CN108347332A - Verify the method and device of firmware signature - Google Patents
Verify the method and device of firmware signature Download PDFInfo
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- CN108347332A CN108347332A CN201710418279.9A CN201710418279A CN108347332A CN 108347332 A CN108347332 A CN 108347332A CN 201710418279 A CN201710418279 A CN 201710418279A CN 108347332 A CN108347332 A CN 108347332A
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- Prior art keywords
- public key
- firmware
- public
- signature
- programming
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
Abstract
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of method and device of verification firmware signature.The method includes：The public private key pair that trust authority CA is generated is obtained, signature is authenticated to firmware using the private key in the public private key pair；In trusted context, by the cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key in the public private key pair to One Time Programmable OTP region, and by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to read only memory ROM；The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the cryptographic Hash of the public key or the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware.OTP, ROM, CA by being combined as the credible core root of credible calculating platform by the present invention, ensure that public key, public key cryptographic Hash and firmware program will not be tampered, and pass through a series of certification and Trust transitivity, it is ensured that the firmware of whole system be by certification, completely it is believable.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of computer technology more particularly to a kind of method and devices of verification firmware signature.
Background technology
If trust computing refer to the behavior of a current entity always in a desired manner, sent out towards target
Exhibition, then it is believable.If from an initial trusted root being trusted, platform computing environment each time
When conversion, this trust state can be kept by way of transmission not to be destroyed, then the computing environment on platform begins
It is believable eventually, the various operations under trusted context will not destroy the credible of platform, and the integrality of platform itself is protected
Card, here it is the pass through mechanism of trust chain.
The core of entire trust computing be exactly the design of trusted root how to ensure it is secure and trusted, and the design of trusted root whether
The secure and trusted firmware for directly affecting whole system whether be by certification, completely it is believable.
Invention content
In order to solve the trusted root safety problem of trust computing, that is, ensure that the safety for verifying the public key of firmware signature is asked
Topic, the embodiment of the present invention provide a kind of method and device of verification firmware signature.
In order to achieve the above object, the embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of method of verification firmware signature, including：It obtains credible
The public private key pair that mechanism CA is generated, signature is authenticated using the private key in the public private key pair to firmware；In trusted context,
By the cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key in the public private key pair to One Time Programmable OTP region, and generation will be guided
Code BOOTLOADER programmings are to read only memory ROM；The guidance code BOOTLOADER is from the areas the One Time Programmable OTP
The cryptographic Hash of the public key or the public key is read in domain, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware.
In order to achieve the above object, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of device of verification firmware signature, including：Signature mould
Block, the public private key pair generated for obtaining trust authority CA, label are authenticated using the private key in the public private key pair to firmware
Name；Programming module is used in trusted context, by the cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key in the public private key pair to one
Secondary property may be programmed OTP region, and by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to read only memory ROM, wherein being tested when carrying out firmware
When card, the guidance code BOOTLOADER is used to read the public key or the public affairs from the One Time Programmable OTP region
The cryptographic Hash of key verifies the authentication signature of the firmware.
The method and apparatus of the revealed verification firmware of the embodiment of the present invention, by by One Time Programmable (One Time
Programable, OTP), read-only memory (Read-only Memory, ROM), certificate authority (Certificate
Authority, CA) it is combined as the credible core root of credible calculating platform, it is ensured that public key, public key cryptographic Hash and firmware program
It will not be tampered, and pass through a series of certification and Trust transitivity, it is ensured that the firmware of whole system is by certification, completely
It is believable.
Description of the drawings
Included attached drawing is used for providing being further understood from the embodiment of the present invention, and which constitute one of specification
Point, for illustrating embodiments of the present invention, and come together with verbal description to illustrate the principle of the present invention.Under it should be evident that
Attached drawing in the description of face is only some embodiments of the present invention, for those of ordinary skill in the art, is not paying wound
Under the premise of the property made is laborious, other drawings may also be obtained based on these drawings.In the accompanying drawings：
Fig. 1 is the process chart of the method for the verification firmware signature of the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the method schematic diagram of the verification firmware signature of one embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 3 is the method schematic diagram of the verification firmware signature of another embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is the method schematic diagram of the verification firmware signature of further embodiment of this invention；
Fig. 5 is the structural schematic diagram of the device of the verification firmware signature of the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific implementation mode
With reference to attached drawing, by following specification, aforementioned and other feature of the invention will be apparent.In specification
In attached drawing, only certain exemplary embodiments of this invention is specifically disclosed, which show the portions for the principle that the present invention wherein may be used
Divide embodiment, it will thus be appreciated that the present invention is not limited to described embodiments, on the contrary, the present invention includes falling into appended power
Whole modifications, modification and equivalent in the range of profit requirement.
