CN107505635B - Method for detecting satellite positioning spoofing attack - Google Patents
Method for detecting satellite positioning spoofing attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN107505635B CN107505635B CN201710561257.8A CN201710561257A CN107505635B CN 107505635 B CN107505635 B CN 107505635B CN 201710561257 A CN201710561257 A CN 201710561257A CN 107505635 B CN107505635 B CN 107505635B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for detecting satellite positioning spoofing attack, which comprises the following steps: receiving satellite signals of a GNSS satellite by adjusting the frequency or phase of a replica carrier signal of a receiver, and acquiring actual frequency shift data of the satellite signals; establishing communication with a GNSS satellite by using a receiver, directly acquiring parameter data of the GNSS satellite, and calculating theoretical frequency shift data of the GNSS satellite according to the parameter data; the parameter data includes: ephemeris data of the GNSS satellite, a unit observation vector between the GNSS satellite and the receiver, a moving speed of the receiver, a transmitting frequency and a signal wavelength; and comparing the actual frequency shift data with the theoretical frequency shift data, and determining that the satellite positioning spoofing attack exists if the difference value of the actual frequency shift data and the theoretical frequency shift data exceeds a preset threshold value.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a method for detecting satellite positioning spoofing attack.
Background
A satellite navigation system is an autonomously utilized space-based satellite system covering the world, allowing a small electronic receiver to determine its location (longitude, latitude, and altitude) and broadcast a time signal transmitted along a line-of-sight direction via a satellite to within a range of precisely 10 meters. The current satellite navigation system which can provide positioning and time service for global scope is mainly: the Global Positioning System (GPS) in the united states and the global navigation satellite system (GLONASS) in russia. The Beidou satellite navigation System (BDS) of China can provide high-precision positioning navigation and time service functions in Asia-Pacific areas.
The emergence of various satellite navigation systems brings great convenience to our productive life, and the satellite navigation systems have greater and greater roles in our productive life. Such as vehicle navigation, unmanned planes, unmanned vehicles, and smart phones that we use daily, etc. As is well known, relevant parameters of a satellite navigation system related to civil use have been published for a long time, and counterfeiting location information and time information according to a published message format also gradually forms a potential threat, and an generative satellite positioning spoofing technology is increasingly developed and matured at present, which is well known to the public.
At present, a GNSS receiver performs positioning through GNSS signals, and if the GNSS receiver receives fake GNSS signals, positioning or time service errors may occur, which may cause serious consequences. Based on the principle that the Doppler frequency shift values of satellites generated by deception signals of GNSS deception attacks of a single signal source are the same and the GNSS attacks of a plurality of signal sources are difficult to accurately control the generated Doppler frequency shift values, whether the GNSS deception attacks exist or not is detected by comparing the actually detected Doppler frequency shifts with the calculated Doppler frequency shift difference.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a method for detecting satellite positioning spoofing attack, which comprises the following steps:
receiving satellite signals of a GNSS satellite by adjusting the frequency or phase of a receiver replica carrier signal, and acquiring actual frequency shift data of the satellite signals;
receiving a signal transmitted by the GNSS satellite by using a receiver, directly acquiring parameter data of the GNSS satellite, and calculating theoretical frequency shift data of the GNSS satellite according to the parameter data;
and comparing the actual frequency shift data with the theoretical frequency shift data, and determining that the satellite positioning spoofing attack exists if the difference value of the actual frequency shift data and the theoretical frequency shift data exceeds a preset threshold value.
In the detection method of the satellite positioning spoofing attack, the actual frequency shift data is Doppler frequency shift data; the step of obtaining the Doppler frequency shift data comprises the following steps: using a carrier tracking loop of the receiver to maintain coincidence with the frequency or phase of the received carrier signal by adjusting the frequency or phase of its replica carrier signal, and obtaining doppler shift data for the GNSS satellite when coincidence is maintained, the doppler shift data being represented by the following equation:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is the value of the doppler shift of the GNSS satellite,
f is the frequency of the GNSS satellite signals received by the receiver, and f is the frequency of the GNSS satellite signal transmissions f.
In the method for detecting the satellite positioning spoofing attack, a receiver is used for receiving signals transmitted by the GNSS satellite, and parameter data of the GNSS satellite are directly obtained, wherein the parameter data comprise: ephemeris data of the GNSS satellite, a unit observation vector between the GNSS satellite and the receiver, a moving speed of the receiver, a transmission frequency, and a signal wavelength.
