CN107367740B - Authorization signal and public open signal combined anti-cheating method for GNSS receiver - Google Patents
Authorization signal and public open signal combined anti-cheating method for GNSS receiver Download PDFInfo
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- CN107367740B CN107367740B CN201710820572.8A CN201710820572A CN107367740B CN 107367740 B CN107367740 B CN 107367740B CN 201710820572 A CN201710820572 A CN 201710820572A CN 107367740 B CN107367740 B CN 107367740B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
Abstract
The navigation signals of the public service are subject to large spoofing interference, the traditional anti-spoofing method can only be effective for specific spoofing interference, if the receiver adopts a single anti-spoofing method, the receiver is subject to a large risk, but if a plurality of anti-spoofing methods are adopted at the same time, the implementation complexity of the receiver is increased undoubtedly. Aiming at the problem, based on the characteristics of an authorized user receiver, the invention provides an authorization signal and public signal combined anti-spoofing method for a GNSS receiver. The method can effectively improve the anti-cheating performance in the authorized receiver and reduce the possibility of cheating.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to navigation neceiver equipment development fields, the specifically a kind of anti-duplicity of raising navigation neceiver
The method of energy can be used in the development for receiving terminal class equipment in satellite navigation system.
Background technique
It, will as Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS:Global Navigation Satellite System) develops
Various diversified services can be provided for different type user, such as present GNSS satellite is broadcast simultaneously on a different frequency
Authorization service (AS:Authorized Serve) signal and open service (OS:Open Serve) signal, wherein AS signal pair
Signal parameter, textual information etc. have carried out encryption authorization operation, and the only user by authorization just can be used；And OS signal
The information such as signal format parameter are completely known, and user can freely use without authorization.For authorized user, both may be used
To receive AS signal, OS signal also can receive, therefore receiver can be improved in AS the and OS signal for handling different frequencies simultaneously
Performance.
In the actual working environment of GNSS receiver, serious cheating interference may be faced.For AS signal, by
Authorization encryption is carried out in its signal parameter etc., the deception pattern faced is relatively simple, and deception side can only be by transparent
Pass-through mode cheats it, and for this curve, receiver is also readily available residual signal detection side
Method carries out detection processing, therefore AS signal itself has preferable anti-deception ability.But for OS signal, sample is cheated
Formula may be varied, this is because deception side is easy to utilize signal according to information such as known signal parameter, message formats
Generating means broadcast false OS signal to receiver, to achieve the effect that deception.It is traditionally used for the side of the anti-deception of OS signal
Method has an AGC gain method, Doppler's detection method, and cross-correlation method between frequency point, multiple antennas reaches horn cupping, and pseudo-code/carriers rate is unanimously examined
Survey method, ephemeris/almanac detection method, text clock method of inspection, the methods of local clock method of inspection.The validity of these methods is often
It can only be directed to specific cheating interference, and in actual environment, and be difficult to know the fraud of the use of deception side.When deception sample
When formula is unknown, biggish risk is faced using single anti-deception measures meeting formula receiver, if but using a variety of anti-deceptions simultaneously
Method undoubtedly will increase the realization complexity of receiver.
Summary of the invention
The anti-deception measures introduced in background technique are difficult to meet the requirement in actual environment to the anti-deception of receiver, for
Defect of the existing technology, the present invention are directed to authorized user, propose a kind of utilization AS signal and the anti-deception of OS combined signal
The method of detection.Anti- deception relay type first specifically is carried out to AS signal to handle, obtains true AS signal, is then being incited somebody to action
Itself and OS signal carry out consistency check, to realize to the anti-fraud detection of OS signal and the effect of processing.This method can have
The anti-deception performance of the raising authorized receiver of effect, reduces cheated possibility.