The feature for describing and/or showing for a kind of embodiment can be in a manner of same or similar one or more
It is used in a other embodiment, it is combined with the feature in other embodiment, or substitute the feature in other embodiment.
It should be emphasized that term "comprises/comprising" refers to the presence of feature, one integral piece, step or component when being used herein, but simultaneously
It is not excluded for the presence or additional of one or more other features, one integral piece, step or component.
The present invention proposes a kind of method and device of verification firmware signature, and innovative point is to propose a kind of completely new credible
The realization method of root ensures the secure and trusted of firmware validation.Technological means is used by the realization of trusted root：It will be disposable
In programmable (One Time Programable, OTP), read-only memory (Read-only Memory, ROM), certificate granting
The heart (Certificate Authority, CA) is combined as the credible core root of credible calculating platform, and CA is as authenticating party to solid
It signs after part certification, it is ensured that program is not tampered；Simultaneously in the burned OTP of cryptographic Hash of the CA public keys for verifying signature, it is ensured that
Public key is not tampered, and the hardware feature of OTP one time programmings ensure that the safety of cryptographic Hash.By this series of certification and
Trust transitivity, it is ensured that the firmware of whole system be by certification, completely it is believable.
Fig. 1 is the process chart of the method for the verification firmware signature of the embodiment of the present invention.As shown in Figure 1, the method
Including：
Step S101 obtains the public private key pair that trust authority CA is generated, using the private key in the public private key pair to firmware
It is authenticated signature；
Step S102, in trusted context, extremely by the cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key in the public private key pair
One Time Programmable OTP region, and by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to read only memory ROM；
Step S103, the guidance code BOOTLOADER read the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region
Or the cryptographic Hash of the public key, verify the authentication signature of the firmware.
In the step S101 of one embodiment, trust authority CA generates a pair of public and private key using asymmetric arithmetic, passes through
After analyzing the integrality that code confirms firmware, signed to firmware using private key.
Also, before being authenticated signature to firmware using the private key in the public and private key, further include：It analyzes described solid
The code of part determines whether the firmware is complete, when determining that the firmware is complete, using the private key in the public and private key to institute
It states firmware and is authenticated signature.Trust authority CA is authoritative institution, goes to examine whether confirmation firmware is complete using the method for oneself
Whole, trust authority CA can sign to firmware after confirmation, and such trust authority CA is just recognized the complete of the firmware
Whole property.
In the step S102 of one embodiment, in trusted context, by the cryptographic Hash programming of public key or public key to OTP,
Ensure that the data in OTP are believable.It, can be in manufacture luck after BOOTLOADER programmings to ROM simultaneously for simple flow
The safety of row test b OOTLOADER.Read only memory ROM is written into BOOTLOADER, is to ensure BOOTLOADER
Safety, once write-in cannot be changed, after operation confirms its safety when dispatching from the factory in this way, when can ensure BOOTLOADER operations
Public key or its cryptographic Hash can be read according to being pre-designed from OTP.
In addition, can be by the firmware programming after signature to device non-volatile memory FLASH, programming operation need not be can
It is carried out in letter environment.
In the step S103 of one embodiment, after upper electricity operation, guidance code BOOTLOADER disposably may be used from described
Programming OTP region reads the cryptographic Hash of the public key or the public key, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware.If guidance code
BOOTLOADER reads the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region, and then be used directly read public key verifications
The signature of firmware, if guidance code BOOTLOADER read from the One Time Programmable OTP region be public key Hash
Value then calculates its cryptographic Hash, with institute according to the public key read from ROM or device non-volatile memory FLASH first
The cryptographic Hash for stating the public key read in One Time Programmable OTP is compared, and unanimously then thinks that public key comes from trust authority CA.Really
Public key is recognized after trust authority CA, using the signature of read public key verifications firmware, and then verifies the integrality of firmware.
