CN107566386A - A kind of voidable attribute base encryption method - Google Patents
A kind of voidable attribute base encryption method Download PDFInfo
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- CN107566386A CN107566386A CN201710827319.5A CN201710827319A CN107566386A CN 107566386 A CN107566386 A CN 107566386A CN 201710827319 A CN201710827319 A CN 201710827319A CN 107566386 A CN107566386 A CN 107566386A
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Abstract
A kind of voidable attribute base encryption method, it is that system generates Your Majesty's key and master key by trusted certificate authority, the user property registered to needs carries out checking and generated to give properties user mass-sending corresponding to each attribute to data management server after corresponding private key.Data management server is that each user generates corresponding KEK binary trees, distribute attribute group cipher, ciphertext after being encrypted to data owner carries out re-encryption, user is sent it to after the data of user are received using request, if trusted certificate authority, which receives user property group, needs the request updated, can be upgraded in time user property group, and the user list after renewal is notified to data management server, be executed by it the key updating of user property group.And if only if, and user is not revoked out attribute group, and is endowed authority and can be decrypted.The invention not only realizes the flexible expression of access strategy, and has good autgmentability and practicality, it is ensured that encryption data it is front and rear to security.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to network file encryption, specifically a kind of voidable attribute base encryption method.
Background technology
In recent years, in face of mass users, key abuse is always the problem for threatening privacy of user and encryption data safety.One
Encipherment scheme before the property set encipherment scheme of kind support fine granularity attribute revocation is compared has more advantages：One side number
Only need the user for according to encryption attribute message, only meeting ciphertext attribute specification to decrypt message according to owner, reduce number
According to encryption overhead and protect privacy of user；On the other hand by attribute with or, that non-sum thresholding operation realizes attribute is flexible
Fine-granularity access control strategy, also ensure that the confidentiality of encryption data.
The comprehensive advantage of this method is on existing attribute base encipherment scheme, and encryption method is modified, is each
User generates a random number and is used for realizing the revocation of attribute at random, and the generation for providing key ciphertext undated parameter is calculated
Method.However, traditional access control method has limitation under cloud computing environment.For example need trusted entity and implement to access control
System strategy, and third party is no longer credible, it may be individually or by colluding with certain disabled user come the data of unauthorized access user.When
When cancelling the authority of some user, it may be desirable to which data owner carries out re-encryption to the ciphertext being related to, and updates user's category
Property key, if authority revocation is frequent, burden will be very big.
In order to solve the problem of the access control based on ciphertext under cloud environment, it is credible to be used as half by data management server
Third party's dissemination system public key and master key, distribute a random number for each user and realize that attribute cancels.Based on binary tree
On the basis of, by distributing KEK binary trees to validated user, unique path key is formed, by data owner to ciphertext
The re-encryption of encipherment protection and data management server to user property and information.Ensure that only possess access rights and not by
The user of revocation attribute could decrypt the data message of encryption.If unrepealed user fails the attribute that upgrades in time, cannot
Timely ciphertext data, realizes resistance against colluders, meets chosen -plain attact.And it is current realize attribute cancel in time into
The also rare document report of the fine-granularity access control of row data.
