryption service DS operations, to decrypt ciphertext.Algorithm with public key Pk, Ciphertext CT and private key for user SK is input, if the requirement that private key for user meets ciphertext access control structure is, output is believed in plain text M is ceased, otherwise output is sky, which while using server computing resource, is maintained to count during decryption It is believed that blinding state of the breath to server.
Attribute cancels algorithm AttrRevoke (CT, Sk), and when attribute revocation occurs, algorithm is updating ciphertext and user Private key.Algorithm is input with ciphertext CT and private key for user, exports updated ciphertext and private key for user { CT ', Sk ' }, works as attribute When revocation occurs, can timely update system, ensure the safety of data.
Further, the S1 steps specifically include：
S11. system initialization selects cyclic groupWherein cyclic groupRank be prime P, generate member point Not Wei g1, g2, set bilinear mapAnd choose hash function
S12. parameter is generated, trusted party TA runs Setup (k) algorithm, and algorithm is with randomly selected two security parameters α,β∈Zp, ZpUsing p as the group of integers of rank, to generate the public key and master key parameter of system,
Master key MK=(β, g1 α), it is that trusted party TA retains,
Public keyIt is distributed to system participant.
Further, the S2 steps specifically include：
Trusted party TA runs KeyGen (Pk, Mk, A) algorithm, and algorithm randomly chooses r ∈ Z immediatelypIf the attribute of user Integrate as A, for each attribute i ∈ A, randomly chooses ri∈Zp, private key Sk is generated,
Further, the S3 steps specifically include：
S31. trusted party TA runs Encrypt (Pk, M, T) algorithm, and data owner DO formulates the visit for accessing tree-like formula Ask structure T=TDO+TES, wherein TDOFor the access structure of user's independent control, TESIt is the access control plan for server process Slightly, LDOAnd LESIndicate TDOAnd TESLeaf node set, LTIndicate to access the leaf node set of tree T, when encryption uses Shamir secret sharing schemes；For accessing any node x in setting, then its shared secret is qx(0)。
S32. data owner DO randomly chooses a 1 rank multinomial q (x), calculates s=q (0), s1=q (1), s2=q (2)；
S33. cryptographic services ES receives { s1, the T that data owner DO is sentES, and using s1 as shared secret, calculate
S34. data owner DO is calculated using s2 as shared secret And C=Me (g are calculated for plaintext M and s=q (0)1,g2)αsWith C '=hs；
S35. cryptographic services ES receives the information { CT that data owner DO is sentDO, C, C ' }, combine CTESCalculate ciphertext：
S36. cryptographic services ES sends CT to storage service, and storage service preserves in cipher-text information to database.
Further, the S4 steps specifically include：
S41. data owner DO runs ReKeyGen (Pk, T1, Sk) algorithm, and DO randomly chooses θ ∈ Zp, updating private key is
S42.DO is calculated
S43.DO combines two parts information, calculates re-encrypted private key RK：
Further, the S5 steps specifically include：
S51. decryption service DS runs ReEncrypt (Pk, CT, Rk) algorithm, for original cipher text Recurrence decryption is carried out, is calculated
Wherein y is the leaf node accessed in tree；
S52. recurrence decryption is carried out for the non-leaf nodes x accessed in setting, calculated：
For root node r, there is A=Fr=e (g1,g2)rs；
S53.DS is calculated
S54. data owner DO receives the information { A, B } that DS is sent and calculates
S55. re-encryption ciphertext CT1 is calculated：
S56. user DO uploads re-encryption ciphertext CT1 and is serviced to decryption, and CT1 is further uploaded to storage by decryption service Service, is saved in storage server, and update original cipher text is attached most importance to encrypted cipher text.
Further, the S6 steps specifically include：
S61. data requester DR runs KeyDiv (Pk, Sk) algorithm, and DR randomly chooses t ∈ Zp, combine its private keyCalculate K '=gt(α+r)/β；
S62.DR calculates ciphertext transition key It is sent to decryption service DS；
S63.DR calculates local decruption key Tk=t, and preserves.
