CN108229106A - A kind of dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method based on interaction protocol - Google Patents
A kind of dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method based on interaction protocol Download PDFInfo
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- CN108229106A CN108229106A CN201711432360.9A CN201711432360A CN108229106A CN 108229106 A CN108229106 A CN 108229106A CN 201711432360 A CN201711432360 A CN 201711432360A CN 108229106 A CN108229106 A CN 108229106A
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- 238000011068 loading method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 36
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 13
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 230000003068 static effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 7
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 claims description 45
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 19
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000013507 mapping Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 abstract description 7
- 239000003795 chemical substances by application Substances 0.000 description 12
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 4
- 238000005538 encapsulation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005206 flow analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000010354 integration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000002360 preparation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000003672 processing method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000717 retained effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
- H04L2209/603—Digital right managament [DRM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/72—Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Technology Law (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method based on interaction protocol.The present invention implements to be used in digital media content protection DRM technology system; the safe designs such as protection is encrypted in software code, interface is hidden are performed to terminal security; the present invention can be effectively prevented under open environment carries out security algorithm attack to drm agent using the illegal means of static code conversed analysis, ensures the reliability of drm agent safety.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to digital media rights managing drm field, specifically a kind of dynamic base based on interaction protocol adds solution
Close and dynamic loading method.
Background technology
Digital media content protects DRM technology, is to be widely used in the multimedia digital contents such as audio and video, document copyright guarantor
The mainstream technology of shield, is widely used in.In DRM application system systems, drm agent undertakes certification, mandate, content decryption pass
One button security function.Drm agent is typically that middleware includes dynamic, the collection of functions form of static library, is needed and various audio and video
The application terminals such as DST PLAYER, document reader integrate, the operating system platforms such as operation Windows, Android, IOS.
In the application of practical DRM technology, one side drm agent software performs security algorithm, has high security requirement；
Another aspect drm agent software executable code, which is in, to be exposed to the open air under open environment, is easy to by software conversed analysis
Attack so as to thoroughly destroy DRM technology foundation for security.Therefore, it is weight in DRM technology safely to solve drm agent software code
It challenges.
The reverse-engineering of software code all have developed rapidly from theory and practice at present, in theory application program slice, mould
The analysis methods such as type checking, data-flow analysis carry out conversed analysis generally directed to code disassembling code is performed, in practice,
C, the programming languages such as C++, Java can do conversed analysis, while have also appeared many reverse engineering softwares.In conversed analysis
On the basis of, means are distorted etc. by code and change software execution route and logic, the safety to crack.
In order to prevent to drm agent static code conversed analysis, therefore propose one kind by core security software generation
Code encryption and interface Hiding Mechanism improve the safety of drm agent.
Invention content
The purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method based on interaction protocol, with solution
Certainly the problems mentioned above in the background art.
To achieve the above object, the present invention provides following technical solution：
A kind of dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method based on interaction protocol, comprise the steps of：
S1, drm agent decompose code loading device and core code library；
S2, core code library file dynamic base external function interface is hidden, calculates digital signature and encrypted content file；
S3, package file head is added to encrypted core code library file；
S4, the code loading device of plaintext is only needed to be integrated with function library and third-party application；
S5, code loading device and DRM system establish information needed of the encryption session channel acquisition to file decryption；
S6, will core code library read in memory in decrypt and check digit signature；
S7, by memory decrypt after core code library dynamic base mapping process virtual linear space；
S8, the entrance function address that core code library is obtained from the dynamic base of mapping, are realized to core code bank interface function
It calls.
As further embodiment of the present invention：The method that the function interface is hidden is specifically：By dynamic chain in dynamic base
It connects function link symbol and function address in function table to remove, interface function address is written according to preset hiding strategy to default one
A code segment space；Generally by the use of special function code section space as interface function address hiding space；The rule that interface is hidden
Then obtained in real time from DRM system end when code loading device starts.
As further scheme of the invention：Gateway and HNR servers can establish network communication tunnel, after tunnel building
All network up and down data of gateway all have to pass through HNR servers, HNR servers by gateway it is all or most of under
Row data all walk digital TV network by IPQAM modulators and are sent to gateway.
As further scheme of the invention：The code loading device when decrypting core code library must by with
Secured session is in real time by obtaining decryption key information between DRM system end.
As further scheme of the invention：To the decryption of core code library and signature verification in memory, solve in memory
Dynamic base is mapped directly to process linear space after close, ensure that the core code that plaintext will not be preserved in terminal document system
Library prevents code static state conversed analysis.
