CN107580324A - A kind of method for GSM IMSI secret protections - Google Patents

A kind of method for GSM IMSI secret protections Download PDF

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Publication number
CN107580324A
CN107580324A CN201710866359.0A CN201710866359A CN107580324A CN 107580324 A CN107580324 A CN 107580324A CN 201710866359 A CN201710866359 A CN 201710866359A CN 107580324 A CN107580324 A CN 107580324A
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imsi
new
amf
information
guti
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CN107580324B (en
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王俊
田永春
张力
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CETC 30 Research Institute
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CETC 30 Research Institute
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/72—Subscriber identity

Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of method for GSM IMSI secret protections; functional entity includes UE, access and mobile management function to ps domain AMF, credible UDM/AUSF, credible SMF and credible UPF; UE is used to perform IMSI change behaviors and initiates network attachment request, while new safety context negotiation is completed based on new IMSI；AMF is used to replace IMSI information and its GUTI information of association under CP modes or UP modes, and completes safety context negotiation again based on new IMSI；UDM/AUSF is used to generate new IMSI information for UE；SMF is used to send a notice credible UPF generations with interior IMSI change control information in UP modes.The present invention can either increase attacker and trace into specific user or derive the difficulty of user real identification, and without prejudice to the requirement of Lawful Interception in the world, while will not also introduce the consumption of extra IMSI identifier spaces.

