CN108205491B - NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method - Google Patents
NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method Download PDFInfo
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- CN108205491B CN108205491B CN201611184626.8A CN201611184626A CN108205491B CN 108205491 B CN108205491 B CN 108205491B CN 201611184626 A CN201611184626 A CN 201611184626A CN 108205491 B CN108205491 B CN 108205491B
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Abstract
The invention relates to a NKV 6.0.0 system-based credible technology compatibility testing method, which comprises the following steps: and (3) trusted boot testing: the device is used for measuring NKV 6.0.0 system kernel images, initrd and boot configuration files by adopting a TCM chip in a grub stage; testing a trusted interface: the interface verification module is used for verifying that NKV 6.0.0 systems and application programs are provided with interface implementation conditions for operating the TCM trusted chip; and (3) trusted operation control test: the CTMM is used for verifying the integrity measurement of the kernel module and the system configuration file loaded in the running process by the CTMM; testing by a trusted management center: for verifying graphical management of the white list of system metrics in charge. The invention can ensure that the trusted boot module, the trusted chip interface execution module, the trusted operation control module and the trusted management center in the trusted technology can work in the NKV 6.0.0 system perfectly and stably, and ensure the safety quality of the trusted technology in the NKV 6.0.0 system to a greater extent.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of computers, in particular to a NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method.
Background
The trusted computing is a trusted computing platform widely used in computing and communication systems and supported by a hardware security module, the trusted computing technology is widely used abroad after years of development, and the terminal type equipment for counting and integrating the trusted computing technology reaches more than 19 hundred million sets at present. The security of the computer system is fundamentally improved, and the method is an effective technical means for solving the security problem of new technology application such as cloud security, Internet of things and the like at present.
Currently, the international trusted Computing organization (TCG-trusted Computing Group) has a great influence on trusted Computing, and meanwhile, standards such as TPM1.2 and TPM2.0 are actively popularized and applied. The specification of the TCG comprises a hardware TPM chip, a software TSS, a secure PC Client, a server, a trusted network connection TNC, an overall system structure and a specific operation interface, and the whole TCG specification becomes a unified whole.
At present, TCM chips and trusted computing cryptographic support platform products based on 'trusted computing cryptographic support platform function and interface specification' are already put on the market, and an autonomous trusted computing industry system is initially established. Therefore, the security chip TCM, the trusted software stack TSM, the security host, the trusted notebook computer and a series of trusted computing solutions are realized. The autonomous trusted computing technology industry has survived market testing and has also had a significant impact on the international trusted computing industry.
Based on the above background, in order to ensure the integrity of autonomous domestic system resources and the credibility of a system operating platform, a trusted technical design, which is called as NKV 6.0.0 system version, is added to NKV5U8 system version. Trusted grub boot (measurement verification is carried out on boot programs and boot files involved in the boot process, and the use of untrusted local configuration boot is prevented), trusted operation control (trusted static chain extension, integrity protection of processes and integrity protection of files), trusted chip TCM support, trusted management center (graphical management operation) and other trusted functions are adopted to relieve security threats suffered by the system.
However, the probability of defects and vulnerabilities is often very high when a new product or technology appears, and before a user uses the product, the compatibility problem that errors occur due to different interfaces and functions of the product in different software and hardware environments needs to be guaranteed.
Currently common compatibility tests include:
testing hardware compatibility: the purpose is to confirm whether the description of the hardware environment is reasonably correct. Because different hardware configurations may affect the performance of software, some software may have different operation results or cannot be executed at all in different hardware environments;
and (3) testing software compatibility: the software compatibility test refers to checking whether the software can be interacted and shared correctly; interaction may be between two programs running on the same computer at the same time, or on different computers that are far apart; that is, it means the test of whether the test software can run well in the specific hardware platform, between different application software, on different operating system platforms, in different networks and other environments; theoretically, any two pieces of software have the possibility of conflict, so the compatibility of the software becomes an important index for measuring the quality of the software;
and (3) data compatibility testing: usually, different software in a series is integrated through a well-defined data format, and different software is integrated through a standard data format, and at this time, it is necessary to check whether the software to be tested can perform correct interaction through various data conforming to the data format for corresponding one or more data formats.