Finally, if firmware validation passes through, guidance code BOOTLOADER moves believable firmware to be transported into RAM
Row, completes the transmission of trust chain.
Embodiment one：
In this embodiment, referring to shown in Fig. 2, a pair of of public private key pair is generated using asymmetric arithmetic in trust authority CA
Afterwards, signature is authenticated to firmware using the private key in public private key pair, the firmware after signature is stored in equipment is non-volatile to deposit
In reservoir FLASH.Meanwhile the storage of public keys in OTP, BOOTLOADER is stored in ROM without carrying public key.Upper electricity operation
Afterwards, BOOTLOADER takes public key from OTP, and the firmware after reading signature in device non-volatile memory FLASH uses institute
The signature of the public key verifications firmware of reading, and then verify the integrality of firmware.If having passed through signature verification, confirm that firmware is complete
Whole property is not destroyed.
Embodiment two：
In this embodiment, shown in referring to Fig. 3, a pair of of public private key pair is generated using asymmetric arithmetic in trust authority CA
Afterwards, signature is authenticated to firmware using the private key in public private key pair, the firmware after signature is stored in equipment is non-volatile to deposit
In reservoir FLASH.Meanwhile in OTP storage of public keys cryptographic Hash, BOOTLOADER is stored in ROM, it is non-volatile in equipment
In memory FLASH simultaneously storage of public keys.After upper electricity operation, BOOTLOADER reads the cryptographic Hash of public key from OTP, non-from equipment
Volatile memory FLASH reads public key, confirms public key source, i.e.,：Cryptographic Hash is calculated after reading public key, with the public key in OTP
Cryptographic Hash make comparisons, unanimously then think public key come from trust authority CA.Public key is being confirmed after trust authority CA, from equipment
The firmware after signature is read in nonvolatile memory FLASH, using the signature of read public key verifications firmware, and then is verified
The integrality of firmware.Since OTP costs are relatively high, in the present embodiment only in OTP storage of public keys cryptographic Hash, therefore can drop
Low cost.
Embodiment three：
In this embodiment, referring to shown in Fig. 4, a pair of of public private key pair is generated using asymmetric arithmetic in trust authority CA
Afterwards, signature is authenticated to firmware using the private key in public private key pair, the firmware after signature is stored in equipment is non-volatile to deposit
In reservoir FLASH.Meanwhile in OTP storage of public keys cryptographic Hash, BOOTLOADER and public key are stored in ROM.Power on fortune
After row, BOOTLOADER reads the cryptographic Hash of public key from OTP, verifies the source of public key in ROM.I.e.：Kazakhstan is calculated after reading public key
Uncommon value, makes comparisons with the cryptographic Hash in OTP, unanimously then thinks that public key comes from trust authority CA.Confirm that public key comes from trust authority
After CA, the firmware after reading signature in device non-volatile memory FLASH uses the label of read public key verifications firmware
Name, and then verify the integrality of firmware.In the present embodiment, on the one hand in OTP storage of public keys cryptographic Hash, reduce into
This, the stability of system can be ensure that with defensive attack by being on the other hand stored in the ROM public key.
Can be obtained from above example, the embodiment of the present invention by One Time Programmable (One Time Programable,
OTP), read-only memory (Read-only Memory, ROM), certificate authority (Certificate Authority, CA)
Be combined as the credible core root of credible calculating platform, CA as authenticating party to guidance code BOOTLOADER and firmware authentication after
Signature, it is ensured that program is not tampered；Simultaneously for verify sign CA public keys the burned OTP of cryptographic Hash in, it is ensured that public key not by
It distorts, and the hardware feature of OTP one time programmings ensure that the safety of cryptographic Hash.By this series of certification and trust biography
Pass, it is ensured that the firmware of whole system be by certification, completely it is believable.
