CN108418680A - A kind of block chain key recovery method, medium based on Secure computing technique - Google Patents
A kind of block chain key recovery method, medium based on Secure computing technique Download PDFInfo
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- CN108418680A CN108418680A CN201710791783.3A CN201710791783A CN108418680A CN 108418680 A CN108418680 A CN 108418680A CN 201710791783 A CN201710791783 A CN 201710791783A CN 108418680 A CN108418680 A CN 108418680A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/46—Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of block chain key recovery method, medium based on Secure computing technique, prevents core node permission excessive, and makes the backup of private key and restore safer, protects user's right.Its technical solution is：By the present invention in that with Secure computing technique, block chain key escrow and recovery are carried out.By introducing the third-party agent quotient for the verification user identity validity that can network with the government organs with legal effect, user identity effectively verify and endorse.On the basis of effective endorsement, user can carry out safe cooperated computing together with cipher key management services quotient to its private key, to realize encrypted backup and the recovery of private key for user.The present invention can realize user identity management, minimize the permission of franchise node, and by the introducing of third-party agent, validation verification is carried out to user identity, to meet the needs of node users key escrow.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to block chain technology more particularly to a kind of block chain key recovery methods.
Background technology
Block chain technology is initiated by the Floor layer Technology of the decentralization distribution account book technology of bit coin, be it is a kind of according to
A kind of linked data structure that data block is combined by time sequencing in such a way that sequence is connected, and ensured in a manner of cryptography
Can not distort and can not forge, realize the distributed account book of decentralization.Node is the basic unit for forming block chain network,
A general node corresponds to a computer, as the participant of block catenary system, safeguards a data copy respectively, can serve as
Different role, such as send out transaction, verification transaction, book keeping operation etc..Node keeps the one of backup database data by algorithm of knowing together
Cause property.Each account is made of address (public key) and private key in block catenary system.User controls account by using private key
In assets, be unique data for proving user identity, user is to the ownership of account assets completely by possessing account
Key determines that is, the core asset of user can only be controlled by private key, only passes through the signature of private key and could realize friendship
Easy confirmation, so the protection about block chain private key is particularly important.For private key once losing, the assets of user or other equity will
It is permanent to disappear.Therefore, block catenary system needs to provide the user with cipher key backup and restores service, or after password loss, carries
For assets transfer service.
In existing block catenary system, there are four types of main stream approach for the storage and use of key：Platform trustship, native client
End, stored value card and offline cold storage.And in these four methods, only platform trustship method can be by the private key of user in core
It is backed up at node, to provide key recovery service.But this method assigns core node excessive right, cannot meet
Customer demand, trustee can actually control account completely, it might even be possible to violate the operation of consigner's wish.
Therefore, a perfect block catenary system, it should design a kind of mechanism：Private key is possessed and is controlled by user, but
Risk occur when, can together with core node, by way of real name under a kind of line or national authority mechanism participate in mode
It can restore the key.
Invention content
A brief summary of one or more aspects is given below to provide to the basic comprehension in terms of these.This general introduction is not
The extensive overview of all aspects contemplated, and be both not intended to identify critical or decisive element in all aspects also non-
Attempt to define the range in terms of any or all.Its unique purpose is to provide the one of one or more aspects in simplified form
A little concepts are with the sequence for more detailed description given later.
It is an object of the invention to solve the above problems, it is close to provide a kind of block chain based on Secure computing technique
Key restoration methods, medium prevent core node permission excessive, and make the backup of private key and restore safer, protect
User's right.
