CN108040042A - A kind of safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case - Google Patents
A kind of safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN108040042A CN108040042A CN201711267969.5A CN201711267969A CN108040042A CN 108040042 A CN108040042 A CN 108040042A CN 201711267969 A CN201711267969 A CN 201711267969A CN 108040042 A CN108040042 A CN 108040042A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- proxy server
- multicast
- server
- client
- key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0884—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case, belong to network technique field.The present invention is on the basis of the CoAP agreements for the IP network design that resourceoriented is limited, it is proposed a kind of safety method for CoAP Protocol Multicast mechanism, including a kind of multicast authentication Encryption Algorithm and a kind of boolean's array testing mechanism, ensure end-by-end security, and be suitable for the agency mechanism of CoAP agreements in itself.Advantage of the present invention is:In the case of CoAP Protocol Multicasts, information is completed while broadcast authentication is realized to the secrecy transmission of multicast group server node, enable the server to extract encryption information from the proxy server of certification, and other servers can not receive this encryption information.The present invention utilizes GDOI algorithms and symmetric key mechanisms in Sensor Network, and boolean's array mechanism is added in proxy server, in the case where ensureing information transmission, improves the security of data communication.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to network technique field, is related to a kind of for CoAP (Constrained under multicast case
Application Protocol) agreement safety method.
Background technology
Since many equipment in Internet of Things are all resource-constrained type, i.e. only a small amount of memory headroom and limited meter
Calculation ability, so traditional http protocol is applied just seems excessively huge and inapplicable on Internet of Things.The CoRE work of IETF
Group proposes a kind of CoAP agreements based on REST frameworks.CoAP is the application layer protocol in 6LowPAN protocol stacks.This article exists
On the basis of the contents of CoAP agreements, feature and interaction models, in uIPv6STARTKIT wireless network development kits, use
Contiki embedded OSs, are realized in the client-side program that browser end realizes CoAP agreements and is write with oneself
CoAP agreements, it is achieved thereby that can not only check real time data on web interface.But in the feelings of CoAP Protocol Multicasts
Under condition, it is difficult to complete information to the secrecy transmission of multicast group server.
The content of the invention
In view of this, will it is an object of the invention to provide a kind of safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case
Boolean's array and GDOI algorithms are incorporated into CoAP agreements, and recognizing for client and proxy server is completed using bidirectional authentication mechanism
Card, then completes recognizing for proxy server and multicast group server under multicast case using GDOI algorithms and boolean's array mechanism
Card, ensures the safe transmission of information.
To reach above-mentioned purpose, the present invention provides following technical solution:
A kind of safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case, comprises the following steps:
S1:System initialization;
S2:Certification between proxy server and client;
S3:Proxy server carries out Multicast operation;
S4:Proxy server establishes renewal boolean array and carries out relevant operation;
S6:Proxy server sends success response to client.
Further, the step S1 is specially:
According to the proxy caching mechanism of CoAP agreements in itself, used first between client and proxy server based on pre-
The certification of shared key and key managing project carry out light-weight authentication, in client and authentication proxy server stage, by life
Into parameter:
Er():Message is encrypted using key r;
Nn:The random number of generation;
Si:Wildcard, is stored between client, proxy server and server;
Ri:The group key generated by GC;
SKsession:Session key between client and proxy server;
IDn:Client identity identifies;
ID'n:Multicast server group identity, n=1,2,3 ...;
H():The Hash message constructed through Hash operation;
V:Multicast message.
Further, the step S2 is specially:
S201:Client initiates certification request to proxy server first, by the ID of itselfnWith the random number N of generation1Hair
Proxy server is sent to, while constructs MAC1=H (N1||counter||IDn);
S202:After proxy server receives the certification request of client, according to client id and N1And shared key SiCalculate
Session key and message authentication code MAC2, SKsession, SKsession=H (Si||R0||R1||IDn), MAC2=H (N1||counter
||IDn), verify MAC1=MAC2Afterwards, MAC is generated using the session key of generation3=H (SKsession,R0||R1||IDn) construct back
Message package is answered to return to client;
S203:Client receives the back message of proxy server, in the same way session key, then gives birth to
Into MAC4Confirm MAC3And MAC4Value it is equal after, then certification is completed, by SKsessionAs client and proxy server it
Between session key, then client the message transmitted will be needed to be sent to proxy server after session key is encrypted;
S204:Proxy server receives ciphertext, and is decrypted with session key, completes relevant operation;
Further, the step S3 is specially:
S301:Multicast server group initiates the request of application addition multicast group to proxy server, in the heading of application
Middle addition server ID number, i.e. Request=Auth (IDn), n=1,2,3...;
S302:After proxy server receives the certification request that server is sent, the ID of server in the message of head is parsed,
According to the ID multicast group numbers received, boolean's array is established in agency service weapon, for the feedback of receipt of subsequent server,
A secure tunnel SA is created between multicast server and proxy server afterwards, by GC generation multicast group keys Ri, group key
Generating mode isAfter generating group key, group key is issued, while use AES-128
Encryption Algorithm, constructs back message, i.e.,N be multicast server number, n=1,2,
3 ..., v are multicast message;
S303:After multicast server receives the response of proxy server according to the secure tunnel SA established before, pass through
The group key R that GC is issuediParse ID to be contrasted, if equal with itself ID number, complete multicast group certification, then share close
Key SiDecrypt multicast message v, if unequal with self ID by contrast, carry out retransmission feedback, again with proxy server it
Between carry out multicast authentication.