Further, the S7 steps specifically include：
S701. decryption service DS runs Decrypt (Pk, CT, SK) algorithm, and for ciphertext, DS carries out recurrence decryption, calculates
Wherein y is the leaf node accessed in tree, ifFyOutput is sky；
S702. recurrence decryption is carried out for the non-leaf nodes x accessed in setting, calculated
Further, the S7 steps further include：
When ciphertext is original cipher text, decrypting process is as follows：
S711. A=F at this timer=e (g1,g2)rs；
S712. B=e (C ', K ')=e (h are calculateds,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g2 βs,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g1,g2)t(α+r)×s；
S713. data requester DR receives information,
{ A, B, C }={ e (g1,g2)rs,e(g1,g2)t(α+r)×s,Me(g1,g2)αs}；
S714.DR carries out local decryption using Tk=t, calculates B=B1/Tk=e (g1,g2)(α+r)×s；
S715.DR is finally decrypted, and data clear text M is obtained：
When ciphertext is the updated ciphertext of access structure, decrypting process is as follows：
S721. A=F at this timer=e (g1,g2)rλ；
S722. B=e (C ', K ')=e (h are calculatedλ,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g2 βs,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g1,g2)t(α+r)×λ；
S723. data requester DR receives information,
A, B, C, E, C ' }={ e (g1,g2)rλ,e(g1,g2)t(α+r)×λ,Me(g1,g2)θs,g1 θe(g1,g2)αλ,hs}；
S724.DR carries out local decryption using Tk=t, calculates B=B1/Tk==e (g1,g2)(α+r)λ；
S725.DR asks decryption C '=h to trusted partys, calculate NewC′=C '1/β=(hs)1/β=g2 s；
S726.DR is finally decrypted, and data clear text M is obtained：
Further, the S8 steps run AttrRevoke (CT, Sk algorithm, algorithm when sending property parameters Implementation procedure includes：
S81. trusted party TA randomly chooses r ∈ Zp；
S82. cryptographic services ES receives the value of r, updates ciphertext
S83. the user for not being revoked attribute receives the r values of trusted party, updates private key
S84. it is revoked the user of attribute, does not receive the r values of trusted party, it is necessary to ask update private to trusted party Key newly calculates private key for user Wherein S ' For the newer property set of user.
Compared with prior art, advantageous effect is：A kind of particulate efficient and safe based on CP-ABE provided by the invention Spend access control method, can effectively settlement server leakage user data, access control policy be difficult to update, attribute revocation it is difficult The problems such as, at the same can solve in local encryption process will consumption it is a large amount of calculate and the communication resource and be difficult to micro- set small The problem of standby, mobile device effectively works, realizes the fine-granularity access control to data, and explicit data sovereignty have ensured user Legitimate rights and interests, this method is safe and efficient.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the method for the present invention schematic diagram.
Fig. 2 is present system illustraton of model.
Fig. 3 is access control policy figure of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is parameter product process figure of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is private key product process figure of the present invention.
Fig. 6 is data encryption product process figure of the present invention.
Fig. 7 is that ciphertext access structure of the present invention updates flow chart.
Fig. 8 is file decryption flow chart of the present invention.
Fig. 9 is that attribute of the present invention cancels flow chart.
Specific implementation mode
As shown in Figures 1 to 3, a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE, including following step Suddenly：
Step 1：System initialization and parameter generate
The key parameter mainly needed in the running environment of configuration system and generation system operation, in conjunction with Fig. 4's Parameter product process figure, trusted party TA activation systems setting operation Setup (k) algorithm, selects cyclic groupWherein Cyclic groupRank be prime P, generate member be respectively g1,g2, set bilinear mapIt choosesHash functions；And randomly selected two security parameters α, the β ∈ Z of algorithmp, the public key of output system and master are close Key；
Master key MK=(β, g1 α), retain for TA；
Public keyIt is distributed to system participant.
