CN108271159A - Communication processing method, apparatus and system, safety communicating method and device - Google Patents
Communication processing method, apparatus and system, safety communicating method and device Download PDFInfo
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- CN108271159A CN108271159A CN201710004223.9A CN201710004223A CN108271159A CN 108271159 A CN108271159 A CN 108271159A CN 201710004223 A CN201710004223 A CN 201710004223A CN 108271159 A CN108271159 A CN 108271159A
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- pseudo
- base station
- short message
- information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention discloses the communication processing method and device of a kind of pseudo-base station, a kind of safety communicating method and devices and a kind of communication processing system of pseudo-base station, for field of communication technology, can solve the problems, such as efficiently cut off the communication between pseudo-base station and user in the prior art.This method includes：Receive the short message that client or terminal report；It detects whether the signing messages in the short message meets condition, when detecting that the signing messages is unsatisfactory for condition, determines that the short message comes from pseudo-base station；Cut off the communication between the client or the terminal and the pseudo-base station.The present invention is used to identify pseudo-base station and cuts off the processing scene of the communication between pseudo-base station and user.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to field of communication technology more particularly to a kind of communication processing method of pseudo-base station, a kind of pseudo-base stations
Communication processing apparatus, a kind of secure communication processing method, a kind of secure communication processing unit and a kind of communication process of pseudo-base station
System.
Background technology
The identification of pseudo-base station is mainly the following with the interception scheme that communicates at present：The first is to pass through technological means
Real ones information is stored in the user terminal, all base station informations received are compared, and filters pseudo-base station；It is for second
It manually identifies and reports, then carry out Regional Radio monitoring, find out pseudo-base station；The third is to allow user in the net pre-established
Reserved cipher is closed, and indicates that third-party platform must carry the cipher when sending short message to user terminal every time, then works as user
When terminal receives the short message of third-party platform transmission, cipher therein to short message is detected, close when not including this in short message
During language, then judge that short message is pretended to be for pseudo-base station transmitted by third-party platform.
But the technical difficulty that there is, input big to the system reform greatly for the first above-mentioned scheme and be related to is big, and
And the problem of communication between base station and user can not be intercepted in time；For above-mentioned second scheme there are general user be difficult know
Other pseudo-base station, so as to also be difficult to screen the short message of pseudo-base station transmission, it is even more impossible to realize asking for the intercept process of pseudo-base station communication
Topic；And existing for the third above-mentioned scheme needs to implement by third-party platform, and what the program primarily served is to inform work
With shortage system automation intercept process process.
To sum up, it is existing can identify short message whether be short message transmitted by pseudo-base station technical solution exist it is as follows
Some is insufficient：
(1) network of base station information compares only carries out in platform, and user or None- identified which short message are by pseudo- base
Stand hair short message, which is the normal short message sent by real ones.
(2) if the real ones information in user terminal is caused to update not in time for some reason, can cause by true
The normal short message that real base station is sent is identified as the short message of pseudo-base station transmission.
(3) real ones information is easy to be acquired, then as the technological progress of pseudo-base station may also imitate real ones
Parameter, above-mentioned the first scheme is caused to fail.
(4) post-processing is belonged to, and need occurrences in human life and first identify to the monitoring of pseudo-base station, tracking, after report
Go to track, but can identify pseudo-base station people seldom and tracking process cost it is very high, equipment is limited.
(5) since the technology of pseudo-base station is being constantly progressive, then go identification that can gradually be cracked using fixed mode, pseudo-base station
Upgrading method can be caused to fail.
(6) existing monitoring method can not be got through the pseudo-base station based on core network and identified, is real by way of automation
When client's early warning inform, the flows such as system automation intercept process.
So how efficiently to identify pseudo-base station, and the communication between pseudo-base station and user terminal is cut off as increasingly tight
The problem of high.
Invention content
Communication processing method and communication processing apparatus, a kind of secure communication an embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of pseudo-base station
Processing method and secure communication processing unit and a kind of communication processing system of pseudo-base station, can solve in the prior art can not be high
The problem of effect ground cuts off the communication between pseudo-base station and user.
In a first aspect, the present invention provides a kind of communication processing method of pseudo-base station, including：It receives in client or terminal
The short message of report；Detect whether the signing messages in the short message meets condition, when detecting that the signing messages is unsatisfactory for condition,
Determine that the short message comes from pseudo-base station；Cut off the communication between the client or the terminal and the pseudo-base station.
With reference to first aspect, in the first embodiment of first aspect, the signing messages is note signature service
Device is carried according to the one-to-one signing messages that pre-arranged code rule is short message generation, and by the signing messages of generation
In the short message.
The first embodiment with reference to first aspect, in second of embodiment of first aspect, the detection institute
It states whether the signing messages in short message meets condition, specifically includes：
Detect whether the signing messages is default signing messages, it is described when the signing messages is default signing messages
Signing messages meets condition；Or
Identify the identification code in the signing messages, when identifying the identification code, the signing messages meets condition.
With reference to first aspect, it is described to determine that the short message comes from pseudo-base station in the third embodiment of first aspect
Later, the method further includes：
Identify the URL information and/or telephone number in the short message；
Differentiate that the URL information whether from malicious websites, differentiates whether the telephone number is fraudulent call number；
By differentiating secure communication processing unit is sent to for the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number.