Description

A kind of method for GSM IMSI secret protections
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of method for GSM IMSI secret protections.
Background technology
GSM has evolved to 4G from 2G, has had evolved to 5G research and normalization period at present. The standardization effort of GSM is dominated by international standard in the world, all research reports and standard gauge of international standard Before the network element that model is all built upon in the operator and its compass of competency of various countries' GSM is all equal believable hypothesis On carrying.
As China develops in the theoretical research in GSM field and technology, the state of civil-military inosculation is gradually established Family's strategy, GSM no longer simply towards the general public user, have the special industry of high safety demand to based on movement The demand that communication system carries out high safety application is increasing, and just proposes what is applied towards vertical industry at the beginning of design 5G networks just bring opportunity to implement civil-military inosculation strategy, therefore country clearly proposes in 5G researchs and the army and the people are melted Cooperate to be studied for important need.
However, under this background, the supposed premise of international standard is just no longer set up, and reason has two：
First, with the development of 5G technologies, the GSM that the fusion of ICT technologies will to close originally becomes Open, all there will be operator will only be merely whole shifting to the various security risks of internet in future mobile communication system A link in dynamic communication ecology, cause the security of network in operator's compass of competency for special industry user only It is relative.
Second, come from the angle of ownership, operator, particularly external operator for the special industry user in China Say, trusting relationship is not reciprocity, then the security of they and its network in compass of competency is for special industry user Also it is relative.
Therefore, the security model of traditional mobile terminal-service network-home network-application system has just developed into shifting Dynamic terminal-service network-trustable network-application system, wherein trustable network is as the net in special industry user's compass of competency Network.As shown in Figure 1.
However, under this security model, the roaming architecture of international standard defined and non-roaming framework be in fact all at present It can not ensure that mobile terminal UE is bound to be attached directly to the credible of special industry user institute compass of competency in its attaching process On the network element of network, the network element of service network will be attached to the only way which must be passed of trustable network as mobile terminal.
Under the framework of international standard, the network element of service network is in order to ensure the proper communication of mobile terminal UE, as UE The destination node of network attachment, the MME in the AMF in 5G, 4G, as the network element of mobile management, inherently record thereon with IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity, being commonly called as permanent identification) be index various contextual informations, such as MSISDN (move Dynamic platform ISDN number, is commonly called as phone number), GUTI (global unique temporary identity symbol, be commonly called as temporary identifications), safety up and down Literary information (with key Kseaf, chain of command key Kcp, user plane key Kup), AKA AV (two-way authentication vector), UE signing CGI (location information of cell) under TAI List (tracking zone list), UE session status under information, UE idle conditions and NSSAI (network section identifier).These information may be unimportant for the general public user, but for particular row Belong to user privacy information for industry user, because IMSI and MSISDN and IMSI and GUTI is close coupling relation, pass through The capture one of information of IMSI, MSISDN or GUTI is possible to track specific user or derives that UE is used in realistic space The true identity at family, so as to be created conditions for further APT attacks.
Trustable network is due to there is special safety prevention measure, even if its network element records these information leakage privacy of user letter The risk of breath is relatively low, but (international standard allows not provide MSISDN information to service network, therefore can for service network So that MSISDN Trapped problems are directed on service network without paying special attention to), attacker is there is by capturing service network IMSI the or GUTI information realizations recorded on AMF/MME track specific user or derive that user is true in real space corresponding to UE The risk of real identity.Although can solve the problem, international standard regulation, the world using IMSI encryptions or false IMSI mechanism Lawful Interception demand requires that service network can identify the true identity of user in the case where no home network is assisted, also It is to say, even with IMSI encryptions either false IMSI, but service network still needs the true IMSI of maintenance and encryption IMSI/ is false IMSI mapping relations, in order to meet international Lawful Interception demand.It can be seen that even UE is by encrypting IMSI or false IMSI Network attachment is completed, service network still can obtain from home network and record true IMSI information, however it remains by catching IMSI or GUTI on service network is obtained to reach tracking specific user or derive the wind of UE user real identifications in realistic space Danger, substantial amounts of inherently limited IMSI identifier spaces in addition will be also wasted, because each UE will actually expend At least two IMSI identifies (one is true IMSI, the second is encryption/IMSI or false IMSI).
Therefore, there is an urgent need to solve special industry user on the premise of extra IMSI identifier spaces consumption is not introduced moving IMSI Privacy Protection in dynamic communication system applications, but international Lawful Interception requirement can not be run counter to.
The content of the invention
In order to overcome the disadvantages mentioned above of prior art, it is used for GSM IMSI privacies the invention provides one kind and protects The method of shield, by realizing the double dereference coupling effect between IMSI and MSISDN and IMSI and GUTI, it can either increase Attacker is added to trace into specific user by capturing IMSI or GUTI or derive UE user real identifications in realistic space Difficulty, enough requirements without prejudice to Lawful Interception in the world of and can, while will not also introduce the consumption of extra IMSI identifier spaces, To meet the needs of special industry user to user secret protection.
The technical solution adopted for the present invention to solve the technical problems is：One kind is used for GSM IMSI privacies and protected The method of shield, functional entity include mobile terminal UE, access and mobile management function to ps domain AMF, credible uniform data management/certification Service function UDM/AUSF, credible conversation management functional SMF and trusted users plane function UPF, wherein：The mobile terminal UE For performing IMSI change behaviors and initiating network attachment request, while new safe context association is completed based on new IMSI Business；The access is used for IMSI information is replaced under CP modes or UP modes and its is associated with mobile management function to ps domain AMF GUTI information, and safety context negotiation is completed based on new IMSI again；The credible uniform data management/authentication service function UDM/AUSF is used to generate new IMSI information for UE；The credible conversation management functional SMF is credible for being sent a notice in UP modes User-plane function UPF produces changes control information with interior IMSI.
Compared with prior art, the positive effect of the present invention is：