Further, the step S5 is specially:In the time t that experience is preset1Afterwards, proxy server is directed to state boolean
Array is traveled through, and is represented the receiving terminal for the array location for wherein not yet changing state and is unsuccessfully received agency's clothes
The information sent before business device or transmission feedback information failure;At this time, infomational message before is weighed again by proxy server
It is transmitted to these receiving terminals for being judged as reception failure;
, it is necessary to be judged according to the quantity of receiving terminal in this re-transmission during re-transmission, if receiving terminal quantity is less than A, adopt
It is transmitted with the form for paying attention to unicast;If receiving terminal quantity is more than or equal to A, continue to be sent out by the way of multi-casting communication
Send, until the information fed back again causes all boolean's arrays to travel through, then prove that this Multicast operation successfully completes.
The beneficial effects of the present invention are:In the case of CoAP Protocol Multicasts, completed while broadcast authentication is realized
Secrecy transmission of the information to multicast group server node so that server can be extracted from the proxy server of certification
Encryption information, and other servers can not receive this encryption information.The present invention is using the GDOI algorithms in Sensor Network and symmetrically
Key mechanism, adds boolean's array mechanism in proxy server, in the case where ensureing information transmission, improves data communication
Security.
Brief description of the drawings
In order to make the purpose of the present invention, technical solution and beneficial effect clearer, the present invention provides drawings described below and carries out
Explanation:
Fig. 1 is based on the symmetric key bidirectional identification protocol between client and proxy server;
Certification schematic diagrames of the Fig. 2 between client and proxy server;
Fig. 3 is heading form;
Fig. 4 is to be responsible for the addition of member and the distribution flow figure of Multicast Key in multicast group server in proxy server;
Fig. 5 establishes renewal boolean array for proxy server and carries out relevant operational flow figure.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with attached drawing, the preferred embodiment of the present invention is described in detail.
As shown in Figure 1-Figure 3, a kind of multicast authentication method based on authentication encryption algorithm and boolean's array, it is real by unicast
During existing CoAP networkings, operation is complex, and be only applicable to receive server end quantity it is few when, if the receiving terminal quantity in system
It is more, then the problem of server end easily occur, to receive information interval excessive, or message is revealed, it can be ensured using this method
The safety of CoAP protocol networkings under multicast case, while it is suitable for the proxy server mechanism of CoAP agreements in itself, its process bag
Include following steps:
S1 system initializations
According to the proxy caching mechanism of CoAP agreements in itself, used first between client and proxy server based on pre-
The certification of shared key and key managing project carry out light-weight authentication,
In client and authentication proxy server stage, following several parameters will be generated:
Er():Message is encrypted using key r;
Nn:The random number of generation;
Si:Wildcard, is stored between client, proxy server and server;
Ri:The group key generated by GC;
SKsession:Session key between client and proxy server;
IDn:Client identity identifies;
ID'n:Multicast server group identity, n=1,2,3 ...;
H():The Hash message constructed through Hash operation;
V:Multicast message.
Certification between S2 proxy servers and client
Step 1:Client initiates certification request to proxy server first, by the ID of itselfnWith the random number N of generation1
Proxy server is sent to, while constructs MAC1=H (N1||counter||IDn)
Step 2:After proxy server receives the certification request of client, according to client id and N1And shared key SiMeter
Calculate session key and message authentication code MAC2, SKsession, SKsession=H (Si||R0||R1||IDn), MAC2=H (N1||
counter||IDn), verify MAC1=MAC2Afterwards, MAC is generated using the session key of generation3=H (SKsession,R0||R1||
IDn) construct bag return client of receiveing the response.