To achieve the above object, the technical scheme is that
A kind of anti-deception measures of joint for receiving GNSS authorization signal and disclosing signal, it is characterised in that including following
Step:
Step 101, GNSS receiver receives the AS signal that GNSS system is broadcast, and remembers that the AS signal received is Sas1；
Step 102, GNSS receiver is using whether there is also AS signals in residual signal detection method detection residual signal；
Step 103, if there are AS signal in residual signal, GNSS receiver normally receives it, and successively remembers
For Sasi, wherein i > 1, SasiIt indicates i-th of AS signal that receiver receives, then repeats step 102, until GNSS is received
Until machine can not detect AS signal in residual signal；
Step 104, GNSS receiver is from all AS signal S receivedas1, Sas2... the middle the smallest AS letter of selection time delay
Number as the true authorization signal received, which is denoted as SasT；
Step 105, GNSS receiver receives the OS signal that GNSS system is broadcast, and remembers that the OS signal received is Sos1, subscript
1 indicates the 1st OS signal received；The OS signal S that will be receivedos1The OS signal to be verified as the 1st；
Step 106, by true authorization signal SasTSignals layer and the information layer parameters letter with OS signal to be verified respectively
Number floor and information layer parameters carry out consistency check, judge whether two signals are consistent；
Step 107, if consistency check is the result shows that OS signal to be verified and SasTParameter it is consistent, then explanation should be to
The OS signal of verifying is true OS signal, is denoted as SosT, so far complete and extract true AS and OS from reception signal
The processing of signal, process flow terminate；
Step 108, if consistency check is the result shows that OS signal to be verified and SasTParameter it is inconsistent, then explanation should
OS signal to be verified is curve, and GNSS receiver needs to detect from residual signal using residual signal detection method at this time
Whether there is also OS signals；
Step 109, if GNSS receiver successfully is detected OS signal again from residual signal, remember that the OS signal received is
Sos2, subscript 2 indicates the 2nd OS signal received, by OS signal Sos2The OS signal to be verified as the 2nd, and it is transferred to step
Rapid 106；It recycles according to this；
Step 110, if GNSS receiver does not detect OS signal from residual signal, illustrate that true OS signal may
Be pressed or step 103 obtain SasTThere may be cheated possibility, process flows to terminate for authorization signal.
Whether the signal being currently received according to the result comprehensive descision of step 107 and step 110 is credible.If final process
Process terminates in step 107, i.e. GNSS receiver successfully detects and receives OS signal Sosj, OS signal SosjWhat expression received
J-th of OS signal, j=1,2 ....And OS signal SosjThe OS signal to be verified as j-th its with true authorization signal SasT
It is determined as consistent signal after consistency check, then illustrates that this j-th OS signal to be verified is true OS signal, be denoted as
SosT.The AS signal S receivedasTWith OS signal SosTFor consistent signal, the true AS signal S received is thought at this timeasTAnd OS
Signal SosTCredible, receiver has successfully completed anti-deception processing.If final process process terminates in step 110, at this time receiver
S can only be handledasTSignal, such case shows that true AS signal or OS signal may be pressed, at this time to subsequent SasTSignal
Processing result need to keep certain suspection attitude.
In step 106, by true authorization signal SasTSignals layer and information layer parameters respectively with OS signal to be verified
Signals layer and information layer parameters carry out consistency check method be: extract true authorization signal S respectivelyasTWith it is to be verified
J-th of OS signal SosjParameter, wherein j=1,2 ...；OS signal SosjIndicate j-th of the OS signal received；Signals layer ginseng
Number includes signal carrier-to-noise ratio, signal Doppler and signal pseudorange etc.；Information layer parameters include text/ephemeris information and satellite clock
Information.
Selection signal carrier-to-noise ratio, at least one of signal Doppler and signal pseudorange parameter (can choose therein one
Kind, two kinds or whole parameters) consistency check is carried out, to judge true authorization signal SasTSignal layer parameter and to be verified
OS signal signal layer parameter it is whether consistent.
Selection text/at least one of ephemeris information and satellite clock information parameter (can choose it is one such or
Two kinds of parameters of person) consistency check is carried out, to judge true authorization signal SasTInformation layer parameters and OS signal to be verified
Whether information layer parameters are consistent.
The consistency check of the parameter of consistency check is carried out according to all selections as a result, obtaining authorization signal SasTWith to
The OS signal S of verifyingosjConsistency result.More relaxed decision method is: all selections carry out the parameter of consistency check
Consistency check result at least one parameter meet the condition of consistency, then authorized signal SasTWith OS to be verified
Signal SosjFor the result of consistency signal.A kind of more stringent decision method is: carrying out consistency and if only if all selections
The consistency check result of the parameter of inspection is all satisfied under conditions of consistency, can just obtain signal SasTAnd SosjFor consistency letter
Number result.
