CN108111303B - Safe connection method of intelligent home gateway - Google Patents
Safe connection method of intelligent home gateway Download PDFInfo
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- CN108111303B CN108111303B CN201711439751.3A CN201711439751A CN108111303B CN 108111303 B CN108111303 B CN 108111303B CN 201711439751 A CN201711439751 A CN 201711439751A CN 108111303 B CN108111303 B CN 108111303B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
- H04L61/09—Mapping addresses
- H04L61/10—Mapping addresses of different types
- H04L61/103—Mapping addresses of different types across network layers, e.g. resolution of network layer into physical layer addresses or address resolution protocol [ARP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/14—Session management
- H04L67/141—Setup of application sessions
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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Abstract
The invention discloses a safe connection method of an intelligent home gateway, which uses a third-party server to register an identifier and an initial key of the home gateway in advance, the home gateway authenticates itself to the third-party server based on registration information and enables the third-party server to acquire a network address and a communication key of itself according to the authentication, then a client authenticates itself to the third-party server based on the registration information, and acquires the network address and the communication key of the home gateway from the third-party server, thereby establishing safe connection with the home gateway.
Description
[ technical field ] A method for producing a semiconductor device
The invention belongs to the field of intelligent home and computer security, and particularly relates to a secure connection method for an intelligent home.
[ background of the invention ]
In recent years, with the rapid development of the computer industry, computer technology has deepened into the lives of people, and gradually combined with our living environment, the concept of smart home appears. The intelligent home is to connect various electric appliances in the home together by using the technologies of computers, communication, sensors, household appliances and the like, and is controlled by a central controller, thereby providing a very convenient living environment for people.
After the smart home is introduced, people can also remotely control smart devices in the home through a client (such as a smart phone), for example, an air conditioner in the home is turned on before the smart device arrives at the home, and the like. To achieve this, a home gateway is usually provided in a smart home, and serves as an internet outlet for all devices in the smart home, and a client is remotely connected to the home gateway through the internet, so as to control smart devices in the home through the home gateway.
In this case, the security of the home gateway needs to be considered, and on one hand, the internet address of the home gateway is probably not fixed, and the internet address of the remote client is uncertain. Therefore, when the client needs to remotely connect to the home gateway, how to determine the address of the home gateway becomes a problem. Similarly, the home gateway also needs to confirm that the client is a valid client for the remotely connected client.
[ summary of the invention ]
In order to solve the technical problem in the prior art, the invention provides a safe connection method of an intelligent home gateway.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a safe connection method of an intelligent home gateway comprises the following steps:
(1) the user registers in a credible third-party server, registration information comprises an identifier ID of the home gateway and an initial Key, and the registration information is stored in the third-party server, the home gateway and the client at the same time;
(2) when the home gateway is connected to the internet, the home gateway randomly generates a communication key K and assembles an address notification message packet M0Sending to the third party server, wherein:
M0＝{ID，EKey(K，ID，Date)}
EKey() Is a symmetric encryption function encrypted by using a Key, and Date is the current Date; and the home gateway monitors the network address of the home gateway at any time, and once the network address of the home gateway changes, the home gateway executes the step (2) again;
(3) the third party server acquires the network address of the connected home gateway and notifies the address of a message packet M0Analyzing to obtain ID and EKey(K，ID，Date)；
(4) The third party server obtains corresponding registration information according to the ID obtained by analysis, obtains a corresponding initial Key, and uses the initial Key to EKey(K, ID, Date) decrypting, checking whether the ID obtained by decryption is the same as the ID obtained by analysis, if not, the address notification message packet M0If it is illegal, directly neglecting the address notification message packet M0(ii) a If the three groups are the same, acquiring the triple (K, ID, Date) obtained by decryption;
(5) the third-party server judges whether the triple obtained by decryption already exists in the database, and if so, ignores the address notification message packet M0If not, the triple is stored in the database, and the network of the home gateway is stored at the same timeA network address;