The present invention is used for GSM IMSI method for secret protection by using one kind so that has high safety demand Special industry user can with one kind not change international standard framework, it is small to change (CP modes) or do not change (UP modes) international standard Flow, few requirement (CP modes) is proposed to standard network element or the mode of (UP modes) of not making demands reaches IMSI secret protections Purpose.The double dereference coupling between IMSI and MSISDN and IMSI and GUTI is realized, is increased with the mode for changing IMSI Attacker is added to track the difficulty of specific user or derivation user's identity in real space by capturing IMSI, simultaneously because UE IMSI to become be even more to be randomly assigned based on true IMSI ponds, these IMSI are true IMSI for service network, therefore simultaneously Without prejudice to the requirement of Lawful Interception in the world, while it will not also introduce the consumption of extra IMSI identifier spaces.This method scope of application Extensively, 5G networks are applicable not only to, apply also for 4G networks and the following mobile communication system using IMSI as permanent identification System.It can solve the problem that special industry user carries out secret protection when high safety is applied using GSM public infrastructure Demand, meet national civil-military inosculation strategy.
Brief description of the drawings
Examples of the present invention will be described by way of reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein：
Fig. 1 is existing GSM functional entity composition schematic diagram；
Fig. 2 is the GSM functional entity composition schematic diagram of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is CP mode IMSI renewal process schematic diagrames；
Fig. 4 is UP mode IMSI renewal process schematic diagrames.
Embodiment
The inventive method follows the standard architecture of international standard, and functional entity includes mobile terminal UE, wireless access network RAN, access and mobile management function to ps domain AMF, credible uniform data management/authentication service function UDM/AUSF, trustable network are cut Piece (credible conversation management functional SMF, trusted users plane function UPF) and application system, as shown in Figure 2：
Mobile terminal UE is used to perform IMSI change behaviors and initiates network attachment request, while is completed based on new IMSI New safety context negotiation.
Service AMF/MME replaces IMSI information and its related GUTI letters with being used for actively (CP modes) or passive (UP modes) Breath, and safety context negotiation is completed based on new IMSI again.
Credible UDM/AUSF/HSS is used to generate new IMSI information according to certain strategy for UE.
Credible SMF/SGW is used to send a notice UPF/PGW generations with interior IMSI change control information in UP mode situations.
Credible UPF/PGW is used to produce changes control information with interior IMSI.
The problem of for being difficult to hide the true IMSI of UE in the prior art in the service network, the invention provides one kind to use In the method for GSM IMSI secret protections, in order to be solved on the premise of without prejudice to the requirement of international Lawful Interception IMSI Privacy Protection.
The inventive method includes two kinds of situations, one is by safeguarding UE signing informations or providing the network element UDM/ of certification AUSF/HSS produces new IMSI information according to certain strategy for UE, replaces the old IMSI before the UE, then safeguards UE signing letters Breath or the network element of offer certification notify AMF/MME to perform the action that the UE changes IMSI by CP (control plane) mechanism, simultaneously New GUTI information is produced for new IMSI, then AMF/MME reinforms UE changes IMSI and GUTI.The second is by safeguarding UE signing letters Breath provides the network element UDM/AUSF/HSS of certification and produces new IMSI information according to certain strategy for UE, replaces old before the UE IMSI, then safeguard that the network element of UE signing informations or offer certification passes through UP (user plane) mechanism notice UE execution changes IMSI Action, while the related GUTI information of old IMSI is deleted, then UE carries new IMSI and initiates network attachment flow again, in AMF/ MME establishes various contextual informations with new IMSI, so as to reach the effect that IMSI is changed on AMF/MME.
First, process is changed for the IMSI of CP modes：
UDM/AUSF first produces UE new IMSI, and sends IMSI UPDATE REQUEST message to AMF, central to take With new IMSI information.
After AMF receives IMSI UPDATE REQUEST, the IMSI of the UE is updated, deletes the GUTI associated by old IMSI Information, and based on the GUTI information of new IMSI generation associations, it is central then to UE transmission IMSI UPDATE REQUEST message Carry the GUTI of new IMSI and new IMSI associations.
After UE receives IMSI UPDATE REQUEST message, IMSI changes action is performed, deletes old IMSI associations GUTI, and the GUTI of new IMSI associations is recorded, and send IMSI UPDATE ACCEPT message to AMF.
After AMF receives IMSI UPDATE ACCEPT message, send IMSI UPDATE ACCEPT to UDM/AUSF and disappear Breath, and new NAS integralities and Confidentiality protection key Knasi and Knase are generated based on root key Kseaf, and to UE again Initiate safety context negotiation action.
UE generates new Knase, Knasi according to safety context negotiation flow and the AMF of standard, and Krrce, Krrci, Kupe and Kupi.
Specific change process is as shown in figure 3, comprise the following steps：
Step S101, UDM/AUSF/HSS produce new IMSI information according to certain strategy for UE, replace old before the UE IMSI；
The IMSI that step S102, UDM/AUSF/HSS send UE to AMF/MME changes request；
Step S103, AMF/MME performs the IMSI changes of the UE, replaces the old IMSI of the UE, while deletes old IMSI and close The GUTI of connection simultaneously generates new GUTI for new IMSI；
Step S104, AMF/MME send IMSI change requests to UE, carry new IMSI GUTI；
Step S105, UE performs IMSI changes action, while records new IMSI GUTI；
Step S106, after UE completes IMSI changes, IMSI change confirmation messages are sent to AMF/MME/MSC；
Step S107, AMF/MME send IMSI change confirmation messages to UDM/AUSF/HSS；
Step S108, AMF/MME and UE are based on new IMSI and complete safety context negotiation.
2nd, process is changed for the IMSI of UP modes：
UDM/AUSF first produces UE new IMSI, and sends IMSI UPDATE REQUEST message to SMF, central to take With new IMSI information.
After SMF receives IMSI UPDATE REQUEST, IMSI UPDATE REQUEST message is sent to UPF, it is central Carry new IMSI information.
UPF sends IMSI UPDATE REQUEST message, central carrying by band control information in user plane to UE New IMSI information.
After UE receives IMSI UPDATE REQUEST message, IMSI changes action is performed, deletes old IMSI associations GUTI, and network attachment flow ATTACH REQUEST are initiated to AMF, it is central to carry new IMSI information.
AMF records the new IMSI of the UE, and carries out subsequent action according to standard network attachment flow.
Specific change process is as shown in figure 4, comprise the following steps：
Step S101, UDM/AUSF/HSS produce new IMSI information according to certain strategy for UE, replace old before the UE IMSI；
Step S102, UDM/AUSF/HSS send IMSI change requests to SMF/SGW；
Step S103, SMF/SGW send IMSI change requests to UPF/PGW；
Step S104, UPF/PGW send IMSI change requests by band control information in UP to UE；
Step S105, UE perform IMSI changes action, while delete the associated GUTI of old IMSI；
Step S106, UE send IMSI change confirmation messages to UPF/PGW；
Step S107, UPF/PGW send IMSI change confirmation messages to SMF/SGW；
Step S108, SMF/SGW send IMSI change confirmation messages to UDM/AUSF/HSS；
Step S109, after UE completes IMSI changes action, carries new IMSI and initiates network attachment stream again to AMF/MME Journey；
Step S110, AMF/MME establish various contextual informations with new IMSI, in this case it is not apparent that the UE has changed IMSI Information.
The IMSI change processes of this UP modes, AMF are that the passive IMSI that completes changes behavior, in this case it is not apparent that UE enters IMSI exception processes are gone, have been new UE attachment for AMF.
By using above technical scheme, beneficial effects of the present invention are presented as four aspects：First, realize IMSI with Dual decoupling property between MSISDN and IMSI and GUTI, increase attacker by capturing IMSI with the mode for changing IMSI To track specific user or derive user's identity difficulty in real space, simultaneously because it is even more to be based on true IMSI that UE IMSI, which becomes, Pond is randomly assigned, and these IMSI are true IMSI for service network, therefore will without departing from Lawful Interception in the world Ask.Second, CP modes change less to normal process, the requirement carried to service network network element is few；UP modes do not change standard Flow, service network network element is not made demands.Third, the consumption of extra IMSI identifier spaces will not be introduced, each UE is still only 1 IMSI mark of consumption.Fourth, this method is applied widely, 5G networks are applicable not only to, apply also for 4G networks and future The GSM of permanent identification is used as using IMSI.