The method of signal power consistency check (i.e. selection signal carrier-to-noise ratio carries out consistency check) is: by SasTSignal
Carrier-to-noise ratio CNRasTAnd SosjThe carrier-to-noise ratio CNR of signalosjCarry out consistency check, detection limit CNRmFlexible design can be carried out,
Including but not limited to following form
CNRm=| CNRasT-CNRosj|
Detection threshold CNR is setTh, even CNRmGreater than CNRTh, then it is assumed that the signal power of the two is inconsistent, conversely, then
Think that the signal power of the two is consistent.
The method of signal Doppler's consistency check is: by SasTThe Doppler measurement f of signalDasTAnd SosjSignal it is more
Pu Le measurement amount fDosjCarry out consistency check, detection limit fDmIt can carry out flexible design, including but not limited to following form
fDm=| fDasT-fDosj|
Detection threshold f is setDTh, even fDmGreater than fDTh, then it is assumed that the signal Doppler of the two is inconsistent, conversely, then recognizing
It is consistent for the signal Doppler of the two.
The method of signal pseudorange consistency check is: by SasTThe Pseudo range measurement ρ of signalasTAnd SosjThe pseudorange of signal is surveyed
Amount amount ρosjCarry out consistency check, detection limit ρmIt can carry out flexible design, including but not limited to following form
ρm=| ρasT-ρosj|
Detection threshold ρ is setTh, even ρmGreater than ρTh, then it is assumed that the signal pseudorange of the two is inconsistent, on the contrary, then it is assumed that two
The signal pseudorange of person is consistent.
The method of signal textual information consistency check is: from SasTThe text of signal extracts information, includes but is not limited to defend
Star location information PasT.From SosjThe text of signal extracts information, including but not limited to satellite position information Posj.Detection limit PmIt can
To carry out flexible design, including but not limited to following form
Pm=| PasT-Posj|
Detection threshold P is setTh, even PmGreater than PTh, then it is assumed that the textual information of the two is inconsistent, on the contrary, then it is assumed that two
The textual information of person is consistent.
It should be noted that signal parameter consistency check method is not limited to four kinds of method (signal function given above
The method of rate consistency check, the method for signal Doppler's consistency check, the method and signal of signal pseudorange consistency check
The method of textual information consistency check), other similar signals layer or information layer parameters consistency check method can also increase
It is added to during consistency check.
The method have the benefit that:
The navigation signal of open service faces larger cheating interference, and traditional anti-deception measures are typically only capable to for specific
Cheating interference is effective, receiver can be made to face greater risk if receiver is using single anti-deception measures, if but adopting simultaneously
With a variety of anti-deception measures, the realization complexity of receiver undoubtedly will increase.For this problem, it is based on authorized user's receiver
The characteristics of, the invention proposes a kind of authorization signal for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal, the party
Method first carries out anti-rotation hairdo deception processing to for AS signal, obtains true AS signal, is then carrying out it with OS signal
Consistency check, to realize that the anti-deception to OS signal is handled.
This method utilizes authorization signal SasTWith open signal SosjCombine and carry out anti-deception processing, it is anti-to can simplify receiver
The process of processing is cheated, while can effectively improve the anti-deception performance in authorized receiver, reduces cheated possibility.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow chart of the invention.
Fig. 2 is signal parameter consistency check process flow diagram.
Specific embodiment
In order to which technical solution of the present invention and advantage is more clearly understood, with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, to this hair
It is bright to be further elaborated.It should be appreciated that described herein, the specific embodiments are only for explaining the present invention, is not used to
Limit the present invention.
The embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of authorization signal for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception side of combined signal
Method, to improve the anti-deceptive interference ability of receiver.
It is taken advantage of as shown in Figure 1, giving a kind of authorization signal for GNSS receiver of the invention and resisting with open combined signal
The flow chart of method is deceived, specific embodiment involved in figure is as follows.
Step 101, GNSS receiver receives the AS signal that GNSS system is broadcast, and remembers that the AS signal received is Sas1；
Step 102, GNSS receiver is using whether there is also AS signals in residual signal detection method detection residual signal；
Step 103, if there are AS signal in residual signal, GNSS receiver normally receives it, and successively remembers
For Sasi, wherein i > 1, SasiIt indicates i-th of AS signal that receiver receives, then repeats step 102, until GNSS is received
Until machine can not detect AS signal in residual signal；
Step 104, GNSS receiver is from all AS signal S receivedas1, Sas2... the middle the smallest AS letter of selection time delay
Number as the true authorization signal received, which is denoted as SasT.This is because for deceiving jamming
For signal, the delay of the delay of curve always greater than actual signal.