In the method for detecting the satellite positioning spoofing attack, the theoretical frequency shift data comprises Doppler frequency theoretical frequency shift data of the current GNSS satellite calculated according to the data of the receiver, and the specific steps are as follows: the obtained doppler frequency theoretical frequency shift data of the GNSS satellite is expressed by the following formula (2) according to a unit observation vector of the satellite and the receiver, a satellite operating speed calculated by a satellite ephemeris, a moving speed of the receiver, and a signal wavelength corresponding to a transmitting frequency:
wherein, I(s)Representing unit observation vector, v, of GNSS satellite and receiver(s)Denotes the satellite velocity calculated from the satellite ephemeris, v denotes the moving velocity of the receiver, f denotes the transmission frequency, and λ denotes the signal wavelength corresponding to the transmission frequency f.
In the method for detecting the satellite positioning spoofing attack, the preset threshold is determined based on the error of the actual frequency shift data and the theoretical frequency shift data.
In the detection method of the satellite positioning spoofing attack, the default threshold value is 50 Hz. Because the value of the doppler frequency shift and the measurement error are related to the position of the GNSS satellite, generally, the smaller the satellite elevation angle is, the larger the doppler frequency shift value is, the smaller the measurement error thereof is, the larger the satellite elevation angle is, the smaller the doppler frequency shift value is, and the larger the error thereof is. The setting of the preset threshold value needs to be set according to a specific working environment.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the GNSS spoofing detection technology with high reliability, low cost and low power consumption is provided for various GNSS spoofing attacks.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a GNSS attack detection method.
Detailed Description
The invention discloses a method for detecting satellite positioning spoofing attack, relates to the technical field of information, and aims to solve the problem that a forged GNSS signal emitter interferes with a GNSS receiver and identify GNSS spoofing signals. The technical scheme of the invention comprises the following three steps: step one, acquiring Doppler actual frequency shift data of a current GNSS satellite signal. Step two, calculating Doppler theoretical frequency shift data of the current GNSS satellite according to ephemeris data of the GNSS satellite received by the receiver, the position relation between the GNSS satellite and the receiver and the current speed of the receiver; and step three, comparing the difference value of the actual frequency shift data and the theoretical frequency shift data, and if the difference value exceeds a preset threshold value, determining that the GNSS attack exists in the preset area. The method is mainly applied to the process of detecting the GNSS attack.
In the first step, the doppler shift value of the current signal receiver is obtained by a specific method that a carrier tracking loop of the receiver keeps consistent with the frequency or phase of the received carrier signal by continuously adjusting the frequency or phase of the duplicated carrier signal. Once consistent, the receiver may then formulate
Calculating the Doppler frequency shift value of the current GNSSGNSS satellite, wherein
Is the value of the doppler shift of the GNSS satellite,
to use for receivingAnd f is the emission frequency f of the GNSS satellite signals.
In the second step, the specific method for calculating the Doppler frequency shift value of the current satellite according to the current data is that the running speed v of the satellite calculated by the satellite ephemeris is calculated according to the unit observation vector I of the satellite and the receiver(s)Calculating the Doppler frequency shift value of the GNSS satellite according to the following formula
And in the third step, calculating the difference value between the Doppler frequency shift actually measured by the receiver and the calculated Doppler frequency shift, and if the difference value is greater than a preset threshold value, sending out a GNSS cheating warning. The preset threshold is determined based on measurements of actual frequency shift data and theoretical frequency shift data. The preset threshold value defaults to 50 Hz. Because the value of the doppler frequency shift and the measurement error are related to the position of the GNSS satellite, generally, the smaller the satellite elevation angle is, the larger the doppler frequency shift value is, the smaller the measurement error thereof is, the larger the satellite elevation angle is, the smaller the doppler frequency shift value is, and the larger the error thereof is. The threshold value needs to be set according to a specific working environment.
Example 1
When a simple single-antenna GNSS spoofing attack occurs, all GNSS signals are emitted by the same antenna, Doppler frequency shift rules of the GNSS signals are always the same, and the positions and the movement speeds of GPS satellites in space are always different, so that the difference value between theoretical Doppler frequency shift data calculated by the method and an actual Doppler frequency shift value obtained by a receiver exceeds a preset threshold value, the GNSS spoofing attack is considered to be suffered, and a GNSS spoofing attack alarm is sent out.
Example 2
When a GNSS spoofing attack using multiple antennas with positive alignment occurs, an attacker can control the Doppler frequency shift value of the GNSS spoofing signal to be similar to the real situation. Because the distance between the GNSS deception transmitter and the attacked GNSS receiver is far smaller than the distance between the receiver and the GNSS satellite, when the receiver moves, deception interference can bring higher Doppler frequency shift, and the difference value between theoretical Doppler frequency shift data calculated by the receiver and an actual Doppler frequency shift value obtained by the receiver exceeds a preset threshold value, the existence of the GNSS attack can be detected. Even if an attacker dynamically changes the transmitting frequency of the transmitted attack signal according to the motion direction of the receiver, the GNSS attack detection method can still detect the GNSS attack to a great extent as long as the attacker cannot correctly estimate the moving speed of the receiver.