Step 2：Private key generates
Private key is generated for user in TA operation KeyGen (Pk, Mk, A) algorithms, and private key is passed to use by safe lane Family.When specific generation private key, in conjunction with the private key product process figure of Fig. 5, algorithm randomly chooses r ∈ ZpIf the property set of user is A randomly chooses r for each attribute i ∈ Ai∈Zp, generate private key Sk and user passed back by safe lane, wherein
Step 3：File encryption
Encrypt (Pk, M, T) Encryption Algorithm is run during file encryption, main purpose is can to utilize clothes While the computing capability of business device, keep data for the blinding state of server, to ensure data sovereignty.Algorithm uses public key Pk, the ciphertext CT that the access structure T and cleartext information M that data owner formulates are closed as input, output with access structure T-phase.
In ciphering process, tree and Fig. 6 data encryption flow charts are accessed in conjunction with Fig. 3, DO, which can be arranged, accesses tree-like formula Access control structure T=TDO+TES, in order to reduce local calculation amount, usual TDOPossess a part of attribute, selects T hereDOOnly Attribute there are one gathering around, and set LDOAnd LESIndicate TDOAnd TESLeaf node set, LTIt indicates to access the leaf node set for setting T, Scheme uses shamir secret sharing schemes, for accessing any node x, q in treex(0) it is the shared secret values of node x.It calculates Method mainly executes following operation：
S31.DO randomly chooses a 1 rank multinomial q (x), calculates s=q (0), s1=q (1), s2=q (2)；
S32.DO sends { s1, TESArrive cryptographic services ES；
S33.ES receives { s1, TESRun afterwards, using s1 as shared secret, calculate CTES：
S34. user DO calculates CT using S2 as shared secretDO；
S35. C=Me (g in addition are calculated for cleartext information M in user terminal1,g2)αs；For shared secret s=q (0), Calculate C '=hs；
S36. user DO sends { CTDO, C, C ' } arrive ES；
S37.ES receives { CTDO, C, C ', V } after, combine various information and generates ciphertext CT：
S38.ES sends CT to storage service, and storage service preserves in cipher-text information to database.
Step 4：Ciphertext access structure updates, and calculates re-encrypted private key Rk, to ciphertext re-encryption, generates re-encryption ciphertext CT1
In the practical application of ciphertext policy ABE base Encryption Algorithm, the access control policy formulated by DO frequently changes, To solve the problems, such as this, often has and update two kinds of solutions at Agency's update and user, but Agency's update usually can be to generation Reason exposes data information, and update computing resource consumes serious and requires user's real-time online at user.The present invention proposes that ciphertext is visited Topology update algorithm is asked, in conjunction with the advantages of update, number owner only needs to calculate re-encrypted private key RK, generation at Agency and user Reason can convert encrypted ciphertext under an access structure T at being calculated at another access structure T1 using this key Re-encryption ciphertext.
Flow chart is updated in conjunction with Fig. 7 ciphertext access structures, DO first runs ReKeyGen (Pk, T1, Sk) and calculates re-encryption Key Rk, algorithm performs include that private key conversion and re-encrypted private key calculate.
1 private key is converted：
Randomly choose θ ∈ Zp, combine the private key of DO Update K value beGenerate the conversion private key SK ' of DO：
2 re-encrypted private keys calculate：
Joint hides private key SK ', if re-encrypted private key Wherein,
Then re-encrypted private key RK is：
3 ciphertext re-encryptions
ES runs ReEncrypt (Pk, CT, Rk) algorithm, encrypted ciphertext will be converted into access knot at access structure T Encrypted ciphertext under structure T1, for original cipher text： The process of establishing of ciphertext re-encryption is：
1) agency carries out recurrence decryption to accessing to set：
A. the decryption of the leaf node in setting access：
B. the decryption of non-leaf nodes in setting access：
C. have for access tree for root node r by recurrence secret：A=Fr=e (g1,g2)rs。
2) B=(C ', K)=e (h are calculateds,g1 (α+r-θ)/β)=e (g1,g2)(α+r-θ)s；
3) A and B are sent back into user, proceeded as follows：
A. user calculates B/A=e (g1,g2)(α+r-θ)s/e(g1,g2)rs=e (g1,g2)(α-θ)s；
B. joint original cipher text includes that the C values of cleartext information calculate NewC=Me (g1,g2)αs/e(g1,g2)(α-θ)s=Me (g1,g2)θs。
4) re-encryption ciphertext CT1 is calculated：
Re-encryption ciphertext CT1 is added to an E=g more compared to original cipher text1 θe(g1,g2)αλ, updating ciphertext is：
5) user uploads re-encryption ciphertext CT1 and is serviced to decryption, and CT1 is further uploaded to storage clothes by decryption service Business, is saved in storage server, and update original cipher text is attached most importance to encrypted cipher text.