Step 105, GNSS receiver receives the OS signal that GNSS system is broadcast, and remembers that the OS signal received is Sos1, subscript
1 indicates the 1st OS signal received；The OS signal S that will be receivedos1The OS signal to be verified as first；
Step 106, by true authorization signal SasTSignals layer and the information layer parameters letter with OS signal to be verified respectively
Number floor and information layer parameters carry out consistency check, judge whether two signals are consistent；
Step 107, if consistency check is the result shows that OS signal to be verified and SasTParameter it is consistent, then explanation should be to
The OS signal of verifying is true OS signal, is denoted as SosT, so far complete and extract true AS and OS from reception signal
The processing of signal, process flow terminate；
Step 108, if consistency check is the result shows that OS signal to be verified and SasTParameter it is inconsistent, then explanation should
OS signal to be verified is curve, and GNSS receiver needs to detect from residual signal using residual signal detection method at this time
Whether there is also OS signals；
Step 109, if GNSS receiver successfully is detected OS signal again from residual signal, remember that the OS signal received is
Sos2, subscript 2 indicates the 2nd OS signal received, by OS signal Sos2The OS signal to be verified as the 2nd, and it is transferred to step
Rapid 106；It recycles according to this；
Step 110, if GNSS receiver does not detect OS signal from residual signal, illustrate that true OS signal may
Be pressed or step 103 obtain SasTThere may be cheated possibility, process flows to terminate for authorization signal.
Whether the signal being currently received according to the result comprehensive descision of step 107 and step 110 is credible.If final process
Process terminates the AS signal S for then illustrating to receive in step 107asTWith OS signal SosTFor consistent signal, think to receive at this time
True AS signal SasTWith OS signal SosTCredible, receiver has successfully completed anti-deception processing；If final process process terminates
In step 110, receiver can only handle S at this timeasTSignal, such case show that true AS signal or OS signal may be pressed
System, at this time to subsequent SasTThe processing result of signal needs to keep certain suspection attitude.
The consistency check method of AS signal and OS signal, involved AS signal and OS signal in figure has been described in detail in Fig. 2
Consistency check method specific embodiment it is as follows:
Step 201, true authorization signal S is extracted respectivelyasTWith j-th of OS signal S to be verifiedosjParameter, wherein believing
Number layer parameter includes signal carrier-to-noise ratio, and signal Doppler, signal pseudorange etc., information layer parameters include text/ephemeris information, satellite
The parameters such as clock information,
Step 202, signal power consistency check, by SasTThe carrier-to-noise ratio CNR of signalasTAnd SosjThe carrier-to-noise ratio of signal
CNRosjCarry out consistency check, detection limit CNRmIt can carry out flexible design, including but not limited to following form
CNRm=| CNRasT-CNRosj|
Detection threshold CNR is setTh, even CNRmGreater than CNRTh, then it is assumed that the signal power of the two is inconsistent, conversely, then
Think that the signal power of the two is consistent.
Step 203, signal Doppler consistency check, by SasTThe Doppler measurement f of signalDasTAnd SosjSignal it is more
Pu Le measurement amount fDosjCarry out consistency check, detection limit fDmIt can carry out flexible design, including but not limited to following form
fDm=| fDasT-fDosj|
Detection threshold f is setDTh, even fDmGreater than fDTh, then it is assumed that the signal Doppler of the two is inconsistent, conversely, then recognizing
It is consistent for the signal Doppler of the two.
Step 204, signal pseudorange consistency check, by SasTThe Pseudo range measurement ρ of signalasTAnd SosjBelieve the pseudorange of signal
Measurement amount ρosjCarry out consistency check, detection limit ρmIt can carry out flexible design, including but not limited to following form
ρm=| ρasT-ρosj|
Detection threshold ρ is setTh, even ρmGreater than ρTh, then it is assumed that the signal pseudorange of the two is inconsistent, on the contrary, then it is assumed that two
The signal pseudorange of person is consistent.
Step 205, signal textual information consistency check, from SasTThe text of signal extracts information, includes but is not limited to defend
Star location information PasT.From SosjThe text of signal extracts information, including but not limited to satellite position information Posj.Detection limit PmIt can
To carry out flexible design, including but not limited to following form
Pm=| PasT-Posj|
Detection threshold P is setTh, even PmGreater than PTh, then it is assumed that the textual information of the two is inconsistent, on the contrary, then it is assumed that two
The textual information of person is consistent.