Based on same design, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of device of verification firmware signature, as shown in figure 5, described
Device includes：Signature blocks 501, the public private key pair generated for obtaining trust authority CA, use the private in the public private key pair
Key is authenticated signature to firmware；Programming module 502, in trusted context, by the public private key pair public key or institute
The cryptographic Hash programming of public key is stated to One Time Programmable OTP region, and by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to read-only storage
Device ROM, wherein when carrying out firmware validation, the guidance code BOOTLOADER is used for from the areas the One Time Programmable OTP
The cryptographic Hash of the public key or the public key is read in domain, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware.
In one embodiment, the programming module 502 is specifically used for：By the public key programming to the One Time Programmable
OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to the read only memory ROM, wherein when carrying out firmware validation,
The guidance code BOOTLOADER is used to read the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region, uses the public key
Verify the authentication signature of the firmware.
In one embodiment, the programming module 502 is specifically used for：By the cryptographic Hash programming of the public key to described primary
Property programmable OTP region the public key is burnt in the guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to the read only memory ROM
Be written to device non-volatile memory FLASH, wherein when carrying out firmware validation, the guidance code BOOTLOADER be used for from
The One Time Programmable OTP region reads the cryptographic Hash of the public key, is read from the device non-volatile memory FLASH
The public key is taken, behind the source that the public key is determined according to the cryptographic Hash of the public key, uses firmware described in the public key verifications
Authentication signature.
In one embodiment, the programming module 502 is specifically used for：By the cryptographic Hash programming of the public key to described primary
Property programmable OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER and the public key programming to the read only memory ROM,
In when carrying out firmware validation, the guidance code BOOTLOADER be used for from the One Time Programmable OTP region read institute
The cryptographic Hash for stating public key reads the public key from the read only memory ROM, according to the determination of the cryptographic Hash of the public key
Behind the source of public key, the authentication signature of firmware described in the public key verifications is used.
In one embodiment, the programming module 502 is additionally operable in the private key using in the public private key pair to solid
Part is authenticated after signature, by the firmware programming after authentication signature to device non-volatile memory FLASH.The present invention is implemented
The method and apparatus of the revealed verification firmware signature of example can be applied in embedded system, PC machine, server, mobile phone, encryption
Chip etc. all safety and credibility are required in relatively high system.Also, if by One Time Programmable (One
Time Programable, OTP), read-only memory (Read-only Memory, ROM), certificate authority
(Certificate Authority, CA) individually takes out, and can be packaged into credible platform module (trusted Platform
Module, TPM) chip, realize more flexible security strategy configuration.
Credible platform module is one kind and plants the chip for providing trusted root for computer in computer-internal.It is according to the present invention
The method for realizing trusted root, by One Time Programmable (One Time Programable, OTP), read-only memory (Read-
Only Memory, ROM), certificate authority (Certificate Authority, CA) be combined as credible platform module
The trusted root is placed in TPM chips and installs the TPM chips in a computer, can be effectively protected meter by trusted root
Calculation machine, prevents unauthorized users to access.
The device and method more than present invention can be by hardware realization, can also be by combination of hardware software realization.The present invention
It is related to such computer-readable program, when the program is performed by logical block, the logical block can be made to realize above
The device or component parts, or the logical block is made to realize various method or steps described above.The invention further relates to
Storage medium for storing procedure above, such as hard disk, disk, CD, DVD, flash memory.
Above in association with specific embodiment, invention has been described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that this
A little descriptions are all exemplary, and are not limiting the scope of the invention.Those skilled in the art can be according to the present invention
Spirit and principle various variants and modifications are made to the present invention, these variants and modifications are also within the scope of the invention.
Claims (11)
1. a kind of method of verification firmware signature, which is characterized in that the method includes：
The public private key pair that trust authority CA is generated is obtained, signature is authenticated to firmware using the private key in the public private key pair；
In trusted context, by the cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key in the public private key pair to One Time Programmable
OTP region, and by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to read only memory ROM；
The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the Kazakhstan of the public key or the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region
Uncommon value, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware.
