CN107733657A - A kind of high in the clouds is based on PTPM and without CertPubKey signature double factor authentication method - Google Patents

A kind of high in the clouds is based on PTPM and without CertPubKey signature double factor authentication method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN107733657A
CN107733657A CN201710996495.1A CN201710996495A CN107733657A CN 107733657 A CN107733657 A CN 107733657A CN 201710996495 A CN201710996495 A CN 201710996495A CN 107733657 A CN107733657 A CN 107733657A
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auth
user
server
ptpm
clouds
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Inventor
夏辉
刘澍
赵志刚
王晨
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Shenyang Normal University
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Shenyang Normal University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Abstract

The present invention relates under cloud computing mode, existing safety problem and deficiency during in order to solve to carry out authentication between user and high in the clouds under current cloud environment, it is applied to by PTPM (portable TPM) and without CertPubKey cipher system in cloud environment, it is proposed it is a kind of be used for realize user with the scheme of bidirectional identity authentication between high in the clouds compared with existing scheme, new departure has advantages below:On the basis of user and high in the clouds identity uniqueness is realized by establishing identity management mechanisms, the true correct of authentication result between the secure and trusted of terminal platform and high in the clouds and user is not only ensured first with PTPM, and supports user to complete the authentication procedures with high in the clouds using any terminal device；Secondly, new departure is based on realizing the double factor authentication process of " password+key " without CertPubKey signature algorithm；Finally, suggest plans while EUF CMA securities are ensured, the computational efficiency of authentication between user and high in the clouds can be significantly improved.

Description

A kind of high in the clouds is based on PTPM and without CertPubKey signature double factor authentication method
Technical field
The invention belongs to cloud computing applied technical field, and in particular to a kind of high in the clouds is based on PTPM and without CertPubKey label Name double factor authentication method.
Background technology
Cloud computing is a kind of emerging service pattern that the resource such as storage and calculating is provided based on internet.Taken by means of cloud Business, enterprise, organizations and individuals user can conveniently and efficiently carry out the operations such as mass data calculating and data storage be shared.But Be, cloud service provider CSP (cloud service provider) firstly the need of to using cloud service enterprise, tissue and The identity of personal user is authenticated, and determines its correctness and legitimacy.Otherwise, the use of cloud service is not applied for the registration of or bought Cloud service can be used per family, so as on the one hand bring huge service response burden and serious economic loss to CSP, together When validated user may because do not obtain timely service response and caused by the loss of result of calculation and storage information.Meanwhile Application is also required to be authenticated CSP identity using the user of cloud service, and otherwise hacker or malice tissue can pass through personation CSP obtains the important information such as user account and privacy, and the threat of serious economic loss and information leakage is brought to user.Cause This to CSP and using the identity of the user of cloud service, it is necessary to carry out safety certification, it is ensured that the legitimacy of the two identity and correct Property.Meanwhile it is that mass users can provide a variety of different types of clothes that cloud computing, which is based on a variety of deployment modes and service mode, Business, and these services may be from different management domains, if using the ID authentication mechanism based on service, will certainly cause Verification process it is cumbersome；In addition, user also can be in different working fields (such as enterprises working field and outside cloud working field) In switch identity at any time, if each working field each establishes cloud user identity management mechanism, user identity just occurs multiple Property, so that user authentication and access become complex.Therefore, compared with traditional calculations pattern, the identity under cloud environment is recognized The problem of card also needs to consider cloud user identity management, different intra domain user identity are realized by establishing identity management mechanisms The uniqueness of information, conciliate so as to improve the usage experience of user never in same area the problem of user identity synchronization.
