CN107295526A - A kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm - Google Patents
A kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm, according to the minimum spectrum requirement and estimated cost and interference relationships of frequency spectrum buyer, it is calculated as meeting spectrum number and the frequency spectrum quantity at one's command that all buyer's demand lower limits must retain, the matching algorithm of the deferred receptive pattern of operational development on this basis, reach stable frequency spectrum allocation result, it ensure that frequency spectrum allocation result meets minimum spectrum requirement and the cost budgeting of secondary user's, improve the frequency spectrum transaction success rate and satisfaction of naive user and secondary user's.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to technical field of the computer network, more particularly to guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm
Frequency spectrum distribution model.
Background technology
In current Internet era, the frequency spectrum of cordless communication network is a kind of indispensable valuable source.However, by
In the growing of wireless communications traffic, frequency spectrum also becomes a kind of nervous resource.It is existing in order to better profit from as far as possible
Frequency spectrum, avoid the frequency spectrum waste that is caused due to traditional static spectral distribution method.Dynamic frequency spectrum distributing method is thus
It is born, it can make wireless service provider buy and sell superfluous spectral channel according to the demand of oneself.
The transaction of frequency spectrum its be substantially frequency spectrum both parties a kind of matching.Knot is matched relative to optimal frequency spectrum
Really, stable frequency spectrum matching result is the rational matching result for free frequency spectrum trade market.Reason is as follows：(1) merchandise
Both parties in market are all selfishnesses, only consider to maximize the interests of itself, this optimization with whole transaction system
Target might not strict conformance.Optimal matching algorithm can only be forced in the integrated system that there is " effector "
Perform, and stable matching algorithm then considers the personal preference of buyer and seller so that any buyer or seller can folk prescriptions
Face obtains more preferable matching result, it is ensured that implementation of the matching algorithm in distributed free frequency spectrum trade market.(2) from calculating
For in complexity, optimal matching scheme is often NP difficult, and stable frequency spectrum matching process can be in multinomial
It is interior to be solved.
Stable matching algorithm comes from Gale and Shapley et al. research.They propose deferred receiving earliest
Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm, solves the matching problem with the demand upper limit.The deferred algorithm that receives is in computer
Scientific domain is widely used in the assignment problem of resource, the Virtual Machine Manager in such as high in the clouds, user's access in Home eNodeB, end
To end frequency spectrum share the problems such as.
It is different from traditional matching problem, important speciality of the frequency spectrum distribution with durability.Durability refers in channel radio
During letter, due to the decay of signal, the signal apart from two remote enough users will not be interfered, therefore the two users
Identical frequency spectrum can be used.Similarly, it can allow frequency spectrum seller that its frequency spectrum is sold into distance in frequency spectrum trade market
The buyer that remote, signal will not be interfered enough.Spectrum reuse improves the service efficiency of frequency spectrum, but to stable frequency spectrum
Challenge is brought with algorithm design.Y.Chen et al. is it is proposed that cross adapted two-stage deferred acceptance
Algorithm, the algorithm make use of frequency spectrum reusability, and can provide stable matching result.However, this algorithm only considers
The spectrum requirement upper limit of each buyer is arrived.In fact, the normal operation in order to realize radio communication, frequency spectrum buyer also has its frequency
Spectrum demand lower limit.Traditional deferred algorithm that receives can not meet demand lower limit, and D.Fragiadakis proposes a kind of expand and passed
Receive by algorithm, for solving while there is the matching problem of the demand upper limit and demand lower limit.However, because frequency spectrum has multiplexing
Property speciality, in this algorithm can not be used directly to solve frequency spectrum matching problem.
The content of the invention
In view of the deficiencies of the prior art, the present invention provides a kind of frequency spectrum of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm
Distribution model.