The content of the invention
A kind of voidable attribute base encryption method provided by the invention, the work load of trusted certificate authority, is effectively carried
High scheme efficiency, meet the demand of resistance against colluders, it is ensured that the confidentiality of encryption data, before realizing encryption data
Backward security.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a kind of voidable attribute base encryption method, and the algorithm includes following
Step：
Step 1, system initialization：Setup (k) algorithm is performed by trusted certificate authority, public key pk is announced and preserves main close
Key mk；
Described trusted certificate authority refer to by user completely being trusted it is main be responsible for system generation Your Majesty's key and
Master key, for the authoritative institution of user's generation, distribution, revocation and Update attribute private key；
Step 2, trusted certificate authority generation private key for user：Trusted certificate authority carries out attribute to the user of application for registration and tested
Card, and be that each user generates corresponding private key by KeyGen algorithms, then properties user corresponding to each attribute is mass-sended
Give data management server；
Described properties user group refers to the set for all users for possessing same alike result；
Described data management server refers to offer data wrapped steel joint service, and control external user is visited data
Ask and the cloud provider of related service is provided；
Step 3, data management server distribution attribute group cipher：After data management server receives properties user group, it is
Each user in customer group generates corresponding KEK binary trees, and distributes attribute group cipher for user；
Described KEK binary trees refer to the binary tree based on user, can be close for being provided for the unrevoked user of attribute
Key fresh information, unrevoked user updates oneself corresponding private key according to key updating information, and then realizes decryption；
Step 4, data owner's encryption data：Data owner is based on Attribute domain and specifies to access a tree, passes through
Message is encrypted Encrypt algorithms；
Gather in the domain that described Attribute domain refers to be made up of attribute；
Described access tree refers to realize encryption key distribution to being used as child nodes user by constructing tree structure；
Step 5, data management server are to data ciphertext re-encryption：After data management server receives data ciphertext, base
Re-encryption is carried out to data ciphertext in properties user group, the access control of user class is performed, using data re-encryption algorithm
ReEncrypt；
Step 6, user's ciphertext data：After user receives data, as long as not being revoked out attribute group, and power is awarded
Limit, attribute group cipher can be decrypted from header, even if user fails the key of real-time update oneself, is then inputted at any time
The attribute list of oneself performs Decrypt algorithm ciphertext data information；
Described header refers to that data management server uses the information of symmetric encryption method generation；
Step 7, trusted certificate authority are when receiving user property renewal request, Update attribute customer group, and by renewal
User list is notified to data management server, performs the renewal of attribute group cipher by data management server, user needs to access
During data, what is received is exactly the data message after renewal.
(1) in step 1, the calculation formula of trusted certificate authority execution Setup (k) algorithm announcement Your Majesty's key is：
1. choose a Bilinear Groups G0With bilinear map e：
G0×G0→G1 (1)
2. calculate：Tj=gtj(1≤j≤n), y=e (g, g)α (2)
3. announce public key：Pk=(e, g, y, Tj(1≤j≤n)) (3)
Trusted certificate authority preserves master key：Mk=(α, tj(1≤j≤n)) (4)
Wherein, k represents security parameter, G0, G1The cyclic group that its rank is prime number p is represented, g represents G0Generation member, what mk referred to
It is master key, pk refers to Your Majesty's key, what α was randomly generated, y, TjIt is to be calculated by above formula, t1, t2, tn∈Zp *。
(2) in step 2, the calculation formula that certification authority is verified to the attribute of user is：
1. choose unique r ∈ Z at random for each userp *, calculate：d0=gα-r (5)
2. to each attribute αj∈ ω, calculate：
3. corresponding private key is sent to each user：
Wherein d0, djIt is that gained is calculated by formula, represents a part for private key, skωRefer to the attribute private key of user, ω
Refer to attribute set.
Then certification authority is by each attribute αjProperties user group U corresponding to ∈ ωjData management server is sent to, its
Middle UjRefer to including α simultaneouslyjThe set of the user of attribute.
(3) in step 3, it is each user in properties user group U after data management server receives properties user group
Corresponding KEK binary trees are generated, then distribute attribute group cipher for each user, specific construction process is：
1. each member is distributed on the leaf node of binary tree, for node v all in treejAll random generation one
Individual key KEK, is designated as KEKj。
Its interior joint vjRefer to representing a node in the tree-model of construction；
2. each leaf node is referred to as path node, the key set representated by path node to the node that root node is passed through
It is each user u to closet∈ U exclusive path key, is designated as PKt.Such as user u in binary tree2The path key stored is
PK2={ KEK9, KEK4, KEK2, KEK1}。
3. for each Uj, a corresponding minimum vertex-covering member be present, it can cover all and UjIn member corresponding to
Leafy node, remember UjMinimum vertex-covering member be KEK (Uj)。
(4) in step 4, data owner is based on Attribute domain and specifies an access tree T, passes through Encrypt (m, T, pk)
Message m is encrypted algorithm, and specific calculation formula is：
1. first layer is encrypted：Calculate：c0=gs, c1=mys=me (g, g)as (8)
Wherein T represent be construction the access tree-model specified, s be choose random number, s ∈ Zp *。
2. the second layer is encrypted：It is value s to be shared to set and access the value for setting T root nodes, and root node is set to and distributed, its
All child nodes perform following recursive algorithm labeled as unallocated, to each unappropriated non-leaf nodes, if identifier
For ∧, and its child nodes are assigned to child nodes labeled as unallocated using mould plus mechanism.Each child nodes are assigned
One random number si(1≤si≤ p-1), the value of last child nodes is：
These nodes are marked to have distributed；If ∨ is identified as, and its child nodes are labeled as unallocated.