The technical scheme is that：Present invention is disclosed a kind of, and the block chain key based on Secure computing technique is extensive
Compound method is participated in by user, third-party agent quotient, cipher key management services quotient, is divided into key recovery service registration stage and key
Restore service request phases, wherein：
In the key recovery service registration stage, user proposes that certification application, third-party agent quotient are logical to third-party agent quotient
Authentication is crossed to verify user identity, certification returns to the cryptographic Hash of successful token and user biological information after passing through；With
Family by token to cipher key management services quotient propose cipher key backup service request, ask backup private key, cipher key management services quotient to
Third-party agent quotient inquires the validity of User Token, as backed up private key if；
In key recovery service request phases, when user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, first user to third party
Agent proposes certification application, and by authentication to verify user identity, certification returns successfully third-party agent quotient after passing through
Token and user biological information cryptographic Hash；User proposes that key recovery services Shen by token to cipher key management services quotient
Private key is please restored with request, cipher key management services quotient inquires the validity of User Token to third-party agent quotient, as looked for if
To user's random number, the cryptographic Hash of random number and user biological information is subjected to cooperated computing, ciphertext is decrypted, and will be after decryption
Obtained private key for user returns to user.
One embodiment of the block chain key recovery method according to the present invention based on Secure computing technique, in key
Restore service registration stage backup private key the step of include：Random number is generated for user in cipher key management services quotient, by random number and
The cryptographic Hash of user biological information carries out cooperated computing and encrypts generation ciphertext to private key for user, and the ciphertext after cooperated computing is sent out
On cloth to block chain.
One embodiment of the block chain key recovery method according to the present invention based on Secure computing technique, in key
Restore service registration stage backup private key the step of include：User oneself generates random number, local to be given birth to using random number and user
The cryptographic Hash of object information is encrypted private key to form ciphertext, and ciphertext is published on block chain, user's cipher key management services
The public key of quotient will be sent to cipher key management services quotient after random number encryption, cipher key management services quotient preserves after being decrypted.
One embodiment of the block chain key recovery method according to the present invention based on Secure computing technique, third party
Agent is by networking with authentication mechanism to verify user identity by authentication, and calling interface verifies user's body
Part.
One embodiment of the block chain key recovery method according to the present invention based on Secure computing technique, identity are tested
It is the government organs for having legal effect to demonstrate,prove mechanism.
Present invention further teaches a kind of computer-readable mediums, including the computer program stored on medium, the calculating
Machine program is for executing the block chain key recovery method below based on Secure computing technique, by user, third party's generation
Quotient, cipher key management services quotient participation are managed, key recovery service registration stage and key recovery service request phases are divided into, wherein：
In the key recovery service registration stage, user proposes that certification application, third-party agent quotient are logical to third-party agent quotient
Authentication is crossed to verify user identity, certification returns to the cryptographic Hash of successful token and user biological information after passing through；With
Family by token to cipher key management services quotient propose cipher key backup service request, ask backup private key, cipher key management services quotient to
Third-party agent quotient inquires the validity of User Token, as backed up private key if；
In key recovery service request phases, when user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, first user to third party
Agent proposes certification application, and by authentication to verify user identity, certification returns successfully third-party agent quotient after passing through
Token and user biological information cryptographic Hash；User proposes that key recovery services Shen by token to cipher key management services quotient
Private key is please restored with request, cipher key management services quotient inquires the validity of User Token to third-party agent quotient, as looked for if
To user's random number, the cryptographic Hash of random number and user biological information is subjected to cooperated computing, ciphertext is decrypted, and will be after decryption
Obtained private key for user returns to user.
One embodiment of computer-readable medium according to the present invention, method be performed in key recovery service registration
The step of stage backup private key includes：Random number is generated for user in cipher key management services quotient, by random number and user biological information
Cryptographic Hash carry out cooperated computing and encrypt private key for user to generate ciphertext, and the ciphertext after cooperated computing is published to block chain
On.
One embodiment of computer-readable medium according to the present invention, method be performed in key recovery service registration
The step of stage backup private key includes：User oneself generates random number, the local Hash for using random number and user biological information
Value is encrypted private key to form ciphertext, and ciphertext is published on block chain, and user will be with the public key of cipher key management services quotient
It is sent to cipher key management services quotient after the encryption of machine number, cipher key management services quotient preserves after being decrypted.
One embodiment of computer-readable medium according to the present invention, third-party agent quotient is by authentication to verify use
Family identity is by networking with authentication mechanism, and calling interface verifies user identity.
One embodiment of computer-readable medium according to the present invention, authentication mechanism are the governments for having legal effect
Mechanism.