Compared with prior art, the beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：The present invention, which utilizes, will have safety requirements in drm agent
Algorithm, logic and flow are included into core code library, it is encrypted, be distributed to again after digital signature it is various types of under open environment
Type application terminal；Code loading device is built upon to core code library decruption key and establishes secured session channel base with DRM system
It is obtained on plinth by interacting message mode from DRM system end；Decryption is completed, and with digital signature verification from memory in memory
Directly mapping loads core code dynamic base.Distribution of these technical methods from drm agent core security function module, terminal
File storage, file decryption, dynamic base load process and decruption key real-time, interactive securing mechanism end to end, have ensured not
It can be intercepted and captured by third party with clear-text way, implement anti-converge to drm agent core security function so as to be effectively prevented third party
Modes static code conversed analysis and the code injections such as volume, ensure that operational safety of the drm agent under open environment.This hair
Processing method in bright for dynamic base is applicable in Windows PE forms, Linux and Android ELF formats and other platforms
Dynamic library file call format.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method flow provided in an embodiment of the present invention based on interaction protocol
Figure.
Fig. 2 is dynamic base function interface hidden method flow chart provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with the attached drawing in the embodiment of the present invention, the technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention is carried out clear, complete
Site preparation describes, it is clear that described embodiment is only part of the embodiment of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art are obtained every other without making creative work
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Please refer to Fig.1 ~ 2, in the embodiment of the present invention, a kind of dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic load side based on interaction protocol
Method, this method are applied to the application that terminal operating system is windows platform, for example video player integrates drm agent reality
The management and control of existing digital media rights protection.Refering to what is shown in Fig. 1, this method generally comprises step S1 to S6：
In step S1, drm agent be divided into code loading device and two, core code library mould as the integration middleware of player
Block.Under windows platform, code loading device is compiled into static library or dynamic base and does binding with player code；Core code
Library is compiled into dynamic base, and the dynamic base after compiling is the dynamic link libraries of PE forms.
In step S2, a group key is pre-set in the drm system, is passed through when needing and core code library version is encrypted
File encryption tool chooses a key from DRM system.Generally preferably core is calculated using MD5 digital digest algorithms first
Code library file digital signature string recycles selection key application symmetric encipherment algorithm AES that file is encrypted.
The above content is a further detailed description of the present invention in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, it is impossible to assert
The specific implementation of the present invention is confined to these explanations.For those skilled in the art to which the present invention belongs, it is not taking off
Under the premise of from present inventive concept, several equivalent substitute or obvious modifications can also be made, and performance or use is identical, all should
When being considered as belonging to protection scope of the present invention.
Package file head is added in step S3, for encrypted core code library file, top of file includes version number, adds
Close key identification ID, interface hiding strategy, file size information, digital signature information and other information is for library text
Part decrypts information needed.
In step S4, code loading device and player do software binding and integrate, player allows to call code loading device public
The function interface opened, for starting module or other funcalls.Encrypted core code library file is beaten with player
Packet or individual files downloading mode are stored in the local file system of terminal device.
Start code loading device simultaneously in step S5, in player start-up course, code loading device is to DRM system
CHAP messaging protocols are initiated, two-way encrypted session channel is set up by exchanging key.Code loading device is from specified text
The encapsulation header of core code library file under part path initiates key query messages in session channel, obtains key identification
The corresponding keys of ID, while interface hiding strategy information is obtained according to version number.
In step S6, code loading device encrypted core code library file is read in memory, find encryption part
Memory start offset does decryption oprerations according to encrypted data length using the key of acquisition to core code file, interior after decryption
Hold and calculate MD5 digital digests and sign consistency with digital digest contrast verification in file header, if it is inconsistent, being considered as illegal
File and abandon subsequent step.
In step S6, code loading device decryption verification is signed after internal storage data, practical corresponding dynamic library file loading process
The line of each section of Section according to the PE format protocols of dynamic link library (DLL) under Windows, is readjusted in virtual linear space
Property address, the specific method of the step are as follows：
First according to PE forms calculate need in process continuously and virtually linear space application space size, and be set as it is read-write can
Execution pattern；Dynamic base each section after being decrypted in memory is copied to corresponding virtual memory space；Recalculate reorientation
Address；Then function can be called behind export entrance function address, that is, completes dll file and be loaded directly into process from memory.
As shown in Fig. 2, another embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of method that dynamic base function interface is hidden,
For drm agent core code library to be removed external function interface symbolic information in the dynamic symbol chained list of dynamic base,
And function address is hidden in code segment or data segment using hidden algorithm.Refering to what is shown in Fig. 2, this method generally comprises step
H1 to H4：
It is obtained in step H1, in the dynamic symbol chained list for the core code dynamic library file for parsing Windows PE forms all
External interface function address.
In step H2, using the code segment that one section of space is reserved in core code dynamic base, specific method is definition one
A to include continuous number non-operation instruction NOP functions, the code segment space occupied by the use of the function is deposited as interface function address
The space put, the function address are the initial positions in this section of space.Preset one group of hiding strategy in the drm system, different core
Heart code library version selects a hiding strategy.Hiding strategy is defined as interface function address and successively puts in order coding.
In step H3, after the completion of interface function address hiding, the root of an agreement is retained in dynamic symbol chained list
Outside interface function address, remaining interface function address contents is removed.
