CN107734588A - One kind is based on the safe and efficient cooperating relay system of selection of network code - Google Patents
One kind is based on the safe and efficient cooperating relay system of selection of network code Download PDFInfo
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- H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
- H04W40/02—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing
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- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3249—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
- H04W40/02—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing
- H04W40/12—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing based on transmission quality or channel quality
Abstract
The invention discloses one kind to be based on the safe and efficient cooperating relay system of selection of network code, belongs to wireless sensor network communication for coordination field.Methods described includes：(1) the RSA homomorphism signature schemes of cooperation relay communication system modeling (2) time of fusion stamp are handled raw data packets；(3) collaboration relay node introduces pollution attack and Replay Attack, structure node degree of safety；(4) based on the bi-directional relaying selection algorithm for receiving signal to noise ratio and channel gain.(5) collaboration relay node is selected.Main solve the particularity of application network coding principle in itself and cause the diffusivity to information stronger, as long as attacker is the fallacious message or slightly made an amendment on relevant information of cooperating relay injection very little may influence a range of even whole network the problem of.The method of the present application on the basis of via node safety is ensured, can be remarkably improved the reachable and speed of destination and effectively reduce outage probability.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of wireless sensor network cooperative communication, and particularly relates to a safe and efficient cooperative relay selection method based on network coding.
Background
The network coding technology has received extensive attention from academia because it can realize a network with minimized throughput and transmission delay, and can balance network load, solve network congestion, improve network bandwidth utilization, and the like. Due to the broadcasting characteristic of wireless communication channel transmission, the network coding technology is more suitable for being applied to a wireless cooperative relay communication network, and the spectrum efficiency and the system capacity can be further improved. But at the same time, it also brings many security problems, and the uniqueness of the network coding principle itself causes strong diffusion of information, so that an attacker in this case may affect a range of even the entire network by injecting little malicious information or slightly modifying related information, compared with the ordinary network. That is to say, with the same attack means, the attack efficiency in the mode network is higher, and the infectivity is stronger, so that the research on the relay node selection algorithm of the secure communication is another important point of the cooperative communication. In cooperative communication, a relay node is used for assisting transmission, and besides a relay node selection strategy, the credibility of the relay node is also considered, so that the transmission safety can be improved.
Based on the relay selection strategy of network coding, zhihang Yi, minChul Ju indicates that the bidirectional single-relay cooperative transmission based on network coding can obtain full diversity gain. In the following research, zhao Qiang, tian and Hao proved that the full diversity gain can still be obtained by adopting the opportunistic relay selection strategy in the two-way multi-relay cooperative system and selecting an optimal relay node for forwarding the network coding signal. It is a considerable problem to reasonably select relay nodes participating in cooperative transmission. The method not only can enable data to be transmitted in the safer relay nodes, but also can achieve system reaching, rate maximization and interruption probability minimization at the same time, and further improves the performance of a communication system.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a safe and efficient cooperative relay selection method based on network coding, which can simultaneously achieve the system accessibility, the rate maximization and the interruption probability minimization and improve the performance of a communication system.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
aiming at the condition that a cooperative relay node of network coding is extremely easy to be subjected to malicious tampering of a data packet by an attacker, so that an information sink node influences decoding of a correct data packet, and if the attacker continuously retransmits malicious information irrelevant to correct data and then causes great waste of network resources, the performance optimization problem of the cooperative relay node is comprehensively considered, and the safe and efficient cooperative relay selection method based on the network coding is provided.
A safe and efficient cooperative relay selection method based on network coding comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: a system model of a single information source, a single information sink and multiple relay nodes is adopted, the relay nodes Forward signals in a half-duplex mode, and an amplification-and-forwarding (AF) processing mode is adopted for the received signals;
step two: the cooperative relay node randomly introduces pollution attack and replay attack, and detects and records whether the relay node is attacked by pollution and replay attack by utilizing an RSA homomorphic signature scheme fusing timestamps;
step three: calculating the safety degree of the node on the basis of a basic dynamic weight calculation formula by using the times of the pollution attack and the replay attack detected by the intermediate node;
step four: calculating the receiving signal-to-noise ratio of the candidate nodes in the direction from the source node to the candidate intermediate nodes, comparing the receiving signal-to-noise ratio with a decision threshold value of a set receiving signal-to-noise ratio, pre-selecting the intermediate nodes meeting the conditions, and then selecting the intermediate nodes with the maximum channel gain from the intermediate nodes to the destination node from the candidate node set meeting the conditions;
step five: and calculating the weighted sum of the highest safety degree of each node in a period of time to be used as a threshold value selected by an algorithm, selecting the most candidate nodes of the cooperative relay nodes meeting the condition of being more than the threshold value, and selecting the relay nodes meeting the maximum accepted signal-to-noise ratio and channel gain from the candidate nodes.