It should be noted that signal parameter consistency check method be not limited to step 202~205 to four kinds of sides
Method, other similar signals layer or information layer parameters consistency check method can also increase to during consistency check.
Step 206, consistency check result is adjudicated, according to all consistency checks as a result, obtaining authorization signal SasTWith to
The OS signal S of verifyingosjConsistency as a result, one of more stringent decision method is and if only if step 202~205
In all inspection results be all satisfied under conditions of consistency, can just obtain signal SasTAnd SosjIt is consistency signal as a result, working as
So other similar decision method can also should be seen as protection content of the invention.
Although in conclusion the present invention has been disclosed as a preferred embodiment, however, it is not to limit the invention, any
Those of ordinary skill in the art, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, when can make it is various change and retouch, therefore this hair
Bright protection scope is subject to the range defined depending on claims.
Claims (7)
1. a kind of authorization signal for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal, which is characterized in that including with
Lower step:
Step 101, GNSS receiver receives the AS signal that GNSS system is broadcast, and remembers that the AS signal received is Sas1；
Step 102, GNSS receiver is using whether there is also AS signals in residual signal detection method detection residual signal；
Step 103, if there are AS signal in residual signal, GNSS receiver normally receives it, and is successively denoted as
Sasi, wherein i > 1, SasiIt indicates i-th of AS signal that receiver receives, then repeats step 102, until GNSS receiver
Until can not detecting AS signal in residual signal；
Step 104, GNSS receiver is from all AS signal S receivedas1, Sas2... the middle the smallest AS signal of selection time delay is made
For the true authorization signal received, which is denoted as SasT；
Step 105, GNSS receiver receives the OS signal that GNSS system is broadcast, and remembers that the OS signal received is Sos1, 1 table of subscript
Show the 1st OS signal received；The OS signal S that will be receivedos1The OS signal to be verified as the 1st；
Step 106, by true authorization signal SasTSignals layer and the information layer parameters signals layer with OS signal to be verified respectively
Consistency check is carried out with information layer parameters, judges whether two signals are consistent；
Step 107, if consistency check is the result shows that OS signal to be verified and SasTParameter it is consistent, then illustrate that this is to be verified
OS signal be true OS signal, be denoted as SosT, so far complete and extract true AS and OS signal from reception signal
Processing, process flow terminates；
Step 108, if consistency check is the result shows that OS signal to be verified and SasTParameter it is inconsistent, then illustrate that this is to be tested
The OS signal of card is curve, and GNSS receiver needs to detect whether from residual signal using residual signal detection method at this time
There is also OS signals；
Step 109, if GNSS receiver successfully is detected OS signal again from residual signal, remember that the OS signal received is Sos2,
Subscript 2 indicates the 2nd OS signal received, by OS signal Sos2The OS signal to be verified as the 2nd, and it is transferred to step
106；It recycles according to this；
Step 110, if GNSS receiver does not detect OS signal from residual signal, illustrate that true OS signal may be pressed
The S that system or step 103 obtainasTThere may be cheated possibility, process flows to terminate for authorization signal.
2. the authorization signal according to claim 1 for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal,
It is characterized in that, in step 106, by true authorization signal SasTSignals layer and information layer parameters believe respectively with OS to be verified
Number signals layer and information layer parameters carry out consistency check method be: extract true authorization signal S respectivelyasTWith it is to be verified
J-th of OS signal SosjParameter, wherein j=1,2 ...；OS signal SosjIndicate j-th of the OS signal received；Signals layer
Parameter includes signal carrier-to-noise ratio, signal Doppler and signal pseudorange etc.；When information layer parameters include text/ephemeris information and satellite
Clock information；
Selection signal carrier-to-noise ratio, at least one of signal Doppler and signal pseudorange parameter carry out consistency check, with judgement
True authorization signal SasTSignal layer parameter and the signal layer parameter of OS signal to be verified it is whether consistent；
Text/at least one of ephemeris information and satellite clock information parameter is selected to carry out consistency check, it is true to judge
Authorization signal SasTInformation layer parameters and the information layer parameters of OS signal to be verified it is whether consistent；
The consistency check of the parameter of consistency check is carried out according to all selections as a result, obtaining authorization signal SasTWith it is to be verified
OS signal SosjConsistency result: all selections carry out at least one in the consistency check result of the parameter of consistency checks
A parameter meets the condition of consistency, then authorized signal SasTWith OS signal S to be verifiedosjFor the knot of consistency signal
Fruit.
