CN107493165A - A kind of car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method with strong anonymity - Google Patents

A kind of car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method with strong anonymity Download PDF

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Publication number
CN107493165A
CN107493165A CN201710931255.3A CN201710931255A CN107493165A CN 107493165 A CN107493165 A CN 107493165A CN 201710931255 A CN201710931255 A CN 201710931255A CN 107493165 A CN107493165 A CN 107493165A
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vehicle
parameter
certification
car networking
message
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CN107493165B (en
Inventor
周由胜
龙兴旺
刘思伶
蒋溢
刘宴兵
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Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications
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Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0815—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities providing single-sign-on or federations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds

Abstract

Two side's certifications towards car networking and cryptographic key negotiation method is claimed in the present invention, is related to car networking field.Key agreement is widely used in car networking certificate scheme, but substantial amounts of tripartite agreement in existing certificate scheme be present, that is, completing cipher key agreement process needs tripartite to cooperate.Under some specific environments, these schemes are unable to reach Expected Results.For example, vehicle, in the case of no perfect trackside infrastructure, it is difficult to complete the certification and secure communication with other vehicles, the invention provides a kind of safe car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method to solve this problem.The security advantages such as the present invention has identity anonymous, message can not connect, malice vehicle is traceable, therefore there is good Privacy Safeguarding and reliable security.Due to the crypto-operation without Bilinear map that this method uses, therefore this method execution efficiency is more efficient.The present invention has the certainty of the scope of application, and scope is determined at into car networking application.

Description

A kind of car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method with strong anonymity
Technical field
The invention belongs to car networking field, and in particular to a kind of two side's certifications and cryptographic key negotiation method towards car networking.
Background technology
Car networking can provide greatly help for the development of intelligent transportation system with deployment, therefore receive each layer of society Extensive concern.It is trusted third party, board units, trackside list respectively because typical car networking structure is made up of three parts Member, because substantial amounts of key agreement scheme is all tripartite's certificate scheme for needing roadside unit to support, and this is in actual life There is certain limitation again.For example, vehicle travels in some meagrely-populated remote districts, need also exist for obtaining the region Some traffic informations, and these areas may be remote due to being located in, and does not dispose roadside unit, then now it can only just pass through Two side's certifications between vehicle and vehicle exchange to complete communication and information.More existing two sides certification and cryptographic key negotiation method Also this purpose can be reached, but the existing defects in efficiency.For example Bilinear map technology is used in certain methods, this raising The security of method but significantly reduces the high efficiency of method.Protected sum it up, how to weigh security, high efficiency, privacy This three aspect is protected, designs the difficult point place that a kind of reasonably certification and cryptographic key negotiation method are this research.Therefore, protecting herein On the premise of demonstrate,proving security and secret protection, two side's certifications and the cryptographic key negotiation method of a kind of no Bilinear map computing are proposed.
The content of the invention
Present invention seek to address that above problem of the prior art.Propose that a kind of computing cost is relatively small, is ensuring to pacify Car networking certification with strong anonymity and the cryptographic key negotiation method of the performance of method, skill of the invention are improved on the premise of complete Art scheme is as follows：
A kind of car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method with strong anonymity, this method include three steps：
1), system initialization step, for completing the related work of vehicle and server initiation；
2), vehicle registration step, validated user is registered；
3), certification and key agreement step, in certain circumstances, using including hash function, mould multiplicative group Cryptography ABC, realized on the basis of based on computational Diffie-Hellman problems two side's certifications and key association Business so that reciprocity communicating pair can be with the help of no third side, and realization is mutually authenticated and completes key agreement, completion pair The certification of other vehicles, and with its secure communication.
Further, the system initialization step of the step 1) mainly includes：Vehicle user i obtains vehicle ViIt is unique Identity information IDiAnd the password PW that setting one only oneself is knowni；Server S generates the public private key pair of oneself：Public key Pk、 Private key Ps, and master keys of the random number X as oneself is chosen, then random number α, β are chosen as secret value, then choose hash letters Number h () and rivest, shamir, adelman Ek(), finally announce public information h (), Ek() and Pk。
Further, the vehicle registration process includes：The vehicle V that need to be registerediBy the channel of safety by the body of oneself Part Information IDiWith user password PWiSubmit to server S；After server S obtains these data, the parameter K of correlation can be calculatedi、 Si、θi；Wherein KiRepresent to carry out master key and testing vehicle register into the parameter after hash, SiRepresent with system secret value α Parameter,Represent the parameter with user password, θiRepresent the parameter with user password and system secret value β, calculating side Formula is：Ki=h (IDi||X)； G represents circled addition group G generation member.Then server S can be by parameter Si、θiReturn to vehicle Vi, vehicle ViIt will receive To parameter deposit in tamper resistant device TPD.