In particular, the method comprises the following steps of,
in the second step, the homomorphic signature scheme of the fused timestamp consists of three parts, namely an asymmetric key generation algorithm, a signature generation algorithm and a signature verification algorithm.
In the third step, the safety degree is calculated:
assuming that all links can be attacked, introducing pollution attack and replay attack on the basis of a basic dynamic weight calculation formula as indexes for calculating the safety degree of the intermediate node, finding a proper intermediate node for data transmission, and ensuring the safety of network coding. In the process of calculating the pollution degree and the replay degree, an RSA signature scheme is used and the idea of time stamp is fused, so that the signature can detect the pollution attack and the replay attack at the same time. Thus, when a data transmission request comes, the best intermediate node can be selected according to the security degree of the intermediate node.
Due to the uncertainty of the network, a dynamic threshold is introduced to calculate the security of the current intermediate node, and the threshold selected by the algorithm is a weighted sum of the highest security of each node in the past period.
The maximum value of the safety degree of each node in the past period is selected according to the dynamic threshold, because the threshold is a threshold, dangerous intermediate nodes are not required to enter the network, the threshold needs to be high, and if the threshold at the current moment is adopted, more dangerous nodes can be planned into the network, so that the network safety is not facilitated.
In the fourth and fifth steps, the optimal relay node selection scheme is as follows:
the selection of the relay node is a key factor influencing the final transmission quality, and the selection of the optimal relay node not only can reduce the network cost, but also can improve the performance of a communication system. The invention calculates the receiving signal-to-noise ratio of the intermediate node from the source node to the intermediate node in the direction of the intermediate node by combining the intermediate node which meets the conditions and is selected by the second chapter from the aspects of the system reachable rate and the interruption probability, compares the receiving signal-to-noise ratio with the decision threshold value of the set receiving signal-to-noise ratio, pre-selects the intermediate node which meets the conditions, and then selects the intermediate node with the maximum channel gain in the link from the intermediate node to the destination node from the candidate node set.
The optimal relay selection scheme takes the received signal-to-noise ratio at the relay node into consideration and selects the maximum channel gain at the destination node.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the core technology of the invention is that in the scheme of selecting the cooperative relay node, the transmission efficiency problem of the relay node is considered, and the safety problem of the non-trust node is also considered. And selecting the optimal performance relay node by taking the system attachability, the rate maximization and the interruption probability minimization as optimization targets, and constructing the calculation of the cooperative relay safety degree by a network coding signature scheme which integrates a time stamp and a homomorphic signature and can simultaneously resist pollution attack and replay attack. The data transmission can be carried out in the safer relay node, the system can reach the maximum speed and the minimum interruption probability at the same time, and the performance of the communication system is further improved.
Drawings
Fig. 1 (a) (b) are respectively two communication system models used in the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a simulation result of the achievable sum rate of the present invention at different total powers for Max-Min, MMCG, the random relay selection algorithm, and the relay selection algorithm herein;
FIG. 3 is a simulation result of the outage probability of each relay selection method of the present invention at different total powers in Max-Min, MMCG, the random relay selection algorithm, and the present relay selection algorithm;
FIG. 4 is a distribution location diagram of the source, sink and cooperative relay nodes of the present invention;
fig. 5 shows the results of three security calculations performed by each intermediate node according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the invention is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings:
referring to fig. 1, a communication system model from a signal source to a cooperative relay node and from the cooperative relay node to a new destination are respectively provided, the relay node forwards a signal in a half-duplex mode, and an amplification-and-forwarding (AF) processing mode is adopted for a received signal.
The specific scheme is as follows:
the method comprises the following steps: the homomorphic signature scheme with fused time stamp consists of three parts, namely an asymmetric key generation algorithm, a signature generation algorithm and a signature verification algorithm.
(1.1) asymmetric key generation algorithm:
randomly selecting two large prime numbers p 1 、p 2 Wherein p is 2 |(p 1 -1), usually taking p 2 For 256 bits, take p 1 Is 1024 bits.
