CN107749865A - Location privacy query method based on homomorphic encryption - Google Patents

Location privacy query method based on homomorphic encryption Download PDF

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Publication number
CN107749865A
CN107749865A CN201711282361.XA CN201711282361A CN107749865A CN 107749865 A CN107749865 A CN 107749865A CN 201711282361 A CN201711282361 A CN 201711282361A CN 107749865 A CN107749865 A CN 107749865A
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ciphertext
service provider
data service
piecemeal
query object
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CN107749865B (en
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石润华
王圣兰
李莉
王晴
张顺
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Anhui Dike Digital Gold Technology Co ltd
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Anhui University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/52—Network services specially adapted for the location of the user terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a location privacy query method based on homomorphic encryption, which comprises a cloud server, a data service provider and a plurality of mobile users; the data service provider SP divides the area on the map into blocks according to the density of the query object, then encrypts the query object in each block by using a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts each symmetric key by using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, finally stores all ciphertext into a cloud server, and secretly stores a homomorphic encrypted private key; the user downloads the ciphertext of the query object and the corresponding symmetric key ciphertext from the cloud server according to the position of the user, and then performs blinding processing on the symmetric key ciphertext and transmits the symmetric key ciphertext to a data service provider; and the data service provider transmits the decrypted blinded plaintext to the user, and the final user decrypts the corresponding query object to obtain a final query result. The position information of the user can not be revealed in the whole process, so that the position privacy is protected.