2. it is according to claim 1 verification firmware signature method, which is characterized in that it is described will be in the public private key pair
The cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key is to One Time Programmable OTP region, and extremely by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings
Read only memory ROM, including：
By the public key programming to the One Time Programmable OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to institute
State read only memory ROM；
The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the Kazakhstan of the public key or the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region
Uncommon value, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware, including：
The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region, uses the public key
Verify the authentication signature of the firmware.
3. it is according to claim 1 verification firmware signature method, which is characterized in that it is described will be in the public private key pair
The cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key is to One Time Programmable OTP region, and extremely by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings
Read only memory ROM, including：
By the cryptographic Hash programming of the public key to the One Time Programmable OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER
Programming is to the read only memory ROM, by the public key programming to device non-volatile memory FLASH；
The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the Kazakhstan of the public key or the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region
Uncommon value, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware, including：
The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the cryptographic Hash of the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region, from institute
State and read the public key in device non-volatile memory FLASH, according to the cryptographic Hash of the public key determine the public key come
Behind source, the authentication signature of firmware described in the public key verifications is used.
4. it is according to claim 1 verification firmware signature method, which is characterized in that it is described will be in the public private key pair
The cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key is to One Time Programmable OTP region, and extremely by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings
Read only memory ROM, including：
By the cryptographic Hash programming of the public key to the One Time Programmable OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER
And the public key programming is to the read only memory ROM；
The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the Kazakhstan of the public key or the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region
Uncommon value, verifies the authentication signature of the firmware, including：
The guidance code BOOTLOADER reads the cryptographic Hash of the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region, from institute
It states and reads the public key in read only memory ROM, behind the source that the public key is determined according to the cryptographic Hash of the public key, use institute
State the authentication signature of firmware described in public key verifications.
5. the method for verification firmware signature according to any one of claims 1 to 4, which is characterized in that use institute described
It states after the private key in public private key pair is authenticated signature to firmware, further includes：By the firmware programming after authentication signature to equipment
Nonvolatile memory FLASH.
6. the method for verification firmware signature according to any one of claim 1 to 4, which is characterized in that in the use
Before private key in the public and private key is authenticated signature to firmware, further include：
The code for analyzing the firmware determines whether the firmware is complete；
The private key using in the public and private key is authenticated signature to firmware, including：
When determining that the firmware is complete, signature is authenticated to the firmware using the private key in the public and private key.
7. a kind of device of verification firmware signature, which is characterized in that described device includes：
Signature blocks, the public private key pair generated for obtaining trust authority CA, using the private key in the public private key pair to firmware
It is authenticated signature；
Programming module is used in trusted context, extremely by the cryptographic Hash programming of public key or the public key in the public private key pair
One Time Programmable OTP region, and by guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to read only memory ROM, wherein when carrying out firmware
When verification, the guidance code BOOTLOADER is used to read the public key or described from the One Time Programmable OTP region
The cryptographic Hash of public key verifies the authentication signature of the firmware.
8. the device of verification firmware signature according to claim 7, which is characterized in that the programming module is specifically used for：
By the public key programming to the One Time Programmable OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings to described
Memory ROM is read, wherein when carrying out firmware validation, the guidance code BOOTLOADER is used for from the One Time Programmable
OTP region reads the public key, uses the authentication signature of firmware described in the public key verifications.
9. the device of verification firmware signature according to claim 7, which is characterized in that the programming module is specifically used for：
By the cryptographic Hash programming of the public key to the One Time Programmable OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER programmings
To the read only memory ROM, by the public key programming to device non-volatile memory FLASH, wherein being tested when carrying out firmware
When card, the guidance code BOOTLOADER is used to read the cryptographic Hash of the public key from the One Time Programmable OTP region,
The public key is read from the device non-volatile memory FLASH, the public key is determined according to the cryptographic Hash of the public key
Source after, use the authentication signature of firmware described in the public key verifications.
10. the device of verification firmware signature according to claim 7, which is characterized in that the programming module is specifically used for：
By the cryptographic Hash programming of the public key to the One Time Programmable OTP region, by the guidance code BOOTLOADER and institute
Public key programming is stated to the read only memory ROM, wherein when carrying out firmware validation, the guidance code BOOTLOADER is used for
The cryptographic Hash that the public key is read from the One Time Programmable OTP region, reads the public affairs from the read only memory ROM
Key behind the source for determining the public key according to the cryptographic Hash of the public key, uses the certification label of firmware described in the public key verifications
Name.