The present invention, which compares the prior art, following advantageous effect：By the present invention in that calculating (multi- with Secure
Party computation) technology, carry out block chain key escrow and recovery.By introduce can with legal effect
The third-party agent quotient of government organs' networking verification user identity validity to user identity effectively verify and endorse.
Effectively on the basis of endorsement, user can carry out safe cooperated computing together with cipher key management services quotient to its private key, to realize use
The encrypted backup of family private key and recovery.The present invention can realize user identity management, minimize the permission of franchise node, and pass through
The introducing of third-party agent carries out validation verification, to meet the needs of node users key escrow to user identity.
Compared to existing method for secret protection, the present invention can realize：
1) private key need not completely be backed up and give cipher key management services quotient by user, can prevent the excessive recovery of its permission
2) qualified third-party agent quotient is introduced, by networking with authoritative institution, the validity of user identity is carried out
Verification and endorsement
3) introducing of Secure computing technique makes user need not back up private key completely to give cipher key management services quotient,
Minimize service provider's permission so that the backup and recovery of private key are safer, protect user's right.
Description of the drawings
After reading the detailed description of embodiment of the disclosure in conjunction with the following drawings, it better understood when the present invention's
Features described above and advantage.In the accompanying drawings, each component is not necessarily drawn to scale, and has similar correlation properties or feature
Component may have same or similar reference numeral.
Fig. 1 shows the first embodiment of the block chain key recovery method based on Secure computing technique of the present invention
Registration phase flow chart.
Fig. 2 shows the second embodiments of the block chain key recovery method based on Secure computing technique of the present invention
Registration phase flow chart.
Fig. 3 shows an embodiment of the block chain key recovery method based on Secure computing technique of the present invention
Restoration stage flow chart.
Specific implementation mode
Below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments, the present invention is described in detail.Note that below in conjunction with attached drawing and specifically real
The aspects for applying example description is merely exemplary, and is understood not to carry out any restrictions to protection scope of the present invention.
Conventional center mechanism, such as bank can be by means such as real-name authentications, if the U-shield for representing user identity is lost
Or forget Password, then it can bind a new U-shield (private key) again by account verification, system.Realize related account assets
Freeze and restore, and digital asset can be restored to a certain extent.Binding relationship in logic is presented into account and private key,
It is operated by the bank of centralization in the case where meeting air control requirement.
To solve technical problem proposed by the present invention, the present invention has references to the thought of conventional center mechanism real-name authentication,
Block chain key recovery needs to realize based on Secure calculating.Multi-party computations (multi-party
Computation) be cryptography research core realm, initial data can be provided for demand data side in the case that without collecting
Multi-party cooperated computing ability, provide the overall data portrait after each side data calculate for party in request, therefore can be in data
Under the premise of without departing from respective node, complete data analysis, processing and result publication, and provide data access authority control and
The consistency guarantee of data exchange, to effective supervision to realizing block catenary system.
On the basis of carrying out key recovery service to the user of block catenary system using Secure computing technique, introduce
The certification to user identity can be achieved in qualified third-party agent quotient, and the networking of the government organs with legal effect, right
User and transaction can be supervised effectively, after user is by agential certification, by together with cipher key management services quotient to user
Private key carries out safe cooperated computing encryption and decryption, and encrypted ciphertext is entered chain storage, and the encryption to realize private key for user is standby
Part and recovery.
The block chain key recovery method based on Secure computing technique of the present invention is divided into two stages：Fig. 1 or Fig. 2
Shown in the key recovery service registration stage respectively correspond to two kinds of optional key recovery service registration modes, it is shown in Fig. 3 close
Key restores service request phases.And system participates in having for key recovery：(common) user, third-party agent quotient, key management clothes
Be engaged in quotient.Preferably, there can also be authentication mechanism, the government organs with legal effect are represented, such as public security bureau etc. is made
For the 4th class participant.