Description

A kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography
Technical field
It is specifically a kind of to be applied to mobile interchange the present invention relates to data encryption and location privacy protection technical field The querying method of location of mobile users privacy is protected in network.
Background technology
In the utilization of mobile Internet, location Based service to life and the work of people bring it is huge just Profit, while the leakage of positional information of mobile subscriber may also be caused, so as to bring huge potential safety hazard.Therefore with LBS's Extensive use, the protection to mobile subscriber's privacy are essential.
At present, conventional location privacy protection method has assumed name anonymity, position k anonymities, space anonymity etc..
(1) assumed name anonymity refers to by the position of an assumed name user to hide the actual position of real user, the inquiry The degree of accuracy determines that this will reduce the degree of accuracy of inquiry, together by the position of assumed name user and the distance of position of real user When be also possible to cause the leakage of user profile.
(2) k anonymities in position refer mainly to some band of position at least k user, and this k user can not pass through identity Distinguished, so even if attacker obtains the positional information of some user, also can not accurately be looked for from this k user Go out real user.When k values are bigger, the information of user is less susceptible to compromised, but communication overhead can be caused to become big.
(3) for the anonymous mainly user in space when sending request, the position for being sent to server becomes the point by some point Some region at place.It is inaccurate due to positional information, it will to reduce the degree of accuracy of inquiry.
In summary, existing location privacy protection also has the following disadvantages：
1st, the position that mobile subscriber is sent to data, services business in existing location privacy protection is some region so that logical Believe that expense becomes big.
2nd, third party's generation and management key are introduced in existing location privacy protection, the part of mobile subscriber may be caused Privacy leakage.
3rd, metadata provider needs to store substantial amounts of data in existing location privacy protection.
4th, the exact value of oneself position can't be sent to data, services business by mobile subscriber in existing location privacy, this The degree of accuracy of inquiry will be reduced.
The content of the invention
The present invention, with reference to symmetric encipherment algorithm and the thought of homomorphic encryption algorithm, proposes that one kind is based on by Cloud Server The location privacy querying method of homomorphic cryptography, is asked to efficiently solve based on the location privacy protection in location-based service Topic, while data service provider SP storage cost and communication cost are reduced, so as to while customer location privacy is ensured Reduce overhead.
The present invention adopts the following technical scheme that to solve technical problem：
A kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography of the present invention, be applied to several mobile subscribers, one In the mobile internet environment that data service provider and a Cloud Server are formed, the mobile internet environment is located at In same region, remember any one mobile subscriber be U, data service provider SP, Cloud Server CS；It is characterized in, The location privacy protection method is to carry out in accordance with the following steps：
Step 1, data service provider SP generations and public address system parameter；
Step 2, the data service provider SP generate the ciphertext corresponding to the query object in different piecemeals；
Step 2.1, the data service provider SP are carried out according to the dense degree of query object to the region on map Piecemeal, and each piecemeal and its position on map are disclosed, wherein any i-th of piecemeal is designated as Di, and by i-th of piecemeal Di Interior all query objects are designated as Mi, i=1,2 ..., n；
Step 2.2, the data service provider SP generate i-th of subregion DiSymmetric key ki；
Step 2.3, the data service provider SP utilize i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiTo the inquiry Object MiAES encryption is carried out, forms ciphertext E (ki,Mi) after send Cloud Server CS storage to, and the ciphertext E is disclosed (ki,Mi)；
The public key pk of step 3, the data service provider SP in the systematic parameter, utilizes Paillier homomorphisms AES is to i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiImplement encryption, form ciphertext Epk(ki) after send the Cloud Server CS to Storage, and the ciphertext E is disclosedpk(ki)；
Step 4, any one the described positions of mobile subscriber U according to present position and each piecemeal on map Confirm the piecemeal D where self-positionj, and place piecemeal D is obtained at the Cloud Server CSjInterior query object MiCiphertext E (kj,Mj) and place piecemeal DjSymmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj)；
Step 5, any one described mobile subscriber U randomly generate a random number sj, and it is same using the Paillier State AES is to the random number sjIt is encrypted, then by the random number sjCiphertext E after encryptionpk(sj) and it is described symmetrical Key kjCiphertext Epk(kj) carry out homomorphism multiply processing, obtain blinding result cj=Epk(sj)·Epk(kj), so as to realize to described Symmetric key kjBlind；The mobile subscriber U blinds result c by describedjIssue the data service provider SP；
Step 6, the data service provider SP blind result c using own private key sk to describedjIt is decrypted, obtains Blind plaintext yj；Again plaintext y is blinded by describedjSend the mobile subscriber U to；
Step 7, any mobile subscriber U are according to the random number sjAnd described blind plaintext yjBlind processing is carried out, is obtained To symmetric key kj=yj-sj；And according to the symmetric key kj, using AES decipherment algorithms to the ciphertext E (kj,Mj) carry out Decryption, subregion D where obtainingjInterior query object Mj, so as to according to the query object MjObtain and self-position minimum distance Query Result.
Compared with the prior art, beneficial effects of the present invention are embodied in：
1st, the query object in each piecemeal is encrypted with symmetric encipherment algorithm by the present invention, so as to ensure that each piecemeal The privacy of interior query object, and because symmetric cryptography compares public key cryptography faster, so as to improve enciphering rate；
2nd, present invention introduces Cloud Server, the ciphertext storage after encryption is arrived Cloud Server by data, services business, so as to effectively Ground reduces the storage cost of data service provider；
3rd, present invention introduces Cloud Server and homomorphic encryption algorithm, user needs only to implement homomorphic cryptography, one Secondary homomorphism multiplies, and once subtracts computing and can obtain corresponding Query Result, on the one hand reduces the computing cost of user, another Side is effectively protected the location privacy of user again；
4th, the key generation in the present invention is managed independently by data service provider completely with distribution, it is not necessary to by other KMC or believable third party, so as to reduce the cost of implementation of system, also improve the security of system.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the system model figure of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the zoning plan of the present invention, each piecemeal D in figureiCorresponding query object is Mi；