11. verifying the device of firmware signature according to claim 7 to 10 any one of them, which is characterized in that the programming mould
Block is additionally operable to after the private key using in the public private key pair is authenticated signature to firmware, by consolidating after authentication signature
Part programming is to device non-volatile memory FLASH.
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| CN201710418279.9A CN108347332A (en) | 2017-06-06 | 2017-06-06 | Verify the method and device of firmware signature |
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| CN201710418279.9A CN108347332A (en) | 2017-06-06 | 2017-06-06 | Verify the method and device of firmware signature |
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Cited By (19)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN109445705A (en) * | 2018-10-29 | 2019-03-08 | 湖南国科微电子股份有限公司 | Firmware authentication method and solid state hard disk |
| CN110086623A (en) * | 2019-03-13 | 2019-08-02 | 捷德（中国）信息科技有限公司 | A kind of firmware method for anti-counterfeit and safety element based on safety element |
| CN111095213A (en) * | 2018-08-23 | 2020-05-01 | 深圳市汇顶科技股份有限公司 | Safe booting method, device, equipment and storage medium of embedded program |
| CN111160879A (en) * | 2018-11-07 | 2020-05-15 | 新明华区块链技术（深圳）有限公司 | Hardware wallet and security improving method and device thereof |
| CN111177693A (en) * | 2019-12-11 | 2020-05-19 | 福建魔方电子科技有限公司 | Method, device, equipment and medium for verifying terminal root certificate |
| CN111241522A (en) * | 2020-01-07 | 2020-06-05 | 杭州涂鸦信息技术有限公司 | Firmware signature method and device and storage medium |
| CN112099855A (en) * | 2020-08-05 | 2020-12-18 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Information processing method, electronic equipment and computer storage medium |
| CN112511306A (en) * | 2020-11-03 | 2021-03-16 | 中国航空工业集团公司西安航空计算技术研究所 | Safe operation environment construction method based on mixed trust model |
| CN112612486A (en) * | 2020-12-28 | 2021-04-06 | 湖北芯擎科技有限公司 | Memory burning method and device and chip to be burned |
| CN112632562A (en) * | 2020-12-28 | 2021-04-09 | 四川虹微技术有限公司 | Equipment starting method, equipment management method and embedded equipment |
| CN112955889A (en) * | 2018-11-07 | 2021-06-11 | 微安科技有限公司 | Safe starting device and method |
| CN113032786A (en) * | 2019-12-25 | 2021-06-25 | 成都鼎桥通信技术有限公司 | Authentication certificate transfer method, chip and equipment |
| CN113468559A (en) * | 2021-06-18 | 2021-10-01 | 中国电子产品可靠性与环境试验研究所（（工业和信息化部电子第五研究所）（中国赛宝实验室）） | Firmware verification method and system |
| CN113486360A (en) * | 2021-07-14 | 2021-10-08 | 上海瓶钵信息科技有限公司 | RISC-V based safe starting method and system |
| CN114065218A (en) * | 2021-11-19 | 2022-02-18 | 山东方寸微电子科技有限公司 | SoC system chip safe starting method |
| US20220067166A1 (en) * | 2020-08-25 | 2022-03-03 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Storage device |
| CN114385248A (en) * | 2020-10-22 | 2022-04-22 | 四零四科技股份有限公司 | Computing system and device for processing trust chain |
| CN114640461A (en) * | 2022-02-16 | 2022-06-17 | 深圳市优博讯科技股份有限公司 | Firmware tamper-proofing method and system based on security chip |
| CN114065218B (en) * | 2021-11-19 | 2024-04-12 | 山东方寸微电子科技有限公司 | SoC system chip safe starting method |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN111095213A (en) * | 2018-08-23 | 2020-05-01 | 深圳市汇顶科技股份有限公司 | Safe booting method, device, equipment and storage medium of embedded program |