Step 5：Data deciphering
Decrypt (Pk, CT, SK) decipherment algorithm is run during data deciphering, main purpose is can to utilize While the computing capability of server, keep data for the blinding state of server, to ensure data sovereignty.In conjunction with Fig. 8 numbers According to decryption flow chart, algorithm uses public key Pk, ciphertext CT and private key for user Sk as input, output data when meeting visiting demand In plain text.Ciphering process includes that private key divides, three processes of ciphertext conversion and local decryption.
1) private key divides：The purpose that private key divides is mainly to ensure the safety of data so that the private key of data requester DR Decryption service is hidden.This process executes KeyDiv (Pk, Sk) algorithm by user, inputs the private key Sk and system public key of DR Pk, the cipher key T k that output is used for the key Rk of ciphertext conversion and locally decrypts, specially：
User randomly chooses t ∈ Zp, federated user private key Calculate D '=gt(α+r)/β, ciphertext transition key Rk and local decruption key TK are generated, wherein：
It is sent to ES request decryption clothes Business, Tk=t are locally preserved.
2) ciphertext is converted：The purpose of ciphertext conversion is to carry out ciphertext using the computing resource of server just to decrypt.It is receiving After decoding request and ciphertext transition key Rk, DS asks data to be decrypted ciphertext, storage service to receive to storage service first After request of data, requested ciphertext CT is sent back into DS；Ciphertext may be original cipher text CT：
Or by the newer ciphertext CT1 of access structure：
When decryption, DS carries out matching inspection between property set and the access structure of ciphertext first, if property set is discontented The demand of sufficient access structure, ciphertext transfer process exports ⊥, if meeting the needs of access structure, starts decrypted at the beginning of ciphertext Journey, if LTIt indicates to access the leaf node set for setting T, detailed process is as follows：
A. the part decryption oprerations of leaf node, for arbitrary y ∈ LT, DS is according to reception information calculating Fy：
IfResult of calculation is sky；
B. the part decryption oprerations of non-leaf nodes x：For all the child node z, S of xxIt is the arbitrary K of node xxA child node Set, call above-mentioned algorithm to decrypt the F of the child node z of all node x firstz, can portion by Lagrange's interpolation formula Divide decryption node as follows, in accessing tree, i=index (z), sx'=index (z):z∈Sx, Δ is Lagrange coefficient, meter Calculate Fx,
C. for the decryption oprerations of root node：As known from the above, when the root node that r is T, to each leaf node y ∈ LDO ∪LESPCarrying out recursive calculation with non-leaf nodes can obtain：
Value for two class ciphertext A is respectively：A1=e (g1,g2)rsWith A2=e (g1,g2)rλ；
D. to two class ciphertexts, the value that B is calculated separately by the C ' in the K ' and ciphertext in public key is：
B1=e (C ', k ')=e (hs,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g2 βs,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g1,g2)t(α+r)×s
B2=e (C ', K ')=e (hλ,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g2 βs,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g1,g2)t(α+r)×λ
Transmission data is returned data requester DR by e.DS, and to two class ciphertexts, the data of transmission are as follows：
For original cipher text：{ A1, B1, C }={ e (g1,g2)rs,e(g1,g2)t(α+r)×s,Me(g1,g2)αs}；
For the updated ciphertext of access structure：
A2, B2, C, E, C ' }={ e (g1,g2)rλ,e(g1,g2)t(α+r)×λ,Me(g1,g2)θs,g1 θe(g1,g2)αλ,hs}。
3) local decryption：
This process is input using local decruption key Tk and DS the ciphertext change data returned, exports the corresponding of ciphertext Data clear text, algorithm performs process are divided into the local decryption of the local decryption and ciphertext after access structure update of original cipher text, During being decrypted, first judge DS returned data tuples number, judge the data type returned, and carry out corresponding solution It is close.