In short, compatibility testing refers to testing the compatibility of a product with various software under a specific environment, i.e., testing whether the software can operate well.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a method for detecting the running condition of each function module of a trusted technology on an NKV 6.0.0 version system, and the invention provides a method for testing the compatibility of the trusted technology based on a NKV 6.0.0 system, which comprises the following steps:
and (3) trusted boot testing: the method is used for measuring NKV 6.0.0 system kernel mirror images, initrd and a start configuration file by adopting a TCM chip in a grub stage, and the credibility of a start system is ensured;
testing a trusted interface: the interface verification module is used for verifying that NKV 6.0.0 systems and application programs are provided with interface implementation conditions for operating the TCM trusted chip;
and (3) trusted operation control test: the CTMM is used for verifying the integrity measurement condition of the CTMM on the kernel module and the system configuration file loaded in the running process and comparing the measurement result with the reference value of the white list;
testing by a trusted management center: the method is used for verifying the graphical management condition of the white list of the system measurement in charge and providing the operation management interface implementation condition of the measurement reference value.
Wherein the trusted boot test comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system compatibility of the upper trusted boot module configuration;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the system's upper trusted boot module metrics;
s3: the expected value initialization, system configuration and update compatibility of the upper trusted boot module of the system is detected NKV 6.0.0.
Wherein the step S1 includes: whether the trusted boot module supports the functions of opening and closing the trusted boot module is verified, when the configuration module is closed, a series of operations including the credibility measurement are not performed after the NKV 6.0.0 system is opened, and when the configuration module is opened, subsequent program execution including the credibility measurement is required after the NKV 6.0.0 system is opened, and relevant information including the measurement file list is provided.
Wherein the step S2 includes: verifying the integrity of a module and an important file loaded before the system kernel is started according to the measurement NKV 6.0.0, and when the system startup file is changed, generating prompt information;
wherein the verification measurement process comprises:
s21: before loading the OS kernel, performing trusted boot to measure and verify a starting code before loading the OS kernel;
s22: trusted boot of the OS kernel to metric verify the OS kernel and vital system files.
Wherein the step S3 includes: and verifying that when relevant contents including the system measurement configuration file are changed, the credibility measurement module informs the credibility management module of needing to modify the file list, and the credibility management module updates the strategy file according to the change of the relevant contents and updates the compatibility of the MCF and the expected value of the switch flag bit according to the strategy file.
Wherein the trusted interface test comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system interface command operating chip state compatibility;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system interface command to obtain compatibility of chip information;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the case of the system interface command authorization data;
s4: compatibility of the encryption and decryption operations of the system interface command is detected NKV 6.0.0.
Wherein the step S1 includes: detecting the compatibility of forcibly activating, forcibly starting and forcibly closing the TCM chip when the winner authorization data does not exist in the TCM chip on the NKV 6.0.0 system; and inputting the compatibility of owner authorization data after the authorization data is created.
Wherein the step S2 includes: detecting compatibility of acquiring TCM chip information, self-testing TCM chip condition, clearing TCM chip information and forcibly clearing TCM chip information on NKV 6.0.0 system.
Wherein the step S3 includes: compatibility of creating an owner authorization data, creating an srk authorization data, modifying the owner authorization data, and modifying the srk authorization data is detected after activation of the TCM chip on the NKV 6.0.0 system.
Wherein the step S4 includes: detecting on NKV 6.0.0 system, after starting TCM chip, encrypting file data, decrypting file data, obtaining EK public key information, NV space, ECC encryption and ECC decryption compatibility.
Wherein the trusted operation control test comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of system initiated metric protection;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 the compatibility of the system process and the file integrity;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system memory file system compatibility;
s4: compatibility of the policy cache management part of the system is tested NKV 6.0.0.
Wherein the step S1 includes: detecting when NKV 6.0.0 system is started and user logs in, extending trust chain compatibility of system boot.
Wherein the step S2 includes: integrity conditions of running processes and executable files of the system of protection NKV 6.0.0 are detected when the system of NKV 6.0.0 runs.
Wherein the step S3 includes: communication between the user layer and the kernel layer in the NKV 6.0.0 system is detected.