In cloud environment, due to enterprise, organizations and individuals user can utilize include PC (personal computer), Terminal device including PDA (personal digital assistant), Laptop and mobile phone is accessed using cloud service, Therefore authentication is directed not only to the secure connection between high in the clouds and terminal device, it is also necessary to considers between user and high in the clouds Secure connection.Because user is only CSP final service object, terminal device is use instrument and the service of user Platform.As shown in figure 1, high in the clouds is used for the node server and the embedded TPM of subscriber terminal equipment of certification user identity (trusted platform module) safety chip completes remote certification process.Although it can serviced using TPM chips Credible connection is established between device and terminal device, but if for realizing user authentication process, safety problem just occurs.This Because if the terminal device that user uses has Malware, then attacker's can by distort authentication result and User cheating, i.e., trusted path can not be connected from terminal device and safely extend to user.In addition, the user under cloud environment It can be accessed and using cloud service using any terminal device, if user utilizes TPM encryptions storage key or other data In certain station terminal equipment, when it is attempted in other-end equipment in use, just needing to carry out data migration operation, and this meeting The operating process of complexity is brought to user or even causes the privacy leakage of user.Therefore, the identity between high in the clouds and user is realized On the one hand certification needs to ensure the authenticity of authentication result, on the other hand need to support user to utilize any terminal device To complete authentication procedures.
The content of the invention
For work on hand the problems of when realizing the authentication between user and high in the clouds and deficiency, this hair It is bright to be based on PTPM (portable TPM) and without CertPubKey signature algorithm, it is proposed that a kind of to support between high in the clouds and user Bidirectional identity authentication scheme；Compared with existing scheme, this programme has advantages below:By establishing identity management mechanisms reality On the basis of current family and high in the clouds identity uniqueness, the secure and trusted and cloud of terminal platform are not only ensured first with PTPM Authentication result is true correct between end and user, and supports user to complete the body with high in the clouds using any terminal device Part verification process；Secondly, new departure is based on realizing the double factor authentication mistake of " password+key " without CertPubKey signature algorithm Journey；Finally, suggest plans while EUF-CMA securities are ensured, authentication between user and high in the clouds can be significantly improved Computational efficiency.The technical solution adopted by the present invention is：
(1) system is established
Given security parameter K, choose the Big prime p of K bit length, it is assumed that G1And G2Be rank be p multiplicative cyclic group, g It is G1Generation member.Bilinear map e:GG1×→1G2, select impact resistant hash function H1, H2, H1:{ 0,1 }*→G1, H2: { 0,1 }*→G1；It is (G that system, which discloses global parameter params,1, G2, e, p, g, H1, H2)；
(2) identity ID is generated
Layering ID tree constructions proposed by the present invention define the identity ID values of the roles such as user in cloud environment, Cloud Server. Whole hierarchy is formed by 2 layers, and root node is KGC, that is, generates third party's key generation centre of User Part private key；Leaf Child node represents terminal user and the high in the clouds certification node server registered beyond the clouds.Obviously, it is layered all in ID tree constructions Node has unique title, it is achieved thereby that the target of user and cloud server identity uniqueness；Assuming that user uiBody Part IDi=DN0||DNi, high in the clouds certification node serverauthIdentity IDauth=DN0||DNserver, wherein, DN0, DNi, DNserverKGC, u are represented respectivelyiAnd serverauthTitle defined in layering ID tree constructions, " | | " represent character The concatenation of string.