Wherein s represents the child nodes set, and flag node is has distributed, p represents the maximum upper limit reached, siRepresent
The random number of each child nodes distribution.
3. to each leaf node αj, (Y represents to access the set of tree T leaf node, Y i ∈ Y∧Represent the t- of ∧ nodes
1 child's leaf node set, Y∨Child's leaf node of ∨ nodes is represented, i is represented to access in tree corresponding to leaf node
Index value, calculatecJ, iRepresent the ciphertext corresponding to each leaf node).
4. return to ciphertextData owner is safely outsourced by this ciphertext
To data management server.
(5) in steps of 5, after data management server receives data ciphertext, using data re-encryption algorithm ReEncrypt
(cT, U), specific process is as follows：
1. for arbitrary Uj∈ U, calculate：
Then ciphertextWherein kj∈ZP *It is randomly selected, cJ, i' represent
Leaf node after encryption.
2. generate header：
Wherein Hdr represents the head message of generation, EK(x) represent to carry out symmetric cryptography to plaintext x using key K, most simply
Implementation method be to use a kind of block cipher EK：{ 0,1 }k→ { 0,1 }k, K expression keys, wherein k is key K length.
Attribute group cipher is sent to effective user by this method, data management server receives what user sent
After data are using request, by (Hdr, cτ') it is sent to user.
(6) in step 6, after user receives data message, if attribute group is not revoked out, and granted permission,
The decryption of attribute group cipher and message decryption can mainly be included to decrypt attribute group cipher.
1. attribute group cipher, calculation formula corresponding to all properties are in decryption properties ω first：
kj={ DK(ckj)}K∈PKt (12)
Wherein, user ut∈Uj, kjAttribute group cipher is referred to, K represents key, PKtThe public key of user is represented, D represents solution
Close algorithm；；
The calculation formula that user updates the private key of oneself by attribute group cipher is：
2. user inputs the attribute list ω=(α of oneself1, α1, L, αk), perform Decrypt (cτ', skω, pk) and algorithm,
Calculate message formula be：
Wherein d0, djRefer to calculating gained by formula in above key generation process, turn into the part of private key, L be with
Machine generation,Each attribute αj∈ω′；
(7) in step 7, as user property UfWhen changing, data management server Update attribute key, calculate public
Formula is：
Then new ciphertext isThe new head letter of generation
Breath：
Wherein,It is that data management server is randomly selected,cτ' it is change
Ciphertext afterwards.
(8) in step 7, when user needs to access data, that receive is (Hdr, the c after renewalτ′).Work as revocation
Event occur when, user decrypts attribute group cipher first, and updates the private key of oneself, secondly according to above-mentioned formula (12),
(13), (14), (15), (16) are entered row information decryption and calculated, by c1Use c1' replace solution to can obtain final decrypted result.When
When the user that attribute is revoked can not obtain key updating key, message m can not be just recovered.
The present invention has advantages below and effect：
1st, reduce the work load of the third-party institution, effectively increase operating efficiency.In attribute base ciphering process, solution
Close process frequently involves substantial amounts of Bilinear map and module exponent computing.This programme is taken by means of the powerful data management of computing capability
Business device performs calculating task, and re-encryption is carried out to the set of properties of user, and decruption key is divided into set of properties decryption and message decryption,
Decruption key and the privacy of clear-text message can be ensured, and greatly alleviate the computation burden of user, and can be external
The result that bag calculates is verified.Therefore, reduce the computation burden of terminal user, improve the operating efficiency of scheme.