(6) when the client needs to obtain the network address of the home gateway, the client assembles an address inquiry message packet M1Namely:
M1＝{ID，EKey(ID，Salt，Date1)}
wherein, Salt is a random number, Date1Is the current date;
(7) the client side sends the address inquiry message packet M1Sending to the third party server, the third party server pair M1Analyzing to obtain ID and EKey(ID，Salt，Date1)；
(8) The third party server resolves M1The obtained ID obtains corresponding registration information, obtains a corresponding initial Key, and uses the initial Key to EKey(ID，Salt，Date1) Performing decryption, checking the decrypted ID and parsing M1If the obtained ID is the same, if not, the address inquiry message packet M1If it is illegal, the address inquiry message packet M is ignored1Ending the treatment; if the three groups are identical, obtaining the triple (ID, Salt, Date) obtained by decryption1)；
(9) The third party server determines the triplet (ID, Salt, Date)1) Whether it already exists in the database, and if so, ignoring the address query message packet M1Ending the treatment; if not, the triple (ID, Salt, Date) is added1) Storing in a database, and continuing the subsequent steps;
(10) the third party server assembles an address response message packet M2Returning to the client, namely: m2＝EKey(IP, ID, K), where IP is the network address of the home gateway;
(11) the client uses the initial Key Key to pair M2Decrypting to obtain IP, ID and K;
(12) the client judges whether the ID obtained by decryption is the ID of the home gateway to be connected, if not, the address response message packet M is ignored2If so, the IP can be considered as the network address of the home gateway to which the connection is required, so that the client establishes a network connection with the home gateway based on the IP and performs encrypted communication with the home gateway by using the communication key K.
Further, the third party server is set up by the manufacturer of the home gateway.
Further, the third party server is connected to the internet and has a fixed internet domain name or network address which is pre-stored in the home gateway and the client.
Further, the identifier ID of the home gateway is a globally unique code.
Further, the length of the initial Key is determined according to the requirements of a subsequent encryption algorithm.
The technical effects realized by the invention are as follows: the client can safely acquire the network address of the home gateway and establish safe connection with the home gateway.
[ description of the drawings ]
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, and are not to be considered limiting of the invention, in which:
fig. 1 is a diagram of an application scenario of the present invention.
[ detailed description ] embodiments
The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the drawings and specific embodiments, wherein the exemplary embodiments and descriptions are provided only for the purpose of illustrating the present invention and are not to be construed as unduly limiting the invention.
Referring to fig. 1, a smart home to which the present invention is applied is shown, where the smart home includes a plurality of smart devices and a home gateway, and the plurality of smart devices and the home gateway are connected through an in-home network, such as a WIFI network. The home gateway can be connected to the internet as an internet outlet of the whole smart home. A user may use a client (e.g., a smart phone) to remotely connect to the home gateway via the internet, so that various smart devices in the home may be accessed and controlled via the home gateway.
What the present invention is concerned about is how a client remotely determines the network address of a home gateway on the internet and establishes a secure connection with the home gateway. The detailed description is as follows:
(1) the user first registers with a trusted third party server, and the registration information includes the identifier ID of the home gateway and an initial Key. The registration information is stored in the third party server, the home gateway and the client, respectively, for subsequent use.
Specifically, the third-party server may be set up by a manufacturer of the home gateway, and the third-party server is connected to the internet and has a fixed internet domain name or network address, which is stored in the home gateway and the client in advance, so that the home gateway and the client can be directly connected to the third-party server conveniently.
The identifier ID of the home gateway may be a globally unique code for uniquely identifying the home gateway. The initial Key is a large random number, and the length of the initial Key is determined according to the requirements of a subsequent encryption algorithm, for example, a 128-bit random number.
(2) When the home gateway is connected to the internet, the home gateway randomly generates a communication key K and assembles an address notification message packet M0Sending to the third party server, wherein:
M0＝{ID，EKey(K，ID，Date)}
EKey() Is a symmetric encryption function that uses the Key for encryption, where any symmetric encryption algorithm known in the art, such as the AES algorithm, may be used. Date is the current Date.
It should be noted that the home gateway monitors its own network address (e.g. IP address) at any time, and once the own network address changes, the home gateway needs to perform step (2) again, that is, randomly generate a new communication key again, and assemble and send a new address notification packet.
