CN108449159B - One-way hash coding-based safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signal - Google Patents
One-way hash coding-based safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signal Download PDFInfo
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- CN108449159B CN108449159B CN201710083635.6A CN201710083635A CN108449159B CN 108449159 B CN108449159 B CN 108449159B CN 201710083635 A CN201710083635 A CN 201710083635A CN 108449159 B CN108449159 B CN 108449159B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/004—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using forward error control
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/0001—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff
- H04L1/0002—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the transmission rate
- H04L1/0003—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the transmission rate by switching between different modulation schemes
- H04L1/0005—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the transmission rate by switching between different modulation schemes applied to payload information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
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Abstract
The invention relates to a safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signals based on one-way hash coding, which comprises the following steps: step 1, the TSRS receives an execution command corresponding to a temporary speed limit command in a block partition filing scheme from a CTC; step 2, carrying out operation sequence, signaling state of the receiver, overlapping check of the speed-limiting area and message capacity check of the responder; step 3, if the check fails, the original state of the speed limit command is kept; if the check is passed, updating the state of the temporary speed limit command to be 'in-line'; and 4, traversing the protected temporary speed-limiting output data of each equipment to be ordered in each memory area, and when the state is a 'issuing in-process' state, checking that the data is not damaged through the hash value, and then outputting a speed-limiting command to each TCC, RBC and the corresponding safe communication interface of the adjacent TSRS according to the output data in the data. Compared with the prior art, the method has the advantages of avoiding unnecessary resource consumption, improving the stability of the system and the like.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signals, in particular to a safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in the field of railway signals based on one-way hash coding.
Background
The temporary speed limit is an important concept in rail transit, and when temporary conditions such as wind, rain, snow, construction and the like occur, the running speed of a train needs to be limited temporarily. In the C2/C3 system, a temporary speed limit command is generated by a dispatcher through a CTC or TDCS device, sent to a temporary speed limit server device (hereinafter referred to as TSRS), and then distributed to corresponding devices such as a train control center (hereinafter referred to as TCC), a radio block center (hereinafter referred to as RBC) and the like through the TSRS. Once the temporary speed limit command is executed in error, the vehicle damage and death can be caused to serious consequences. Therefore, safety protection for temporary speed limit-related processing is required.
To prevent random failures, in the SIL4 level safety system in the railway signaling field, at the system architecture level, EN50129 presents 3 fail-safe system architectures to achieve safety goals including reactive fail-safe, combined fail-safe, intrinsic fail-safe. For a single set of system, in a software level, an existing algorithm includes a coding method, and a safety parameter used in calculation is coded to code a calculation process, so that at present, when a problem occurs in coding, corresponding processing is performed to the safety side. The existing method also comprises a BIT method, and random failure is detected by detecting hardware, so that the processing of the guiding safety side is carried out.
The methods have the characteristics of easy realization of platform and stronger universality. But may consume excessive resources and increase development and maintenance costs.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects in the prior art, provides a safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signals based on one-way hash coding, provides a safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit, avoids unnecessary resource consumption and improves the stability of a system.
The purpose of the invention can be realized by the following technical scheme:
a safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signals based on one-way hash coding comprises the following steps:
step 1, the temporary speed limit server equipment TSRS receives an execution command corresponding to a temporary speed limit command in a block zone filing scheme from a train dispatching centralized command control system CTC, searches an area where the corresponding temporary speed limit is located in a memory, checks the speed limit command in the memory by using a hash value after the execution command is found, and determines that the input speed limit command parameter is legal after the checking is passed;
step 2, carrying out operation sequence, signaling state of the receiver, overlapping check of the speed-limiting area and message capacity check of the responder;
step 3, if the check fails, keeping the original state of the speed limit command, and meanwhile, reporting an error to the CTC; if the check is passed, updating the state of the temporary speed limit command to be 'under running', and updating the state of the speed limit command of each device to be 'under running';
and 4, traversing the protected temporary speed-limiting output data of each equipment to be ordered in each memory area, when the state is a 'issuing state', checking that the data is not damaged through the hash value, outputting a speed-limiting command to each train control center TCC, a radio block center RBC and a safety communication interface corresponding to the adjacent TSRS according to the output data in the data, encrypting the data by the safety communication module, and then sending the data to each receiving equipment.
The temporary speed limit command extraction comprises the following steps:
the first scheme is as follows: directly taking out the temporary speed limit command from the RSSP-I or RSSP-II safety protocol, and discarding the original safety data packet after taking out the temporary speed limit command;
or the scheme II: and using the MAC value in the RSSP-II security protocol and the CRCM in the RSSP-I protocol as a hash value corresponding to the temporary speed limit command.