The technical scheme is that the frequency spectrum distribution model of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm, comprising with
Lower step：
A kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm, it is characterised in that define P frequency
Buyer, Q frequency spectrum seller are composed, frequency spectrum buyer is secondary user's, and frequency spectrum seller is naive user, and the method includes the steps of：
Step 1, Q interference figure is set up, each interference figure corresponds to the frequency spectrum of a frequency spectrum seller, i.e., for frequency spectrum seller s,
Set up interference figure Gs=(N, Es), wherein node set N is the set of P frequency spectrum buyer, line set EsTo set up mode as follows.
For every a pair of frequency spectrums buyer j, j ', if j, j ' disturbed on frequency spectrum s, then add sideTo line set EsIn.Step 2, root
Bid according to frequency spectrum buyer to the frequency spectrum of frequency spectrum seller, set up that buyer gathers buyer the preference relation of seller and seller is inclined
Good relation, specific method is：Buyer is to the generation method of the preference relation of the seller, if buyer i is to seller j's and seller j '
Bid relation isSo preference relation is j ＞ ＞ i j '.Preference relation the going out by buyer that seller gathers buyer
Valency and interference figure are determined.Assuming that having buyer set A and B for seller i, if the buyer in buyer's set A is mutually not
Interference, i.e.,There is the buyer interfered in seller's set B, i.e.,It is so inclined
Good relation is A ＞ ＞iB；If the buyer in buyer's set A does not interfere with each other mutually with the buyer in set B, and buyer in A
Total bid of buyer in B is always bidded above, i.e.,So preference relation is A ＞ ＞iB, vice versa；
Step 3, spectrum number θ at one's command is calculated, is comprised the following steps that：
Step 3.1, for each demand lower limit be pcBuyer s, create pcIndividual dummy node.
Step 3.2, each newly-built dummy node inherit all interference relationships of origin node, that is, inherit origin node and exist
Side in all original interference figures.
Step 3.3, the establishment conflict side between each two dummy node of same origin node.
Step 3.4, the interference figure to being obtained according to step step 3.1 to step 3.3, use Welch Powell methods, meter
Whole G minimum number of colours coloring, θ=M-coloring can be covered by calculating, and wherein M is the number of all sellers.
Step 4, according to each buyer c demand lower limit pcWith demand upper limit qc(being determined by buyer's budget), generates two
New virtual buyer：Conventional type caWith expanding type cb。caDemand lower limit be 0, the demand upper limit be pc；cbDemand lower limit be 0, need
It is q to seek the upper limitc-pc。caAnd cbInherit bids and preference relation of the c to all sellers.To the frequency spectrum of all sellers, with all
New virtual buyer sets up new interference figure G for nodes, comprise the following steps that：
Step 4.1, caAnd cbAll c conflict relationship is inherited, that is, inherits sides of the c in original interference figure.
Step 4.2, in caAnd cbBetween set up a line.
Step 5, frequency spectrum is matched, and is comprised the following steps that；
Step 5.1, the candidate matches list object A by all seller sSIt is set to all buyer N.By all buyer c time
Choosing matching list object WcIt is set to empty set.By the final list of matches μ (c) of all buyers and the final list of matches of all sellers
μ (s) is set to empty set.
Step 5.2, the candidate matches list object A if there is sellerSIt is not empty set, jumps to step 5.3；Otherwise,
Whole algorithm terminates.
Step 5.3, to all candidate matches list object ASIt is not the seller s of empty set, it is dry at it using greedy algorithm
Disturb figure GsOn obtain maximal independent set
If step 5.4, all seller s' obtained according to step 5.23All it is empty set, then end step 5；It is no
Then, step 5.5 is jumped to.
Step 5.5, the maximal independent set for all seller sIn buyer c, by s add c candidate matches object
List WcIn；By c from s candidate matches list object ASIt is middle to delete, and in s conflict graph GsIt is middle by represent c node and
Coupled edge contract.