With reference to first aspect, it is described to determine that the short message comes from pseudo-base station in the 4th kind of embodiment of first aspect
Later, the method further includes：
Obtain the identification parameter information of the pseudo-base station and first position information；
Obtain the client or the current second position information of the terminal；By the identification parameter information, described
One location information and the second position information are sent to secure communication processing unit.
Second aspect, the present invention provides a kind of communication processing apparatus of pseudo-base station, including：
Receiving unit, for receiving the short message that client or terminal report；
Whether detection unit, the signing messages for detecting in the short message meet condition, detect the signing messages
When being unsatisfactory for condition, determine that the short message comes from pseudo-base station；
Processing unit, for cutting off the communication between the client or the terminal and the pseudo-base station.
With reference to second aspect, in the first embodiment of second aspect, the signing messages is note signature service
Device is carried according to the one-to-one signing messages that pre-arranged code rule is short message generation, and by the signing messages of generation
In the short message.
With reference to the first embodiment of second aspect, in second of embodiment of second aspect, the detection is single
Member is specifically used for：
Detect whether the signing messages is default signing messages, it is described when the signing messages is default signing messages
Signing messages meets condition；Or
Identify the identification code in the signing messages, when identifying the identification code, the signing messages meets condition.
With reference to second aspect, in the third embodiment of second aspect, described device further includes：
Recognition unit, for determining the short message after the pseudo-base station, identify URL information in the short message and/
Or telephone number；
Discriminating unit, for differentiating that the URL information whether from malicious websites, differentiates whether the telephone number is swindleness
Deceive telephone number；
First transmitting element, for that will be sent differentiating for the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Give secure communication processing unit.
With reference to second aspect, in the 4th kind of embodiment of second aspect, described device further includes：
Acquiring unit, for determining that the short message after pseudo-base station, obtains the identification parameter information of the pseudo-base station
With first position information；
Positioning unit, for obtaining the client or the current second position information of the terminal；
Second transmitting element, for by the identification parameter information, the first position information and the second confidence
Breath is sent to secure communication processing unit.
The third aspect, the present invention provides a kind of secure communication processing method, the method includes：Receive the knowledge of pseudo-base station
URL information from malicious websites and/or swindleness in other parameter information and first position information, the short message from the pseudo-base station
Deceive telephone number and client or the current second position information of terminal；According to the identification parameter information, first described
Confidence breath, the second position information and the URL information and/or fraudulent call number from malicious websites are directed to the puppet
Base station securely communicates processing.
It is described according to the identification parameter information, institute in the first embodiment of the third aspect with reference to the third aspect
State first position information, the second position information and the URL information and/or fraudulent call number needle from malicious websites
Processing is securely communicated to the pseudo-base station, is specifically included：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for other described clients or terminal recognition
The pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for
The pseudo-base station is tracked；The puppet is intercepted according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Base station comes to other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal of client or terminal transmission
The pseudo-base station.
Fourth aspect, the present invention propose a kind of secure communication processing unit, including：Described device includes：Receiving unit,
For receiving the identification parameter information of pseudo-base station and first position information, the short message from the pseudo-base station of user terminal acquisition
In URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number and the client or the current second position of terminal
Information；Processing unit, for according to the identification parameter information, the first position information, the second position information and institute
It states URL information and/or the fraudulent call number from malicious websites and securely communicates processing for the pseudo-base station.
With reference to fourth aspect, in the first embodiment of fourth aspect, the processing unit is specifically used for：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for other described clients or terminal recognition
The pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for
The pseudo-base station is tracked；
The pseudo-base station is intercepted to all visitors according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal that family end or terminal are sent are from the pseudo- base
It stands.
5th aspect, the present invention provides a kind of communication processing system of pseudo-base station, the system comprises：Note signature takes
The communication processing apparatus of business device and pseudo-base station；And the note signature server, for being short message according to pre-arranged code rule
One-to-one signing messages is generated, and the signing messages of generation is carried in the short message；The pseudo-base station is led to
Believe processing unit, determine that the short message comes from pseudo- base when being unsatisfactory for condition for the signing messages in the short message for detecting reception
It stands, and cuts off the communication of client or terminal and the pseudo-base station.
In terms of the 5th, in the first embodiment of the 5th aspect, the system also includes：Secure communication is handled
Device；And
The communication processing apparatus of the pseudo-base station is determining the short message after pseudo-base station, for the identification of pseudo-base station
URL information from malicious websites and/or swindle in parameter information and first position information, the short message from the pseudo-base station
Telephone number and the current second position information of the client or terminal are sent to the secure communication processing unit；
The secure communication processing unit is used for：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for other described clients or terminal recognition
The pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for
The pseudo-base station is tracked；The puppet is intercepted according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Base station comes to other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal of client or terminal transmission
The pseudo-base station.
Communication processing method and communication processing apparatus, a kind of secure communication an embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of pseudo-base station
Processing method and processing device and a kind of communication processing system of pseudo-base station, if differentiating what is carried in the short message that user receives in the present invention
Note signature server meets condition for its one-to-one signing messages added, it is determined that the base station is real ones, no
Then it is determined as pseudo-base station.