For scenario one: and adding corresponding hash values to the extracted temporary speed limit commands, and adopting different generating polynomials to respectively generate CRC1 and CRC2 for the temporary speed limit commands, or adopting the form of MD5 codes as hash check values.
In each calculation period or according to setting, before reading the temporary speed limit command each time, re-checking whether the temporary speed limit command corresponds to the corresponding hash value, if so, processing the temporary speed limit according to normal steps, if not, considering that the temporary speed limit is damaged, and performing downtime processing; and according to the setting, reporting the speed limit command as a failure state to a speed limit command issuing party.
The hash value generation process in the step 4) is as follows:
traversing each 'Protected Data', finding out 'Protected Data' corresponding to the current temporary speed limiting command according to a Data _ Protected formula, modifying the state value of the 'Protected Data' according to the input Data, and then generating a hash value corresponding to the 'Protected Data' according to the latest result
The Data _ Protected formula is specifically as follows:
Data_Protected＝(((TSR_Command*2M+(TSR_Output))^TimeStamp)*2N+OutputStatus
wherein, the Data _ Protected is the Protected Data;
TSR _ Command is the speed limit Command itself;
m is the actual length of the output data;
TimeStamp is a TimeStamp;
TSR _ Output, which has different meanings for different ordered devices, wherein in TSRS, TSR _ Output represents a speed limit command to the Output of a specific TCC/RBC/adjacent TSRS; in TCC equipment, representing message data output by a specific transponder;
and the OutputStatus is a state where the temporary speed limit set according to the current input is positioned, and the speed limit command is changed into a state to be issued after receiving the execution command and is represented by N bytes.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
1. by adopting the technology, the damage of the memory failure to the temporary speed limit key parameter can be found, so that the overall safety and reliability of the system are improved.
2. The unexpected damage to the temporary speed limit key parameter caused by the memory border crossing caused by the program bug can be found, so that the overall safety and reliability of the system are improved.
3. Compared with a hardware detection technology, the method has the advantages that the whole program system does not need to be suspended, interrupts do not need to be suspended, and the influence on the system is smaller. The algorithm directly checks the detected object, but not indirectly proves through detection hardware, so that the algorithm is more direct and effective, and the detection period can be greatly shortened. Moreover, hardware detection techniques are unable to detect damage to critical parameters caused by accidental program violations.
4. Compared with general safety coding (such as VCP coding), the whole program does not need to be converted into the safety coding, the technology makes full use of the exhaustibility of temporary speed limit after block partition filing, combines coding and table lookup, avoids the complexity of an algorithm and improves the operating efficiency of a system.
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FIG. 1 is a general flow diagram of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some, not all, embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments, which can be obtained by a person skilled in the art without any inventive step based on the embodiments of the present invention, shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.
The invention provides a safety guarantee method aiming at the characteristics of China railway operation and aiming at temporary speed limit, thereby avoiding unnecessary resource consumption and improving the stability of the system.
Aiming at the random failure scene possibly occurring in the temporary speed limit treatment in the current railway field, the method comprises the following steps
(1) Interference occurs during transmission, resulting in deviation of transmitted data.
(2) The temporary speed limit command is destroyed while running inside the system.
For scenario 1, the existing protection of the secure communication protocol is out of the scope of the scheme.
The scheme only provides a solution aiming at the scene 2, provides an algorithm for improving the safety degree and the safety confidence, and can further solve the problem by combining mechanisms such as fault safety, reaction fault safety, inherent fault safety and the like if the safety target of a specific system is reached.
The invention provides a safety method aiming at temporary speed limit, which does not depend on a hardware architecture and can be reused by different railway signal related systems with temporary speed limit so as to improve the safety index of the system.
The specific technical content of the invention is as follows:
firstly, before block partition filing, temporary speed limit is issued in units of meters, and related parameters of the temporary speed limit can only depend on real-time calculation, and the following method is provided:
(1) and extracting a temporary speed limit command.
For different systems and scenarios, we propose two solutions
The first scheme is as follows: the temporary speed-limiting command directly taken out from the safety protocol (the China railway is the RSSP-II safety protocol and the RSSP-I safety protocol) is taken out and then discarded, and the original safety data packet is discarded, and the issue of the temporary speed-limiting command can be considered to realize closed-loop control, so when the speed limit is received in the memory for the first time, if the extraction process is invalid, the speed-limiting parameter is wrong, the speed-limiting parameter can be found by the original speed-limiting equipment or personnel, and the failure is not considered in the scheme. The scheme has the advantages of small occupied space and the defect that the temporary speed limit extraction needs application-level security analysis or other security and guarantee algorithms.