2nd, the demand of resistance against colluders is met.If the attribute set of multiple users is all unsatisfactory for ciphertext access structure,
But it can not still be decrypted when combining between user.When trusted certificate authority is that each user generates key, by choosing random number
Carry out randomized user private key.During encryption, encryption exponent is embedded in different ciphertext fragments, even if multiple disabled users close
Scheme, and jointly owned attribute set meets the access structure of ciphertext, but random number difference can not still crack ciphertext.Therefore,
Meet the demand of resistance against colluders.
3rd, it ensure that the confidentiality of encryption data.Scheme uses linear privacy sharing mechanism, according to the property linearly recombinated,
If the attribute set of user is unsatisfactory for the access structure of ciphertext, then user can not just decrypt the close of renewal oneself in decrypting process
Key, so can not just decrypt ciphertext.Therefore, which ensure that the confidentiality of encryption data.
4th, the preceding backward security of encryption data is realized.When the attribute of a certain ciphertext access structure of user is revoked, accordingly
Attribute group change, data management server will Update attribute group cipher, user can not just recover what is be randomized
Message is so as to decrypt ciphertext, it is thereby achieved that the forward secrecy of encryption data；Meet that ciphertext is visited when user newly adds one
The attribute of structure is asked, data management server carries out attribute group cipher renewal, chooses random number again and carries out re-encryption, and newly uses
Family can not obtain before random number therefore the ciphertext before can not decrypting.It is thereby achieved that the backward security of encryption data.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below according to Fig. 1, presently preferred embodiments of the present invention is illustrated.
As shown in figure 1, the present invention provides a kind of voidable attribute base encryption method, the method includes the steps of：
Step 1, system initialization：Setup (k) algorithm is performed by trusted certificate authority, public key pk is announced and preserves main close
Key mk；
Described trusted certificate authority refer to by user completely being trusted it is main be responsible for system generation Your Majesty's key and
Master key, for the authoritative institution of user's generation, distribution, revocation and Update attribute private key；
Step 2, trusted certificate authority generation private key for user：Trusted certificate authority carries out attribute to the user of application for registration and tested
Card, and be that each user generates corresponding private key by KeyGen algorithms, then properties user corresponding to each attribute is mass-sended
Give data management server；
Described properties user group refers to the set for all users for possessing same alike result；
Described data management server refers to offer data wrapped steel joint service, and control external user is visited data
Ask and the cloud provider of related service is provided；
Step 3, data management server distribution attribute group cipher：After data management server receives properties user group, it is
Each user in customer group generates corresponding KEK binary trees, and distributes attribute group cipher for user；
Described KEK binary trees refer to the binary tree based on user, can be close for being provided for the unrevoked user of attribute
Key fresh information, unrevoked user updates oneself corresponding private key according to key updating information, and then realizes decryption；
Step 4, data owner's encryption data：Data owner is based on Attribute domain and specifies to access a tree, passes through
Message is encrypted Encrypt algorithms；
Described Attribute domain refers to a domain being made up of attribute；
Described access tree refers to realize encryption key distribution to being used as child nodes user by constructing tree structure；
Step 5, data management server are to data ciphertext re-encryption：After data management server receives data ciphertext, base
Re-encryption is carried out to data ciphertext in properties user group, the access control of user class is performed, using data re-encryption algorithm
ReEncrypt；
Step 6, user's ciphertext data：After user receives data, as long as not being revoked out attribute group, and power is awarded
Limit, attribute group cipher can be decrypted from header, even if user fails the key of real-time update oneself, is then inputted at any time
The attribute list of oneself performs Decrypt algorithm ciphertext data information；
Described header refers to that data management server uses the information of symmetric encryption method generation；
Step 7, trusted certificate authority are when receiving user property renewal request, Update attribute customer group, and by renewal
User list is notified to data management server, performs the renewal of attribute group cipher by data management server, user needs to access
During data, what is received is exactly the data message after renewal.
Below this method is illustrated with an example.