Wherein the trusted management center testing comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the user interface of the system trusted management center;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of white list management of the system trusted management center;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of policy management of the system trusted management center;
s4: compatibility of the system trust management center audit is tested NKV 6.0.0.
Wherein the step S1 includes: in NKV 6.0.0 system graphic interface window, testing whether the layout, picture and character display and operation use condition of each interface of the credible management center meet the requirement.
Wherein the step S2 includes: in the NKV 6.0.0 system, the compatibility of adding, deleting, modifying and checking operations on kernel modules and system configuration files loaded in operation by using a trusted management center is tested, and the unification of graphical operations and character operations is ensured.
Wherein the step S3 includes: and detecting compatibility conditions of policy management of a trusted management center in the NKV 6.0.0 system, and ensuring that functions including at least one of file storage configuration, policy switch configuration, password configuration function and user-defined policy are normally used.
Wherein the step S4 includes: the compatibility of an audit module of a trusted management center in an NKV 6.0.0 system is detected, and normal use of functions including at least one of audit receiving, audit inquiring and audit displaying is ensured.
In the present invention, "NKV 6.0.0 (called NeoKylinlinux Trusted OS V6.0)" means the standard kylin Trusted operating system software V6.0.
In the present invention, "NK 5U8 (fully referred to as" neo Linux Security OS V5.0(Update8) ", means that the winning kylin Security operating system V5.0(Update8) is an upgraded version of the winning kylin Security operating system V5.0.
In the invention, the CTMM (Cs 2c Trusted Measure Module) refers to a Trusted measurement Module, which loads a white list policy in initrd, where initrd is to be measured in grub stage, so as to ensure that the policy is not tampered before loading, and all accessed common files can be Trusted measured in the system operation process.
In the present invention, the term "TCM (Trusted Cryptography Module)" refers to a Trusted Cryptography Module, which is introduced by the national crypto authority in conjunction with some IT enterprises in China. The key basic component is necessary for a trusted computing password support platform, and functions of a password algorithm, random number generation, a nonvolatile storage space and the like are provided.
In the present invention, "TCG (fully Trusted Computing Group)" refers to a Trusted technical specification, and the purpose of the present invention is to widely use a Trusted Computing platform based on hardware security module support in Computing and communication systems to improve the overall security.
The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method provided by the invention can ensure that the trusted boot module, the trusted chip interface execution module, the trusted operation control module and the trusted management center in the trusted technology can work in the NKV 6.0.0 system perfectly and stably, and the security quality of the trusted technology in the NKV 6.0.0 system is ensured to a greater extent.
Drawings
FIG. 1: the invention relates to a whole system scheme flow chart corresponding to the test method;
FIG. 2: the overall operation environment of the testing method is shown schematically;
FIG. 3: a system framework diagram of the main operating environment of the test method of the present invention;
FIG. 4: the structure and the work flow chart of the trusted boot module corresponding to the testing method are disclosed;
FIG. 5: the structure and the work flow chart of a trusted interface module corresponding to the testing method are disclosed;
FIG. 6: the structure and the work flow chart of a credible operation control module corresponding to the testing method are disclosed;
FIG. 7: the invention relates to a structure and a work flow chart of a trusted management center corresponding to a test method.
Detailed Description
In order to further understand the technical scheme and the beneficial effects of the present invention, the following detailed description of the technical scheme and the beneficial effects thereof is provided with the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of an overall system scheme corresponding to the testing method of the present invention, as shown in fig. 1, when the specific test is implemented, a corresponding testing rule needs to be manually made in an early stage, specifically, the overall system scheme includes:
1. and (3) credible technical requirement analysis: and (3) making credible technical requirements by product personnel, refining details of each function, and modeling for complex requirements.
2. And (3) credible technical requirement evaluation: and after the product personnel determine the requirements of the credible technology, informing all the participating project personnel to carry out requirement review on the credible technology. Product personnel put forward credible technical requirements, and developers consider the scheme and feasibility of function implementation. The testers mainly ask questions about understanding of the requirements so as to write credible technical test cases according to the requirements subsequently.
3. Making a credible technology test plan: and (4) making a test period by a tester according to a credible technology development plan, and planning the number of test rounds according to conditions. The test plan is mailed to each department responsible and all personnel participating in the project.