The Cloud Server that Fig. 3 is the present invention stores ciphertext graph.
Embodiment
Technical solution of the present invention is described in detail below, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited to embodiment.
In the present embodiment, as shown in figure 1, a kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography is to be applied to several In the mobile internet environment that mobile subscriber, a data service provider and a Cloud Server are formed, it is specific real Body Model is as shown in Figure 1：1. mobile subscriber U.Service request is proposed to data, services business according to the location of oneself；2. data Service provider SP.Data owner, it is responsible for receiving mobile subscriber U service request and making correspondingly responding, the mechanism half It is credible.3. Cloud Server CS.Data service provider SP can be stored data on CS by way of paying, Cloud Server CS The ciphertext of upper storage is full disclosure, and the mechanism half is credible.The location privacy protection method is to carry out in accordance with the following steps：
Step 1, data service provider SP generations and public address system parameter；
1. data service provider SP will be divided into the group of equal length in plain text, every group of length is 128, and the key of selection is grown Spend for 128；
2. data service provider SP randomly selects two prime number ps and q, and meets gcd (pq, (p-1) (q-1))=1；
3. calculate N=pq and Edward Carmichael function lambda=λ (N)=lcm (p-1, q-1)；
4. data service provider SP selects a random numberAnd meet u=(L (gλmodN2))-1ModN, Wherein defined function L isPublic key pk=(N, g), private key sk=lcm (p-1, q-1)；
5. disclosing the key length and block length of AES encryption algorithm, the public key of Paillier AESs is disclosed in addition {N,g}。
Step 2, data service provider SP generate the ciphertext corresponding to the query object in different piecemeals；
Step 2.1, data service provider SP carry out piecemeal according to the dense degree of query object to the region on map, And each piecemeal and its position on map are disclosed, wherein any i-th of piecemeal is designated as Di, and by i-th of piecemeal DiInterior institute There is query object to be designated as Mi, i=1,2 ..., n；
(2.1.1) as shown in Fig. 2 data service provider SP according to the dense degree of query object to the region on map Piecemeal is carried out, the region division is more concentrated into the piecemeal to differ in size, query object, then the piecemeal is smaller, otherwise piecemeal is got over Greatly, and by each piecemeal it is labeled as Di(i=1,2 ..., n), the query object in each piecemeal is not more than 10.
(2.1.2) data service provider SP is by each piecemeal DiCorresponding query object total abstract is labeled as Mi(i=1, 2,...,n)。
Step 2.2, data service provider SP generate i-th of subregion DiSymmetric key ki；
Step 2.3, data service provider SP utilize i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiTo query object MiCarry out AES Encryption, form ciphertext E (ki,Mi) after send Cloud Server CS storages, and open ciphertext E (k toi,Mi)。
(2.3.1) AES encryption process, a state array will be copied into plain text, carry out a wheel initial transformation.Then enter In nine capable wheel changes, each round is carried out according to the order of byte substitution, row displacement, row mixing and InvAddRoundKey, last In one round transformation, byte substitution, row displacement, InvAddRoundKey are only carried out.
(2.3.2) is as shown in figure 3, Cloud Server CS stores ciphertext E (k by one piece of continuous region is distributedi,Mi), due to Each piecemeal it is of different sizes, institute for store ciphertext E (ki,Mi) area size it is also variant.
The public key pk of step 3, data service provider SP in systematic parameter, utilizes Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithms To i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiImplement encryption, form ciphertext Epk(ki) after send Cloud Server CS storages to, and openly Ciphertext Epk(ki)；
Data service provider SP selects a random numberTo symmetric key kiIt is encrypted, it is specific encrypted Journey is as follows：Data service provider SP is by ciphertext Epk(ki) store and arrive Cloud Server CS, this makes Data service provider SP is obtained not have to preserve substantial amounts of symmetrical key ki。
Step 4, any one location confirmations of mobile subscriber U according to present position and each piecemeal on map Piecemeal D where self-positionj, and place piecemeal D is obtained at Cloud Server CSjInterior query object MiCiphertext E (kj,Mj) with Place piecemeal DjSymmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj)；
Step 5, any one mobile subscriber U randomly generate a random number sj, and calculated using Paillier homomorphic cryptographies Method is to random number sjIt is encrypted, then by random number sjCiphertext E after encryptionpk(sj) and symmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj) enter Row homomorphism multiplies processing, obtains blinding result cj=Epk(sj)·Epk(kj), so as to realize to symmetric key kjBlind；It is mobile to use Family U will blind result cjIssue data service provider SP；
Any mobile subscriber U randomly generates a random numberAny mobile subscriber U is used in systematic parameter Public key pk encrypted random numbers sj, specific ciphering process is as follows：Again by the random number after encryption sjWith symmetric key kjCarry out homomorphism and multiply processing, homomorphism multiplies comprising the following steps that for processing：
Step 6, data service provider SP are using own private key sk to blinding result cjIt is decrypted, obtains blinding in plain text yj；Plaintext y will be blinded againjSend mobile subscriber U to；
Data service provider SP is with the private key sk of itself to cjIt is decrypted, specifically decrypting process is as follows：The result after decryption is sent to any mobile subscriber U again.
Step 7, any mobile subscriber U are according to random number sjAnd blind plaintext yjBlind processing is carried out, obtains symmetric key kj =yj-sj；And according to symmetric key kj, using AES decipherment algorithms to ciphertext E (kj,Mj) be decrypted, subregion D where obtainingjIt is interior Query object Mj, so as to according to query object MjObtain the Query Result with self-position minimum distance.
AES decrypting processes, ciphertext is copied into a state array, carries out initial transformation.Then the nine wheel changes carried out In, the order that each round replaces according to the displacement of reverse row, reverse byte, InvAddRoundKey and reverse row mix is carried out, last In one round transformation, reverse row displacement is only carried out, reverse byte replaces and InvAddRoundKey.
The present invention is stored in each piecemeal of Cloud Server with AES symmetric encipherment algorithm encrypted data services provider SP Query object, so as to ensure that the security of the query object of each piecemeal.Any mobile subscriber U is sent to data service provider Blinding for SP contains k in ciphertextjAnd sjThe two unknown numbers, although data service provider SP can decrypt the ciphertext, obtain Simply blind in plain text, any mobile subscriber U particular location can not be obtained.