In addition, when being determined as pseudo-base station, on the one hand pseudo-base station communication processing apparatus can believe the identification parameter of pseudo-base station
Breath, location information, URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number and the location information of itself in short message
Secure communication processing unit is sent to, the communication between pseudo-base station and all users is blocked for secure communication processing unit；It is another
Aspect pseudo-base station communication processing apparatus cuts off its communication between pseudo-base station according to the identification parameter information of pseudo-base station.Due to puppet
Every short message that base station communication processing unit receives can all carry different label informations, then pseudo-base station is sent to the short message of user
Efficiently it can be identified and intercept, and the technical solution whole process automates, and has got through the pseudo-base station based on core network
The flows such as identification, real-time early warning are informed, system automation intercept process, while any to radio network part generation need not be transformed,
Any parameter need not be monitored, it is easy to operate efficient, and improvement cost is low, versatile.
Description of the drawings
In order to illustrate the technical solution of the embodiments of the present invention more clearly, it will make below to required in the embodiment of the present invention
Attached drawing is briefly described, it should be apparent that, drawings described below is only some embodiments of the present invention, for
For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, other are can also be obtained according to these attached drawings
Attached drawing.
Fig. 1 is the schematic flow chart of the communication processing method of the pseudo-base station provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the schematic flow chart of the communication processing method of the pseudo-base station provided according to a second embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is the schematic flow chart of the communication processing method of the pseudo-base station provided according to a third embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is the schematic block diagram of the communication processing apparatus of the pseudo-base station provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is the schematic block diagram of the communication processing apparatus of the pseudo-base station provided according to a second embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 6 is the schematic flow chart of secure communication processing method provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 7 is the schematic flow chart of secure communication processing method provided according to a second embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 8 is the schematic block diagram of secure communication processing unit provided according to one embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 9 is the schematic block diagram of the communication processing system of the pseudo-base station provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention；
Figure 10 is the schematic block diagram of the communication processing system of the pseudo-base station provided according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Purpose, technical scheme and advantage to make the embodiment of the present invention are clearer, below in conjunction with the embodiment of the present invention
In attached drawing, the technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention is clearly and completely described, it is clear that described embodiment is
Part of the embodiment of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.Based on the embodiments of the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art
All other embodiments obtained without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
It should be noted that in the absence of conflict, the feature in embodiment and embodiment in the application can phase
Mutually combination.The application is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in conjunction with the embodiments.
Fig. 1 is the schematic flow chart of the communication processing method of the pseudo-base station provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention.It should
Method includes：Step S110 receives the short message that client or terminal report；Step S120 detects the A.L.S. in the short message
Whether breath meets condition, when detecting that the signing messages is unsatisfactory for condition, determines that the short message comes from pseudo-base station；Step
S130, when detecting that the short message does not carry the default signing messages, it is pseudo-base station to determine the base station；Step S130,
Cut off the communication between the client or the terminal and the pseudo-base station.
In step S110 and step S120, when receiving the short message that client or terminal report, the short message is detected
Whether signing messages meets condition, when being unsatisfactory for, then can determine that the short message comes from pseudo-base station.
It is understood that it according to pre-arranged code rule is what short message generated that the signing messages, which is note signature server,
One-to-one signing messages, and the signing messages of generation is carried in the short message.Pass through note signature service
Device carries out SMS encryption processing before by short message sending to target user to it, one-to-one each for the generation of each short message
Different signing messages, and carried in short message, for example the signing messages can be increased at the end of short message, to avoid
It is easily cracked since pattern is fixed, improves the safety and reliability of communication.
It is understood that can be on the one hand note signature for generating the pre-arranged code rule of signing messages for short message
The coding rule of system default is on the other hand in server or user edits the coding rule set, to increase coding rule
The flexibility then set promotes user experience.
It is understood that whether the signing messages that can be specifically detected by following two modes in short message meets item
Part, i.e.,：(1) detect whether the signing messages is default signing messages, it is described when the signing messages is default signing messages
Signing messages meets condition；(2) identification code in the signing messages, when identifying the identification code, the A.L.S. are identified
Breath meets condition.
That is, what the signing messages in short message can be fixed default signing messages or generate at random
And the identification code that user can identify, such as identification code can be made of random code or own coding, wherein random code is produced by system
It gives birth to, own coding can be by user setting composition rule, for example for fixed number, character etc. or can also incite somebody to action random
Code is processed by algorithm set by user and is generated.
Specifically, it is illustrated for random code is generated identification code by algorithm set by user processing.
The coding rule of the note signature information of oneself is normally set or changed for user by an open short message port
Service is provided, user can carry out the setting or modification of the coding rule of oneself by way of sending short message, to ensure the knowledge
The authority of other system may be used port 10086 as rule setting and modification port, can set and such as give an order：
Rule setting：Operation code：DXSB；
Rule encoding：Regular coding --- GD, setting rule --- GZ；
Rule encoding mode：R+ algorithms symbol+parameter；
Cover up rule：Rule setting is carried out every time, rule before covering automatically；
Blank character #.
Rule in above-metioned instruction, it is illustrated below：If for set the label that a regular coding is 356
Name information, it is only necessary to be sent to 10086 with the mobile phone terminal editing short message DXSB#GD#356 of oneself；If user wants
It is modified as 3 times that own coding is random code, it is only necessary to be sent to mobile phone terminal editing short message DXSB#GZ#R × 3 of oneself
10086；If user thinks alteration ruler, without the concern for the rule of front, it is only necessary to send in the above manner newly
Rule setting short message, new rule understand the rule before covering automatically.