Step 5.6, for all candidate matches list object WcIt is not empty buyer c, is handled as follows：
If step 5.61, c belong to conventional type buyer, in WcWith μ's (c) and concentrate choose c most preferences no more than c
The frequency spectrum of demand upper limit number is added in the list of matches μ (s) of these frequency spectrums as new μ (c), and by c, jumps to step
5.7；Otherwise, if c belongs to expanding type buyer, interim counting variable count=0 is made, step 5.62 is jumped to.
Step 5.62, when count is less than spectrum number θ at one's command, and there is the mould that expanding type buyer c meets μ (c)
The candidate matches list object W of the demand upper limit and c less than ccWhen being not empty set, buyer c matching frequency spectrum is considered successively, it is no
Then, step 5.7 is jumped to.Consider buyer ciIf, μ (ci) mould be less than ciThe demand upper limit and ciCandidate matches object column
TableIt is not empty set, fromWith μ (ci) and concentrate take ciOne frequency spectrum s of most preference is added to μ (ci) in, and by ciPlus
In the list of matches μ (s) for entering frequency spectrum s, by s fromIt is middle to delete, and by interference figure GsIn represent ciNode and its connected
Edge contract, adds 1 by counting variable count；Otherwise, if μ (ci) mould be equal to ciThe demand upper limit or ciCandidate matches pair
As listWhen being not empty set, i=i+1, repeat step 5.62.
Step 5.7, empty Wc。
Step 5.8 jumps to step 5.2.
In a kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of above-mentioned guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm,
In step 3, Welch Powell algorithms include：
Step 2.1, the order that the node in interference figure G successively decreases by the number of degrees arranged into (the row of the node of the identical number of degrees
Row are random).
Step 2.2, with the first color to first node-coloring, and by ordering pair and front nodal it is non-conterminous
It is each to light same color.
Step 2.3, with second of color to still uncoloured repeat step 2.2, until all points all upper color
Untill.
Step 2.4, required number of colours are coloring.Spectrum number at one's command is θ=M-coloring.
In a kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of above-mentioned guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm, in steps of 5, use
Maximum independent set is solved in calculatingGreedy algorithm include：
Step 5.1, for all seller s, find out buyer's set Qs.In QsIn buyer meet constraints：
Constraints 1, in candidate matches list object ASIn；
Constraints 2, not with list of matches μ (s) any buyer c disturb.
Step 5.2,For interference figure GsIn include QsThe subgraph of buyer, forIn node n, weightnFor node n
Weight, degreenFor node n degree, according to weightn/(degreen+ 1) descending is to node sequencing.
Step 5.3, taking-up come a node n, i.e. weight for foremostn/(degreen+ 1) the maximum node of value,
Add it to maximum independent setIn, by its fromDelete, and by all coupled nodes and side fromIn delete
Remove.
Step 5.4, whenIn when no longer there is node, terminate the algorithm；Otherwise, step 5.2 is jumped to.
The invention has the advantages that：Frequency spectrum distributing method described in the invention can meet the frequency of all frequency spectrum buyers
Spectrum demand lower limit and cost budgeting, and ensure the stability of frequency spectrum allocation result, i.e., in the absence of any pair of frequency spectrum buyer and
Seller wishes mutually to replace the frequency spectrum seller of oneself current matching and buyer.The operational efficiency of the frequency spectrum distributing method is high, tool
There is polynomial complexity.Compared with traditional frequency spectrum distributing method, the final frequency spectrum allocation result that the invention is obtained is improved
Frequency spectrum buyer and the transaction success rate and satisfaction of frequency spectrum seller.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the algorithm flow chart of the frequency spectrum matching process of the present invention.
Fig. 2 a are the frequency spectrum matching flow charts (first round) of the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 b are the frequency spectrum matching flow charts (the second wheel) of the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 c are the frequency spectrum matching flow charts (third round) of the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 d are the frequency spectrum matching flow charts (last matching result) of the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is the Welch Powell algorithm flow charts of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is maximum independent set of the present inventionGreedy algorithm flow chart.