The protection of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. Variations and advantages that may occur to those skilled in the art may be incorporated into the invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the inventive concept, and the scope of the appended claims is intended to be protected.
Claims (6)
1. A method for detecting a satellite positioning spoofing attack, comprising:
receiving satellite signals of a GNSS satellite by adjusting the frequency or phase of a receiver replica carrier signal, and acquiring actual frequency shift data of the satellite signals;
receiving a signal transmitted by the GNSS satellite by using a receiver, directly acquiring parameter data of the GNSS satellite, and calculating theoretical frequency shift data of the GNSS satellite according to the parameter data;
and comparing the actual frequency shift data with the theoretical frequency shift data, and determining that the satellite positioning spoofing attack exists if the difference value of the actual frequency shift data and the theoretical frequency shift data exceeds a preset threshold value.
2. The method of detecting a satellite positioning spoofing attack as recited in claim 1, wherein said actual frequency shift data is doppler frequency shift data; the step of obtaining the Doppler frequency shift data comprises the following steps: using a carrier tracking loop of the receiver to maintain coincidence with the frequency or phase of the received carrier signal by adjusting the frequency or phase of its replica carrier signal, and obtaining doppler shift data for the GNSS satellite when coincidence is maintained, the doppler shift data being represented by the following equation:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is the value of the doppler shift of the GNSS satellite,
f is the frequency of the GNSS satellite signals received by the receiver, and f is the frequency of the GNSS satellite signal transmissions f.
3. The method for detecting a satellite positioning spoofing attack as recited in claim 1, wherein a receiver is used to receive the signals transmitted by the GNSS satellites and directly obtain parameter data of the GNSS satellites, the parameter data comprising: ephemeris data of the GNSS satellite, a unit observation vector between the GNSS satellite and the receiver, a moving speed of the receiver, a transmission frequency, and a signal wavelength.
4. The method for detecting the satellite positioning spoofing attack as recited in claim 1, wherein the theoretical frequency shift data includes doppler frequency theoretical frequency shift data of the current GNSS satellite calculated according to the data of the receiver, and the specific steps are as follows: the obtained doppler frequency theoretical frequency shift data of the GNSS satellite is expressed by the following formula (2) according to a unit observation vector of the satellite and the receiver, a satellite operating speed calculated by a satellite ephemeris, a moving speed of the receiver, and a signal wavelength corresponding to a transmitting frequency:
wherein, I(s)Representing unit observation vector, v, of GNSS satellite and receiver(s)Denotes the satellite velocity calculated from the satellite ephemeris, v denotes the moving velocity of the receiver, f denotes the transmission frequency, and λ denotes the signal wavelength corresponding to the transmission frequency f.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the predetermined threshold is determined based on an error between the actual frequency shift data and the theoretical frequency shift data.
6. The method of detecting a satellite positioning spoofing attack as recited in claim 5, wherein said predetermined threshold is 50 Hz.
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| DE102018209162A1 (en) * | 2018-06-08 | 2019-12-12 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | Safe method for determining the position of a receiving device |
| CN109683178B (en) * | 2019-01-14 | 2020-08-04 | 清华大学 | Satellite navigation spoofing detection method and device |
| CN109884669B (en) * | 2019-05-07 | 2020-04-10 | 湖南国科防务电子科技有限公司 | Satellite navigation deception jamming detection method, system and equipment based on prior information |
| CN110082790A (en) * | 2019-06-26 | 2019-08-02 | 深圳市西博泰科电子有限公司 | A kind of satellite the deception recognition methods, apparatus and system of facing moving terminal |
| FR3098926B1 (en) * | 2019-07-15 | 2021-07-16 | Safran Electronics & Defense | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR DETECTION OF A LURRING OPERATION OF A GNSS SYSTEM |
| CN111060935B (en) * | 2020-01-17 | 2022-04-22 | 中山大学 | GNSS deception jamming detection method |
| CN111954219B (en) * | 2020-07-29 | 2022-04-05 | 北京邮电大学 | Detection method, system and device for deception attack of unmanned aerial vehicle |
| CN113447972B (en) * | 2021-06-07 | 2022-09-20 | 华东师范大学 | Automatic driving GPS deception detection method and system based on vehicle-mounted IMU |
| CN113447959B (en) * | 2021-06-25 | 2023-05-23 | 中山大学 | GNSS deception jamming detection method and related device based on Doppler frequency |
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