In the key recovery service registration stage, user proposes that certification application, third-party agent quotient are logical to third-party agent quotient
Cross authentication with verify user identity (wherein third-party agent quotient by authentication with verify user identity be by and body
Such as public security bureau of part certifying organization networks, and calling interface verifies user identity), certification returns to successful token after passing through
(token) and the cryptographic Hash of user biological information；User proposes that key is standby by token (token) to cipher key management services quotient
Part service request asks backup private key, cipher key management services quotient to inquire the effective of User Token (token) to third-party agent quotient
Property, such as pass through, then there are two types of optional methods with backup keys：The first optional method is that random number is generated for user in service provider,
It the cryptographic Hash of random number and user biological information is carried out cooperated computing encrypts private key for user to generate ciphertext, and by cooperated computing
Ciphertext afterwards is published on block chain；Second of optional method is that random number is generated by user oneself, then local using random
Generation ciphertext is encrypted to its private key in the cryptographic Hash of number and user biological information, and ciphertext is published on block chain.Finally,
User will be sent to cipher key management services quotient with the public key of cipher key management services quotient after random number encryption, cipher key management services quotient will
It is preserved after decrypting.
The more specifically flow in the key recovery service registration stage of the first way of counterpart keys backup refers to
Fig. 1, below for the process in the description key recovery service registration stages of Fig. 1 step by step.Serial number corresponding diagram 1 in following the description
In serial number.
1. user shows identity ID and user biological information (including face, fingerprint, iris etc.), to (third party) agent
Ask identity authentication service.
2. the biological information that agent calls and the government organs with legal effect network identifies interface, by user identity
ID and biological information are sent to government organs.
3. government organs audit user identity id information and whether biological information matches, if matching, returns to agent
" yes (YES) " otherwise returns " no (no) ".
4. it is right that agent generates User Token (token)：(token：yes/no).
The interface that 5. agent calls again and the government organs with legal effect network, by user identity ID and biology
Information is sent to government organs.
6. government organs audit match information, agent and the associated user biological information feature of identity ID are returned
(ID:feature)。
7. the cryptographic Hash of the token obtained from the government organs with legal effect and feature is sent to by agent
User：(token：Yes/no, h (feature)), wherein h (feature) indicates the cryptographic Hash of feature.
8. user generates public private key pair (sk1, pk1).
9. the token of generation and identity ID are sent to cipher key management services quotient by user, request cipher key management services quotient into
Row cipher key backup service.
10. user token is sent to agent, the validity of requests verification token by cipher key management services quotient.
11. agent inquires the libraries local user token, the whether effective information of user token is sent to key management
Service provider：(yes/no).
12. if the information returned is yes, cipher key management services quotient generates user's random number, is denoted as (ID:r).
13. user and cipher key management services quotient utilize MPC cooperated computing methods, use user biological information feature's
Cryptographic Hash and random number r carry out symmetric cryptography to private key for user sk1 and obtain ciphertext C, and calculation formula is：
14. ciphertext C is synchronized to block chain, user registration success by cipher key management services quotient.
The more specifically flow in the key recovery service registration stage of the second way of counterpart keys backup refers to
Fig. 2, below for the process in the description key recovery service registration stages of Fig. 2 step by step.Serial number corresponding diagram 2 in following the description
In serial number.
1. user shows identity ID and user biological information (including face, fingerprint, iris etc.), to (third party) agent
Ask identity authentication service.
2. the biological information that agent calls and the government organs with legal effect network identifies interface, by user identity
ID and biological information are sent to government organs.
3. government organs audit user identity id information and whether biological information matches, if matching, returns to agent
" yes (YES) " otherwise returns " no (no) ".
4. it is right that agent generates User Token (token)：(token：yes/no).
The interface that 5. agent calls again and the government organs with legal effect network, by user identity ID and biology
Information is sent to government organs.
6. government organs audit match information, agent and the associated user biological information feature of identity ID are returned
(ID:feature)。
7. the cryptographic Hash of the token obtained from the government organs with legal effect and feature is sent to by agent
User：(token：Yes/no, h (feature)), wherein h (feature) indicates the cryptographic Hash of feature.
8. user generates public private key pair (sk1, pk1).