During Fig. 5 is the embodiment of the present invention, it is assumed that interference figure identical of the secondary user's (frequency spectrum buyer) on every frequency spectrum
Relation schematic diagram.
During Fig. 6 is the embodiment of the present invention, be three buyers create 2, the relation schematic diagram after 1,2 dummy nodes.
During Fig. 7 is the embodiment of the present invention, the interference figure after the conventional type of generation and expanding type buyer.
Embodiment
Present invention is primarily based on the deferred algorithm of the expansion for meeting demand lower limit, it is considered to the reusable characteristic of frequency spectrum, proposition
A kind of frequency spectrum distribution model of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm.Rate that this method has taken into full account that the match is successful and
Buyer and the satisfaction of seller.The frequency spectrum allocation result obtained by the present invention goes for the frequency spectrum city of frequency spectrum free transaction
.
The method that the present invention is provided can use computer software technology implementation process.Referring to Fig. 1, embodiment is to the present invention
Flow carry out one it is specific illustrate, embodiment is as follows：
Assuming that in the presence of three frequency spectrum buyers A, B, C, six frequency spectrum sellers a, b, c, d, e, f, each frequency spectrum seller possesses one
Individual frequency spectrum.Bid of the frequency spectrum buyer to frequency spectrum seller is as shown in the table.
Table 1.
| Buyer A | Buyer B | Buyer C | |
| Seller a | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| Seller b | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Seller c | 2 | 6 | 5 |
| Seller d | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Seller e | 5 | 5 | 2 |
| Seller f | 3 | 4 | 6 |
| Demand lower limit | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| The demand upper limit | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Step 1, the interference relationships transmitted according to secondary user's on the frequency spectrum of each naive user set up interference figure Gs=
(N,Es), wherein node set N represents all secondary user's.If secondary user's c and c ' is disturbed on frequency spectrum s, add
SideTo line set EsIn.
In embodiment, it is assumed that the interference figure of secondary user's (frequency spectrum buyer) on every frequency spectrum is identical, all as shown in Figure 5.
Step 2, the bid according to secondary user's (frequency spectrum buyer) to the frequency spectrum of naive user (frequency spectrum seller), sets up buyer
The preference relation that preference relation and seller to seller are gathered buyer.
Buyer is to the generation method of the preference relation of the seller, if buyer i is to seller j and seller j ' bid relationSo preference relation is j ＞ ＞ i j '.Bid and interference figure of the preference relation that seller gathers buyer by buyer
Determine.Assuming that having buyer set A and B for seller i, if the buyer in buyer's set A does not interfere with each other mutually, i.e.,There is the buyer interfered in seller's set B, i.e.,So preference relation is
A ＞ ＞ i B；If the buyer in buyer's set A does not interfere with each other mutually with the buyer in set B, and in A buyer total overbid
Total bid of buyer in B, i.e.,So preference relation is A ＞ ＞ i B, and vice versa.
The specific embodiment of embodiment is as follows：
Bid according to buyer to seller, the preference relation that can set up buyer to seller is as follows：
A ＞ ＞AE ＞ ＞AB ＞ ＞AF ＞ ＞AC ＞ ＞A d
C ＞ ＞BE ＞ ＞BF ＞ ＞BD ＞ ＞BB ＞ ＞B a
F ＞ ＞CC ＞ ＞CD ＞ ＞CB ＞ ＞CE ＞ ＞C a
Step 3, spectrum number θ at one's command is calculated, is comprised the following steps that：(1) it is p for each demand lower limitc's
Buyer s, creates pcIndividual dummy node.(2) each newly-built dummy node inherits all interference relationships of origin node, i.e., after
Hold side of the origin node in all original interference figures.(3) conflict side is created between each two dummy node of same origin node.
(4) to the interference figure obtained according to step (1) (2) (3), using Welch Powell methods, whole G minimum face can be covered by calculating
Chromatic number coloring, θ=M-coloring, wherein M is the number of all sellers.