Scheme II: and the temporary speed limit command is not taken out from the RSSP-II or the RSSP-I data packet, and the MAC value in the RSSP-II security protocol and the CRCM in the RSSP-I protocol are used as the hash value corresponding to the temporary speed limit command. The disadvantage of this method is that extra space is needed to store the whole data packet where the temporary speed limit is located, and the algorithm of the MAC checksum CRCM has higher time complexity and needs to increase extra calculation overhead.
(2) And adding the corresponding hash value for the extracted speed limit command. For the second scheme in the step 1, no additional hash value is needed, and for the first scheme in the step 1, the CRC value corresponding to the temporary speed limit command may be increased, and for further improving the security, different generator polynomials may be used to generate CRC1 and CRC2 for the temporary speed limit command, respectively. Similarly, the MD5 code may also be used as a hash check value.
(3) In each calculation period, or before reading the temporary speed limit command each time according to the requirement, re-checking whether the temporary speed limit command corresponds to the corresponding hash value, if so, processing the temporary speed limit according to normal steps, if not, considering that the temporary speed limit is damaged, and at the moment, further adopting a processing measure for guiding to a safety side, and suggesting downtime processing; according to the requirement, the speed limit command issuing party can be reported that the speed limit command is in a failure state.
Secondly, after the block subarea filing scheme is adopted, the temporary speed limit range is defined by the block subareas, because the number of the block subareas in one line is limitable, the executable temporary speed limit commands only have the limitable number,
fig. 1 is a general description of the algorithm, in which a thick solid line represents an actual flow of the algorithm, and a thin dotted line represents a flow of the temporary speed limit processing when the algorithm is not used.
Protected data in the graph is determined off-line except for the time stamp, output data and the current state of the hash value, is generated by a tool, and the generation algorithm is
The Data _ Protected formula is specifically as follows:
Data_Protected＝(((TSR_Command*2M+(TSR_Output))^TimeStamp)*2N+OutputStatus
wherein, the Data _ Protected is the Protected Data;
TSR _ Command is the speed limit Command itself;
m is the actual length of the output data;
HASH (TSR _ Command) the one-way HASH value of a TSR _ Command, HASH represents a HASH function, which may be MD5 or a CRC calculation function.
TimeStamp is a TimeStamp;
TSR _ Output, which has different meanings for different ordered devices, wherein in TSRS, TSR _ Output represents a speed limit command to the Output of a specific TCC/RBC/adjacent TSRS; in TCC equipment, representing message data output by a specific transponder;
and the OutputStatus is a state where the temporary speed limit set according to the current input is positioned, and the speed limit command is changed into a state to be issued after receiving the execution command and is represented by N bytes.
The specific processing of the links indicated by the arrows "input" in fig. 1 is as follows:
traversing each 'Protected Data', finding out 'Protected Data' corresponding to the current temporary speed limiting command according to a Data _ Protected formula, modifying the state value of the 'Protected Data' according to the input Data, and then generating a hash value corresponding to the 'Protected Data' according to the latest result.
The specific processing of the link indicated by the arrow "output" in fig. 1 is as follows:
and traversing each 'protected data', checking whether the 'protected data' is damaged or not through the hash value, and if the 'protected data' is damaged, guiding to a security side, wherein the security side can be customized by the equipment according to self conditions. And if the data is not damaged, taking out the current output data from the 'protected data' according to the current state, and outputting the output data to the secure communication module.
To prevent stale data from occurring, the timestamp data is exclusively XOR'd with the protected data, updating the timestamp every cycle.
Through the above, it can also be seen that the process of modifying the state according to the input information and selecting the output information according to the state is not protected, and for this point, the problem can be solved by other means such as a differentiation algorithm and an encoding technology.
As shown in fig. 1, the safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signals based on one-way hash coding of the invention comprises the following steps:
and 001, receiving an execution command corresponding to the speed limit setting command in the block partition filing scheme from the CTC by the TSRS, searching the area where the corresponding temporary speed limit is located in the memory, checking the speed limit command in the memory by using the hash value after the execution command is found, and judging that the input speed limit command parameter is legal after the checking is passed.
And step 002, performing operation sequence, signaling state of the receiver, overlapping check of the speed limit area and message capacity check of the responder, and considering that the failure of the check does not influence the safety of the temporary speed limit, so that extra safety redundancy measures can not be taken.
Step 003, if the check fails, keep the original state of the speed limit command, meanwhile, report the mistake to CTC; and if the check is passed, updating the state of the temporary speed limit command to be 'under the control', and updating the state of the speed limit command of each device to be 'under the control'.
Step 004, the output program traverses the protected temporary speed-limiting output data of each equipment to be ordered in each memory area, when the state is a 'issuing state', the data is checked to be not damaged through the hash value, a speed-limiting command is output to a safety communication interface corresponding to each TCC, RBC and adjacent TSRS according to the output data in the data, and the data is encrypted by the safety communication module and then is sent to each receiving equipment.