Further, the certification and cipher key agreement process can complete following work；Assuming that in certain circumstances, vehicle VA Need and vehicle VBCommunicated, process is as follows：
For vehicle VAFor, in order to initiate a certification and cipher key agreement process, it chooses 3 random number r firstA、 ra、rn, then calculate parameter u required during communication1,u2,w1,w2,δ1, u1Expression carries random value rAParameter, u2Expression carries Random value ra、rnParameter, w1Represent to use secret value β by parameter u4Parameter after hiding, w2Represent to use secret value β by parameter u5Parameter after hiding, δ1Represent to use rivest, shamir, adelman by parameter u3Parameter after encryption.Then by message M1={ u1|| u2||w1||w2||δ1||T1Use u4Carry out hash computings and obtain M2=h (u1||u2||w1||w2||u4||δ1||T1), it will finally disappear Breath group (M1, M2) it is sent to vehicle VB；
For vehicle VBFor, come from vehicle V when receivingAMessage after, first check for the validity of timestamp to prevent Replay Attack, TC-T1≤ △ T, wherein TCRepresent current time stamp, T1Very first time stamp is represented, △ T represent the maximum in networking Propagation delay time, if inequality is set up, calculate u4=w1·g-β, then use u4Verify hash values M2It is whether correct,Wherein symbolExpression verifies whether correctly, if equation is set up, vehicle VBEquation can be passed throughVerify vehicle VALegitimacy, equation is set up then by checking, on the contrary then abandon this Consult；If vehicle VACertification, vehicle V are passed throughBThe result will be returned and give vehicle VA；
Vehicle VAReceive vehicle VBAfter the message of return, the validity T of timestamp is first checked forC-T2≤ △ T, if not Equation is set up, then calculates v4=w3·g-βAnd v5=w4·g-β, and pass through equationChecking Vehicle VBLegitimacy, if equation set up, pass through checking；It is on the contrary then abandon this time consulting；If vehicle VBPass through and recognized Card, then vehicle VACalculate shared key SKAB=h (v5||u5||v5 rn), and pass throughChecking Hash values, if establishment, complete key agreement；Finally calculate M5=h (SKAB||V5||T3), and by message (M5,T3) be sent to Vehicle VB, wherein T3For the 3rd timestamp；
For vehicle VBFor, receive VAReturn message after, first check for timestamp, TC-T3≤ △ T, if equation Set up, verify M5=h (SKAB||V5||T3), if equation is set up, complete key agreement.
Further, the vehicle VATo u1,u2,w1,w2,δ1Calculation be： w1=u4·gβ；u5 =grn；w2=u5·gβ。
Further, if vehicle VACertification, vehicle V are passed throughBThe result will be returned and give vehicle VA, specifically include；
Vehicle VBChoose 3 random number rB、rb、rm, and calculate the relevant parameter v for needing to return1,v2,w3,w4,δ2, calculating side Formula is： w3=v4·gβ；w4=v5·gβ.Wherein T2For the second timestamp, then VBCalculate shared keyAnd by message M3={ v1||v2||w3||w4||δ2||T2Use SKABCarry out hash fortune Calculation obtains M4=h (v1||v2||w3||w4||δ2||T2||SKAB), finally by message (M3,M4) it is sent to vehicle VA。
Advantages of the present invention and have the beneficial effect that：
Novelty of the invention uses Montgomery Algorithm, hash on the basis of based on computational Diffie-Hellman problems The methods of computing, constructs certification and the cryptographic key negotiation method of safety, it is however generally that, based on Diffie-Hellman problems Two side's certificate schemes, certain security can be ensured, but exist on the anonymity and dispute traceability to user Contradiction.Want to ensure that anonymity must just hide individualized feature, but do not reach the requirement of traceability thus；Guarantee can Traceability must just provide individualized feature, but not reach the requirement of anonymity thus.Therefore, transported in scheme by mould power The methods of calculation, hash computings, randomization, brings vehicle personalization feature into Transfer Parameters, such as Deng.This causes scheme to also ensure that anonymity while traceability is obtained, additionally, due to To δ1, δ2Encryption：So that scheme has independent between data Property, there is more reliable security.Because the method amount of calculation of use is all smaller, so on the premise of safety is ensured, also can Preferably improve the performance of method.There is practical application scene in the present invention, when vehicle is in remote districts, nearby without roadside unit Or during base station, the communication process of safety can be carried out by the method for the present invention, without disposing roadside device in each place, this Substantial amounts of human and material resources can be saved.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the scene graph that the present invention provides preferred embodiment；
Fig. 2 is the registration process figure of two side's certifications；
Fig. 3 is certification and the cipher key agreement process figure of two side's certifications.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is carried out clear, detailed Carefully describe.Described embodiment is only the part of the embodiment of the present invention.