It is assumed that before being cancelled at present to scheme proposed by the present invention and traditional support attribute but cannot be guaranteed encryption data
To the attribute base encipherment scheme of security, the two updates the efficiency feelings for comparing two schemes in size and decryption expense from ciphertext
Condition is as shown in Table 1 and Table 2：(wherein make G0Represent G0In computing, G1Represent G1In computing, CeRepresent GTOn bilinearity match somebody with somebody
It is right, | I | represent the attribute number for meeting ciphertext access structure)
Ciphertext renewal size and decryption expense when table 1 cancels without attribute
| Scheme | Ciphertext updates size | Decrypt expense |
| Traditional scheme | (2+2I)G0 | (2|I|+2)Ce |
| The present invention program | 0 | (2|I|+1)Ce |
Ciphertext renewal size and decryption expense when table 2 has attribute revocation
| Scheme | Ciphertext updates size | Decrypt expense |
| Traditional scheme | (2+2I)G0 | (2|I|+2)Ce |
| The present invention program | 3G0+G1 | (2|I|+2)Ce |
Table 1 is in the case where no user attribute cancels, and compared with traditional scheme, this programme need not carry out ciphertext renewal and solution
Close expense reduces by 1 G1On Bilinear Pairing computing, effectively increase scheme efficiency.Table 2 when there is user property revocation, with
Traditional scheme is compared, and this paper schemes ciphertext renewal size is relatively fewer, alleviates the work load of data management server, effectively
Ground improves the efficiency of scheme.
Although present disclosure is discussed in detail by examples detailed above, but it should be appreciated that the description above is not
It is considered as limitation of the present invention.After those skilled in the art have read the above, a variety of for the present invention repair
Change and substitute and all will be apparent.Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be limited to the appended claims.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of voidable attribute base encryption method, it is characterised in that this method comprises the following steps：
Step 1, system initialization：Setup (k) algorithm is performed by trusted certificate authority, public key pk is announced and preserves master key mk,
Trusted certificate authority perform Setup (k) algorithm announce Your Majesty's key calculation formula be：
1. choose a Bilinear Groups G0With bilinear map e：
G0×G0→G1 (1)
2. calculate：
3. announce public key：Pk=(e, g, y, Tj(1≤j≤n)) (3)
Trusted certificate authority preserves master key：Mk=(α, tj(1≤j≤n)) (4)
Wherein, k represents security parameter, G0, G1The cyclic group that its rank is prime number p is represented, g represents G0Generation member, mk refers to leading
Key, pk refer to Your Majesty's key, what α was randomly generated, y, TjIt is to be calculated by above formula, t1, t2, tn∈Zp *；
The main system that is responsible for that described trusted certificate authority refers to by user completely to be trusted generates Your Majesty's key and led close
Key, for the authoritative institution of user's generation, distribution, revocation and Update attribute private key；
Step 2, trusted certificate authority generation private key for user：Trusted certificate authority carries out attribute checking to the user of application for registration,
And corresponding private key is generated for each user by KeyGen algorithms, then properties user mass-sending corresponding to each attribute is given
Data management server, the calculation formula that certification authority is verified to the attribute of user are：
1. choose unique r ∈ Z at random for each userp *, calculate：d0=gα-r (5)
2. to each attribute αj∈ ω, calculate：
3. corresponding private key is sent to each user：
Wherein d0, djIt is that gained is calculated by formula, represents a part for private key, user's number here is far smaller than the big of selection
Prime number p, αjRepresent each property value corresponding to the user of generating random number, skωThe attribute private key of user is referred to, ω is referred to
Attribute set；
Then certification authority is by each attribute αjProperties user group U corresponding to ∈ ωjIt is sent to data management server, wherein Uj
Refer to including α simultaneouslyjAll users set of attribute；
Described properties user group refers to the set for all users for possessing same alike result；
Described data management server refers to offer data wrapped steel joint service, and control external user conducts interviews simultaneously to data
The cloud provider of related service is provided；
Step 3, data management server distribution attribute group cipher：It is user after data management server receives properties user group
Each user in group generates corresponding KEK binary trees, and distributes attribute group cipher for user, and specific construction process is：
1. each member is distributed on the leaf node of binary tree, for node v all in treejAll random generation one is close
Key KEK, is designated as KEKj；
Its interior joint vjRefer to representing a node in the tree-model of construction；
2. each leaf node is referred to as path node to the node that root node is passed through, the cipher key sets representated by path node are
For each user ut∈ U exclusive path key, is designated as PKt；Such as user u in binary tree2The path key stored is PK2=
{KEK9, KEK4, KEK2, KEK1}；