Calculate n = p 1 p 2 ，Randomly selecting integersAnd satisfies the following conditions:
generating an RSA signature private key d and a public key (n, e), wherein d satisfies:
(1.2) signature generation algorithm:
the time stamp mechanism is introduced into the RSA digital signature process, which is a process for generating a signature for the combination of a message and a time stamp, and comprises the following specific steps:
the source node generates m pieces of information to be sent, and the m pieces of information are recorded as: x is the number of i (i＝1,2,…m)
Taking the current timestamp T i As a time stamp for this message, the message x is then signed with its own private key d i (i =1,2, \ 8230; m) signature SIGN (x) thereof i ，T i ) Represents:
wherein T is i Time stamp, x, representing the ith message i Representing the ith message, r is the private key of the information source, d is the public key of the information source, g j Public parameters for sources
(1.3) signature verification Algorithm
After receiving a message of { Y, T, SIGN (Y, T) }, the intermediate node determines whether the formula (4) is established.
Wherein y is i For the message received by the intermediate node, T is the time stamp of the intermediate node receiving the message, e is the public key of the information source, r is the private key of the information source, g j Is a public parameter of the source.
If the formula (4) is satisfied, the message is not attacked by pollution, the next step is carried out, if the formula (4) is not satisfied, the message is attacked by pollution, the intermediate node should discard the message, and a pollution attack alarm is returned.
Whether the message is attacked by replay is judged by the timestamp, if the message timestamp is within the time limit range, the message is not replayed, and if not, the message is discarded by the node.
Step two: calculation of degree of security
Assuming that all links can be attacked, introducing pollution attack and replay attack on the basis of a basic dynamic weight calculation formula as indexes for calculating the safety degree of the intermediate node, finding a proper intermediate node for data transmission, and ensuring the safety of network coding. In the process of calculating the pollution degree and the replay degree, an RSA signature scheme is used and the idea of time stamp is fused, so that the signature can detect the pollution attack and the replay attack at the same time. Thus, when a data transmission request comes, the best intermediate node can be selected according to the safety degree of the intermediate node.
Initial security s of intermediate node i All values are assigned as 1, and the security degree of the intermediate node is calculated as follows:
where N represents the total number of messages sent by node i, N p Representing the number of contaminated attacks, N, in the information sent by node i r The number of the replay attacks in the information sent by the node i is represented, and the alpha and the beta are used for measuring the pollution attack degree and the replay attack degree in the node i:
due to the uncertainty of the network, a dynamic threshold is introduced to calculate the security of the current intermediate node, and the threshold selected by the algorithm is the weighted sum of the highest security of each node in the past period. The calculation formula is as shown in formula 8
S jmax Representing the maximum value of the security level that the intermediate node j appears during a period of time. S. the y Representing the dynamic threshold set by the algorithm. The security degree of the intermediate node satisfies S jmax >S y Then this node may be considered a preselected node.
The maximum value of the safety degree of each node in the past period is selected according to the dynamic threshold value, and the threshold value is a threshold value, so that dangerous intermediate nodes in the network do not want to enter, the threshold value needs to be high, if the threshold value at the current moment is adopted, more dangerous nodes can be drawn into the network, and the safety of the network is not facilitated.
Step three: optimal relay node selection scheme
The selection of the relay node is a key factor influencing the final transmission quality, and the selection of the optimal relay node not only can reduce the network cost, but also can improve the performance of a communication system. The invention calculates the receiving signal-to-noise ratio of the intermediate node in the direction from the source node to the intermediate node and compares the receiving signal-to-noise ratio with the decision threshold value of the set receiving signal-to-noise ratio by combining the intermediate node which meets the conditions and is selected in the second chapter from the aspects of system accessibility, rate and interruption probability, the intermediate node which meets the conditions is selected in advance, and then the intermediate node with the maximum channel gain in the link from the intermediate node to the destination node is selected from the candidate node set.
And (3.1) all the channels are quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels, and the channel state is kept unchanged in one transmission period. For each link of source node, relay node and destination node, the total signal transmission power is limited to p, the source node occupies half of the total power, the residual power is uniformly distributed by the relay nodes, and no direct transmission link exists between the two source end nodes. Respectively representing the channel fading coefficients from the source node S to the ith relay node and from the ith relay node to the destination node d.Andis a mean of zero and a variance ofAndcomplex gaussian random variables. Each link is affected by additive white gaussian noise with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. The whole model adopts a time division working mode and is completed in two time slots.