Welch Powell algorithms can be described as follows：
(1) order that the node in interference figure G successively decreases by the number of degrees is arranged (arrangement of the node of the identical number of degrees with
Meaning).
(2) with the first color to first node-coloring, and it is non-conterminous each by ordering pair and front nodal
Light same color.
(3) (2) are repeated to still uncoloured point with second of color, until all points all untill upper color.
(4) number of colours required for is coloring.
The specific embodiment of embodiment is as follows：
Due to A, B, C smallest match number is respectively 2,1,2, therefore respectively three buyers' establishments 2,1,2 virtual sections
Point, i.e. A, A ', B, C, C '.Each newly-built dummy node inherits all interference relationships of origin node, that is, inherits origin node
Side in all original interference figures.Conflict side is created between each two dummy node of same origin node.As shown in Figure 6.
In the figure being made up of dummy node, using Welch Powell methods, the minimum face of whole figure can be covered by calculating
Chromatic number coloring, detailed process is as follows：
(1) node in conflict graph is ranked up by number of degrees descending order, ranking results are A, A ', C, C ', B.
(2) node-coloring that A is coloured and is not connected with A with color 1.Because all nodes are all connected with A, 1, color
A can be coloured.Similarly, A ' is coloured with color 2.The node B colorings being connected with color 3 to C and not with C, with color 4 to C '
Color.So far all dummy node colorings are finished.With 4 kinds of colors.
(3) θ=6-4=2.
Step 3, according to each buyer c demand lower limit pcWith demand upper limit qc(being determined by buyer's budget), generates two
New virtual buyer：Conventional type caWith expanding type cb。caDemand lower limit be 0, the demand upper limit be pc；cbDemand lower limit be 0, need
It is q to seek the upper limitc-pc。caAnd cbInherit bids and preference relation of the c to all sellers.To the frequency spectrum of all sellers, with all
New virtual buyer sets up new interference figure G for nodes, comprise the following steps that：(1)caAnd cbAll c conflict relationship is inherited,
Inherit sides of the c in original interference figure.(2) in caAnd cbBetween set up a line.
The specific embodiment of embodiment is as follows：
The conventional type of generation and expanding type buyer are：Aa,Ab,Ba,Bb,Ca,Cb, demand lower limit is all 0, demand upper limit difference
For 2,1,1,2,2,1, new interference figure is as shown in Figure 7.
Step 5, frequency spectrum is matched, and is comprised the following steps that；
(1) by all seller s candidate matches list object ASIt is set to all buyer N.By all buyer c candidate matches
List object WcIt is set to empty set.The final list of matches μ (s) of the final list of matches μ (c) of all buyers and all sellers is put
For empty set.
(2) if there is the candidate matches list object A of sellerSIt is not empty set, jumps to (3)；Otherwise, end step 5.
(3) to all candidate matches list object ASIt is not the seller s of empty set, using greedy algorithm in its interference figure Gs
On obtain maximal independent set
(4) if all seller s for being obtained according to (3)All it is empty set, then end step 5；Otherwise, jump to
(5)。
(5) for all seller s maximal independent setIn buyer c, by s add c candidate matches list object Wc
In；By c from s candidate matches list object ASIt is middle to delete, and in s conflict graph GsIt is middle by represent c node and with its phase
Edge contract even.
(6) for all candidate matches list object WcIt is not empty buyer c,
If a) c belongs to conventional type buyer, in WcWith μ's (c) and concentrate choose c most preferences the demand no more than c on
The frequency spectrum of limit number is added in the list of matches μ (s) of these frequency spectrums as new μ (c), and by c, is jumped to (7)；Otherwise, such as
When fruit c belongs to expanding type buyer, interim counting variable count=0 is made, is jumped to b).