4. Writing a trusted technical document: and designing a trusted technical test scheme and compiling a trusted technical test case by a tester according to the trusted technical requirement document.
5. And (3) credible technical case evaluation: before the credible technical use case is evaluated, the use case is sent to related personnel in a mail mode, so that the related personnel know which functions are verified by the use case in advance and the verification details. Then, the test personnel reviews the use case, the development personnel proposes the non-conformity item of the use case and the actual function, and the product personnel grasp the specific implementation mode through the use case.
6. The specific test execution flow comprises the following steps: and (3) testing by a tester on the built test platform, if a problem is found, feeding back the problem to a developer through a defect management tool, judging whether the bug is effective or not by the developer, confirming that the bug is effective and repairing the bug, otherwise, performing bug evaluation, and finally determining bug effectiveness by a product worker. And after the repairing of the developer is finished, submitting the developer to the tester again for the second round of detection.
7. The test passed: after several rounds of testing, until no new problems are found, or problems are temporarily unresolved, or not urgent. The upper level confirms that the message can pass. And compiling a test report and an acceptance scheme.
Based on NKV 6.0.0 version, the invention uses trusted computing technology to realize trusted basic support software, and monitors the user's behavior in the system, thereby realizing the safe support of the current system, the invention mainly aims to detect the trusted basic support software, including trusted guidance, trusted interface, trusted operation control and the operation condition of the trusted management center four functional modules on NKV 6.0.0 version, and ensure that the modules can be interdependent and relatively independent.
The trusted boot module provides basic support for system trust, the trusted interface module provides trusted chip interface for the system, the trusted operation control module protects system processes based on the security protection level selected by a user, meanwhile, user data is prevented from being illegally read when the system is offline, and the trusted management center module provides a graphical interface which is convenient to configure for the user.
FIGS. 2 and 3 are a schematic diagram of the overall operating environment and a system framework diagram of the main operating environment of the testing method of the present invention, respectively; as shown in fig. 2 to fig. 3, the present invention provides a method for testing compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system, including:
and (3) trusted boot testing: the method is used for measuring NKV 6.0.0 system kernel mirror images, initrd and a start configuration file by adopting a TCM chip in a grub stage, and the credibility of a start system is ensured;
trusted interface test (i.e., TCM chip control): the interface verification module is used for verifying that NKV 6.0.0 systems and application programs are provided with interface implementation conditions for operating the TCM trusted chip;
and (3) trusted operation control test: the CTMM is used for verifying the integrity measurement condition of the CTMM on the kernel module and the system configuration file loaded in the running process and comparing the measurement result with the reference value of the white list;
testing by a trusted management center: the method is used for verifying the graphical management condition of the white list of the system measurement in charge and providing the operation management interface implementation condition of the measurement reference value.
Fig. 4 is a configuration and a work flow diagram of a trusted boot module corresponding to the testing method of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 4, the trusted boot module has a function of preventing a system from being damaged due to tampering of a file related to computer boot, and performs measurement verification on a boot program and a boot file involved in a system boot process to prevent the boot from being started using an untrusted local configuration; meanwhile, initialization is provided, and expected metric values related to the starting process are updated; and allows the user to turn off the trusted boot module configuration.
Thus, the corresponding trusted boot test includes:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system compatibility of the upper trusted boot module configuration;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the system's upper trusted boot module metrics;
s3: the expected value initialization, system configuration and update compatibility of the upper trusted boot module of the system is detected NKV 6.0.0.
Specifically, the step S1 includes: whether the trusted boot module supports the functions of opening and closing the trusted boot module is verified, when the configuration module is closed, a series of operations including the credibility measurement are not performed after the NKV 6.0.0 system is opened, and when the configuration module is opened, subsequent program execution including the credibility measurement is required after the NKV 6.0.0 system is opened, and relevant information including the measurement file list is provided.
Specifically, the step S2 includes: verifying the integrity of a module and an important file loaded before the system kernel is started according to the measurement NKV 6.0.0, and when the system startup file is changed, generating prompt information;
wherein the verification measurement process comprises:
s21: before loading the OS kernel, performing trusted boot to measure and verify a starting code before loading the OS kernel;
s22: trusted boot of the OS kernel to metric verify the OS kernel and vital system files.