9. user generates random number r, then use the cryptographic Hash of random number r and user biological information feature to private key
Sk1 is encrypted, and obtains ciphertext C, and ciphertext is published on block chain, calculation formula is:
10. user is encrypted random number r using the public key of cipher key management services quotient, the ciphertext Cr of r is obtained.
11. the token of generation and identity ID are sent to cipher key management services quotient by user, request cipher key management services quotient into
Row random number backup services.
12. user token is sent to agent, the validity of requests verification token by cipher key management services quotient.
13. agent inquires the libraries local user token, the whether effective information of user token is sent to key management
Service provider：(yes/no).
14. if the information returned is yes, cipher key management services quotient allows the ciphertext Cr for receiving user's random number.
15. user sends random number ciphertext Cr.
16. ciphertext Cr is decrypted cipher key management services quotient using its private key, obtain r, and preserve, user's registration at
Work(.
In key recovery service request phases, when user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, first user to third party
Agent proposes certification application, and to verify user identity, (wherein third-party agent quotient is logical by authentication by third-party agent quotient
It is by networking with such as public security bureau of authentication mechanism that authentication, which is crossed, to verify user identity, and calling interface verifies user
Identity), certification returns to the cryptographic Hash of successful token (token) and user biological information after passing through；User passes through token
(token) propose that key recovery service request restores private key with request to cipher key management services quotient, cipher key management services quotient is to the
Tripartite agent inquires the validity of User Token (token), and as found user's random number if, random number and user are given birth to
The cryptographic Hash of object information carries out cooperated computing and is decrypted to ciphertext, and the private key for user obtained after decryption is returned to user.
More specifically flow refers to Fig. 3, below for the description key recovery service request phases of Fig. 3 step by step
Process.The serial number in serial number corresponding diagram 3 in following the description.
1. user shows identity ID and biometric information, identity authentication service is asked to agent.
2. the biological information that agent calls and the government organs with legal effect network identifies interface, by user identity
ID and biological information are sent to government organs.
3. government organs audit user identity id information and whether biological information matches, if matching, returns to agent
" yes (YES) " otherwise returns " no (no) ".
4. it is right that agent generates User Token (token)：(token：yes/no).
5. agent calls again and government organs' networking interface with legal effect, user identity ID and biology are believed
Breath is sent to government organs.
6. government organs audit match information, agent and the associated user biological information feature of identity ID are returned：
(ID:Feature), corresponding same identity ID, the user feature that this stage government organs returns are consistent with registration phase.
7. the cryptographic Hash of the token obtained from government organs and feature is sent to user by agent：(token：
Yes/no, h (feature)), wherein h (feature) indicates the cryptographic Hash of feature.
8. the token of generation and identity ID are sent to cipher key management services quotient by user, request cipher key management services quotient into
Row key recovery service.
9. user token is sent to agent, the validity of requests verification token by cipher key management services quotient.
10. agent inquires the libraries local user token, the whether effective information of user token is sent to key management
Service provider：(yes/no).
11. if the information returned is yes, cipher key management services quotient finds user random number r by user identity ID, and
Private key ciphertext C is fetched on chain.
12. user and cipher key management services quotient utilize MPC cooperated computing methods, use user biological information feature's
Cryptographic Hash and random number r carry out symmetrical decryption to private key for user ciphertext C and obtain private key for user sk1, and calculation formula is：
13. sk1 is returned to user by cipher key management services quotient, user restores key success.
In addition, another theme of the present invention is the computer program stored on computer-readable medium, including medium, meter
Calculation machine program is used to execute the block chain key recovery method based on Secure computing technique described in previous embodiment.Due to
Method and step is identical with previous embodiment, and details are not described herein.
Although to simplify explanation to illustrate the above method and being described as a series of actions, it should be understood that and understand,
The order that these methods are not acted is limited, because according to one or more embodiments, some actions can occur in different order
And/or with from it is depicted and described herein or herein it is not shown and describe but it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that other
Action concomitantly occurs.