In the step s 120, determining short message after the pseudo-base station, then need to cut off client or terminal and pseudo-base station it
Between communication, with the safety and reliability really to communicate.
Fig. 2 is the schematic flow chart of the communication processing method of the pseudo-base station provided according to a second embodiment of the present invention.Fig. 2
The step S110-S130 contents that method shown in step S110-S130 and Fig. 1 that shown method includes includes are basically identical, difference
It is, after step s 130, can also includes the following steps：Step S140, identify URL information in the short message and/or
Telephone number；Step S150 differentiates that the URL information whether from malicious websites, differentiates whether the telephone number is swindle
Telephone number；Step S160 will differentiate that being sent to safety for the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number leads to
Believe processing unit.
In this embodiment, by URL (Uniform Resource Locator, the unified resource positioning in short message
Symbol) information and telephone number differentiated, that is, differentiate whether be whether URL information from malice and differentiate telephone number
For fraudulent call number, and differentiating as when being, the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number are sent to
Secure communication processing unit to carry out safety prompt function or active interception, prevents any client or terminal from revisiting and asking Fishing net
Network receives fraudulent call, that is, cuts off the communication between all clients or terminal and pseudo-base station, plays strike pseudo-base station
Effect.
Fig. 3 is the schematic flow chart of the communication processing method of the pseudo-base station provided according to a third embodiment of the present invention.Fig. 3
The step S110-S130 contents that method shown in step S110-S130 and Fig. 1 that shown method includes includes are basically identical, difference
It is, this method further includes after step s 130：Step S170, obtain the pseudo-base station identification parameter information and first
Confidence ceases；Step S180 obtains the client or the current second position information of the terminal；Step S190, by the knowledge
Other parameter information, the first position information and the second position information are sent to secure communication processing unit.
In an embodiment of the present invention, by by the identification parameter information of the pseudo-base station acquired and its first position information,
The second position information that client or terminal are presently in is sent to secure communication processing unit, wherein, identification parameter information tool
Body can include：LAC (Location Area Code, Location Area Code) and CI (Community Identity, cell identification),
So that secure communication processing unit securely communicates processing according to above- mentioned information for the pseudo-base station, specifically：This is logical safely
Believe that processing unit can be by the identification parameter synchronizing information of pseudo-base station to other clients or terminal and the safe APP of other third parties
Using with the communication between network-wide basis internal cutting off and pseudo-base station；The secure communication processing unit can also be according to pseudo-base station
With user terminal respective positions information, pass through GIS (Geographic Information System, GIS-Geographic Information System)
The mode of map superposition provides strike pseudo-base station illegal activities for the security controls such as public security, Wireless Management Committee mechanism
Tracking investigation facility, wherein, client or terminal and pseudo-base station respective positions information can be GPS (Global
Positioning System, global positioning system) location information.
To sum up, in an embodiment of the present invention, it is added by detecting the note signature server carried in short message for it
Whether signing messages meets condition to identify whether the base station is pseudo-base station, i.e., by can all carry different marks for every short message
Information is signed, the short message that pseudo-base station is sent to user can be made efficiently to be identified and intercept, and the embodiment flows entirely
Process automation has got through the identification of the pseudo-base station based on core network, real-time early warning is informed, the streams such as system automation intercept process
Journey, simultaneously because the store-and-forward mechanism based on short message, then without radio network part is generated any transformation, need not monitor it is any
Parameter, it is easy to operate efficient, a note signature server only need to be added, improvement cost is low, versatile.
Fig. 4 is the schematic block diagram of the communication processing apparatus of the pseudo-base station provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention.Such as Fig. 4
Shown, which includes：
Receiving unit 201, for receiving the short message that client or terminal report；
Whether detection unit 202, the signing messages for detecting in the short message meet condition, detect the A.L.S.
When breath is unsatisfactory for condition, determine that the short message comes from pseudo-base station；
Processing unit 203, for cutting off the communication between the client or the terminal and the pseudo-base station.
It is understood that it according to pre-arranged code rule is what short message generated that the signing messages, which is note signature server,
One-to-one signing messages, and the signing messages of generation is carried in the short message.
It is understood that the detection unit 202 is specifically used for：
Detect whether the signing messages is default signing messages, it is described when the signing messages is default signing messages
Signing messages meets condition；Or
Identify the identification code in the signing messages, when identifying the identification code, the signing messages meets condition.
Fig. 5 is the schematic block diagram of the communication processing apparatus of the pseudo-base station provided according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
It is understood that as shown in figure 5, the device 200 can also include：
Recognition unit 204, for after determining that the short message comes from pseudo-base station, identifying the URL information in the short message
And/or telephone number；
Discriminating unit 205, for differentiating whether the URL information whether from malicious websites, differentiates the telephone number
For fraudulent call number；
First transmitting element 206, for that will will differentiate as URL information and/or fraudulent call number from malicious websites
It is sent to secure communication processing unit.
It is understood that as shown in figure 5, the device 200 can also include：
Acquiring unit 207 for determining the short message after pseudo-base station, obtains the identification parameter letter of the pseudo-base station
Breath and first position information；
Positioning unit 208, for obtaining the client or the current second position information of the terminal；
Second transmitting element 209, for by the identification parameter information, the first position information and the second position
Information is sent to secure communication processing unit.