Claims (5)

  1. A kind of 1. method for GSM IMSI secret protections, it is characterised in that：Functional entity includes mobile terminal UE, access and mobile management function to ps domain AMF, credible uniform data management/authentication service function UDM/AUSF, credible session management Function SMF and trusted users plane function UPF, wherein：The mobile terminal UE is used to perform IMSI change behaviors and initiation Network attachment is asked, while new safety context negotiation is completed based on new IMSI；The access and mobile management function to ps domain AMF For replacing IMSI information and its GUTI information of association under CP modes or UP modes, and safety is completed based on new IMSI again Context negotiation；The credible uniform data management/authentication service function UDM/AUSF is used to generate new IMSI information for UE；Institute Credible conversation management functional SMF is stated to be used to send a notice trusted users plane function UPF generations with interior IMSI change controls in UP modes Information processed.
  2. A kind of 2. method for GSM IMSI secret protections according to claim 1, it is characterised in that： The change process of IMSI information comprises the following steps under CP modes：
    (1) UDM/AUSF produces new IMSI and replaces old IMSI, and the change request for carrying new IMSI is sent to AMF；
    (2) AMF updates IMSI, deletes the GUTI information associated by old IMSI, and the GUTI information associated based on new IMSI generations, Then the change for the GUTI information for carrying new IMSI and its association being sent to UE is asked；
    (3) UE performs IMSI changes action, deletes the GUTI of old IMSI associations, and records the GUTI of new IMSI associations, and to AMF Send IMSI change confirmation messages；
    (4) AMF sends IMSI change confirmation messages to UDM/AUSF, and is based on new IMSI with UE and completes safety context negotiation.
  3. A kind of 3. method for GSM IMSI secret protections according to claim 2, it is characterised in that：UE Safety context negotiation flow and AMF according to standard generate new Knase, Knasi, and Krrce, Krrci, Kupe and Kupi。
  4. A kind of 4. method for GSM IMSI secret protections according to claim 1, it is characterised in that： The change process of IMSI information comprises the following steps under UP modes：
    (1) UDM/AUSF produces new IMSI, and the change request for carrying new IMSI is sent to SMF；
    (2) SMF sends the change request for carrying new IMSI to UPF；
    (3) UPF sends the change request for carrying new IMSI in user plane by band control information to UE；
    (4) UE performs IMSI changes action, deletes the GUTI of old IMSI associations, and attached to the new IMSI of AMF initiation carryings network Request；
    (5) AMF records new IMSI, and carries out subsequent action according to standard network attachment flow.
  5. A kind of 5. method for GSM IMSI secret protections according to claim 4, it is characterised in that：UE Performing the process that IMSI changes act is：UE sends IMSI change confirmation messages to UPF；UPF sends IMSI changes to SMF and confirmed Message；SMF sends IMSI change confirmation messages to UDM/AUSF.
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