(3) key generates
According to the thought without CertPubKey cipher system, leafy node node in schemeiThe following institute of key generation process State:
A、nodeiChooseAs secret value, calculating and open public key
B, KGC choosesS0For KGC master key, calculating and open public keyGiven layering Each leafy node node in ID structuresi, KGC obtains node firstiCorresponding identity IDiAnd pkiValue, then calculates Qi= H1(IDi), rear KGC utilizes QiCalculate and sendTo nodei；
C, nodei passes through calculating firstObtain the part private key of KGC generationsThen inquiry point is passed through Layer ID tree constructions obtain identity IDi, calculate Qi=H1(IDi) and verifyThe correctness of value: Private key is generated if equal
During narration below, user uiPublic private key pair be expressed as And high in the clouds certification node serverauthPublic private key pair be expressed as
(4) user's registration
A, user uiInput IDiWith password value pwi, H is calculated first using PTPM2(IDi||pwi)；Then chooseCalculateWithLast uiSend registration request Give high in the clouds certification node serverauth；
B、serverauthReceive RegreqAfterwards, first according to registered users information table TregisterTo inquire about IDiWhether deposit If it is not, calculating Qi'=H1(IDi), then verifyThe correctness of value:
If equal serverauthChooseAnd calculate g using TPMSj, by IDi, Sj, gSiAnd H2(IDi||pwi) store and arrive Tregister, then utilize TPM Calculate
And send registration response messageTo ui；
Otherwise registration failure mark is returned to ui.If TregisterThe ID is storediValue, then return it is registered indicate to ui。
C、uiReceive registration response message RegresAfterwards, Q ' is calculated first with PTPMj=H1(IDauth) and H2(IDauth|| pkj), then calculateAnd by judging equation Whether verified into Rob RoyThe correctness of value, if equal expression uiIn serverauthLocate successful registration, PTPM outputs The mark that succeeds in registration arrives display window, while uiStore IDauth, SiAnd gSj；Otherwise registration failure mark is exported.
(5) login authentication
A, user uiID is inputted firstiAnd pwi, and calculate H using PTPM2(IDi||pwi), choose simultaneously And calculate gri, then PTPM send login authentication request Authreq=(IDi, H2(IDi||pwi), gri) give serverauth。
B、serverauthReceive information AuthreqAfterwards, first according to IDiInquire about TregisterThe H of storage2(IDi||pwi) value It is whether equal with what is received, if, serverauthPassword error message is returned to ui；Otherwise serverauthObtain first IDiCorresponding SjAnd gSiValue, (g is calculated using TPMSi)Sj；Then chooseAnd calculated using TPMWithWhereinAfter sendTo ui.
C、uiReceive serverauthThe information Auth of returnresAfterwards, first according to the ID receivedauthValue inquiry is corresponded to SiAnd gSj, then calculate k '=(g respectively using PTPMSj)SiAnd D1'=HMACk′(gri), verify D1With D1' whether equal. If equal expression uiComplete to serverauthThe certification of identity, then calculate DHMAC using PTPM2=k′(grj) and send To serverauth；Otherwise server is verifiedauthIdentity fails, uiTerminate verification process.
D、serverauthD is calculated using TPM2'=HMACk(grj) and and D2It is compared.If equal expression serverauthComplete to uiThe certification of identity, then serverauthD is calculated using TPM3=HMACk((gri)rj||IDauth) And it is sent to ui；Otherwise u is verifiediIdentity fails, serverauthTerminate verification process.
E、uiD is calculated using PTPM3'=HMACk′((grj)ri||IDauth) and the D with receiving3It is compared.If phase It is proved to be successful mark Deng, PTPM output and arrives display window；Otherwise authentication failed mark is exported.Complete above-mentioned authentication procedures Afterwards, uiAnd serverauthCan utilizes session keyTo carry out follow-up interaction.
(6) password updates
Assuming that uiNeed original password pwiIt is updated to pwi', then uiH is calculated respectively first with PTPM2(IDi|| pw′i)、
WithThen password renewal request is sent To serverauth, wherein, × represent group G1On multiplying.Treat serverauthReceive updatepwAfterwards, first according to IDi Inquire about the g of storageSiIt is worth and utilizes TPM to calculate (gSi)rj, judgeWithIt is whether equal；If do not wait and terminate password Renewal process；Otherwise calculated using TPMObtain H2(IDi||pwi'), by inquiring about IDi by H2(IDi||pwi) replace For H2(IDi||pw′i)。
Beneficial effect
(1) it is combined by PTPM and without CertPubKey signature algorithm to solve the body under cloud environment between user and high in the clouds Part authentication question；
(2) identity management mechanisms including user and high in the clouds are established based on layering ID tree constructions, realized any The target of communication entity identity uniqueness；
(3) using PTPM ensure that authentication result between the secure and trusted of terminal platform and high in the clouds and user it is true just Really；
(4) the double factor authentication process of " password+key " is realized between high in the clouds and user；
(5) user is supported to complete the bidirectional identity authentication process with high in the clouds using any terminal device.