It should be noted that in one embodiment of the schematic block diagram of device shown in Fig. 5, can not include in Fig. 5
Shown whole units, you can the unit shown in Fig. 5 is increased and decreased or be combined according to practical application scene.
The communication processing apparatus 200 of pseudo-base station according to embodiments of the present invention may correspond to puppet according to embodiments of the present invention
Executive agent in the communication processing method of base station, and each unit in the communication processing apparatus 200 of pseudo-base station is above-mentioned
With other operation and/or functions respectively in order to realize the corresponding flow of each method in Fig. 1 to Fig. 3, for sake of simplicity, herein not
It repeats again.
Fig. 6 is the schematic flow chart of secure communication processing method provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention.Such as Fig. 6 institutes
Show, this method includes：Step S310, receive pseudo-base station identification parameter information and first position information, from the pseudo-base station
Short message in URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number and client or the current second of terminal
Confidence ceases；Step S320, according to the identification parameter information, the first position information, the second position information and described
URL information and/or fraudulent call number from malicious websites securely communicate processing for the pseudo-base station.
In step S310 and step S320, the signature in the short message of reception is detected when the communication processing apparatus of pseudo-base station
When information is unsatisfactory for condition, determine the short message come from pseudo-base station when, receive pseudo-base station identification parameter information and its location information,
The position letter that URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number and client or terminal in short message are presently in
Breath, be directed to pseudo-base station secure communication processing, cut off any communication pseudo-base station between, provide communication safety and reliably
Property.
Wherein, the identification parameter information of base station can include LAC and CI, and the identification information of short message can include URL and electricity
Number is talked about, and corresponding location information can be positioned to obtain by GPS.
Fig. 7 is the schematic flow chart of secure communication processing method provided according to a second embodiment of the present invention.Shown in Fig. 7
The step S310 contents that method shown in step S310 and Fig. 6 that method includes includes are basically identical, and difference lies in step S320 tools
Body performs：The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for other described clients by step S321
Or pseudo-base station described in terminal recognition and cut off and the communication between it；Step S322, according to the first position information and described
Second position information generates the tracked information of the pseudo-base station, for being tracked to the pseudo-base station；Step S323, according to
The URL information and/or fraudulent call number from malicious websites intercept what the pseudo-base station was sent to client or terminal
Other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal come from the pseudo-base station.
In step S321 to step S323, according to the communication processing apparatus of pseudo-base station collect information for pseudo-base station into
When row secure communication is handled, specifically：Can by the identification parameter synchronizing information of pseudo-base station to other users terminal and other the
The safe APP applications of tripartite, with the communication between network-wide basis internal cutting off and pseudo-base station；It can also be according to pseudo-base station and client
Or terminal respective positions information, it is the security controls such as public security, Wireless Management Committee by way of GIS map superposition
Mechanism provides the tracking investigation facility of strike pseudo-base station illegal activities；The URL from malicious websites in short message can also be believed
Breath and fraudulent call number carry out safety prompt function or active interception, prevent any user from revisiting and ask Fishing net network or receive swindleness
Phone is deceived, that is, cuts off the communication between user and pseudo-base station, plays the role of hitting pseudo-base station, i.e., on the one hand in short message
URL information carries out comparison discriminating by web crawlers technology, determines whether from malicious websites, and to the malice journey of the network address
Degree carries out grade classification, on the other hand carries out big data discriminating to the telephone number in short message, determines whether fraudulent call number
Code, then can be to finally judging that URL information from malicious websites and fraudulent call number carry out prompting interception, specifically
Ground is carried out popup web page prompting to the user for accessing website corresponding with the URL information or is directly blocked using the whole network, prevented
Other users visit again the malicious websites and the telephone number received are added in malice number mark pond, other clients exist
By IVR (Interactive Voice Response, interactive voice answering) voice to caller when dialing the telephone number
User carries out fraudulent call prevention and reminds or start hook procedure to be blocked to all calls for dialing the fraudulent call number,
So as to improve the safety and reliability of communication.
To sum up, in an embodiment of the present invention, base station is being recognized as puppet by the communication processing apparatus according to pseudo-base station
Behind base station, the identification parameter information of the pseudo-base station of acquisition, location information, URL information from malicious websites in short message and
The location information of itself blocks the communication between pseudo-base station and all users, so that the short message that pseudo-base station is sent to user can be high
It is identified and intercepts to effect, and the embodiment whole process automates, got through the pseudo-base station based on core network and identified, is real
When early warning inform, the flows such as system automation intercept process, while without generating any transformation to radio network part, without monitoring
Any parameter, it is easy to operate efficient, and improvement cost is low, versatile.
Fig. 8 is the schematic block diagram of secure communication processing unit provided according to one embodiment of the invention.As shown in figure 8,
The device 400 includes：
Receiving unit 401, for receive user terminal acquisition pseudo-base station identification parameter information and first position information,
URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number and the client in short message from the pseudo-base station
Or the second position information that terminal is current；
Processing unit 402, for according to the identification parameter information, the first position information, the second confidence
Breath and the URL information and/or fraudulent call number from malicious websites securely communicate processing for the pseudo-base station.
It is understood that the processing unit 402 is specifically used for：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for other described clients or terminal recognition
The pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for
The pseudo-base station is tracked；
The pseudo-base station is intercepted to all visitors according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal that family end or terminal are sent are from the pseudo- base
It stands.