A. original cipher text is locally decrypted：At this time DR receive DS return data be { A1, B1, C }, firstly for data B1 with Local decruption key Tk=t is calculated Data are carried out later Final decryption, obtains data clear text M：
B. the updated ciphertext decryption of access structure：It is { A2, B2, C, E, C ' } that user, which receives the data that DS is returned, at this time, It is calculated with local decruption key Tk=t firstly for data B
Then it solvesUser is in credible later Heart request decryption C '=hs, trusted party TA calculating NewC '=C '1/β=(hs)1/β=g2 sAnd user is returned to, it finally carries out most Whole ciphertext decryption, obtains data clear text M：
Step 6：Attribute cancels
In system operation, the problem of attribute changes inevitably occurs, is related to attribute revocation.In conjunction with Fig. 9 Attribute cancels flow chart, and when attribute revocation occurs for some user in system, trusted party randomly chooses r ∈ Zp, and by r values and It upgrades demand and is sent to the user for not being revoked attribute and cryptographic services ES, be used for the update of ciphertext and private key for user.
1) cryptographic services ES receives the ciphertext of trusted party transmission when upgrading demand with r values, for ciphertext Newer cryptogram computation is：
2) user for not being revoked attribute updates private key, and the user for not being revoked attribute receives trusted party transmission more When new demand and r values, for its private key Update Private key be calculated as：
3) user for being revoked attribute updates private key,
It is revoked the user of attribute, since it does not receive private key more new description and r values, and ciphertext at this time is by more New mistake, ciphertext acquisition data clear text cannot have been decrypted again by cancelling the private key of properties user, and the user for cancelling attribute must update The private key of oneself could ciphertext data.User needs to send private key request to trusted party again at this time, and trusted party receives When private key is asked, it is assumed that the property set of user is updated to A ' at this time, and trusted party calculates private key for user and is
Finally, safety analysis is carried out to method provided by the invention and the carrying out practically time counts.
Safety analysis
Access control structure T is decomposed into the present invention：T=TDO+TES, TDOIn can effectively subtract comprising less attribute Few complexity calculated and communicate, according to TDOIt is randomly assigned a rank multinomial q (x), and s=q (0), s1=q (1), s2=are set q(2).ES can only obtain (T in ciphering processESP, s1), it is total according to Threshold Secret for the rank multinomial being arbitrarily designated Scheme is enjoyed, in the case where just knowing that s1, secret component s is theory α coefficient.
And for the safety of algorithm, ES, DS and SS are incredible, they appoint according to algorithm performs calculating While business, corresponding information can be also obtained.It is assumed that ES, DS and SS carry out conspiracy attack, it is obtained respectively information state into The following analysis of row：
MK=(β, gα), retain for TA；
DS：PossessThe A=e calculated with oneself (g, g)rs, B=e (g, g)t(α+r).s；
ES：Possess s1, TESP, what oneself was calculated The CT uploaded with userDO, C '=Me (g, g)αsAnd C=hs；
Storage service：Possess ciphertext：
Public keyIt is shared to each side；
ES s1 e(g,g)αs1 e(g,g)βs1
DS e(g,g)rs E (g, g)t(α+r)s e(g,g)ts
As seen from the above table, ES is exactly blinding state to ES due to not knowing the random number s for hiding plaintext M, ciphertext, and ES has no knowledge about the access control structure of user setting, can not also attempt that operation is decrypted；For hiding privates of the DS due in Random number t being embedded in key, and since t is the index for generating member g, the private key for solving user is equal to solution DLP difficult problems, I.e. private key for user is also blinding state to DS, server can not or data content, the privacy of data protected, therefore calculate Method is safe.
Run time statistics
This experiment is in test in Ubuntu14.04LTS, 3.8Gb memories, i5-4210M@2.6GHZ × 4,16.8GB hard disks Under virtual machine.
Collection set a property as [' ONE', ' TWO', ' THREE'], access structure is ((ONE and THREE) and (TWO OR FOUR)), in plain text using random selection, newer access structure is (ONE and (TWO OR FOUR)), runs above-mentioned calculation Method, just like following table run time statistics result.