Specifically, the step S3 includes: verifying that when relevant contents including a system measurement configuration file are changed, a trusted measurement module (namely a kernel layer) informs a trusted management module (namely an application layer) of needing to modify a file list, and the trusted management module updates a policy file according to the file list and updates the compatibility of the MCF and an expected value of a switch flag bit according to the policy file.
Fig. 5 is a diagram of the structure and the work flow of the trusted interface module corresponding to the testing method of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 5, the trusted interface module has the main functions of performing visual operation on the TCM chip integrated in the hardware, activating cancellation and turning on the chip, checking availability of the chip, performing encryption and decryption functions, and clearing chip information.
Therefore, the corresponding trusted interface test mainly detects the implementation of interface instructions for TCM chip integrated in NKV 6.0.0-based system, which includes:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system interface command operating chip state compatibility;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system interface command to obtain compatibility of chip information;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the case of the system interface command authorization data;
s4: compatibility of the encryption and decryption operations of the system interface command is detected NKV 6.0.0.
Specifically, the step S1 includes: detecting the compatibility of forcibly activating, forcibly starting and forcibly closing the TCM chip when the winner authorization data does not exist in the TCM chip on the NKV 6.0.0 system; and inputting the compatibility of owner authorization data after the authorization data is created.
Specifically, the step S2 includes: detecting compatibility of acquiring TCM chip information, self-testing TCM chip condition, clearing TCM chip information and forcibly clearing TCM chip information on NKV 6.0.0 system.
Specifically, the step S3 includes: compatibility of creating an owner authorization data, creating an srk authorization data, modifying the owner authorization data, and modifying the srk authorization data is detected after activation of the TCM chip on the NKV 6.0.0 system.
Specifically, the step S4 includes: detecting on NKV 6.0.0 system, after starting TCM chip, encrypting file data, decrypting file data, obtaining EK public key information, NV space, ECC encryption and ECC decryption compatibility.
Fig. 6 is a configuration and a work flow diagram of a trusted operation control module corresponding to the testing method of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 6, the trusted operation control module may also be referred to as a CTMM module and is responsible for measuring, protecting and auditing objects such as executable programs and scripts in the system according to a white list configured by an administrator. The main functions are as follows: the trusted basic support software is guaranteed not to be damaged in the system operation; allowing a trusted user to define a kernel white list through a trusted management module to ensure that a specified file is not damaged; according to the protection range configured by the user, the range can be modified, the executable file in the system can be protected, and illegal modification and execution operation can be audited.
Thus, the corresponding trusted operational control test comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of system initiated metric protection;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 the compatibility of the system process and the file integrity;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system memory file system compatibility;
s4: compatibility of the policy cache management part of the system is tested NKV 6.0.0.
Specifically, the step S1 includes: detecting when NKV 6.0.0 system is started and user logs in, extending trust chain compatibility of system boot. Thus passing the chain of trust from bios, kernel to the system and requiring the user to log in when the boot is complete.
Specifically, the step S2 includes: integrity conditions of running processes and executable files of the system of protection NKV 6.0.0 are detected when the system of NKV 6.0.0 runs. In the measurement of the executable file, the work of the trusted kernel does not depend on a file system and only depends on the configuration of a user. The trusted kernel plays a role in protecting the integrity of the file, and the file with the tampered integrity can be found in the trusted access control of the kernel, so that the running of the program is prevented and the related measurement operation of the audit is started.
Specifically, the step S3 includes: communication between the user layer and the kernel layer in the NKV 6.0.0 system is detected. The memory file system mainly comprises 4 parts of detection contents: the test system comprises a test setting file, a test control file, a test user management sub-module and a test management audit interface.
Specifically, in step S4, the main task of policy cache management is to be responsible for providing the management of the user-level policy and the cache to the measurement server, so as to improve the query efficiency.
Fig. 7 is a configuration and a work flow diagram of a trusted management center corresponding to the testing method of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 7, a trusted management center module works in a user space, provides an application layer usage and configuration interface for the trusted technology, provides a graphical mode to assist a user in completing the trusted technology security management of a system, and facilitates the user to configure a trusted module expected value, process audit information, and the like.