The present invention solve above-mentioned technical problem technical scheme be：
Described in reference picture 1- Fig. 3, the technical scheme is that：
1) in such as Fig. 1 scene, it will be assumed that vehicle VAWith vehicle VBAll it is to be already registered for obtaining validated user, i.e. car VAWith vehicle VBIt is obtained all relevant parameters required during communication.
2) for vehicle VAFor, in order to initiate a certification and cipher key agreement process, it chooses 3 random number r firstA、 ra、rn, then calculate parameter u required during communication1,u2,w1,w2,δ1.Calculation is： w1 =u4·gβ；w2=u5·gβ.Wherein T1For timestamp, then by message M1={ u1||u2||w1||w2||δ1|| T1Use u4Carry out hash computings and obtain M2=h (u1||u2||w1||w2||u4||δ1||T1), finally by message groups (M1, M2) send Give vehicle VB.As 1. shown in Fig. 1.
3) for vehicle VBFor, come from vehicle V when receivingAMessage after, first check for the validity of timestamp to prevent Only Replay Attack, TC-T1≤ △ T, wherein TCCurrent time stamp is represented, △ T represent the maximum transmitted time delay in networking.If no Equation is set up, then calculates u4=w1·g-β, then use u4Verify hash values M2It is whether correct,This The purpose that sample is done is to prevent message to be tampered.If equation is set up, vehicle VBEquation can be passed throughVerify vehicle VALegitimacy, equation is set up then by checking, on the contrary then abandon this Consult.If vehicle VACertification, following vehicle V are passed throughB3 random number r will be chosenB、rb、rm, and calculate what needs returned Relevant parameter v1,v2,w3,w4,δ2.Calculation is： w3=v4·gβ；w4=v5·gβ.Wherein T2For Timestamp, then VBCalculate shared keyAnd by message M3={ v1||v2||w3|| w4||δ2||T2Use SKABCarry out hash computings and obtain M4=h (v1||v2||w3||w4||δ2||T2||SKAB), finally by message (M3,M4) it is sent to vehicle VA.As shown in ② in Figure 1.
4) for vehicle VAFor, receive vehicle VBAfter the message of return, the validity of timestamp is first checked for prevent Replay Attack, TC-T2≤ △ T, if inequality is set up, calculate v4=w3·g-βAnd v5=w4·g-β, and pass through equationVerify vehicle VBLegitimacy, if equation set up, pass through checking；It is on the contrary then abandon This time consult.If vehicle VBCertification is passed through, then vehicle VACalculate shared key SKAB=h (v5||u5||v5 rn), and pass throughHash values are verified, if establishment, complete key agreement.Finally calculate M5=h (SKAB||V5| |T3), and by message (M5,T3) it is sent to vehicle VB, wherein T3For timestamp.As shown in ③ in Figure 1.
5) for vehicle VBFor, receive VAReturn message after, first check for timestamp, TC-T3≤ △ T, if waited Formula is set up, and verifies M5=h (SKAB||V5||T3), if equation is set up, complete key agreement.
The above embodiment is interpreted as being merely to illustrate the present invention rather than limited the scope of the invention. After the content for having read the record of the present invention, technical staff can make various changes or modifications to the present invention, these equivalent changes Change and modification equally falls into the scope of the claims in the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. a kind of car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method with strong anonymity, it is characterised in that this method includes three steps Suddenly：
1), system initialization step, for completing the related work of vehicle and server initiation；
2), vehicle registration step, validated user is registered；
3), certification and key agreement step, in certain circumstances, using close including hash function, mould multiplicative group Code learns ABC, and two side's certifications and key agreement are realized on the basis of based on computational Diffie-Hellman problems, is made Reciprocity communicating pair is obtained to realize with the help of no third side and be mutually authenticated and complete key agreement, complete to other The certification of vehicle, and with its secure communication.