B) when count is less than spectrum number θ at one's command, and there is expanding type buyer c and meet μ (c) mould and be less than c
The candidate matches list object W of the demand upper limit and ccWhen being not empty set, buyer c matching frequency spectrum is considered successively, otherwise, is redirected
To (7).Consider buyer ciIf, μ (ci) mould be less than ciThe demand upper limit and ciCandidate matches list objectIt is not sky
Collection, fromWith μ (ci) and concentrate take ciOne frequency spectrum s of most preference is added to μ (ci) in, and by ciAdd frequency spectrum s
With in list μ (s), by s fromIt is middle to delete, and by interference figure GsIn represent ciNode and its edge contract that is connected, will count
Number variable count adds 1；Otherwise, if μ (ci) mould be equal to ciThe demand upper limit or ciCandidate matches list objectNo
During for empty set, i=i+1 is repeated b).
(7) W is emptiedc。
(8) jump to (2).
Maximum independent set is solved for calculatingGreedy algorithm be described as follows：
(1) for all seller s, buyer's set Q is found outs.In QsIn buyer meet condition：A) in candidate matches pair
As list ASIn；B) do not disturbed with any buyer c in list of matches μ (s).
(2)For interference figure GsIn include QsThe subgraph of buyer, forIn node n, weightnFor node n power
Weight, degreenFor node n degree, according to weightn/(degreen+ 1) descending is to node sequencing.
(3) the node n, i.e. weight for coming foremost are taken outn/(degreen+ 1) the maximum node of value, by it
It is added to maximum independent setIn, by its fromDelete, and by all coupled nodes and side fromIt is middle to delete.
(4) whenIn when no longer there is node, terminate the algorithm；Otherwise, jump to (2).
As shown in Fig. 2 the specific embodiment of embodiment is as follows：
Now enter matching algorithm, by all buyer's dummy node Aa,Ab,Ba,Bb,Ca,Cb, seller a, b are all added to,
C, d, e, f candidate matches list object AsIn.
In the first round of matching algorithm, for seller a, due to AaWeightn/(degreen+ 1) value is maximum, by Aa
It is added to seller a most authority independent setsIn, by AaAfter being deleted with coupled buyer's dummy node from interference figure,
No longer there is node in interference figure, so far, seller a most authority independent sets are { Aa}.Similarly, for seller b, due to Ca's
weightn/(degreen+ 1) it is maximum, by CaIt is added to seller b most authority independent setsIn, and delete node Ca,Aa,
Ab,Cb, node B is taken in remaining nodeaIt is added toIn, no longer there is node in interference figure, so far, seller b is most
Authority independent sets areSimilarly, the most authority independent sets of remaining seller are { Ca,Ba}.All sellers to
Buyer in oneself most authority independent sets proposes matching application, and by it from ASMiddle to delete, buyer puts the seller filed an application
In candidate matches list object WcIn, and delete the purchaser node filed an application in the interference figure of oneself.That is seller a to
AaFile an application, remaining seller is to Ca,BaFile an application.For Aa, the channel number filed an application is 1, AaThe demand upper limit be 2,
Because the seller's number filed an application is less than the demand upper limit, AaReceive seller a matching application.For Ba, the seller's number filed an application
For 5, BaThe demand upper limit be 1, because seller's number for filing an application is more than the demand upper limit, BaReceive the seller c of most preference Shen
Please.For Ca, the seller's number filed an application is 5, CaThe demand upper limit be 2, because seller's number for filing an application is more than in demand
Limit, CaReceive the seller c and seller f of most preference application.Empty the candidate matches list of all buyers.So far, the first round
With end.
In the second wheel matching algorithm, due to channel a temporarily and AaMatching, therefore asking seller a most authority only
During vertical collection, exclude and AaThe node of interference.So far, there is no node, channel a most authority independent sets are empty set.Similarly, try to achieve
Seller b most authority independent sets are { Cb,Bb}；Seller c most authority independent sets are empty set；Seller d, e, f most authority independent sets
For { Cb,Bb}.Now, Cb,BbCandidate matches list for sky, θ=2.For Bb, select most preference in its candidate matches list
Seller e, now count=1<θ；For Cb, the seller d of most preference in its candidate matches list is selected, now count=2<
θ.Empty the candidate matches list of all buyers.So far, the second wheel matching terminates.