Brief description of the drawings
The present invention is further illustrated below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 represents the flow for authenticating ID figure based on TPM under cloud environment；
Fig. 2 represents the bidirectional identity authentication flow chart between user and high in the clouds；
(a) the user's registration stage：(b) the login authentication stage；
Any terminal of multi-user described in Fig. 3 embodiments completes task flow for authenticating ID；
(a) single user completes certification using multiple terminal devices；
(b) multi-user completes certification using a station terminal equipment.
Embodiment
Embodiment 1
As shown in Fig. 2 user holds PTPM hardware modules, high in the clouds certification node server insertion TPM safety chips.With Bidirectional identity authentication process between family and high in the clouds includes the user's registration shown in Fig. 2 (a) and the login authentication shown in Fig. 2 (b) Two stages.
In registration phase, user uiPassword pw is inputted firstiWith identity IDiEtc. information, then it is calculated using PTPM Registration information Regreq；Certification node server receives the registration information Reg of userreqAfterwards, first according to identity IDi Inquire about user uiIt is whether registered, then input KGC and uiPublic key and using TPM calculate checking by pwiAnd IDiGiven birth to etc. information Into signature value it is whether correct, it is to be verified it is correct after, certification node server storage user uiLog-on message, and send phase The registration response message Reg answeredresTo ui；Receiving registration response message RegresAfterwards, uiKGC and certification node clothes are inputted first Whether the public key of business device is simultaneously correct come the signature value of authentication verification node server using PTPM, and registration is exported if correct The identity ID of Success Flag and authentication storage node serverauthWith the information such as secret value.
In authentication phase, user uiSending first includes IDi、H2(IDi||pwi) and griEtc. certification request information Authreq Give certification node server；In the H that checking receives2(IDi||pwi) after value is correct, certification node server calculates HMAC firstk (gr i), the secret that key k depends on user wherein used in HMAC computings and certification node server generates in registration phase The value of information, then certification node server send IDauth、HMACk(gr i) andg r jEtc. authentication response information AuthresTo ui；ui Calculate and verify received HMACk(gr i) value correctness after, just complete the certification to certification node server identity, together When also need to calculate HMACk(g r j) it is used as response message；And certification node server is by verifying uiThe HMAC of transmissionk(grj) Whether value is correctly completed to user uiThe certification of identity, while in order to allow uiConfirmation has passed through certification, it is also necessary to sends again HMACk((gri)rj||IDahut) value is to ui, random number and ID that the HMAC values are generated based on both sides beforeauthAnd it is calculated； Whole user uiUtilizing PTPM checkings HMACk((gri)rj||IDahut) value correctness after, output be proved to be successful mark arrive PTPM Display window.
Because the user in cloud environment can be accessed using cloud service using any terminal device, therefore there have been Single user shown in Fig. 3 (a) is completed using the multi-user shown in multiple terminal devices and Fig. 3 (b) using a station terminal equipment Authentication procedures between user and high in the clouds.
Embodiment 2
(1) system is established
Given security parameter K, choose the Big prime p of K bit length, it is assumed that G1And G2Be rank be p multiplicative cyclic group, g It is G1Generation member.Bilinear map e:GG1×→1G2, select impact resistant hash function H1, H2, H1:{ 0,1 }*→G1, H2: { 0,1 }*→G1；It is (G that system, which discloses global parameter params,1, G2, e, p, g, H1, H2)；
(2) identity ID is generated
Layering ID tree constructions proposed by the present invention define the identity ID values of the roles such as user in cloud environment, Cloud Server. Whole hierarchy is formed by 2 layers, and root node is KGC, that is, generates third party's key generation centre of User Part private key；Leaf Child node represents terminal user and the high in the clouds certification node server registered beyond the clouds.Obviously, it is layered all in ID tree constructions Node has unique title, it is achieved thereby that the target of user and cloud server identity uniqueness；Assuming that user uiBody Part IDi=DN0||DNi, high in the clouds certification node serverauthIdentity IDauth=DN0||DNserver, wherein, DN0, DNi, DNserverKGC, u are represented respectivelyiAnd serverauthTitle defined in layering ID tree constructions, " | | " represent character The concatenation of string.