Thus, the corresponding trusted management center test includes:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the user interface of the system trusted management center;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of white list management of the system trusted management center;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of policy management of the system trusted management center;
s4: compatibility of the system trust management center audit is tested NKV 6.0.0.
Specifically, the step S1 includes: in NKV 6.0.0 system graphic interface window, testing whether the layout, picture and character display and operation use condition of each interface of the credible management center meet the requirement.
Specifically, the step S2 includes: in the NKV 6.0.0 system, the compatibility of adding, deleting, modifying and checking operations on kernel modules and system configuration files loaded in operation by using a trusted management center is tested, and the unification of graphical operations and character operations is ensured.
Specifically, the step S3 includes: and detecting compatibility conditions of policy management of a trusted management center in the NKV 6.0.0 system, and ensuring that functions including at least one of file storage configuration, policy switch configuration, password configuration function and user-defined policy are normally used.
Specifically, the step S4 includes: the compatibility of an audit module of a trusted management center in an NKV 6.0.0 system is detected, and normal use of functions including at least one of audit receiving, audit inquiring and audit displaying is ensured.
In the present invention, the "EK (collectively referred to as TPM endsegment key)" indicates a cryptographic module key.
In the present invention, "NV (collectively referred to as non-volatile)" means nonvolatile.
In the present invention, "srk (collectively referred to as a storage root key)" means a storage root key.
In the present invention, the term "ECC (collectively referred to as" ECC cubes Cipher ") refers to an Elliptic curve cryptography algorithm.
When the NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method provided by the invention is implemented specifically, the invention provides the following two embodiments:
example 1: checking of file integrity protection compatibility by trusted run control
1. Description of the test
And verifying the integrity measurement of the CTMM on the kernel module and the executable file loaded in the running process, comparing the measurement result with the reference value of the white list, and if the verification fails, refusing the loading of the module or the execution of the application program.
2. Precondition
(1) The tested machine has a TCM chip and is provided with NKV 6.0.0 systems;
(2) ctmm is in an open state;
(3) an executable program ntsysv exists under/usr/sbin and is within the white list.
3. Procedure for the preparation of the
Step 1: the secam user logs in NKV 6.0.0 system, and enters the trusted management center: sequentially clicking 'start' -system tool '-security control management center' -double-click to enter a trusted management center;
step 2: setting the executable file to strict mode: click "set" - "metric set" - "executable-strict" in sequence;
and step 3: entering a white list management interface, and searching whether the executable file ntsysv is in a white list;
and 4, step 4: switching terminals, logging in NKV 6.0.0 system by root users, running ntsysv, and executing commands:
[root@locahost～]#cd/usr/sbin
[root@locahost～]#./ntsysv
and 5: switching terminals, using secadm to log in a graphical interface, and entering a trusted management center-white list management;
step 6: deleting the ntsysv file from the white list;
and 7: switching terminals, logging in NKV 6.0.0 system by root user, running ntsysv again, and executing the command:
[root@locahost～]#cd/usr/sbin
[root@locahost～]#./ntsysv
and 8: the secadm logs in the graphical interface and switches the executable file option settings in the metric settings back to the relaxed mode.
4. Expected result
And 4, step 4: executable program ntsysv can run normally;
and 7: the Operation not permitted is prompted that executable ntsysv cannot run. # specifies an executable file that is not in the whitelist and is denied execution.
Example 2: trusted management center adding white list test
1. Description of the test
And verifying that the system can be scanned at the trusted management center and the scanned files are added to a white list.
2. Precondition for testing
(1) The tested machine has a TCM chip and is provided with NKV 6.0.0 systems;
(2) there is a test script file test3 under the "/tmp/lvl 4" directory, and this file does not exist in the white list;
(3) the ctmm state is open and the standard/normal script is set to the relaxed mode.