It should be noted that in one embodiment of the schematic block diagram of device shown in Fig. 8, can not include in Fig. 8
Shown whole units, you can unit shown in fig. 8 is increased and decreased or be combined according to practical application scene.
Secure communication processing unit 400 according to embodiments of the present invention may correspond to safety according to embodiments of the present invention and lead to
Believe processing method in executive agent, and above and other operation of each unit in secure communication processing unit 400 and/
Or function is respectively in order to realize the corresponding flow of each method in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, for sake of simplicity, details are not described herein.
Fig. 9 is the schematic block diagram of the communication processing system of the pseudo-base station provided according to a first embodiment of the present invention.Such as Fig. 9
Shown, the system 500 includes：Note signature server 501 and the communication processing apparatus of pseudo-base station 502；And
The note signature server 501, for generating one-to-one A.L.S. for short message according to pre-arranged code rule
Breath, and the signing messages of generation is carried in the short message；
The communication processing apparatus 502 of the pseudo-base station, is unsatisfactory for for the signing messages in the short message for detecting reception
The short message is determined during condition from pseudo-base station, and cuts off the communication of client or terminal and the pseudo-base station.
It is understood that as shown in figure 9, the system 500 further includes：Secure communication processing unit 503；And
The communication processing apparatus 502 of the pseudo-base station is determining the short message after pseudo-base station, for pseudo-base station
URL information from malicious websites in identification parameter information and first position information, the short message from the pseudo-base station and/or
Fraudulent call number and the current second position information of the client or terminal are sent to the secure communication processing unit
503；
The secure communication processing unit 503 is used for：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for other described clients or terminal recognition
The pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for
The pseudo-base station is tracked；The puppet is intercepted according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Base station comes to other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal of client or terminal transmission
The pseudo-base station.
Figure 10 is the system composition schematic block diagram of the communication process of pseudo-base station according to an embodiment of the invention.
As shown in Figure 10, when A mobile phones by base station to B sending short message by mobile phone when, base station can be through GSM (Global first
System for Mobile Communication, global system for mobile communications) short message is forwarded to positioned at sms center by network
The note signature system (i.e. note signature server) of side is signed, that is, increasing short message in the sms center side of network
Signature system sets up storage, algorithm generation and the automatic transmitting equipment of exclusive cipher or identification code (i.e. default signing messages), should
Equipment in the gateway pre-established indicates that when sending short message to user terminal every time the cipher or identification code must be carried；
Then, the short message for carrying cipher or identification code is sent to B mobile phones by note signature system through base station.
Wherein, SMS encryption mode mainly increases identification code or cipher, the storage based on short message at normal short message end
Forwarding mechanism, the implementation of method do not need to the transmitting of existing net, wirelessly, user terminal do any transformation and upgrading, it is only necessary to
Sms center side increases note signature system, and being equivalent to increases a short message service server, and the cipher that is included in short message or
Identification code is made of random code and own coding, and composition rule can be recognized by the user by user setting, cipher wherein included or
Identification code passes through operator SMS center, it is ensured that the cipher of every short message or identification code be it is different, specifically, random code by
System generates, and own coding can be stationary digital or be passed through algorithm set by user by random code by user setting generation rule
It generates.
For example, in the case of own coding is generated by random code by algorithm set by user, pass through an open short message
The coding rule that port normally set or changed the note signature information of oneself for user provides service, and user can pass through transmission
The mode of short message carries out the setting or modification of the coding rule of oneself, and to ensure the authority of the identifying system, end may be used
Mouth 10086 can set and such as give an order as rule setting and modification port：
Rule setting：Operation code：DXSB；
Rule encoding：Regular coding --- GD, setting rule --- GZ；
Rule encoding mode：R+ algorithms symbol+parameter；
Cover up rule：Rule setting is carried out every time, rule before covering automatically；
Blank character #.
Rule in above-metioned instruction, it is illustrated below：If for set the label that a regular coding is 356
Name information, it is only necessary to be sent to 10086 with the mobile phone terminal editing short message DXSB#GD#356 of oneself；If user wants
It is modified as 3 times that own coding is random code, it is only necessary to be sent to mobile phone terminal editing short message DXSB#GZ#R × 3 of oneself
10086；If user thinks alteration ruler, without the concern for the rule of front, it is only necessary to send in the above manner newly
Rule setting short message, new rule understand the rule before covering automatically.
When B mobile phones receive short message, first, determine the short message being currently received whether be transmitted by operator, specifically,
Using note signature identification judged, the short message that user receives can client end AP P or by way of directly forwarding,
Background server is reported to, judges whether the short message is that operator sends according to exclusive signature by background server.Then, may be used
To carry out system judgement (comprising normal channels short message and pseudo-base station note) to all short messages received via client end AP P,
Wherein, which can carry out data sharing and upload, and client is supported short message to be set to add by APP modes with note signature system
Close rule, the then further if short message received does not include the cipher that user is set by official's short message port or APP
Or identification code, then the APP judge the short message that the short message that user is received is sent for pseudo-base station automatically, then by the position of pseudo-base station
Information, the short message content that pseudo-base station is sent, pseudo-base station the identification of base stations parameter information such as LAC, CI, client itself GPS location letter
Breath etc. is sent to report collection system；Client end AP P can actively be blocked according to LAC, CI of pseudo-base station etc. into row information simultaneously
It cuts, the communication between cut-out and pseudo-base station.