(3) key generates
According to the thought without CertPubKey cipher system, leafy node node in schemeiThe following institute of key generation process State:
A、nodeiChooseAs secret value, calculating and open public key
B, KGC choosesS0For KGC master key, calculating and open public keyGiven layering Each leafy node node in ID structuresi, KGC obtains node firstiCorresponding identity IDiAnd pkiValue, then calculates Qi= H1(IDi), rear KGC utilizes QiCalculate and sendTo nodei；
C, nodei passes through calculating firstObtain the part private key of KGC generationsThen inquiry point is passed through Layer ID tree constructions obtain identity IDi, calculate Qi=H1(IDi) and verifyThe correctness of value: Private key is generated if equal
During narration below, user uiPublic private key pair be expressed aspki=gxi； And high in the clouds certification node serverauthPublic private key pair be expressed as
(4) user's registration
A, user uiInput IDiWith password value pwi, H is calculated first using PTPM2(IDi||pwi)；Then chooseCalculateWithLast uiSend registration request Give high in the clouds certification node serverauth；
B、serverauthReceive RegreqAfterwards, first according to registered users information table TregisterTo inquire about IDiWhether deposit If it is not, calculating Qi'=H1(IDi), then verifyThe correctness of value:If equal serverauthChooseAnd G is calculated using TPMSj, by IDi, Sj, gSiAnd H2(IDi||pwi) store and arrive Tregister, then calculated using TPM
And send registration response messageTo ui；
Otherwise registration failure mark is returned to ui.If TregisterThe ID is storediValue, then return it is registered indicate to ui。
C、uiReceive registration response message RegresAfterwards, Q ' is calculated first with PTPMj=H1(IDauth) and H2(IDauth|| pkj), then calculateAnd by judging equationWhether verified into Rob RoyThe correctness of value, such as The equal expression u of fruitiIn serverauthLocate successful registration, PTPM exports the mark that succeeds in registration and arrives display window, while uiStorage IDauth, SiAnd gSj；Otherwise registration failure mark is exported.
(5) login authentication
A, user uiID is inputted firstiAnd pwi, and calculate H using PTPM2(IDi||pwi), choose simultaneously And calculate gri, then PTPM send login authentication request Authreq=(IDi, H2(IDi||pwi), gri) give serverauth。
B、serverauthReceive information AuthreqAfterwards, first according to IDiInquire about TregisterThe H of storage2(IDi||pwi) value It is whether equal with what is received, if, serverauthPassword error message is returned to ui；Otherwise serverauthObtain first IDiCorresponding SjAnd gSiValue, (g is calculated using TPMSi)Sj；Then chooseAnd calculated using TPMWithWhereinAfter sendTo ui.
C、uiReceive serverauthThe information Auth of returnresAfterwards, first according to the ID receivedauthValue inquiry is corresponded to SiAnd gSj, then calculate k '=(g respectively using PTPMSj)SiAnd D1'=HMACk′(gri), verify D1With D1' whether equal. If equal expression uiComplete to serverauthThe certification of identity, then calculate DHMAC using PTPM2=k′(grj) and send To serverauth；Otherwise server is verifiedauthIdentity fails, uiTerminate verification process.
D、serverauthD is calculated using TPM2'=HMACk(grj) and and D2It is compared.If equal expression serverauthComplete to uiThe certification of identity, then serverauthD is calculated using TPM3=HMACk((gri)rj||IDauth) And it is sent to ui；Otherwise u is verifiediIdentity fails, serverauthTerminate verification process.