(3) The third party server acquires the network address of the connected home gateway and notifies the address of a message packet M0Analyzing to obtain ID and EKey(K，ID，Date)。
Since the home gateway necessarily needs to establish a network connection with the third-party server when sending the message packet, the third-party server can directly acquire the network address of the home gateway through the network connection.
(4) The third party server obtains corresponding registration information according to the ID obtained by analysis, obtains a corresponding initial Key, and uses the initial Key to EKey(K, ID, Date) decrypting, checking whether the ID obtained by decryption is the same as the ID obtained by analysis, if not, the address notification message packet M0If it is illegal, directly neglecting the address notification message packet M0(ii) a And if the three groups are identical, acquiring the decrypted triple (K, ID, Date).
As mentioned above, the registration information is stored in the third party server after the user is registered, and in general, the third party server may use a user database to store all the registration information, and then it may retrieve the corresponding initial key from the database by using the unique identifier ID in the registration information.
(5) The third-party server judges whether the triple obtained by decryption already exists in the database, and if so, ignores the address notification message packet M0And if the three groups do not exist, storing the three groups in the database and simultaneously storing the network address of the home gateway.
The communication key K is a random number that should be different every time, and with the ID and date restrictions, the probability of the true occurrence of the same triplet is extremely small, so if the triplet is already present in the database, it can be considered that the address notification packet has been received before, and the current packet is likely to be a replay attack by a hacker and is illegal.
The above steps (2) - (5) are actually a process in which the home gateway authenticates itself to the third-party server based on the registration information, and the third-party server acquires the network address and the communication key of the home gateway after the authentication.
(6) When the client needs to obtain the network address of the home gateway, the client assembles an address inquiry message packet M1Namely:
M1＝{ID，EKey(ID，Salt，Date1)}
wherein, Salt is a random number, which is used to play a role of random interference and avoid being attacked by replay. Date (R) data1Is the current date.
(7) The client side sends the address inquiry message packet M1Sending to the third party server, the third party server pair M1Analyzing to obtain ID and EKey(ID，Salt，Date1)。
(8) The third party server obtains corresponding registration information according to the ID obtained by analysis, obtains a corresponding initial Key, and uses the initial Key to EKey(ID，Salt，Date1) Performing decryption, checking the decrypted ID and parsing M1If the obtained ID is the same, if not, the address inquiry message packet M1If it is illegal, the address inquiry message packet M is ignored1Ending the process, if the three groups are the same, obtaining the triple (ID, Salt, Date) obtained by decryption1)。
(9) The third party server determines the triplet (ID, Salt, Date)1) Whether it already exists in the database, and if so, ignoring the address query message packet M1Ending the treatment; if not, the triple (ID, Salt, Date) is added1) And storing in a database, and continuing the subsequent steps.
Like step (5) above, step (9) is also to prevent replay attacks by hackers. The above-described steps (6) - (9) are actually procedures by which the client authenticates itself to the third-party server based on the registration information.
(10) The third party server assembles an address response message packet M2Returning to the client, namely: m2＝EKey(IP, ID, K), where IP is the home gatewayThe network address of (2).
(11) The client uses the initial Key Key to pair M2And decrypting to obtain the IP, the ID and the K.
(12) The client judges whether the ID obtained by decryption is the ID of the home gateway to be connected, if not, the address response message packet M is ignored2If so, the IP can be considered as the network address of the home gateway to which the connection is required, so that the client establishes a network connection with the home gateway based on the IP and performs encrypted communication with the home gateway by using the communication key K. In this way, the client establishes a secure connection with the home gateway.