In step H4, after core code library DLL is mapped to memory headroom by code loading device, using in Document encapsulation head
Version number obtains interface hiding strategy information from DRM system.The root interface function in core code library according to interface hiding strategy also
Original goes out other all correct corresponding interface function addresses, returns to code loading device interface function address list and is total to code loading
Device funcall.
Claims (5)
1. a kind of dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method based on interaction protocol, which is characterized in that comprise the steps of：
S1, drm agent decompose code loading device and core code library；
S2, core code library file dynamic base external function interface is hidden, calculates digital signature and encrypted content file；
S3, package file head is added to encrypted core code library file；
S4, the code loading device of plaintext is only needed to be integrated with function library and third-party application；
S5, code loading device and DRM system establish information needed of the encryption session channel acquisition to file decryption；
S6, will core code library read in memory in decrypt and check digit signature；
S7, by memory decrypt after core code library dynamic base mapping process virtual linear space；
S8, the entrance function address that core code library is obtained from the dynamic base of mapping, are realized to core code bank interface function
It calls.
2. dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method according to claim 1 based on interaction protocol, which is characterized in that
The method that the function interface is hidden is specifically：By function link symbol and function address in dynamic link function table in dynamic base
It removes, interface function address is written according to preset hiding strategy to a default code segment space；Generally utilize special function generation
Code section space is as interface function address hiding space；The rule that interface is hidden is when code loading device starts in real time from DRM systems
System end obtains.
3. dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method according to claim 1 based on interaction protocol, which is characterized in that
Believed by calculating digital digest and encryption by adding the key needed for the description decryption of package file head in the core code library
Breath, version information.
4. dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method according to claim 1 based on interaction protocol, which is characterized in that
The code loading device must be solved by obtaining in real time when decrypting core code library by secured session between DRM system end
Key information.
5. dynamic base encryption and decryption and dynamic loading method according to claim 4 based on interaction protocol, which is characterized in that
To the decryption of core code library and signature verification in memory, dynamic base is mapped directly to process linear space after decrypting in memory,
Ensure that will not preserve the core code library of plaintext in terminal document system, prevent code static state conversed analysis.
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Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN108985096A (en) * | 2018-07-13 | 2018-12-11 | 厦门市美亚柏科信息股份有限公司 | A kind of enhancing of Android SQLite database security, method for safely carrying out and device |
| CN109359451A (en) * | 2018-11-12 | 2019-02-19 | 兴科迪科技（泰州）有限公司 | A kind of architecture based on security control box container, method and system |
| CN109446751A (en) * | 2018-09-30 | 2019-03-08 | 深圳市迷你玩科技有限公司 | Generate the method, apparatus and storage medium of the data set including multiple subfiles |
| CN110414217A (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2019-11-05 | 广东小天才科技有限公司 | Method for safe operation, device, electronic equipment and the storage medium of application program |
| CN111800416A (en) * | 2020-07-03 | 2020-10-20 | 西南大学 | Cryptographic protocol analysis method based on non-monotonicity dynamic cognitive logic |
| CN112130863A (en) * | 2020-08-18 | 2020-12-25 | 许继集团有限公司 | Protection method for preventing disassembly of client program |
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Cited By (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108985096A (en) * | 2018-07-13 | 2018-12-11 | 厦门市美亚柏科信息股份有限公司 | A kind of enhancing of Android SQLite database security, method for safely carrying out and device |
| CN108985096B (en) * | 2018-07-13 | 2021-11-02 | 厦门市美亚柏科信息股份有限公司 | Security enhancement and security operation method and device for Android SQLite database |
| CN109446751A (en) * | 2018-09-30 | 2019-03-08 | 深圳市迷你玩科技有限公司 | Generate the method, apparatus and storage medium of the data set including multiple subfiles |
| CN109359451A (en) * | 2018-11-12 | 2019-02-19 | 兴科迪科技（泰州）有限公司 | A kind of architecture based on security control box container, method and system |
| CN110414217A (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2019-11-05 | 广东小天才科技有限公司 | Method for safe operation, device, electronic equipment and the storage medium of application program |
| CN110414217B (en) * | 2019-07-31 | 2023-03-24 | 广东小天才科技有限公司 | Safe operation method and device of application program, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN111800416A (en) * | 2020-07-03 | 2020-10-20 | 西南大学 | Cryptographic protocol analysis method based on non-monotonicity dynamic cognitive logic |
| CN111800416B (en) * | 2020-07-03 | 2021-07-27 | 西南大学 | Cryptographic protocol analysis method based on non-monotonicity dynamic cognitive logic |
| CN112130863A (en) * | 2020-08-18 | 2020-12-25 | 许继集团有限公司 | Protection method for preventing disassembly of client program |
| CN112130863B (en) * | 2020-08-18 | 2023-10-20 | 许继集团有限公司 | Protection method for preventing disassembly of client program |
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