E、uiD is calculated using PTPM3'=HMACk′((grj)ri||IDauth) and the D with receiving3It is compared.If phase It is proved to be successful mark Deng, PTPM output and arrives display window；Otherwise authentication failed mark is exported.Complete above-mentioned authentication procedures Afterwards, uiAnd serverauthCan utilizes session keyTo carry out follow-up interaction.
(6) password updates
Assuming that uiNeed original password pwiIt is updated to pwi', then uiH is calculated respectively first with PTPM2(IDi|| pw′i)、
WithThen password renewal request is sentTo serverauth, wherein, × represent group G1On multiplying.Treat serverauth Receive updatepwAfterwards, first according to IDiInquire about the g of storageSiIt is worth and utilizes TPM to calculateJudgeWithIt is whether equal；If do not wait and terminate password renewal process；Otherwise calculated using TPMObtain H2(IDi|| pwi'), by inquiring about IDiBy H2(IDi||pwi) replace with H2(IDi||pw′i)。

Claims (3)

1. a kind of high in the clouds is based on PTPM and without CertPubKey signature double factor authentication method, it is characterised in that comprises the following steps： (1) system is established；(2) identity ID is generated；(3) key generates；(4) user's registration；(5) login authentication；(6) password updates.
2. a kind of high in the clouds according to claims 1 is based on PTPM and signed double factor authentication method without CertPubKey, its It is characterised by, the detailed process of above-mentioned steps is：
(1) system is established：Given security parameter K, choose the Big prime p of K bit length；Assuming that G1And G2It is that the multiplication that rank is p follows Ring group, g are G1Generation member, bilinear map e:G G1×→1G2, select impact resistant hash function H1, H2, H1:{ 0,1 }*→ G1, H2:{ 0,1 }*→G1, the open global parameter params that unites is (G1, G2, e, p, g, H1, H2)；
(2) identity ID is generated：The identity ID of the roles such as user in cloud environment, Cloud Server is defined using layering ID tree constructions Value, whole hierarchy are formed by 2 layers, and root node is KGC, that is, generate third party's key generation centre of User Part private key； Leafy node represents terminal user and the high in the clouds certification node server registered beyond the clouds, that is, all knots being layered in ID tree constructions Point has unique title, it is achieved thereby that the target of user and cloud server identity uniqueness.Assuming that user ui identity IDi=DN0 | | DNi, high in the clouds certification node server auth identity IDauth=DN0 | | DNserver, wherein, DN0, DNi, DNserver represent the title of KGC, ui and serverauth defined in layering ID tree constructions respectively, " | | " table Show the concatenation of character string；
(3) key generates
According to the thought without CertPubKey cipher system, leafy node node in schemeiKey generation process it is as described below:
A、nodeiChooseAs secret value, calculating and open public key
B, KGC choosesS0For KGC master key, calculating and open public keyGiven layering ID knots Each leafy node node in structurei, KGC obtains node firstiCorresponding identity IDiAnd pkiValue, then calculates Qi=H1 (IDi), rear KGC utilizes QiCalculate and sendTo nodei；
C, nodei passes through calculating firstObtain the part private key of KGC generationsThen it is layered ID by inquiring about Tree construction obtains identity IDi, calculate Qi=H1(IDi) and verifyThe correctness of value:If It is equal, generate private key
During narration below, user uiPublic private key pair be expressed as ski=(Qi s0, xi), pki=gxi；And high in the clouds Certification node serverauthPublic private key pair be expressed as
(4) user's registration：
A, user uiInput IDiWith password value pwi, H is calculated first using PTPM2(IDi||pwi)；Then chooseMeter CalculateWithLast uiSend registration requestGive High in the clouds certification node serverauth。