Step 3:Client receives the back message of proxy server, in the same way session key, then
Generate MAC4Confirm MAC3And MAC4Value it is equal after, then certification is completed, by SKsessionAs client and proxy server
Between session key, then client the message transmitted will be needed to be sent to proxy server after session key is encrypted.
Step 4:Proxy server receives ciphertext, and is decrypted with session key, completes relevant operation.
S3 proxy servers carry out Multicast operation
Server group initiates multicast application to proxy server first, uses base between server and proxy server at this time
Multicast authentication is carried out in DTLS agreements, authentication header that Auth is added in coap agreements, resource consumption is minimized, in agency service
GDOI Multicast Key management algorithms are introduced in device, Auth-Lite heading forms are as follows:
It is responsible for the addition of member and distribution, that is, GC of Multicast Key in multicast group server in proxy server at the same time
(GroupController), as shown in Figure 4:
Multicast authentication process is as follows:
Step 1:Multicast server group initiates the request of application addition multicast group to proxy server, in the message of application
Server ID number, i.e. Request=Auth (ID are added in headn), n=1,2,3...
Step 2:After proxy server receives the certification request that server is sent, server in the message of head is parsed
ID, according to the ID multicast group numbers received, establishes boolean's array, for the anti-of receipt of subsequent server in agency service weapon
Feedback, creates a secure tunnel SA afterwards between multicast server and proxy server, by GC generation multicast group keys Ri, organize close
Key generating mode isAfter generating group key, group key is issued, while use AES-
128 Encryption Algorithm, construct back message, i.e.,N be multicast server number (n=1,
2,3), v is multicast message.
Step 3:After multicast server receives the response of proxy server according to the secure tunnel SA established before, lead to
Cross the group key R that GC is issuediParse ID to be contrasted, if equal with itself ID number, complete multicast group certification, then share
Key SiDecrypt multicast message v, if unequal with self ID by contrast, carry out retransmission feedback, again with proxy server
Between carry out multicast authentication
S4 proxy servers establish renewal boolean array and carry out relevant operation.
Receive server and receive the message of proxy server, and after completing relevant operation, receiving server can take to agency
Business device sends feedback message.After proxy server receives numerous feedback informations, according to the ID of numerous receiving terminals, for previous
Boolean's array that step creates carries out Status Change.
It experienced the time t that presets1Afterwards, proxy server is traveled through for state boolean's array, for wherein
The array location for not yet changing state be represent the receiving terminal and be unsuccessfully received the information sent before proxy server or
Send feedback information failure.At this time, infomational message before is retransmitted again by proxy server and is judged as receiving to these
The receiving terminal of failure.
, it is necessary to be judged according to the quantity of receiving terminal in this re-transmission during re-transmission, if receiving terminal quantity is less than A, adopt
It is transmitted with the form for paying attention to unicast;If receiving terminal quantity is more than or equal to A, continue to be sent out by the way of multi-casting communication
Send, until the information fed back again causes all boolean's arrays to travel through, then prove that this Multicast operation successfully completes, such as
Shown in Fig. 5.
S5 proxy servers send success response to client
After completing aforesaid operations, proxy server feeds back to one confirmation message of client in the form of unicast, confirms
This sends successfully.
Finally illustrate, preferred embodiment above is merely illustrative of the technical solution of the present invention and unrestricted, although logical
Cross above preferred embodiment the present invention is described in detail, however, those skilled in the art should understand that, can be
Various changes are made to it in form and in details, without departing from claims of the present invention limited range.
Claims (5)
- A kind of 1. safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case, it is characterised in that:This method comprises the following steps:S1:System initialization;S2:Certification between proxy server and client;S3:Proxy server carries out Multicast operation;S4:Proxy server establishes renewal boolean array and carries out relevant operation;S6:Proxy server sends success response to client.
- A kind of 2. safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case according to claim 1, it is characterised in that:It is described Step S1 is specially:According to the proxy caching mechanism of CoAP agreements in itself, used first between client and proxy server and be based on pre-share The certification of key and key managing project carry out light-weight authentication, and in client and authentication proxy server stage, generation is joined Number:Er():Message is encrypted using key r;Nn:The random number of generation;Si:Wildcard, is stored between client, proxy server and server;Ri:The group key generated by GC;SKsession:Session key between client and proxy server;IDn:Client identity identifies;ID'n:Multicast server group identity, n=1,2,3 ...;H():The Hash message constructed through Hash operation;V:Multicast message.