3. for each Uj, a corresponding minimum vertex-covering member be present, it can cover all and UjIn member corresponding to leaf
Node, remember UjMinimum vertex-covering member be KEK (Uj)；
Described KEK binary trees refer to the binary tree based on user, can be used for providing key more for the unrevoked user of attribute
Fresh information, unrevoked user updates oneself corresponding private key according to key updating information, and then realizes decryption；
Step 4, data owner's encryption data：Data owner is based on Attribute domain and specifies to access a tree T, passes through Encrypt
Message m is encrypted (m, T, pk) algorithm, and specific calculation formula is：
1. first layer is encrypted：Calculate：c0=gs, c1=mys=me (g, g)as (8)
Wherein s is the random number chosen, and m refers to message, and T refers to the access tree of construction, s ∈ Zp *；
2. the second layer is encrypted：It is value s to be shared to set and access the value for setting T root nodes, and root node is set to and distributed, it is all
Child nodes perform following recursive algorithm labeled as unallocated, to each unappropriated non-leaf nodes, if identifier is ∧,
And its child nodes are assigned to child nodes labeled as unallocated using mould plus mechanism, one is assigned to each child nodes
Random number si(1≤si≤ p-1), the value of last child nodes is：
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>s</mi>
<mi>t</mi>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>s</mi>
<mo>-</mo>
<msubsup>
<mi>&Sigma;</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>i</mi>
<mo>=</mo>
<mn>1</mn>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>t</mi>
<mo>-</mo>
<mn>1</mn>
</mrow>
</msubsup>
<msub>
<mi>s</mi>
<mi>i</mi>
</msub>
<mi>mod</mi>
<mi> </mi>
<mi>p</mi>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>9</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
These nodes are marked to have distributed；If ∨ is identified as, and its child nodes are labeled as unallocated.
Wherein p represents the maximum upper limit that can reach, and s represents the child nodes set, and flag node is to have distributed.
3. to each leaf node αJ, i(Y represents to access the set of tree T leaf node, Y ∈ Y∧Represent t-1 child of ∧ nodes
Cotyledon child node set, Y∨Child's leaf node of ∨ nodes is represented, i represents to access the index in tree corresponding to leaf node
Value, calculate)；
Wherein cJ, iRefer to ciphertext corresponding to leaf node in tree；
4. return to ciphertextData owner is safely outsourced to number by this ciphertext
According to management server, message is encrypted by Encrypt algorithms；
Gather in the domain that described Attribute domain refers to be made up of attribute；
Described access tree refers to realize encryption key distribution to being used as child nodes user by constructing tree structure；
Step 5, data management server are to data ciphertext re-encryption：After data management server receives data ciphertext, based on category
Property customer group re-encryption is carried out to data ciphertext, the access control of user class is performed, using data re-encryption algorithm
ReEncrypt, specific process are as follows：
1. for arbitrary Uj∈ U, calculate：
<mrow>
<mo>&ForAll;</mo>
<msub>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<mi>Y</mi>
<mo>:</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msubsup>
<mi>T</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
<msub>
<mi>s</mi>
<mi>i</mi>
</msub>
</msubsup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
</msup>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>10</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
Then ciphertextWherein kj∈ZP *, randomly selected, cτ' it is close after encrypting
Text；
2. generate header：
What wherein Hdr was represented is header, EK(x) represent to carry out symmetric cryptography, simplest realization side to plaintext x using key K
Method is to use a kind of block cipher EK：{ 0,1 }k→ { 0,1 }k, wherein k is key K length；
Attribute group cipher is sent to effective user by this method, data management server receives the data that user sends
After request, by (Hdr, cτ') it is sent to user；
Step 6, user's ciphertext data：After user receives data, if attribute group is not revoked out, and granted permission, can
To decrypt attribute group cipher from header at any time, even if user fails the key of real-time update oneself, oneself is then inputted
Attribute list perform Decrypt algorithm ciphertext data information, wherein mainly include attribute group cipher decryption and message decryption：
1. attribute group cipher, calculation formula corresponding to all properties are in decryption properties ω first：
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<msub>
<mrow>
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<msub>
<mi>D</mi>
<mi>K</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mo>}</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>K</mi>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<mi>P</mi>
<mi>K</mi>
<mi>t</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>12</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
Wherein, user ut∈Uj, kjAttribute group cipher is referred to, K represents key, PKtThe public key of user is represented, D represents that decryption is calculated
Method；
The calculation formula that user updates the private key of oneself by attribute group cipher is：
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>sk</mi>