3. the authorization signal according to claim 2 for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal,
It is characterized in that, in step 106, selection signal carrier-to-noise ratio carries out consistency check and carries out signal power consistency check, side
Method is:
By SasTThe carrier-to-noise ratio CNR of signalasTWith OS signal S to be verifiedosjThe carrier-to-noise ratio CNR of signalosjCarry out consistency check:
CNRm=| CNRasT-CNRosj|
Detection threshold CNR is setTh, even CNRmGreater than CNRTh, then it is assumed that SasTSignal and OS signal S to be verifiedosjSignal this
The signal power of the two is inconsistent, on the contrary, then it is assumed that the signal power of the two is consistent.
4. the authorization signal according to claim 2 or 3 for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal,
It is characterized in that, selection signal Doppler carries out consistency check, the method for signal Doppler's consistency check in step 106
It is:
By SasTThe Doppler measurement f of signalDasTWith OS signal S to be verifiedosjThe Doppler measurement f of signalDosjCarry out one
Cause property is examined:
fDm=| fDasT-fDosj|
Detection threshold f is setDTh, even fDmGreater than fDTh, then it is assumed that SasTSignal and OS signal S to be verifiedosjBoth signals
Signal Doppler it is inconsistent, it is on the contrary, then it is assumed that the signal Doppler of the two is consistent.
5. the authorization signal according to claim 4 for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal,
It is characterized in that, in step 106, selection signal pseudorange carries out consistency check, and the method for signal pseudorange consistency check is:
By SasTThe Pseudo range measurement ρ of signalasTWith OS signal S to be verifiedosjThe Pseudo range measurement ρ of signalosjCarry out consistency
It examines:
ρm=| ρasT-ρosj|
Detection threshold ρ is setTh, even ρmGreater than ρTh, then it is assumed that SasTSignal and OS signal S to be verifiedosjBoth signals
Signal pseudorange is inconsistent, on the contrary, then it is assumed that the signal pseudorange of the two is consistent.
6. the authorization signal according to claim 2 for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal,
It is characterized in that, selection signal textual information carries out consistency check, and the method for signal textual information consistency check is:
From SasTThe text of signal extracts information, including but not limited to satellite position information PasT；From SosjThe text of signal extracts letter
Breath, including but not limited to satellite position information Posj；
Pm=| PasT-Posj|
Detection threshold P is setTh, even PmGreater than PTh, then it is assumed that SasTSignal and OS signal S to be verifiedosjBoth signals
Textual information is inconsistent, on the contrary, then it is assumed that the textual information of the two is consistent.
7. the authorization signal according to claim 2 for GNSS receiver and the open anti-deception measures of combined signal,
It is characterized in that, under conditions of the consistency check result that all selections carry out the parameter of consistency check is all satisfied consistency,
It could authorized signal SasTWith OS signal S to be verifiedosjFor the result of consistency signal.
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| CN108828628B (en) * | 2018-04-23 | 2021-04-27 | 厦门大学 | Deception signal detection method |
| CN109696696B (en) * | 2019-02-15 | 2020-07-31 | 航天恒星科技有限公司 | Navigation receiver device suitable for high-orbit spacecraft |
| CN109917437B (en) * | 2019-04-30 | 2020-07-31 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Satellite navigation signal carrier phase multipath deviation elimination method based on APCRW correlator |
| US11668835B2 (en) | 2020-07-23 | 2023-06-06 | Honeywell International Inc. | GNSS spoofing detection using carrier-to-noise based monitoring |
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| US9500483B1 (en) * | 2013-10-28 | 2016-11-22 | Rockwell Collins, Inc. | Surrogate navigation receiver for transferring capabilities to a host navigation receiver and related method |
| CN103983986B (en) * | 2014-06-10 | 2016-05-18 | 哈尔滨工业大学 | A kind of anti-deception formula of modified RAIM interference method based on particle filter |
| US9910160B2 (en) * | 2014-11-24 | 2018-03-06 | The Boeing Company | Detecting and removing spoofing signals |
| CN106772455B (en) * | 2016-12-29 | 2018-04-17 | 南京航空航天大学 | A kind of GNSS anti-spoofing loop tracks methods based on Inertia information auxiliary with parameter Estimation |
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