In the first time slot, the source node S is powered by p s A signal x is transmitted. Then the relay node r i The received signal is represented as:
wherein n is r Is additive white gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance 1.
In the second time slot, the relay node r i The received signal is network coded and then broadcast to the destination node d. The signals received by the destination node are:
wherein n is d Is additive white gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance 1. RelayNode r i With the AF protocol, a is the amplification factor,P r is a relay node r i The forwarding power of (a).
Therefore, an acceptable signal-to-noise ratio expression of the destination node can be obtained:
(3.2) the optimal relay node selection scheme used by the invention is to set the received signal-to-noise ratio threshold value at each intermediate node, and screen out the optimal relay node after two selections, and the specific steps are as follows:
(3.2.1) setting reasonable received SNR decision threshold value delta in system TH In the system, there are n relay nodes, and assuming that the variance of noise in the channel is 1, S-r can be obtained in the previous section i The received signal-to-noise ratio at the intermediate node in the (source-intermediate node) direction isSatisfying equation (12) may pre-derive some candidate nodes for the following selection.
(3.2.2) at r i -d (intermediate node-destination node) direction, selecting the relay node with the largest channel gain, which satisfies equation (13)
The optimal relay selection scheme takes the received signal-to-noise ratio at the relay node into consideration and selects the maximum channel gain at the destination node.
In addition, the first and second substrates are,
(1) Defining a nonlinear discrete-time system:
wherein X (k) is an n-dimensional estimated state vector at time k; z (k) is an m-dimensional observation vector at the k moment; f [ is ] is an n-dimensional differentiable vector function; g (k-1) is a k-1 moment n multiplied by r dimension process noise transfer matrix; w (k-1) is r dimension process noise at the k-1 moment; h [ cndot ] is an m-dimensional differentiable vector function; v (k) is m-dimensional observation noise at the k time.
(2) Calculating the error covariance:
assuming that the error covariance is an unknown constant vector or matrix, the adaptive filtering problem is to find the error covariance and state X (k) based on the observations.
(3) When P is present x When unknown, along with the states X (0), \8230, the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimate of X (k)The smoothed estimate x (j/k) at time k can be found by maximizing the conditional probability density:
J * ＝p[X(k),P x |Z(k)]
wherein, X (k) = { X (0), X (1), \8230;, X (k) }; z (k) = { Z (1), Z (2) \8230;, Z (k) };representing the variable probability.
From Bayes' formula
(4) p [ Z (k) ] is not optimization-related, so the problem translates into maximization of the following unconditional probability densities:
J＝p[X(k),P x ,Z(k)]＝p[Z(k)|X(k),P x ]·p[X(k)|P x ]·p[P x ]
(5) Suppose P x Obey uniform distribution and are easily known by normal assumption
Is like that
Wherein x (j) is a smoothed estimate; x (j-1) is the pre-smoothed estimate; x (0) is an initial state; p 0 Is the initial error covariance; c, d 1 ,d 2 Const is a constant.
J and lnJ have the same pole. Temporarily setting x (j/k) to be known, then order
MAP estimator capable of obtaining error covariance statistics
(6) Suboptimal MAP estimator
A suboptimal MAP estimator can be obtained by replacing the computationally complex smoothed estimate x (j/k) with a filtered estimate x (j/j) or a predicted estimate x (j/j-1) approximation.
(7) Suboptimal unbiased MAP estimator
In the formula
Therefore, it is not only easy to useWherein, P x (j/j-1) pre-filtered estimate covariance with X, P x (j/j) the covariance of the filtered estimate for X.
(8) An estimator of recursive unbiased MAP is derived
The effects of the present invention can be further illustrated by the following simulations:
an experiment platform: an Intel i7 processor, and Matlab R2009a simulation software under the professional edition of 64-bit Windows 7 with the main frequency of 2.20 GHz.
(1) Effectiveness of the protocol
Fig. 2 and fig. 3 are simulation comparisons from the aspects of achievable and rate performance and outage probability performance for a relay selection method, a maximum minimum signal-to-noise ratio relay selection scheme, a maximum minimum channel gain relay selection scheme, and a random relay selection scheme, respectively, according to the present invention. Fig. 2 simulation results show that, when the method based on maximizing the received signal-to-noise ratio and the channel gain provided herein is adopted, the achievable rate and the speed of the cooperative system are superior to those of a Max-Min relay selection scheme, a channel gain harmonic mean value maximization scheme and a random relay selection scheme. According to the graph, the scheme provided by the method is improved by 3.9%, 11.1% and 14.3% in the reachable rate and the performance compared with the other four schemes. Fig. 3 shows that, under the condition of a certain total power of the system, the improved bidirectional relay selection scheme proposed herein has the smallest interruption probability and the best performance among the four relay selection schemes.