<mi>&omega;</mi>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mn>0</mn>
</msub>
<mo>,</mo>
<mo>&ForAll;</mo>
<msub>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<mi>&omega;</mi>
<mo>:</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mo>-</mo>
<mn>1</mn>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>13</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
Wherein, d0, djRefer to calculating gained by formula in above key generation process, turn into a part for private key；
2. user inputs the attribute list ω '=(α of oneself1, α1, L, αk), perform Decrypt (cτ', skω, pk) and algorithm, calculate
The formula of message is：
<mrow>
<mi>m</mi>
<mo>=</mo>
<mfrac>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>1</mn>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mi>e</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>0</mn>
</msub>
<mo>,</mo>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mn>0</mn>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<munder>
<mo>&Pi;</mo>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<msup>
<mi>&omega;</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
</munder>
<mi>e</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>,</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
</mfrac>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>14</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mtable>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<munder>
<mo>&Pi;</mo>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<msup>
<mi>&omega;</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
</munder>
<mi>e</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>,</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mo>=</mo>
<munder>
<mo>&Pi;</mo>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<msup>
<mi>&omega;</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
</munder>
<mi>e</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msubsup>
<mi>T</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
<msub>
<mi>s</mi>
<mi>i</mi>
</msub>
</msubsup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
</msup>
<mo>,</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mo>-</mo>
<mn>1</mn>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mo>=</mo>
<munder>
<mo>&Pi;</mo>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<msup>
<mi>&omega;</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
</munder>
<mi>e</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<mi>g</mi>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>t</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<msub>
<mi>s</mi>
<mi>i</mi>
</msub>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
</msup>
<mo>,</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<mi>g</mi>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>rt</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mo>-</mo>
<mn>1</mn>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mo>-</mo>
<mn>1</mn>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>r</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
</mtable>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>15</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mtable>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mi>e</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>0</mn>
</msub>
<mo>,</mo>
<msub>
<mi>d</mi>
<mn>0</mn>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>r</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>e</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<mi>g</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</msup>
<mo>,</mo>
<msup>
<mi>g</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mo>-</mo>
<mi>r</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>r</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mo>-</mo>
<mi>r</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>r</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
</mtable>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>16</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<msup>
<mi>m</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<mfrac>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>1</mn>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mfrac>
<mo>=</mo>
<mfrac>
<mrow>
<mi>m</mi>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mfrac>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>m</mi>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>17</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
Wherein L is generated at random,Each attribute αj∈ω′；
Described header refers to that data management server uses the information of symmetric encryption method generation；
Step 7, trusted certificate authority are when receiving user property renewal request, Update attribute customer group, and by the user of renewal
List is notified to data management server, performs the renewal of attribute group cipher by data management server, user needs to access data
When, what is received is exactly the data message after renewal, as user property UfWhen changing, data management server Update attribute
Key, its calculation formula are：
<mrow>
<mtable>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>0</mn>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>0</mn>
</msub>
<msup>
<mi>g</mi>
<msup>
<mi>s</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<msup>
<mi>g</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>s</mi>
<mo>+</mo>
<msup>