B、serverauthReceive RegreqAfterwards, first according to registered users information table TregisterTo inquire about IDiIt whether there is, such as Fruit does not have, then calculates Qi'=H1(IDi), then verifyThe correctness of value:If equal serverauthChooseAnd profit G is calculated with TPMSj, by IDi, Sj, gSiAnd H2(IDi||pwi) store and arrive Tregister, then calculated using TPMAnd send registration response messageTo ui；
Otherwise registration failure mark is returned to ui.If TregisterThe ID is storediValue, then return to registered indicate to ui；
C、uiReceive registration response message RegresAfterwards, Q ' is calculated first with PTPMj=H1(IDauth) and H2(IDauth||pkj), Then calculateAnd by judging equation Whether verified into Rob RoyThe correctness of value.If equal expression uiIn serverauthLocate successful registration, PTPM output notes Volume Success Flag is to display window, while uiStore IDauth, SiAnd gSj；Otherwise registration failure mark is exported；
(5) login authentication：A, user uiID is inputted firstiAnd pwi, and calculate H using PTPM2(IDi||pwi), choose simultaneouslyAnd calculate gri, then PTPM send login authentication request Authreq=(IDi, H2(IDi||pwi), gri) give serverauth；
B、serverauthReceive information AuthreqAfterwards, first according to IDiInquire about TregisterThe H of storage2(IDi||pwi) value is with receiving It is whether equal, if, serverauthPassword error message is returned to ui；Otherwise serverauthID is obtained firstiIt is corresponding SjAnd gSiValue, (g is calculated using TPMSi)Sj；Then chooseAnd calculated using TPMWithWhereinAfter sendTo ui；
C、uiReceive serverauthThe information Auth of returnresAfterwards, first according to the ID receivedauthS corresponding to value inquiry acquisitioniWith gSj, then calculate k '=(g respectively using PTPMSj)SiAnd D1'=HMACk′(gri), verify D1With D1' whether equal；If phase Deng expression uiComplete to serverauthThe certification of identity, then calculate D HMAC using PTPM2=k′(grj) and be sent to serverauth；Otherwise server is verifiedauthIdentity fails, uiTerminate verification process；
D、serverauthD is calculated using TPM2'=HMACk(grj) and and D2It is compared.If equal expression serverauthIt is complete Into to uiThe certification of identity, then serverauthD is calculated using TPM3=HMACk((gri)rj||IDauth) and be sent to ui； Otherwise u is verifiediIdentity fails, serverauthTerminate verification process；
E、uiD is calculated using PTPM3'=HMACk′((grj)ri||IDauth) and the D with receiving3It is compared.If equal, PTPM Output is proved to be successful mark and arrives display window；Otherwise authentication failed mark is exported；After completing above-mentioned authentication procedures, uiWith serverauthCan utilizes session keyTo carry out follow-up interaction；
(6) password updates
Assuming that uiNeed original password pwiIt is updated to pwi', then uiH is calculated respectively first with PTPM2(IDi||pw′i)、WithThen password renewal request is sent To serverauth, wherein, × represent group G1On multiplying.Treat serverauthReceive updatepwAfterwards, first according to IDiLook into Ask the g of storageSiIt is worth and utilizes TPM to calculate (gSi)rj, judgeWithIt is whether equal.If do not wait and terminate password more New process；Otherwise calculated using TPMObtain H2(IDi||pw′i), by inquiring about IDiBy H2(IDi||pwi) replace with H2 (IDi||pw′i)。
3. a kind of high in the clouds according to claim 1 or 2 be based on PTPM and without CertPubKey sign double factor authentication method, its It is characterised by, the model definition of methods described is：The security of this method is based on CDH (computational Diffie- Hellman) difficulty of problem, related definition are as follows：
Define 1CDH problems, it is known thatG is generation member, gives (g, ga, gb), calculate gab；Here,Represent equally distributed from meetingMiddle selection element a and b；
2CDH is defined it is assumed that algorithm B solves the problems, such as that CDH probability is Adv within the probabilistic polynomial timeCDH(B)=pr [gab←B (g,ga,gb)], if AdvCDH(B) it can be neglected, then claim CDH problems to be difficult.
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