(2) Security of a scheme
The homomorphic signature scheme based on timestamps herein assumes that the source node is always secure and that the intermediate nodes are not trusted. The attacker may control the intermediate node to destroy the information it sends, implementing a polluting attack, or the attacker may control the intermediate node to resend the sent information, implementing a replay attack.
And (3) pollution attack security analysis: the first is that an attacker can forge received data packets (Y, T) and intends to generate effective signatures for the forged data packets, but because the attacker does not know the private key of the source node, the attacker cannot generate effective signatures for the data packets (Y, T), and the first attack mode fails. In the second attack mode, the attacker intends to generate the matched forged data { Y ', T' } through the valid signature SIGN (Y, T) of the intercepted data packet, and { Y ', T' } ≠ Y, T }, which is difficult to solve the discrete logarithm problem. The difficulty in solving the discrete logarithm problem will be demonstrated below.
Proposition: knowing the valid message (Y, T) and its valid signature SIGN (Y, T), finding a message { Y ', T' }, makes SIGN (Y, T) = SIGN (Y ', T'), but the difficulty of { Y ', T' } ≠ Y, T } is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem.
And (3) proving that: first, consider the case where m = n = 1. The signature of the data packet received by the intermediate node isAnd the information forged by the attacker is signed as. Now fix y 1 ' and y 2 ' order y = y 3 ', so the above formula can be simplified toThereby obtainingThe problem translates to finding y that satisfies the above equation, which is known to be a difficult problem to solve discrete logarithm. The proof can be generalized to m = n>, 2. The proposition is determined.
Replay attack security analysis: for the replay attack, there are two attack modes, one is to directly replay the intercepted message combination, assuming that the message combination intercepted by the attacker is { Y, T, SIGN (Y, T) }, and after a node receives the message, the node receives the received timestamp T i And comparing the current time T with the current time T, if the current time T is not in the time efficiency range, judging the message as a replay message, discarding the replay message, and making the attack invalid. The second attack mode is equivalent to the first mode in the pollution attack, the timestamp in the intercepted message combination is modified and a signature is generated, and an attacker cannot sign the part in the intercepted message combination because the attacker does not know the private key of the source node, so the attack is invalid.
(3) Emulated content
The position of the selected cooperative relay node is shown in fig. 3, where serial numbers 2 to 11 are respectively ten randomly selected relay nodes, serial number 1 is the source node, and serial number 12 is the destination node. A source node sends ten data packets, each data packet has ten components, pollution attack and replay attack are randomly introduced to each intermediate node, and the results of security degree calculation performed by each intermediate node for three times in a period of time are shown in fig. 4
According to a safety dynamic threshold value formulaThe dynamic threshold values obtained on the basis of this experiment were:
satisfies S jmax ＞S y The sequence numbers of the middle nodes of the formula are 2, 5, 6, 9 and 11, and the five nodes are used for carrying out an optimal relay node selection algorithm. And running the program according to the third step to obtain the finally selected node as the relay node 6.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and changes may be made by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. A safe and efficient cooperative relay selection method based on network coding is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) Adopting a system model of a single information source, a single information sink and multiple relay nodes, wherein the relay nodes adopt a half-duplex mode to forward signals, and adopt an amplification forwarding processing mode for the received signals;
(2) Randomly introducing pollution attack and replay attack into the cooperative relay node, and detecting and recording whether the relay node is attacked by pollution and replayed by utilizing an RSA homomorphic signature scheme fused with a timestamp;
(3) Calculating the safety degree of the node on the basis of a basic dynamic weight calculation formula by using the times of the pollution attack and the replay attack detected by the intermediate node;
(4) Calculating the receiving signal-to-noise ratio of the candidate nodes in the direction from the source node to the candidate intermediate nodes, comparing the receiving signal-to-noise ratio with a decision threshold value of a set receiving signal-to-noise ratio, pre-selecting the intermediate nodes meeting the conditions, and then selecting the intermediate nodes with the maximum channel gain from the intermediate nodes to the destination node from the candidate node set meeting the conditions;
(5) And calculating the weighted sum of the highest safety degree of each node in a period of time to be used as a threshold value selected by an algorithm, selecting the cooperative relay node which meets the condition that the cooperative relay node is larger than the threshold value as a candidate node, and selecting the relay node which meets the requirements of receiving the signal-to-noise ratio and having the maximum channel gain from the candidate nodes.