In third round matching, seller b most authority independent sets are { Aa, the most authority independent sets of remaining seller are empty set.
Seller b is to AaPropose matching application.Now, seller a is temporarily and AaMatching, the seller's number filed an application and the seller temporarily matched
Number sum is 2, no more than AaThe demand upper limit, therefore AaReceive seller b application.
So far, matching algorithm terminates.Matching result is, AaMatch with seller a, b；BaMatch with seller c；BbWith selling
Family e matches；CaMatch with seller c, f；CbMatch with seller d.
Specific embodiment described herein is only to spirit explanation for example of the invention.Technology neck belonging to of the invention
The technical staff in domain can be made various modifications or supplement to described specific embodiment or be replaced using similar mode
Generation, but without departing from the spiritual of the present invention or surmount scope defined in appended claims.
Claims (3)
1. a kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of the guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm, it is characterised in that define P frequency spectrum
Buyer, Q frequency spectrum seller, frequency spectrum buyer is secondary user's, and frequency spectrum seller is naive user, and the method includes the steps of：
Step 1, Q interference figure is set up, the frequency spectrum of one frequency spectrum seller of each interference figure correspondence, that is, for frequency spectrum seller s, is set up
Interference figure Gs=(N, Es), wherein node set N is the set of P frequency spectrum buyer, line set EsTo set up mode as follows；For
Every a pair of frequency spectrums buyer j, j ', if j, j ' disturbed on frequency spectrum s, then add sideTo line set EsIn；Step 2, according to frequency
Bid of the buyer to the frequency spectrum of frequency spectrum seller is composed, the preference pass that buyer gathers buyer the preference relation of seller and seller is set up
It is that specific method is：Buyer is to the generation method of the preference relation of the seller, if bids of the buyer i to seller j and seller j '
Relation isSo preference relation is j ＞ ＞ij′；The preference relation that seller gathers buyer is by the bid of buyer and dry
Disturb figure decision；Assuming that having buyer set A and B for seller i, if the buyer in buyer's set A does not interfere with each other mutually, i.e.,There is the buyer interfered in seller's set B, i.e.,So preference relation is
A ＞ ＞iB；If the buyer in buyer's set A does not interfere with each other mutually with the buyer in set B, and in A buyer total overbid
Total bid of buyer in B, i.e.,So preference relation is A ＞ ＞iB, vice versa；
Step 3, spectrum number θ at one's command is calculated, is comprised the following steps that：
Step 3.1, for each demand lower limit be pcBuyer s, create pcIndividual dummy node；
Step 3.2, each newly-built dummy node inherit all interference relationships of origin node, that is, inherit origin node all
Side in original interference figure；
Step 3.3, the establishment conflict side between each two dummy node of same origin node；
Step 3.4, the interference figure to being obtained according to step step 3.1 to step 3.3, using Welch Powell methods, are calculated
Whole G minimum number of colours coloring, θ=M-coloring can be covered, wherein M is the number of all sellers；
Step 4, according to each buyer c demand lower limit pcWith demand upper limit qc(being determined by buyer's budget), generate two it is new
Virtual buyer：Conventional type caWith expanding type cb；caDemand lower limit be 0, the demand upper limit be pc；cbDemand lower limit be 0, in demand
It is limited to qc-pc；caAnd cbInherit bids and preference relation of the c to all sellers；To the frequency spectrum of all sellers, with all new
Virtual buyer is that node sets up new interference figure Gs, comprise the following steps that：
Step 4.1, caAnd cbAll c conflict relationship is inherited, that is, inherits sides of the c in original interference figure；
Step 4.2, in caAnd cbBetween set up a line；
Step 5, frequency spectrum is matched, and is comprised the following steps that；