<mi>s</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>1</mn>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mn>1</mn>
</msub>
<msup>
<mi>y</mi>
<msup>
<mi>x</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>m</mi>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mi>s</mi>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<msup>
<mi>&alpha;s</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<mi>m</mi>
<mi>e</mi>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>g</mi>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>&alpha;</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mi>s</mi>
<mo>+</mo>
<msup>
<mi>s</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>f</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>T</mi>
<mi>f</mi>
</msub>
<msubsup>
<mi>s</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msubsup>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<msup>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</msub>
</msup>
<mo>,</mo>
<mo>&ForAll;</mo>
<msub>
<mi>a</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<mi>Y</mi>
<mo>\</mo>
<mo>{</mo>
<mi>f</mi>
<mo>}</mo>
<mo>:</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
<mo>=</mo>
<msup>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>T</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>s</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
</msup>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
</msup>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
</mtable>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>18</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
Then new ciphertext isThe new header of generation：
<mrow>
<mi>H</mi>
<mi>d</mi>
<mi>r</mi>
<mo>=</mo>
<mfenced open = "(" close = ")">
<mtable>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mrow>
<mo>{</mo>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>E</mi>
<mi>K</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mrow>
<msup>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>f</mi>
</msub>
<mo>&prime;</mo>
</msup>
</mrow>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
<mo>}</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>K</mi>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<mi>K</mi>
<mi>E</mi>
<mi>K</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>U</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>,</mo>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
<mtr>
<mtd>
<mrow>
<mo>&ForAll;</mo>
<msub>
<mi>a</mi>
<mrow>
<mi>j</mi>
<mo>,</mo>
<mi>i</mi>
</mrow>
</msub>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<mi>Y</mi>
<mo>\</mo>
<mo>{</mo>
<mi>f</mi>
<mo>}</mo>
<mo>:</mo>
<msub>
<mi>c</mi>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<msub>
<mrow>
<mo>{</mo>
<msub>
<mi>E</mi>
<mi>K</mi>
</msub>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>k</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
<mo>}</mo>
</mrow>
<mrow>
<mi>K</mi>
<mo>&Element;</mo>
<mi>K</mi>
<mi>E</mi>
<mi>K</mi>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<msub>
<mi>U</mi>
<mi>j</mi>
</msub>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
</msub>
</mrow>
</mtd>
</mtr>
</mtable>
</mfenced>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mo>-</mo>
<mrow>
<mo>(</mo>
<mn>20</mn>
<mo>)</mo>
</mrow>
</mrow>
Wherein,It is that data management server is randomly selected,cτ' it is close after changing
Text.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201710827319.5A CN107566386A (en) | 2017-09-14 | 2017-09-14 | A kind of voidable attribute base encryption method |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201710827319.5A CN107566386A (en) | 2017-09-14 | 2017-09-14 | A kind of voidable attribute base encryption method |
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| CN107566386A true CN107566386A (en) | 2018-01-09 |
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Cited By (18)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108255435A (en) * | 2018-01-19 | 2018-07-06 | 中山大学 | A kind of data-storage system accessed using hierarchical tree structure control |
| CN108632385A (en) * | 2018-05-15 | 2018-10-09 | 上海海事大学 | Multiway tree data directory structure cloud storage method for secret protection based on time series |
| CN108880798A (en) * | 2018-06-28 | 2018-11-23 | 西南交通大学 | A kind of attribute base weight encryption method for realizing the revocation of fine granularity attribute |
| CN108880801A (en) * | 2018-07-09 | 2018-11-23 | 西南交通大学 | The distributed nature base encryption method of fine granularity attribute revocation is supported on a kind of lattice |
| CN108989026A (en) * | 2018-07-05 | 2018-12-11 | 华东师范大学 | A kind of voidable method of user property under publish/subscribe environment |
| CN110457930A (en) * | 2019-08-16 | 2019-11-15 | 上海海事大学 | The attribute base encryption method and system of the hiding traceable revocation malicious user of strategy |
| CN110602063A (en) * | 2019-08-27 | 2019-12-20 | 西安电子科技大学 | Multi-authorization-center access control method and system and cloud storage system |
| CN110932847A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-27 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | User revocation method for identity identification cryptosystem with ciphertext homomorphism |
| CN111586045A (en) * | 2020-05-08 | 2020-08-25 | 武汉思普崚技术有限公司 | Attribute encryption and dynamic security layer protection method and corresponding firewall |
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