3. Procedure for the preparation of the
Step 1: the test script file test3 is run, and the command:
[secadm@locahost～]$cd/tmp/lvl4
[secadm@locahost～]$./test3
step 2: after editing the contents of the script file test3, the following operations are performed again:
[secadm@locahost～]$vim test3
[secadm@locahost～]$./test3
and step 3: the secam user logs in NKV 6.0.0 system, opens "trusted management center": sequentially clicking ' start ' -system tool ' -security control management center ' -trusted management center ';
and 4, step 4: add test script file test3 to the white list: click on "view whitelist" - "add whitelist" -input path/tmp/lvl 4/test 3;
and 5: query test3 within the white list: inputting 'test 3' in the search box to query;
step 6: the test script file test3 is run, and the command:
[secadm@locahost～]$cd/tmp/lvl4
[secadm@locahost～]$./test3
and 7: after editing the contents of the script file test3, the operation is resumed, and the command is executed:
[secadm@locahost～]$vim test3
[secadm@locahost～]$./test3
4. expected result
Step 1: the script file test3 can be correctly run;
step 2: the script file test3 can be correctly run;
and 4, step 4: prompt "load success";
and 5: the test file test3 added in step 4 can be found in the white list;
step 6: the script file test3 may be run;
and 7: due to the change in the metric value, the script file test3 cannot be executed, proving that the file has been added to the white list, governed by the white list.
The beneficial effects that the invention can realize are as follows:
1. the invention strictly detects according to the test flow, can ensure that the trusted boot module, the trusted chip interface execution module, the trusted operation control module and the trusted management center in the trusted technology can work in NKV 6.0.0 system perfectly and stably, and ensure the safety quality of the trusted technology in NKV 6.0.0 system to a greater extent.
2. The invention combines the software and hardware compatibility test, aims at the hardware machine integrated with the TCM chip, and installs a software system with NKV 6.0.0 version credible technology, thereby ensuring the running condition, and the harmony and the stability of the two during the running.
3. The invention can ensure the normal operation of the trusted technology on the NKV 6.0.0 system and timely discover the existence of risks and hidden dangers.
4. When the credible technology is tested, the invention can detect whether the product meets the design requirement and evaluate the realized function.
Although the present invention has been described with reference to the preferred embodiments, it should be understood that the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and those skilled in the art will appreciate that various changes and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.
Claims (19)
1. A method for testing credible technical compatibility based on NKV 6.0.0 system is characterized by comprising the following steps:
and (3) trusted boot testing: the method is used for measuring NKV 6.0.0 system kernel mirror images, initrd and a start configuration file by adopting a TCM chip in a grub stage, and the credibility of a start system is ensured;
testing a trusted interface: the interface verification module is used for verifying that NKV 6.0.0 systems and application programs are provided with interface implementation conditions for operating the TCM trusted chip;
and (3) trusted operation control test: the CTMM is used for verifying the integrity measurement condition of the CTMM on the kernel module and the system configuration file loaded in the running process and comparing the measurement result with the reference value of the white list;
testing by a trusted management center: the method is used for verifying the graphical management condition of the white list of the system measurement in charge and providing the operation management interface implementation condition of the measurement reference value.
2. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 1, wherein the trusted boot test comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system compatibility of the upper trusted boot module configuration;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the system's upper trusted boot module metrics;
s3: the expected value initialization, system configuration and update compatibility of the upper trusted boot module of the system is detected NKV 6.0.0.
3. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 2, wherein step S1 includes: whether the trusted boot module supports the functions of opening and closing the trusted boot module is verified, when the configuration module is closed, a series of operations including the credibility measurement are not performed after the NKV 6.0.0 system is opened, and when the configuration module is opened, subsequent program execution including the credibility measurement is required after the NKV 6.0.0 system is opened, and relevant information including the measurement file list is provided.
4. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 2, wherein step S2 includes: verifying the integrity of a module and an important file loaded before the system kernel is started according to the measurement NKV 6.0.0, and when the system startup file is changed, generating prompt information;
wherein the verification measurement process comprises:
s21: before loading the OS kernel, performing trusted boot to measure and verify a starting code before loading the OS kernel;
s22: trusted boot of the OS kernel to metric verify the OS kernel and vital system files.
5. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 2, wherein step S3 includes: and verifying that when relevant contents including the system measurement configuration file are changed, the credibility measurement module informs the credibility management module of needing to modify the file list, and the credibility management module updates the strategy file according to the change of the relevant contents and updates the compatibility of the MCF and the expected value of the switch flag bit according to the strategy file.
6. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 1, wherein the trusted interface testing comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system interface command operating chip state compatibility;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system interface command to obtain compatibility of chip information;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the case of the system interface command authorization data;
s4: compatibility of the encryption and decryption operations of the system interface command is detected NKV 6.0.0.
7. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 6, wherein step S1 includes: detecting the compatibility of forcibly activating, forcibly starting and forcibly closing the TCM chip when the winner authorization data does not exist in the TCM chip on the NKV 6.0.0 system; and inputting the compatibility of owner authorization data after the authorization data is created.
8. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 6, wherein step S2 includes: detecting compatibility of acquiring TCM chip information, self-testing TCM chip condition, clearing TCM chip information and forcibly clearing TCM chip information on NKV 6.0.0 system.
9. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 6, wherein step S3 includes: compatibility of creating an owner authorization data, creating an srk authorization data, modifying the owner authorization data, and modifying the srk authorization data is detected after activation of the TCM chip on the NKV 6.0.0 system.
10. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 6, wherein step S4 includes: detecting on NKV 6.0.0 system, after starting TCM chip, encrypting file data, decrypting file data, obtaining EK public key information, NV space, ECC encryption and ECC decryption compatibility.
11. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technology compatibility testing method of claim 1, wherein the trusted execution control test comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of system initiated metric protection;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 the compatibility of the system process and the file integrity;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 system memory file system compatibility;
s4: compatibility of the policy cache management part of the system is tested NKV 6.0.0.
12. The method for testing the compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system of claim 11, wherein step S1 includes: detecting when NKV 6.0.0 system is started and user logs in, extending trust chain compatibility of system boot.
13. The method for testing the compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system of claim 11, wherein step S2 includes: integrity conditions of running processes and executable files of the system of protection NKV 6.0.0 are detected when the system of NKV 6.0.0 runs.
14. The method for testing the compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system of claim 11, wherein step S3 includes: communication between the user layer and the kernel layer in the NKV 6.0.0 system is detected.
15. The NKV 6.0.0 system-based trusted technical compatibility testing method of claim 1, wherein the trusted management center testing comprises:
s1: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of the user interface of the system trusted management center;
s2: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of white list management of the system trusted management center;
s3: detecting NKV 6.0.0 compatibility of policy management of the system trusted management center;
s4: compatibility of the system trust management center audit is tested NKV 6.0.0.
16. The method for testing the compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system of claim 15, wherein step S1 includes: in NKV 6.0.0 system graphic interface window, testing whether the layout, picture and character display and operation use condition of each interface of the credible management center meet the requirement.
17. The method for testing the compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system of claim 15, wherein step S2 includes: in the NKV 6.0.0 system, the compatibility of adding, deleting, modifying and checking operations on kernel modules and system configuration files loaded in operation by using a trusted management center is tested, and the unification of graphical operations and character operations is ensured.
18. The method for testing the compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system of claim 15, wherein step S3 includes: and detecting compatibility conditions of policy management of a trusted management center in the NKV 6.0.0 system, and ensuring that functions including at least one of file storage configuration, policy switch configuration, password configuration function and user-defined policy are normally used.
19. The method for testing the compatibility of trusted technologies based on NKV 6.0.0 system of claim 15, wherein step S4 includes: the compatibility of an audit module of a trusted management center in an NKV 6.0.0 system is detected, and normal use of functions including at least one of audit receiving, audit inquiring and audit displaying is ensured.
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| CN110334518B (en) * | 2019-07-05 | 2021-05-14 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | Trusted computing platform-based measurement policy verification method and device |
| CN110334522B (en) * | 2019-07-08 | 2021-07-27 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | Method and device for starting measurement |
| CN110677416A (en) * | 2019-09-29 | 2020-01-10 | 北京可信华泰信息技术有限公司 | Dynamic measurement method and device and trusted computing terminal |
| CN117970907B (en) * | 2024-04-01 | 2024-06-14 | 西安热工研究院有限公司 | Trusted DCS controller trusted function test method, electronic equipment and storage medium |
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