While the invention has been described with reference to specific embodiments, the invention is not limited thereto, and various equivalent modifications and substitutions can be easily made by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims (6)
1. A safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signals based on one-way hash coding is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1, the temporary speed limit server equipment TSRS receives an execution command corresponding to a temporary speed limit command in a block zone filing scheme from a train dispatching centralized command control system CTC, searches an area where the corresponding temporary speed limit is located in a memory, checks the speed limit command in the memory by using a hash value after the execution command is found, and determines that the input speed limit command parameter is legal after the checking is passed;
step 2, carrying out operation sequence, signaling state of the receiver, overlapping check of the speed-limiting area and message capacity check of the responder;
step 3, if the check fails, keeping the original state of the speed limit command, and meanwhile, reporting an error to the CTC; if the check is passed, updating the state of the temporary speed limit command to be 'under running', and updating the state of the speed limit command of each device to be 'under running';
and 4, traversing the protected temporary speed-limiting output data of each equipment to be ordered in each memory area, when the state is a 'issuing state', checking that the data is not damaged through the hash value, outputting a speed-limiting command to each train control center TCC, a radio block center RBC and a safety communication interface corresponding to the adjacent TSRS according to the output data in the data, encrypting the data by the safety communication module, and then sending the data to each receiving equipment.
2. The method for guaranteeing safety of temporary speed limit in railway signal based on one-way hash coding as claimed in claim 1, wherein said temporary speed limit command extraction comprises:
the first scheme is as follows: directly taking out the temporary speed limit command from the RSSP-I or RSSP-II safety protocol, and discarding the original safety data packet after taking out the temporary speed limit command;
or the scheme II: and using the MAC value in the RSSP-II security protocol and the CRCM in the RSSP-I protocol as a hash value corresponding to the temporary speed limit command.
3. The method for securing temporary speed limit in railway signal based on one-way hash coding as claimed in claim 2, wherein for scheme one: and adding corresponding hash values to the extracted temporary speed limit commands, and adopting different generating polynomials to respectively generate CRC1 and CRC2 for the temporary speed limit commands, or adopting the form of MD5 codes as hash check values.
4. The method for guaranteeing the safety of the temporary speed limit in the railway signal based on the one-way hash code as claimed in claim 1, wherein in each calculation period or according to the setting, before reading the temporary speed limit command each time, whether the temporary speed limit command corresponds to the corresponding hash value is checked again, if so, the temporary speed limit is processed according to the normal steps, and if not, the temporary speed limit is considered to be damaged, and the downtime processing is carried out; and according to the setting, reporting the speed limit command as a failure state to a speed limit command issuing party.
5. The method for securing a temporary speed limit in a railway signal based on one-way hash coding as claimed in claim 1, wherein the hash value generation process in step 4 is as follows:
traversing each 'Protected Data', finding out 'Protected Data' corresponding to the current temporary speed limiting command according to a Data _ Protected formula, modifying the state value of the 'Protected Data' according to the input Data, and then generating a hash value corresponding to the 'Protected Data' according to the latest result.
6. The safety guarantee method for temporary speed limit in railway signals based on one-way hash coding as claimed in claim 5, wherein the Data _ Protected formula is specifically:
Data_Protected＝(((TSR_Command*2M+(TSR_Output))^TimeStamp)*2N+OutputStatus
wherein, the Data _ Protected is the Protected Data;
TSR _ Command is the speed limit Command itself;
m is the actual length of the output data;
TimeStamp is a TimeStamp;
TSR _ Output, which has different meanings for different ordered devices, wherein in TSRS, TSR _ Output represents a speed limit command to the Output of a specific TCC/RBC/adjacent TSRS; in TCC equipment, representing message data output by a specific transponder;
and the OutputStatus is a state where the temporary speed limit set according to the current input is positioned, and the speed limit command is changed into a state to be issued after receiving the execution command and is represented by N bytes.
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| CN111124418B (en) * | 2019-12-10 | 2022-07-15 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Communication data timeout judging method based on VCP redundant codes |
| CN113830142B (en) * | 2021-11-26 | 2022-02-22 | 卡斯柯信号(北京)有限公司 | Transponder message temporary speed limit reverse-resolution verification method and system of train control software |
| CN113859328B (en) * | 2021-12-02 | 2022-03-15 | 卡斯柯信号(北京)有限公司 | Method and system for filing position precision of speed limit area of passenger dedicated line train control system |
| CN114329103B (en) * | 2021-12-22 | 2023-10-24 | 郑州畅想高科股份有限公司 | Method for comparing operation revealing and LKJ temporary data segments |
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