| CN109445705B (en) * | 2018-10-29 | 2022-03-22 | 湖南国科微电子股份有限公司 | Firmware authentication method and solid state disk |
| CN109445705A (en) * | 2018-10-29 | 2019-03-08 | 湖南国科微电子股份有限公司 | Firmware authentication method and solid state hard disk |
| CN111160879B (en) * | 2018-11-07 | 2023-11-03 | 新明华区块链技术（深圳）有限公司 | Hardware wallet and security improving method and device thereof |
| CN111160879A (en) * | 2018-11-07 | 2020-05-15 | 新明华区块链技术（深圳）有限公司 | Hardware wallet and security improving method and device thereof |
| CN112955889A (en) * | 2018-11-07 | 2021-06-11 | 微安科技有限公司 | Safe starting device and method |
| CN110086623A (en) * | 2019-03-13 | 2019-08-02 | 捷德（中国）信息科技有限公司 | A kind of firmware method for anti-counterfeit and safety element based on safety element |
| CN111177693B (en) * | 2019-12-11 | 2022-08-16 | 福建魔方电子科技有限公司 | Method, device, equipment and medium for verifying terminal root certificate |
| CN111177693A (en) * | 2019-12-11 | 2020-05-19 | 福建魔方电子科技有限公司 | Method, device, equipment and medium for verifying terminal root certificate |
| CN113032786A (en) * | 2019-12-25 | 2021-06-25 | 成都鼎桥通信技术有限公司 | Authentication certificate transfer method, chip and equipment |
| CN111241522B (en) * | 2020-01-07 | 2022-10-04 | 杭州涂鸦信息技术有限公司 | Firmware signature method and device and storage medium |
| CN111241522A (en) * | 2020-01-07 | 2020-06-05 | 杭州涂鸦信息技术有限公司 | Firmware signature method and device and storage medium |
| CN112099855A (en) * | 2020-08-05 | 2020-12-18 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Information processing method, electronic equipment and computer storage medium |
| CN112099855B (en) * | 2020-08-05 | 2022-01-14 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Information processing method, electronic equipment and computer storage medium |
| US11520896B2 (en) * | 2020-08-25 | 2022-12-06 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Storage device |
| US20220067166A1 (en) * | 2020-08-25 | 2022-03-03 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Storage device |
| CN114385248A (en) * | 2020-10-22 | 2022-04-22 | 四零四科技股份有限公司 | Computing system and device for processing trust chain |
| CN112511306A (en) * | 2020-11-03 | 2021-03-16 | 中国航空工业集团公司西安航空计算技术研究所 | Safe operation environment construction method based on mixed trust model |
| CN112632562A (en) * | 2020-12-28 | 2021-04-09 | 四川虹微技术有限公司 | Equipment starting method, equipment management method and embedded equipment |
| CN112612486A (en) * | 2020-12-28 | 2021-04-06 | 湖北芯擎科技有限公司 | Memory burning method and device and chip to be burned |
| CN112632562B (en) * | 2020-12-28 | 2024-01-26 | 四川虹微技术有限公司 | Device starting method, device management method and embedded device |
| CN113468559A (en) * | 2021-06-18 | 2021-10-01 | 中国电子产品可靠性与环境试验研究所（（工业和信息化部电子第五研究所）（中国赛宝实验室）） | Firmware verification method and system |
| CN113468559B (en) * | 2021-06-18 | 2024-01-05 | 中国电子产品可靠性与环境试验研究所（（工业和信息化部电子第五研究所）（中国赛宝实验室）） | Firmware verification method and system |
| CN113486360A (en) * | 2021-07-14 | 2021-10-08 | 上海瓶钵信息科技有限公司 | RISC-V based safe starting method and system |
| CN114065218A (en) * | 2021-11-19 | 2022-02-18 | 山东方寸微电子科技有限公司 | SoC system chip safe starting method |
| CN114065218B (en) * | 2021-11-19 | 2024-04-12 | 山东方寸微电子科技有限公司 | SoC system chip safe starting method |
| CN114640461A (en) * | 2022-02-16 | 2022-06-17 | 深圳市优博讯科技股份有限公司 | Firmware tamper-proofing method and system based on security chip |
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Application publication date: 20180731 |