After that, the client may store the IP and K, and when it is needed to connect to the home gateway, the IP and K are used to connect first, but once a certain time finds that the home gateway cannot be connected using the IP and K, which indicates that the network address of the home gateway may have changed, the client repeats steps 6-12 to obtain a new IP and K.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and all equivalent changes or modifications of the structure, characteristics and principles described in the present invention are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (5)
1. A safe connection method of an intelligent home gateway is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) the user registers in a credible third-party server, registration information comprises an identifier ID of the home gateway and an initial Key, and the registration information is stored in the third-party server, the home gateway and the client at the same time;
(2) when the home gateway is connected to the internet, the home gateway randomly generates a communication key K and assembles an address notification message packet M0Sending to the third party server, wherein:
M0＝{ID，EKey(K，ID，Date)}
EKey() Is a symmetric encryption function encrypted by using a Key, and Date is the current Date; and areThe home gateway monitors the network address of the home gateway at any time, and once the network address of the home gateway changes, the home gateway executes the step (2) again;
(3) the third party server acquires the network address of the connected home gateway and notifies the address of a message packet M0Analyzing to obtain ID and EKey(K，ID，Date)；
(4) The third party server obtains corresponding registration information according to the ID obtained by analysis, obtains a corresponding initial Key, and uses the initial Key to EKey(K, ID, Date) decrypting, checking whether the ID obtained by decryption is the same as the ID obtained by analysis, if not, the address notification message packet M0If it is illegal, directly neglecting the address notification message packet M0(ii) a If the three groups are the same, acquiring the triple (K, ID, Date) obtained by decryption;
(5) the third-party server judges whether the triple obtained by decryption already exists in the database, and if so, ignores the address notification message packet M0If the triple does not exist, the triple is stored in the database, and the network address of the home gateway is stored at the same time;
(6) when the client needs to obtain the network address of the home gateway, the client assembles an address inquiry message packet M1Namely:
M1＝{ID，EKey(ID，Salt，Date1)}
wherein, Salt is a random number, Date1Is the current date;
(7) the client side sends the address inquiry message packet M1Sending to the third party server, the third party server pair M1Analyzing to obtain ID and EKey(ID，Salt，Date1)；
(8) The third party server resolves M1The obtained ID obtains corresponding registration information, obtains a corresponding initial Key, and uses the initial Key to EKey(ID，Salt，Date1) Performing decryption, checking the decrypted ID and parsing M1If the obtained ID is the same, if not, the address inquiry message packet M1If it is illegal, the address inquiry message packet M is ignored1Ending the treatment; if the three groups are identical, obtaining the triple (ID, Salt, Date) obtained by decryption1)；
(9) The third party server determines the triplet (ID, Salt, Date)1) Whether it already exists in the database, and if so, ignoring the address query message packet M1Ending the treatment; if not, the triple (ID, Salt, Date) is added1) Storing in a database, and continuing the subsequent steps;
(10) the third party server assembles an address response message packet M2Returning to the client, namely: m2＝EKey(IP, ID, K), where IP is the network address of the home gateway;
(11) the client uses the initial Key Key to pair M2Decrypting to obtain IP, ID and K;
(12) the client judges whether the ID obtained by decryption is the ID of the home gateway to be connected, if not, the address response message packet M is ignored2If so, the IP can be considered as the network address of the home gateway to which the connection is required, so that the client establishes a network connection with the home gateway based on the IP and performs encrypted communication with the home gateway by using the communication key K.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the third party server is set up by a manufacturer of the home gateway.
3. A method according to any of claims 1-2, characterized in that the third party server is connected to the internet and has a fixed internet domain name or network address, which is pre-stored in the home gateway and client.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the identifier ID of the home gateway is a globally unique code.
5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the length of the initial Key Key is determined according to the requirements of the subsequent encryption algorithm.
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| WO2017117024A1 (en) * | 2015-12-31 | 2017-07-06 | Acxiom Corporation | Salting text in database tables, text files, and data feeds |
| CN111163035A (en) * | 2018-11-07 | 2020-05-15 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | Method, device and system for managing remote connection of home gateway |
| CN113225732B (en) * | 2020-01-21 | 2023-07-04 | 深圳市云海物联科技有限公司 | Data transmission method and device and terminal equipment |
| CN113890778B (en) * | 2021-11-04 | 2023-08-25 | 深圳海智创科技有限公司 | Intelligent home authentication and encryption method and system based on local area network |
| CN113872761B (en) * | 2021-11-17 | 2023-07-07 | 湖北工业大学 | Batch authentication method for intelligent household equipment, computing equipment and storable medium |
| CN114710348B (en) * | 2022-03-31 | 2023-07-04 | 湖北工业大学 | Authorization authentication and key negotiation method for user to use home intelligent equipment |
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