- A kind of 3. safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case according to claim 2, it is characterised in that:It is described Step S2 is specially:S201:Client initiates certification request to proxy server first, by the ID of itselfnWith the random number N of generation1It is sent to Proxy server, while construct MAC1=H (N1||counter||IDn);S202:After proxy server receives the certification request of client, according to client id and N1And shared key SiCalculate session Key and message authentication code MAC2, SKsession, SKsession=H (Si||R0||R1||IDn), MAC2=H (N1||counter|| IDn), verify MAC1=MAC2Afterwards, MAC is generated using the session key of generation3=H (SKsession,R0||R1||IDn) construction response Message package returns to client;S203:Client receives the back message of proxy server, in the same way session key, then generates MAC4Confirm MAC3And MAC4Value it is equal after, then certification is completed, by SKsessionAs between client and proxy server Session key, then client the message transmitted will be needed to be sent to proxy server after session key is encrypted;S204:Proxy server receives ciphertext, and is decrypted with session key, completes relevant operation.
- A kind of 4. safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case according to claim 3, it is characterised in that:It is described Step S3 is specially:S301:Multicast server group initiates the request of application addition multicast group to proxy server, adds in the heading of application Enter server ID number, i.e. Request=Auth (IDn), n=1,2,3...;S302:After proxy server receives the certification request that server is sent, the ID of server in the message of head is parsed, according to The ID multicast group numbers received, establish boolean's array in agency service weapon, for the feedback of receipt of subsequent server, afterwards A secure tunnel SA is created between multicast server and proxy server, by GC generation multicast group keys Ri, group key establishment Mode isAfter generating group key, group key is issued, while is encrypted using AES-128 Algorithm, constructs back message, i.e.,N be multicast server number, n=1,2,3 ..., v For multicast message;S303:After multicast server receives the response of proxy server according to the secure tunnel SA established before, by under GC The group key R of hairiParse ID to be contrasted, if equal with itself ID number, complete multicast group certification, then shared key Si Decrypt multicast message v, if unequal with self ID by contrast, carry out retransmission feedback, again between proxy server into Row multicast authentication.
- A kind of 5. safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case according to claim 4, it is characterised in that:It is described Step S5 is specially:In the time t that experience is preset1Afterwards, proxy server is traveled through for state boolean's array, for it In not yet change the array location of state and represent the receiving terminal and be unsuccessfully received the information sent before proxy server Or send feedback information failure;At this time, infomational message before is retransmitted again by proxy server and is judged as connecing to these Receive the receiving terminal of failure;, it is necessary to be judged according to the quantity of receiving terminal in this re-transmission during re-transmission, if receiving terminal quantity is less than A, using note The form of meaning unicast is transmitted;If receiving terminal quantity is more than or equal to A, continue to be transmitted by the way of multi-casting communication, Until the information fed back again causes all boolean's arrays to travel through, then prove that this Multicast operation successfully completes.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201711267969.5A CN108040042B (en) | 2017-12-05 | 2017-12-05 | Safety method for CoAP protocol under multicast condition |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201711267969.5A CN108040042B (en) | 2017-12-05 | 2017-12-05 | Safety method for CoAP protocol under multicast condition |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
CN108040042A true CN108040042A (en) | 2018-05-15 |
CN108040042B CN108040042B (en) | 2020-07-03 |
Family
ID=62095365
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
CN201711267969.5A Active CN108040042B (en) | 2017-12-05 | 2017-12-05 | Safety method for CoAP protocol under multicast condition |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
CN (1) | CN108040042B (en) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN110022312A (en) * | 2019-03-20 | 2019-07-16 | 杭州职业技术学院 | One kind being used for the prolongable lightweight method of proof of internet of things equipment |
CN114124388A (en) * | 2022-01-27 | 2022-03-01 | 济南量子技术研究院 | Gossip protocol synchronization method based on quantum key |
Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN103297563A (en) * | 2013-06-14 | 2013-09-11 | 南京邮电大学 | Method for preventing duplicated address detection attack on basis of identity authentication |
CN104821930A (en) * | 2014-02-03 | 2015-08-05 | 塔塔咨询服务公司 | A computer implemented system and method for lightweight authentication on datagram transport for internet of things |