When report collection system receives the base stations such as LAC, CI of pseudo-base station that the client end AP P in B mobile phones reports automatically
During identification parameter information, which is distributed to the loading user of other client end APs P, as illustrated in the drawing C mobile phones and D
Mobile phone to carry out that the interception or prompting of short message are sent to pseudo-base station, can also synchronize the above- mentioned information of pseudo-base station open to it
His third party's security application；Automatically relevant GPS reported as the client end AP P that receives in B mobile phones of report collection system
Can be the pseudo-base stations bursting tubes such as public security, Wireless Management Committee in a manner that generalized information system map is superimposed when confidence ceases
Manage the tracking investigation information that mechanism provides strike pseudo-base station illegal activities；The client in B mobile phones is received when report collection system
During URL and telephone number in the short message contents that report automatically of end APP, on the one hand can to URL by web crawlers technology into
Row comparison differentiates, determines whether doubtful fishing website, and carry out grade classification to the malice degree of the network address；It on the other hand can
Big data discriminating is carried out to the telephone number in short message content, determines whether doubtful fraudulent call.
Then the URL most judged at last and telephone number are synchronized to prompting intercepting system by report collection system, make prompting
Intercepting system carries out the whole network user reminding and interception, that is, reminds intercepting system by reporting what collection system was passed to real-time reception
Telephone number and URL information carry out classification processing, for example, the telephone number received can be added in malice number mark pond,
The fraudulent call that other users carry out calling subscribe by IVR voices when dialing the telephone number carries out prevention prompting or opens
Dynamic hook procedure, blocks all calls for dialing the fraudulent call number；It and can be according to evil to the URL information received
Meaning intensity grade is carried out popup web page prompting to the user for accessing the website or is directly blocked using the whole network, prevents other users
The fishing website is visited again, cuts off the communication between pseudo-base station and user, plays the role of hitting pseudo-base station, than as shown in the figure leading to
Cross the communication reminded and intercepted between the F mobile phones of cut-out unloaded client end AP P and G mobile phones and pseudo-base station.
To sum up, the embodiment of the present invention, by supporting what is customized can all carry difference by every short message that user receives
Cipher or identification code (for example being arranged on the end of short message) this mode pseudo-base station information early warning is provided；Pass through client end AP P
Or short message is encrypted in the coding rule of the preset note signature system of the modes such as systemic presupposition, has got through based on core network
The flows such as pseudo-base station identification, real-time customer early warning are informed, system automation intercept process, realize whole process automation；And
By the way that the URL in short message and telephone number are identified, and then malice URL and malicious call number are intercepted so that
User can not access malice URL, can not connect malicious call, the channel that cut-out pseudo-base station is swindled by transmitting short message.
Moreover, operationally provide two kinds identification and decision procedure, client can both select short message mode be customized and
Voluntarily judge, can also automatically be intercepted by installing APP.It once seeing that short message can identify is normal that ordinary user, which can be allowed,
Short message or pseudo-base station note even more for each user difference, for every short message difference of each user, allow pseudo-base station to send out
More short messages can be recognized by the user and be intercepted by system again, lead and render ineffective, interrupt its interests chain, and it is empty to squeeze pseudo-base station existence
Between, it is easy to operate efficient；In addition, the embodiment of the present invention can not monitor any without generating any transformation to radio network part
Parameter, pseudo-base station no matter how technological progress, be impossible to be intercepted to imitate to identify, improvement cost is low, versatile.
Those of ordinary skill in the art may realize that each exemplary lists described with reference to the embodiments described herein
Member and algorithm steps can be realized with the combination of electronic hardware, computer software or the two, in order to clearly demonstrate hardware
With the interchangeability of software, each exemplary composition and step are generally described according to function in the above description.This
A little functions are performed actually with hardware or software mode, specific application and design constraint depending on technical solution.Specially
Industry technical staff can realize described function to each specific application using distinct methods, but this realization is not
It is considered as beyond the scope of this invention.
It is apparent to those skilled in the art that for convenience of description and succinctly, foregoing description is
The specific work process of system, device and unit can refer to the corresponding process in preceding method embodiment, and details are not described herein.
The above description is merely a specific embodiment, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, any
Those familiar with the art in the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, can readily occur in various equivalent modifications or replace
It changes, these modifications or substitutions should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be with right
It is required that protection domain subject to.
Claims (16)
1. a kind of communication processing method of pseudo-base station, which is characterized in that the method includes：
Receive the short message that client or terminal report；
It detects whether the signing messages in the short message meets condition, when detecting that the signing messages is unsatisfactory for condition, determines
The short message comes from pseudo-base station；
Cut off the communication between the client or the terminal and the pseudo-base station.
2. communication processing method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the signing messages is note signature server
It is carried according to the one-to-one signing messages that pre-arranged code rule is short message generation, and by the signing messages of generation in institute
It states in short message.
3. communication processing method according to claim 1 or 2, which is characterized in that the signature in the detection short message
Whether information meets condition, specifically includes：
Detect whether the signing messages is default signing messages, when the signing messages is default signing messages, the signature
Information meets condition；Or
Identify the identification code in the signing messages, when identifying the identification code, the signing messages meets condition.