Claims (1)

1. a kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography, it is applied to several mobile subscribers, a data, services In the mobile internet environment that provider and a Cloud Server are formed, the mobile internet environment is located at same area In domain, remember any one mobile subscriber be U, data service provider SP, Cloud Server CS；It is characterized in that the position Method for secret protection is to carry out in accordance with the following steps：
Step 1, data service provider SP generations and public address system parameter；
Step 2, the data service provider SP generate the ciphertext corresponding to the query object in different piecemeals；
Step 2.1, the data service provider SP carry out piecemeal according to the dense degree of query object to the region on map, And each piecemeal and its position on map are disclosed, wherein any i-th of piecemeal is designated as Di, and by i-th of piecemeal DiInterior institute There is query object to be designated as Mi, i=1,2 ..., n；
Step 2.2, the data service provider SP generate i-th of subregion DiSymmetric key ki；
Step 2.3, the data service provider SP utilize i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiTo the query object MiAES encryption is carried out, forms ciphertext E (ki,Mi) after send Cloud Server CS storage to, and the ciphertext E (k are disclosedi, Mi)；
The public key pk of step 3, the data service provider SP in the systematic parameter, utilizes Paillier homomorphic cryptographies Algorithm is to i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiImplement encryption, form ciphertext Epk(ki) after send the Cloud Server CS to and deposit Storage, and the ciphertext E is disclosedpk(ki)；
Step 4, any one the described location confirmations of mobile subscriber U according to present position and each piecemeal on map Piecemeal D where self-positionj, and place piecemeal D is obtained at the Cloud Server CSjInterior query object MiCiphertext E (kj, Mj) and place piecemeal DjSymmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj)；
Step 5, any one described mobile subscriber U randomly generate a random number sj, and utilize the Paillier homomorphic cryptographies Algorithm is to the random number sjIt is encrypted, then by the random number sjCiphertext E after encryptionpk(sj) and the symmetric key kj Ciphertext Epk(kj) carry out homomorphism multiply processing, obtain blinding result cj=Epk(sj)·Epk(kj), so as to realize to described symmetrical Key kjBlind；The mobile subscriber U blinds result c by describedjIssue the data service provider SP；
Step 6, the data service provider SP blind result c using own private key sk to describedjIt is decrypted, is blinded Plaintext yj；Again plaintext y is blinded by describedjSend the mobile subscriber U to；
Step 7, any mobile subscriber U are according to the random number sjAnd described blind plaintext yjBlind processing is carried out, is obtained pair Claim key kj=yj-sj；And according to the symmetric key kj, using AES decipherment algorithms to the ciphertext E (kj,Mj) be decrypted, Subregion D where obtainingjInterior query object Mj, so as to according to the query object MjAcquisition is looked into self-position minimum distance Ask result.
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CN111083631A (en) * 2019-12-02 2020-04-28 兰州交通大学 Efficient query processing method for protecting location privacy and query privacy
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CN111683071A (en) * 2020-05-29 2020-09-18 百度在线网络技术（北京）有限公司 Private data processing method, device, equipment and storage medium of block chain
CN111814076A (en) * 2020-06-12 2020-10-23 西安热工研究院有限公司 Power station position mark query method, system, equipment and readable storage medium
CN113141246A (en) * 2021-03-08 2021-07-20 江苏大学 System design and implementation method for homomorphic encryption in student mental health investigation
CN113505390A (en) * 2021-07-12 2021-10-15 东莞理工学院 Cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption
CN116708040A (en) * 2023-08-07 2023-09-05 成都墨甲信息科技有限公司 Data security management and control method and system based on symmetric homomorphic encryption
CN118643538A (en) * 2024-08-14 2024-09-13 山东浪潮科学研究院有限公司 Position data protection method and system based on searchable encryption

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