2 each Riming time of algorithm table of table
SetUp KeyGen Encryption ReKeyGen ReEncryption KeyDiv Ciphertext is converted Local decryption
Second 0.03875 0.04463 0.05158 0.05514 0.05521 0.00140 0.04292 0.00175
Obviously, the above embodiment of the present invention be only to clearly illustrate example of the present invention, and not be pair The restriction of embodiments of the present invention.For those of ordinary skill in the art, may be used also on the basis of the above description To make other variations or changes in different ways.There is no necessity and possibility to exhaust all the enbodiments.It is all this All any modification, equivalent and improvement etc., should be included in the claims in the present invention made by within the spirit and principle of invention Protection domain within.

Claims (10)

1. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE, which is characterized in that include the following steps：
S1. system initialization and parameter generate, and trusted party TA runs Setup (k) algorithm, and initialization and parameter are carried out to system It generates, algorithm is input with security parameter K, generates system public key Pk, master key Mk；
S2. private key generates, and private is generated for user according to user property collection in trusted party TA operation KeyGen (Pk, Mk, A) algorithms Key Sk；
S3. data encryption, trusted party TA run Encrypt (Pk, M, T) algorithm, the access control policy formulated according to user T is that data ciphertext M carries out data encryption, generates the ciphertext CT with access control policy；
S4. re-encrypted private key generates, and data owner DO runs ReKeyGen (Pk, T1, Sk) algorithm, when the access that user formulates When control strategy updates, ciphertext re-encrypted private key Rk is generated for user according to private key for user；
S5. ciphertext re-encryption, decryption service DS runs ReEncrypt (Pk, CT, Rk) algorithm, when the access control that user formulates When policy update, ciphertext update is carried out under ciphertext state, generates re-encryption ciphertext CT1；
S6. private key divides, and data requester DR runs DeyDiv (Pk, Sk) algorithm, and private key for user is divided, and generates ciphertext Convert private key Rk and local decruption key Tk；
S7. data deciphering, decryption service DS run Decrypt (Pk, CT, Sk) algorithm, judge whether private key for user meets data The access control policy that user formulates when encryption carries out data deciphering for user, plaintext M is exported if meeting, and otherwise output is It is empty；
S8. attribute cancels, and runs AttrRevoke (CT, Sk) algorithm, to update ciphertext and private key for user, is removed when sending attribute When pin, the user for not being revoked attribute can directly update private key, and the user for being revoked attribute must be to trusted party TA requests more New private key.
2. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 1, feature It is, the S1 steps specifically include：
S11. system initialization selects cyclic groupWherein cyclic groupRank be prime P, generate member be respectively g1,g2, choose hash functionOne random library of hash function main analog, and set bilinear map
S12. parameter is generated, trusted party TA runs Setup (k) algorithm, and algorithm is with randomly selected two security parameters α, β ∈ Zp, wherein ZpFor using p as the group of integers of rank, system generates public key and master key parameter,
Master key MK=(β, g1 α), it is that trusted party TA retains,
Public keyIt is distributed to system participant.
3. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 2, feature It is, the S2 steps specifically include：
Trusted party TA runs KeyGen (Pk, Mk, A) algorithm, and algorithm randomly chooses r ∈ Z immediatelypIf the property set of user is A, For each attribute i ∈ A, random selection ri ∈ Zp, private key Sk is generated,
4. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 3, feature It is, the S3 steps specifically include：
S31. trusted party TA runs Encrypt (Pk, M, T) algorithm, and data owner DO formulates the access knot for accessing tree-like formula Structure T=TDO+TES, wherein TDOFor the access structure of user's independent control, TESIt is the access control policy for server process, LDO And LESIndicate TDOAnd TESLeaf node set, LTIt indicates to access the leaf node set for setting T；
S32. data owner DO randomly chooses a 1 rank multinomial q (x), calculates s=q (0), s1=q (1), s2=q (2)；
S33. cryptographic services ES receives { s1, the T that data owner DO is sentES, and using s1 as shared secret, then set for accessing In any node x, shared secret value is qx (0), and is calculated
S34. data owner DO is calculated using s2 as shared secret And C=Me (g are calculated for plaintext M and s=q (0)1,g2)αsWith C '=hs；
S35. cryptographic services ES receives the information { CT that data owner DO is sentDO, C, C ' }, combine CTESCalculate ciphertext：
S36. cryptographic services ES sends CT to storage service, and storage service preserves in cipher-text information to database.
5. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 4, feature It is, the S4 steps specifically include：
S41. data owner DO runs ReKeyGen (Pk, T1, Sk) algorithm, and DO randomly chooses θ ∈ Zp, updating private key is
S42.DO is calculated
S43.DO combines two parts information, calculates re-encrypted private key RK：
6. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 5, feature It is, the S5 steps specifically include：
S51. decryption service DS runs ReEncrypt (Pk, CT, Rk) algorithm, for original cipher text Recurrence decryption is carried out, is calculated：
Wherein y is the leaf node accessed in tree；
S52. recurrence decryption is carried out for the non-leaf nodes x accessed in setting, calculated：
For root node r, there is A=Fr=e (g1,g2)rs；
S53. it calculates：
S54. data owner DO receives the information { A, B } that DS is sent and calculates NewC：
S55. re-encryption ciphertext CT1 is calculated：
S56. user uploads re-encryption ciphertext CT1 and is serviced to decryption, and CT1 is further uploaded to storage service by decryption service, It is saved in storage server, update original cipher text is attached most importance to encrypted cipher text.
7. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 6, feature It is, the S6 steps specifically include：
S61. data requester DR runs KeyDiv (Pk, Sk) algorithm, and DR randomly chooses t ∈ Zp, combine its private keyCalculate K '=gt(α+r)/β；
S62.DR calculates ciphertext transition key It is sent to decryption service DS；
S63.DR calculates local decruption key Tk=t, and preserves.
8. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 7, feature It is, the S7 steps specifically include：
S701. decryption service DS runs Decrypt (Pk, CT, SK) algorithm, and for ciphertext, DS carries out recurrence decryption, calculates：
Wherein y is the leaf node accessed in tree, ifFyValue is sky；
S702. recurrence decryption is carried out for the non-leaf nodes x accessed in setting, calculated：
9. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 8, feature It is, the S7 steps further include：
When ciphertext is original cipher text, decrypting process is as follows：
S711. A=F at this timer=e (g1,g2)rs；
S712. B=e (C ', K ')=e (h are calculateds,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g2 βs,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g1,g2)t(α+r)×s；
S713. data requester DR receives information,
{ A, B, C }={ e (g1,g2)rs,e(g1,g2)t(α+r)×s,Me(g1,g2)αs}；
S714.DR carries out local decryption using Tk=t, calculates B=B1/Tk=e (g1,g2)(α+r)×s；
S715.DR is finally decrypted, and data clear text M is obtained：
When ciphertext is the updated ciphertext of access structure, decrypting process is as follows：
S721. A=F at this timer=e (g1,g2)rλ；
S722. B=e (C ', K ')=e (h are calculatedλ,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g2 βs,g1 t(α+r)/β)=e (g1,g2)t(α+r)×λ；
S723. data requester DR receives information,
A, B, C, E, C ' }={ e (g1,g2)rλ,e(g1,g2)t(α+r)×λ,Me(g1,g2)θs,g1θe(g1,g2)αλ,hs}；
S724.DR carries out local decryption using Tk=t, calculates B=B1/Tk==e (g1,g2)(α+r)λ；
S725.DR asks decryption C '=h to trusted partys, calculate NewC '=C '1/β=(hs)1/β=g2 s；
S726.DR is finally decrypted, and data clear text M is obtained：
10. a kind of fine-grained access control method efficient and safe based on CP-ABE according to claim 9, feature It is, the S8 steps, when sending property parameters, runs AttrRevoke (CT, Sk) algorithm, algorithm performs process packet It includes：
S81. trusted party TA randomly chooses r ∈ Zp；
S82. cryptographic services ES receives the value of r, updates ciphertext
S83. the user for not being revoked attribute receives the r values of trusted party, updates private key
S84. it is revoked the user of attribute, does not receive the r values of trusted party, it is necessary to ask update private key to trusted party, newly Calculate private key for user Wherein A ' is user Newer property set.
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