Those skilled in the art will further appreciate that, the various illustratives described in conjunction with the embodiments described herein
Logic plate, module, circuit and algorithm steps can be realized as electronic hardware, computer software or combination of the two.It is clear
Explain to Chu this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, frame, module, circuit and step be above with
Its functional form makees generalization description.Such functionality be implemented as hardware or software depend on concrete application and
It is applied to the design constraint of total system.Technical staff can realize each specific application described with different modes
Functionality, but such realization decision should not be interpreted to cause departing from the scope of the present invention.
General place can be used in conjunction with various illustrative logic plates, module and the circuit that presently disclosed embodiment describes
Reason device, digital signal processor (DSP), application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), field programmable gate array (FPGA) other are compiled
Journey logical device, discrete door or transistor logic, discrete hardware component or its be designed to carry out function described herein
Any combinations are realized or are executed.General processor can be microprocessor, but in alternative, which can appoint
What conventional processor, controller, microcontroller or state machine.Processor is also implemented as the combination of computing device, example
As DSP and the combination of microprocessor, multi-microprocessor, the one or more microprocessors to cooperate with DSP core or it is any its
His such configuration.
It can be embodied directly in hardware, in by processor in conjunction with the step of method or algorithm that embodiment disclosed herein describes
It is embodied in the software module of execution or in combination of the two.Software module can reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM and deposit
Reservoir, eprom memory, eeprom memory, register, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM or known in the art appoint
In the storage medium of what other forms.Exemplary storage medium is coupled to processor so that the processor can be from/to the storage
Medium reads and writees information.In alternative, storage medium can be integrated into processor.Pocessor and storage media can
It resides in ASIC.ASIC can reside in user terminal.In alternative, pocessor and storage media can be used as discrete sets
Part is resident in the user terminal.
In one or more exemplary embodiments, described function can be in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof
Middle realization.If being embodied as computer program product in software, each function can be used as the instruction of one or more items or generation
Code may be stored on the computer-readable medium or is transmitted by it.Computer-readable medium includes computer storage media and communication
Both media comprising any medium for facilitating computer program to shift from one place to another.Storage medium can be can quilt
Any usable medium that computer accesses.It is non-limiting as example, such computer-readable medium may include RAM, ROM,
EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disc storage, disk storage or other magnetic storage apparatus can be used to carrying or store instruction
Or data structure form desirable program code and any other medium that can be accessed by a computer.Any connection is also by by rights
Referred to as computer-readable medium.For example, if software is using coaxial cable, fiber optic cables, twisted-pair feeder, digital subscriber line
(DSL) or the wireless technology of such as infrared, radio and microwave etc is passed from web site, server or other remote sources
It send, then the coaxial cable, fiber optic cables, twisted-pair feeder, DSL or such as infrared, radio and microwave etc is wireless
Technology is just included among the definition of medium.Disk (disk) and dish (disc) as used herein include compression dish
(CD), laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc (DVD), floppy disk and blu-ray disc, which disk (disk) are often reproduced in a manner of magnetic
Data, and dish (disc) with laser reproduce data optically.Combinations of the above should also be included in computer-readable medium
In the range of.
Offer is that can make or use this public affairs to make any person skilled in the art all to the previous description of the disclosure
It opens.The various modifications of the disclosure all will be apparent for a person skilled in the art, and as defined herein general
Suitable principle can be applied to spirit or scope of other variants without departing from the disclosure.The disclosure is not intended to be limited as a result,
Due to example described herein and design, but should be awarded and principle disclosed herein and novel features phase one
The widest scope of cause.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of block chain key recovery method based on Secure computing technique, which is characterized in that by user, third party's generation
Quotient, cipher key management services quotient participation are managed, key recovery service registration stage and key recovery service request phases are divided into, wherein：
In the key recovery service registration stage, user proposes that certification application, third-party agent quotient pass through body to third-party agent quotient
To verify user identity, certification returns to the cryptographic Hash of successful token and user biological information after passing through for part verification；User is logical
It crosses token and proposes cipher key backup service request to cipher key management services quotient, ask backup private key, cipher key management services quotient is to third
Square agent inquires the validity of User Token, as backed up private key if；
In key recovery service request phases, when user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, first user to third-party agent
Quotient proposes certification application, and by authentication to verify user identity, certification is returned after passing through and successfully enabled third-party agent quotient
The cryptographic Hash of board and user biological information；User by token to cipher key management services quotient propose key recovery service request with
Request restores private key, and cipher key management services quotient inquires the validity of User Token to third-party agent quotient, as found use if
The cryptographic Hash of random number and user biological information is carried out cooperated computing and is decrypted to ciphertext, and will obtained after decryption by family random number
Private key for user return to user.