4. communication processing method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that it is described determine the short message from pseudo-base station it
Afterwards, the method further includes：
Identify the URL information and/or telephone number in the short message；
Differentiate that the URL information whether from malicious websites, differentiates whether the telephone number is fraudulent call number；
By differentiating secure communication processing unit is sent to for the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number.
5. communication processing method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that it is described determine the short message from pseudo-base station it
Afterwards, the method further includes：
Obtain the identification parameter information of the pseudo-base station and first position information；
Obtain the client or the current second position information of the terminal；
The identification parameter information, the first position information and the second position information are sent to secure communication processing dress
It puts.
6. a kind of communication processing apparatus of pseudo-base station, which is characterized in that described device includes：
Receiving unit, for receiving the short message that client or terminal report；
Whether detection unit, the signing messages for detecting in the short message meet condition, detect that the signing messages is discontented with
During sufficient condition, determine that the short message comes from pseudo-base station；
Processing unit, for cutting off the communication between the client or the terminal and the pseudo-base station.
7. the communication processing apparatus of pseudo-base station according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the signing messages is short message label
Name server is according to the one-to-one signing messages that pre-arranged code rule is short message generation, and by the signing messages of generation
It carries in the short message.
8. the communication processing apparatus described according to claim 6 or 7, which is characterized in that the detection unit is specifically used for：
Detect whether the signing messages is default signing messages, when the signing messages is default signing messages, the signature
Information meets condition；Or
Identify the identification code in the signing messages, when identifying the identification code, the signing messages meets condition.
9. communication processing apparatus according to claim 6, which is characterized in that described device further includes：
Recognition unit, for after determining that the short message comes from pseudo-base station, identifying the URL information and/or electricity in the short message
Talk about number；
Discriminating unit, for differentiating that the URL information whether from malicious websites, differentiates whether the telephone number is swindle electricity
Talk about number；
First transmitting element, for peace will to be sent to for the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number by differentiating
Full communication processing unit.
10. communication processing apparatus according to claim 6, which is characterized in that described device further includes：
Acquiring unit for determining the short message after the pseudo-base station, obtains the identification parameter information and the of the pseudo-base station
One location information；
Positioning unit, for obtaining the client or the current second position information of the terminal；
Second transmitting element, for the identification parameter information, the first position information and the second position information to be sent out
It send to secure communication processing unit.
11. a kind of secure communication processing method, which is characterized in that the method includes：
It receives in the identification parameter information and first position information, the short message from the pseudo-base station of pseudo-base station and comes from malice net
The current second position information of the URL information and/or fraudulent call number and client or terminal stood；
According to the identification parameter information, the first position information, the second position information and it is described come from malicious websites
URL information and/or fraudulent call number securely communicate processing for the pseudo-base station.
12. secure communication processing method according to claim 11, which is characterized in that described to be believed according to the identification parameter
Breath, the first position information, the second position information and the URL information and/or fraudulent call from malicious websites
Number securely communicates processing for the pseudo-base station, specifically includes：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for described in other described clients or terminal recognition
Pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for institute
Pseudo-base station is stated to be tracked；The pseudo-base station is intercepted according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal sent to client or terminal are from described
Pseudo-base station.
13. a kind of secure communication processing unit, which is characterized in that described device includes：
Receiving unit, for receiving the identification parameter information of the pseudo-base station of user terminal acquisition and first position information, from institute
State URL information from malicious websites in the short message of pseudo-base station and/or fraudulent call number and the client or terminal
Current second position information；
Processing unit, for according to the identification parameter information, the first position information, the second position information and described
URL information and/or fraudulent call number from malicious websites securely communicate processing for the pseudo-base station.
14. secure communication processing unit according to claim 13, which is characterized in that the processing unit is specifically used for：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for described in other described clients or terminal recognition
Pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for institute
Pseudo-base station is stated to be tracked；
The pseudo-base station is intercepted to all clients according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Or other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal of terminal transmission come from the pseudo-base station.
15. a kind of communication processing system of pseudo-base station, which is characterized in that the system comprises：Note signature server and pseudo- base
The communication processing apparatus stood；And
The note signature server, for generating one-to-one signing messages for short message according to pre-arranged code rule, and will
The signing messages of generation is carried in the short message；
The communication processing apparatus of the pseudo-base station, it is true when being unsatisfactory for condition for the signing messages in the short message for detecting reception
The fixed short message cuts off the communication of client or terminal and the pseudo-base station from pseudo-base station.
16. communication processing system according to claim 15, which is characterized in that the system also includes：At secure communication
Manage device；And
The communication processing apparatus of the pseudo-base station is determining the short message after pseudo-base station, for the identification parameter of pseudo-base station
The URL information and/or fraudulent call from malicious websites in information and first position information, the short message from the pseudo-base station
Number and the current second position information of the client or terminal are sent to the secure communication processing unit；
The secure communication processing unit is used for：
The identification parameter information is sent to other clients or terminal, for described in other described clients or terminal recognition
Pseudo-base station and cut-out and the communication between it；
The tracked information of the pseudo-base station is generated according to the first position information and the second position information, for institute
Pseudo-base station is stated to be tracked；The pseudo-base station is intercepted according to the URL information from malicious websites and/or fraudulent call number
Other short messages or the prompting client or the received current short message of terminal sent to client or terminal are from described
Pseudo-base station.
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| CN201710004223.9A CN108271159A (en) | 2017-01-04 | 2017-01-04 | Communication processing method, apparatus and system, safety communicating method and device |
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