2. car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method according to claim 1 with strong anonymity, it is characterised in that institute Stating the system initialization step of step 1) mainly includes：Vehicle user i obtains vehicle ViUnique identity information IDiAnd setting One password PW only oneself knowni；Server S generates the public private key pair of oneself：Public key Pk, private key Ps, and choose random number X is as the master key of oneself, then chooses random number α, β as secret value, then chooses hash function h () and asymmetric encryption Algorithm Ek(), finally announce public information h (), Ek() and Pk。
3. car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method according to claim 2 with strong anonymity, it is characterised in that institute Stating vehicle registration process includes：The vehicle V that need to be registerediBy the channel of safety by the identity information ID of oneselfiAnd user password PWiSubmit to server S；After server S obtains these data, the parameter K of correlation can be calculatedi、Si、θi；Wherein KiRepresent Master key and testing vehicle register are carried out to the parameter after hash, SiThe parameter with system secret value α is represented,Expression carries user The parameter of password, θiThe parameter with user password and system secret value β is represented, calculation is：Ki=h (IDi||X)；G represents circled addition group G's Generation member, then server S can be by parameter Si、θiReturn to vehicle Vi, vehicle ViThe parameter received is deposited in into anti-usurp Repacking is put in TPD.
4. car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method according to claim 3 with strong anonymity, it is characterised in that institute Following work can be completed by stating certification and cipher key agreement process；Assuming that in certain circumstances, vehicle VANeed and vehicle VBLed to Letter, process are as follows：
For vehicle VAFor, in order to initiate a certification and cipher key agreement process, it chooses 3 random number r firstA、ra、rn, Then parameter u required during communication is calculated1,u2,w1,w2,δ1, u1Expression carries random value rAParameter, u2Expression carries random value ra、rnParameter, w1Represent to use secret value β by parameter u4Parameter after hiding, w2Represent to use secret value β by parameter u5Hide Parameter afterwards, δ1Represent to use rivest, shamir, adelman by parameter u3Parameter after encryption.Then by message M1={ u1||u2||w1 ||w2||δ1||T1Use u4Carry out hash computings and obtain M2=h (u1||u2||w1||w2||u4||δ1||T1), finally by message groups (M1,M2) it is sent to vehicle VB；
For vehicle VBFor, come from vehicle V when receivingAMessage after, first check for the validity of timestamp to prevent from resetting Attack, TC-T1≤ △ T, wherein TCRepresent current time stamp, T1Very first time stamp is represented, △ T represent the maximum transmitted in networking Time delay, if inequality is set up, calculate u4=w1·g-β, then use u4Verify hash values M2It is whether correct,Wherein symbolExpression verifies whether correctly, if equation is set up, vehicle VBEquation can be passed throughVerify vehicle VALegitimacy, equation is set up then by checking, on the contrary then abandon this Consult；If vehicle VACertification, vehicle V are passed throughBThe result will be returned and give vehicle VA；
Vehicle VAReceive vehicle VBAfter the message of return, the validity T of timestamp is first checked forC-T2≤ △ T, if inequality Set up, then calculate v4=w3·g-βAnd v5=w4·g-β, and pass through equationVerify vehicle VB Legitimacy, if equation set up, pass through checking；It is on the contrary then abandon this time consulting；If vehicle VBPass through certification, then Vehicle VACalculate shared key SKAB=h (v5||u5||v5 rn), and pass throughHash values are verified, If establishment, key agreement is completed；Finally calculate M5=h (SKAB||V5||T3), and by message (M5,T3) it is sent to vehicle VB, its Middle T3For the 3rd timestamp；
For vehicle VBFor, receive VAReturn message after, first check for timestamp, TC-T3≤ △ T, if equation is set up, Verify M5=h (SKAB||V5||T3), if equation is set up, complete key agreement.
5. car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method according to claim 4 with strong anonymity, it is characterised in that institute State vehicle VATo u1,u2,w1,w2,δ1Calculation be： w1=u4·gβ；u5=grn；w2=u5·gβ。
6. car networking certification and cryptographic key negotiation method according to claim 4 with strong anonymity, it is characterised in that such as Fruit vehicle VACertification, vehicle V are passed throughBThe result will be returned and give vehicle VA, specifically include；
Vehicle VBChoose 3 random number rB、rb、rm, and calculate the relevant parameter v for needing to return1,v2,w3,w4,δ2, calculation For： w3=v4·gβ；w4=v5·gβ.Wherein T2For the second timestamp, then VBCalculate shared keyAnd by message M3={ v1||v2||w3||w4||δ2||T2Use SKABCarry out hash fortune Calculation obtains M4=h (v1||v2||w3||w4||δ2||T2||SKAB), finally by message (M3,M4) it is sent to vehicle VA。
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