2. the block chain key recovery method according to claim 1 based on Secure computing technique, which is characterized in that
Include in the step of key recovery service registration stage backup private key：Random number is generated for user in cipher key management services quotient, will be with
The cryptographic Hash of machine number and user biological information carries out cooperated computing and encrypts generation ciphertext to private key for user, and will be after cooperated computing
Ciphertext is published on block chain.
3. the block chain key recovery method according to claim 1 based on Secure computing technique, which is characterized in that
Include in the step of key recovery service registration stage backup private key：User oneself generates random number, it is local using random number and
The cryptographic Hash of user biological information is encrypted private key to form ciphertext, and ciphertext is published on block chain, user's key pipe
The public key of reason service provider will be sent to cipher key management services quotient after random number encryption, cipher key management services quotient protects after being decrypted
It deposits.
4. the block chain key recovery method according to claim 2 or 3 based on Secure computing technique, feature exist
In third-party agent quotient is by networking with authentication mechanism to verify user identity by authentication, and calling interface comes
Verify user identity.
5. the block chain key recovery method according to claim 4 based on Secure computing technique, which is characterized in that
Authentication mechanism is the government organs with legal effect.
6. a kind of computer-readable medium, which is characterized in that including the computer program stored on medium, the computer program
For executing the block chain key recovery method below based on Secure computing technique, by user, third-party agent quotient, close
Key management service quotient participates in, and is divided into key recovery service registration stage and key recovery service request phases, wherein：
In the key recovery service registration stage, user proposes that certification application, third-party agent quotient pass through body to third-party agent quotient
To verify user identity, certification returns to the cryptographic Hash of successful token and user biological information after passing through for part verification；User is logical
It crosses token and proposes cipher key backup service request to cipher key management services quotient, ask backup private key, cipher key management services quotient is to third
Square agent inquires the validity of User Token, as backed up private key if；
In key recovery service request phases, when user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, first user to third-party agent
Quotient proposes certification application, and by authentication to verify user identity, certification is returned after passing through and successfully enabled third-party agent quotient
The cryptographic Hash of board and user biological information；User by token to cipher key management services quotient propose key recovery service request with
Request restores private key, and cipher key management services quotient inquires the validity of User Token to third-party agent quotient, as found use if
The cryptographic Hash of random number and user biological information is carried out cooperated computing and is decrypted to ciphertext, and will obtained after decryption by family random number
Private key for user return to user.
7. computer-readable medium according to claim 6, which is characterized in that taken in key recovery what method was performed
Be engaged in registration phase backup private key the step of include：Random number is generated for user in cipher key management services quotient, and random number and user are given birth to
The cryptographic Hash of object information carries out cooperated computing and encrypts generation ciphertext to private key for user, and the ciphertext after cooperated computing is published to area
On block chain.
8. computer-readable medium according to claim 6, which is characterized in that taken in key recovery what method was performed
Be engaged in registration phase backup private key the step of include：User oneself generates random number, local to use random number and user biological information
Cryptographic Hash private key is encrypted to form ciphertext, ciphertext is published on block chain, user's public affairs of cipher key management services quotient
Key will be sent to cipher key management services quotient after random number encryption, cipher key management services quotient preserves after being decrypted.
9. computer-readable medium according to claim 7 or 8, which is characterized in that third-party agent quotient is tested by identity
Card is by networking with authentication mechanism to verify user identity, and calling interface verifies user identity.
10. computer-readable medium according to claim 9, which is characterized in that authentication mechanism is with law effect
The government organs of power.
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