Step 5.1, the candidate matches list object A by all seller sSIt is set to all buyer N；By all buyer c candidate matches
List object WcIt is set to empty set；The final list of matches μ (s) of the final list of matches μ (c) of all buyers and all sellers is put
For empty set；
Step 5.2, the candidate matches list object A if there is sellerSIt is not empty set, jumps to step 5.3；Otherwise, it is whole to calculate
Method terminates；
Step 5.3, to all candidate matches list object ASIt is not the seller s of empty set, using greedy algorithm in its interference figure Gs
On obtain maximal independent set
If step 5.4, all seller s' obtained according to step 5.23All it is empty set, then end step 5；Otherwise, jump
Go to step 5.5；
Step 5.5, the maximal independent set for all seller sIn buyer c, by s add c candidate matches list object
WcIn；By c from s candidate matches list object ASIt is middle to delete, and in s conflict graph GsIt is middle by represent c node and and its
Connected edge contract；
Step 5.6, for all candidate matches list object WcIt is not empty buyer c, is handled as follows：
If step 5.61, c belong to conventional type buyer, in WcWith μ's (c) and concentrate choose c most preferences the demand no more than c
The frequency spectrum of upper limit number is added in the list of matches μ (s) of these frequency spectrums as new μ (c), and by c, jumps to step 5.7；It is no
Then, if c belongs to expanding type buyer, interim counting variable count=0 is made, step 5.62 is jumped to；
Step 5.62, it is less than spectrum number θ at one's command as count, and there is expanding type buyer c and meet μ (c) mould and be less than
The c demand upper limit and c candidate matches list object WcWhen being not empty set, buyer c matching frequency spectrum is considered successively, otherwise,
Jump to step 5.7；Consider buyer ciIf, μ (ci) mould be less than ciThe demand upper limit and ciCandidate matches list object
It is not empty set, fromWith μ (ci) and concentrate take ciOne frequency spectrum s of most preference is added to μ (ci) in, and by ciAdd frequency
Compose s list of matches μ (s) in, by s fromIt is middle to delete, and by interference figure GsIn represent ciNode and its side that is connected delete
Remove, counting variable count is added 1；Otherwise, if μ (ci) mould be equal to ciThe demand upper limit or ciCandidate matches object column
TableWhen being not empty set, i=i+1, repeat step 5.62；
Step 5.7, empty Wc；
Step 5.8 jumps to step 5.2.
2. a kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm according to claims 1,
It is characterized in that：
In step 3, Welch Powell algorithms include：
Step 2.1, the order that the node in interference figure G successively decreases by the number of degrees arranged (arrangement of the node of the identical number of degrees with
Meaning)；
Step 2.2, with the first color to first node-coloring, and by ordering pair and front nodal it is non-conterminous each
Light same color；
Step 2.3, with second of color to still uncoloured repeat step 2.2, until all points all upper color be
Only；
Step 2.4, required number of colours are coloring；Spectrum number at one's command is θ=M-coloring.
3. a kind of frequency spectrum distributing method of guarantee demand lower limit based on stable matching algorithm according to claims 1,
It is characterized in that：In steps of 5, maximum independent set is solved for calculatingGreedy algorithm include：
Step 5.1, for all seller s, find out buyer's set Qs；In QsIn buyer meet constraints：
Constraints 1, in candidate matches list object ASIn；
Constraints 2, not with list of matches μ (s) any buyer c disturb；
Step 5.2,For interference figure GsIn include QsThe subgraph of buyer, forIn node n, weightnFor node n power
Weight, degreenFor node n degree, according to weightn/(degreen+ 1) descending is to node sequencing；
Step 5.3, taking-up come a node n, i.e. weight for foremostn/(degreen+ 1) the maximum node of value, by it
It is added to maximum independent setIn, by its fromDelete, and by all coupled nodes and side fromIt is middle to delete；
Step 5.4, whenIn when no longer there is node, terminate the algorithm；Otherwise, step 5.2 is jumped to.
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