US20160277391A1 (en) * | 2015-03-16 | 2016-09-22 | Convida Wireless, Llc | End-to-end authentication at the service layer using public keying mechanisms |
CN106341255A (en) * | 2015-07-07 | 2017-01-18 | 思科技术公司 | Intelligent wide area network (iwan) |
CN106663143A (en) * | 2014-07-18 | 2017-05-10 | 康维达无线有限责任公司 | M2m ontology management and semantics interoperability |
JP2017188958A (en) * | 2011-02-11 | 2017-10-12 | インターデイジタル パテント ホールディングス インコーポレイテッド | Systems, methods and apparatus for managing machine-to-machine (m2m) entities |
-
2017
- 2017-12-05 CN CN201711267969.5A patent/CN108040042B/en active Active
Patent Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2017188958A (en) * | 2011-02-11 | 2017-10-12 | インターデイジタル パテント ホールディングス インコーポレイテッド | Systems, methods and apparatus for managing machine-to-machine (m2m) entities |
CN103297563A (en) * | 2013-06-14 | 2013-09-11 | 南京邮电大学 | Method for preventing duplicated address detection attack on basis of identity authentication |
CN104821930A (en) * | 2014-02-03 | 2015-08-05 | 塔塔咨询服务公司 | A computer implemented system and method for lightweight authentication on datagram transport for internet of things |
CN106663143A (en) * | 2014-07-18 | 2017-05-10 | 康维达无线有限责任公司 | M2m ontology management and semantics interoperability |
US20160277391A1 (en) * | 2015-03-16 | 2016-09-22 | Convida Wireless, Llc | End-to-end authentication at the service layer using public keying mechanisms |
CN106341255A (en) * | 2015-07-07 | 2017-01-18 | 思科技术公司 | Intelligent wide area network (iwan) |
Non-Patent Citations (3)
Title |
---|
武涛 等: ""GDOI多源多播的研究"", 《计算机与现代化》 * |
肖永平: ""基于GDOI的安全组播研究与实现"", 《万方数据库》 * |
郭雨萌: ""关于CoAP可靠组通信协议的研究"", 《中国优秀硕士学位论文全文数据库 信息科技辑》 * |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN110022312A (en) * | 2019-03-20 | 2019-07-16 | 杭州职业技术学院 | One kind being used for the prolongable lightweight method of proof of internet of things equipment |
CN110022312B (en) * | 2019-03-20 | 2021-06-01 | 杭州职业技术学院 | Lightweight proof method for expansibility of Internet of things equipment |
CN114124388A (en) * | 2022-01-27 | 2022-03-01 | 济南量子技术研究院 | Gossip protocol synchronization method based on quantum key |
CN114124388B (en) * | 2022-01-27 | 2022-05-10 | 济南量子技术研究院 | Gossip protocol synchronization method based on quantum key |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN108040042B (en) | 2020-07-03 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
JP6844908B2 (en) | Computer-based systems and computer-based methods for establishing secure sessions and exchanging encrypted data | |
CN111799867B (en) | Mutual trust authentication method and system between charging equipment and charging management platform | |
CN113612605B (en) | Method, system and equipment for enhancing MQTT protocol identity authentication by using symmetric cryptographic technology | |
CN109246053A (en) | A kind of data communications method, device, equipment and storage medium | |
CN105162599B (en) | A kind of data transmission system and its transmission method | |
CN101127604B (en) | Information secure transmission method and system | |
US10158608B2 (en) | Key establishment for constrained resource devices | |
CN113630407B (en) | Method and system for enhancing transmission security of MQTT protocol by using symmetric cryptographic technology | |
CN101645883A (en) | Data transmitting method, a data sending method and a data receiving method | |
CN103428221A (en) | Safety logging method, system and device of mobile application | |
CN112637136A (en) | Encrypted communication method and system | |
US11622276B1 (en) | Systems and method for authentication and authorization in networks using service based architecture | |
CN106571907A (en) | Method and system for securely transmitting data between upper computer and USB flash disk | |
CN113079022B (en) | Secure transmission method and system based on SM2 key negotiation mechanism | |
CN104243146A (en) | Encryption communication method and device and terminal | |
KR101704540B1 (en) | A method of managing group keys for sharing data between multiple devices in M2M environment | |
CN108040042A (en) | A kind of safety method for being directed to CoAP agreements under multicast case | |
CN104618362B (en) | A kind of method and device of Resource Server and client interactive sessions message | |
CN103986716B (en) | Establishing method for SSL connection and communication method and device based on SSL connection | |
CN107135228B (en) | Authentication system and authentication method based on central node | |
CN117098123A (en) | Quantum key-based Beidou short message encryption communication system | |
CN108900584B (en) | Data transmission method and system for content distribution network | |
CN110719169A (en) | Method and device for transmitting router safety information | |
Helander et al. | Secure web services for low-cost devices | |
Ortiz-Yepes | Balsa: Bluetooth low energy application layer security add-on |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PB01 | Publication | ||
PB01 | Publication | ||
SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
GR01 | Patent grant | ||
GR01 | Patent grant |