2. The cooperative relay selection method based on network coding with high security and high efficiency as claimed in claim 1, wherein the homomorphic signature scheme of the fused timestamp in step (2) is as follows:
(2.1) asymmetric key generation algorithm: randomly selecting two large prime numbers p 1 、p 2 Usually, take p 2 For 256 bits, take p 1 Is 1024 bits. Calculate n = p 1 p 2 ，Randomly selecting integersAnd satisfies the following conditions:
generating an RSA signature private key d and a public key (n, e), wherein d satisfies:
(2.2) signature generation algorithm: the time stamp mechanism is introduced into the RSA digital signature process, which is a process for generating a signature for the combination of a message and a time stamp, and comprises the following specific steps: the source node generates m pieces of information to be sent, and the m pieces of information are recorded as: x is the number of i (i＝1,2,…m)
Taking the current timestamp T i As a time stamp for this message, the message x is then signed with its own private key d i (i =1,2, \ 8230; m) for signatureSIGN(x i ，T i ) Represents:
wherein T is i Time stamp, x, indicating the ith message i Representing the ith message, r is the private key of the information source, d is the public key of the information source, g j Public parameters of the information source;
(2.3) signature verification algorithm: after receiving a message of { Y, T, SIGN (Y, T) }, the intermediate node first determines whether the following formula is true,
wherein y is i For the message received by the intermediate node, T is the time stamp of the intermediate node receiving the message, e is the public key of the information source, r is the private key of the information source, g j For the public parameters of the source to be,
if the above formula is true, the message is not attacked by pollution, the next step is carried out, if the formula is false, the message is attacked by pollution, the intermediate node returns an alarm of the attack by pollution,
judging whether the message is attacked by replay or not according to the time stamp, if the message time stamp is in the time limit range, indicating that the message is not replayed, and if not, returning a replay attack alarm by the node.
3. The method for selecting a cooperative relay based on network coding security degree with high efficiency as claimed in claim 1, wherein the security degree is calculated in step (3) by the following specific method:
initial security s of intermediate node i All values are assigned as 1, and the safety degree of the intermediate node is calculated as follows:
wherein N represents the information transmitted by the node iTotal number of (2), N p Representing the number of polluting attacks, N, in the information sent by node i r The number of replay attacks suffered in the information sent by the node i is represented, and alpha and beta are used for measuring the pollution attack degree and the replay attack degree in the node i:
due to the uncertainty of the network, a dynamic threshold value is introduced to calculate the safety degree of the current intermediate node, the threshold value selected by the algorithm is the weighted sum of the highest safety degree of each node in the past period, and the calculation formula is as follows
S jmax Represents the maximum value of the safety degree of the intermediate node j in a period of time, S y Representing the dynamic threshold value set by the algorithm, the safety degree of the intermediate node satisfies S jmax >S y Then this node may be considered a preselected node.
4. The method for selecting a safe and efficient cooperative relay based on network coding according to claim 1, wherein the intermediate node with the largest channel gain in the link from the intermediate node to the destination node is selected in the step (4), and the specific method is as follows:
(4.1) setting reasonable receiving signal-to-noise ratio decision threshold value delta in the system TH Assuming that the variance of the noise in the channel is 1, S-r i The received signal-to-noise ratio at the intermediate node in the (source-intermediate node) direction isCandidate nodes can be obtained in advance by satisfying the following formula, and the candidate nodes are used for the following selection,
representing the channel fading coefficients from the source node S to the ith relay node, the source node S having power p s Transmitting a signal x, a relay node r i The received signals are:
wherein n is r Additive white gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance 1;
(4.2) at r i -d (intermediate node-destination node) direction, selecting the relay node with the largest channel gain, which satisfies the formula
Representing the channel fading coefficients from the ith relay node to the destination node d.
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| WO2023204427A1 (en) * | 2022-04-22 | 2023-10-26 | 삼성전자 주식회사 | Method for authenticating electronic device, and electronic device therefor |
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