CN107294782B - Complex network path attack method based on multi-hop - Google Patents
Complex network path attack method based on multi-hop Download PDFInfo
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- CN107294782B CN107294782B CN201710522188.XA CN201710522188A CN107294782B CN 107294782 B CN107294782 B CN 107294782B CN 201710522188 A CN201710522188 A CN 201710522188A CN 107294782 B CN107294782 B CN 107294782B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/14—Network analysis or design
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/20—Hop count for routing purposes, e.g. TTL
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
Abstract
The invention proposes a kind of complex network path attack method based on multi-hop, for solving the technical problem that maximal connected subgraphs size variation is slow, attack effect is poor present in existing route degree centrality attack method, step is realized are as follows: define path center formula CPl, specify the path length to attacking network；Hop count l when specified attack；Obtain the set of paths that all length in network is specified path length；Calculate the path center that hop count is specified in each path in set of paths；It specifies the maximum path of path center of hop count to attack in path each in set of paths, obtains rest network；Calculate rest network maximal connected subgraphs size；Maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under specified hop count with the variation of number of times of attack；Maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under different hop counts with the variation of number of times of attack.The present invention can make network maximal connected subgraphs size acute variation under identical number of times of attack, and bigger destruction is caused to network, and attack effect is good.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to complex network technical fields, are related to a kind of complex network path attack method, and in particular to a kind of
Complex network path attack method based on multi-hop, can be used for efficiently attacking complex network, examines complex network
Robustness.
Background technique
Real-life many systems can be described as complex network, and the network system of various complexity penetrates into
The every aspect of life.Complex network describes the relationship between things, such as internet, electric power networks, transportation network.By these
Individual in system indicates that the relationship between individual is indicated with side, to be abstracted as complex network with point.
The final goal of complex network research is that the high system of robustness is designed for daily life.But these systems pass through
It often can be by some attacks for unintentionally destroying even malice, such as power failure, the city of network attack, electric power networks in internet
The traffic jam in city.In complex network, these destroy and attack the certain nodes that can be considered as by network or side from network
In the attack left out.Understand the attack method in complex network, people can be allowed to design these systems using better method
Obtain more firm and safety.
Currently, researchers have furtherd investigate the attack method in complex network.Wherein, center sexual assault is spent
Method is widely paid close attention to only needing the local topology information of network when its attack.There is generation in degree centrality attack method
Table is node degree centrality attack method and the path degree centrality attack method that is made of node and side.
The method that node center is measured in node degree centrality attack method is the degree for calculating the node, attack process
Are as follows: calculate the degree of all nodes in network；Attack maximum node is spent: deletion of node and its all even sides are remained
Co-net network；Calculate the maximal connected subgraphs size of rest network；It repeats the above process until node is not present in network, obtains most
Big connected subgraph size with number of times of attack variation.In node degree centrality attack method, the degree of node the big then can be preferential
It is attacked, i.e. the neighbor node of node is more, then it is assumed that the node is more important, and when attack will preferentially be selected.
By the description of node degree centrality attack method it is found that hub node and its surroundings nodes in network, due to its neighbour
It is more to occupy node, degree is big, and when attack will be preferred, that is, attacking can always carry out around hub node and its surroundings nodes.
When this kind of node is attacked, the influence to network connectivty is little, maximal connected subgraphs size variation very little, attack effect
Difference.
The method that path center is measured in the degree centrality attack method of path is the degree for calculating the path, that is, calculates the road
The neighbor node number of diameter.Its attack process are as follows: the specified path length to attacking network；Obtaining all length in network is to refer to
Determine the set of paths of path length；Calculate each path degree centrality in set of paths；To path degree centrality each in set of paths
Maximum path is attacked: being deleted the side in path, is obtained rest network；The maximal connected subgraphs for calculating rest network are big
It is small；It repeats the above process until the set of paths that length is specified path length is not present in network, obtains maximal connected subgraphs
Size with number of times of attack variation.In the degree centrality attack method of path, the degree in path the big, can preferentially be attacked, i.e. road
The neighbor node of diameter is more, then it is assumed that the path is more important, and when attack will preferentially be selected.
By the description of path degree centrality attack method it is found that those in network contain the path of hub node due to it
Neighbor node is more, and degree is big, attack when can be preferred, that is, attack always can around itself have the path of hub node into
Row.When this class.path is attacked, residue of network organization part still keeps good connectivity, and maximal connected subgraphs size variation is not
Obviously, attack effect is poor.
Summary of the invention
It is an object of the invention to overcome the problems of the above-mentioned prior art, a kind of complex web based on multi-hop is proposed
Network path attack method, it is slow for solving maximal connected subgraphs size variation present in existing route degree centrality attack method
Slowly, the technical problem of attack effect difference.
To achieve the above object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention includes the following steps:
(1) path center formula CP is definedl, while the specified path length to attacking network；
(2) hop count l when attack is specified；
(3) set of paths that all length in network is specified path length is obtained:
(3a) judges that each node whether there is away from it as the node of specified path length in network, if so, executing step
(3b) is otherwise executed step (7)；
The node pair that (3b) saves each node and constitute away from it for the node of specified path length, and record each node
Node between, each node to the node to intermediate node and each of which node to the node to intermediate section
The company side of point constitutes set of paths；
(4) path center that hop count is specified in each path in set of paths is calculated:
(4a) judges that each path in set of paths whether there is away from it for the node for specifying hop count, if so, executing step
Suddenly (4b) is otherwise executed step (7)；
(4b) utilizes path center formula CPl, calculate the path center that each path specifies hop count；
(5) it specifies the maximum path of path center of hop count to attack in path each in set of paths: deleting path
Side in the maximum path of centrality, obtains rest network；
(6) the maximal connected subgraphs size of rest network is calculated；
(7) maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under specified hop count with the variation of number of times of attack: rest network is repeated
Step (3)~(6), until the node or the road set of paths Zhong Meitiao away from it for specified path length is not present in each node
Until diameter is all not present away from the node that it is specified hop count, maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under specified hop count with number of times of attack
Variation；
(8) maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under different hop counts with the variation of number of times of attack: being enabled l=l+1, is repeated step
Suddenly (2)~(7), it is that the node of specified hop count is that each path when attacking first time in set of paths, which is all not present away from it,
Only, maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under different hop counts with the variation of number of times of attack.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
The present invention calculates path center using the method for multi-hop, so that will preferentially attack direct or indirect connection when attack
Itself path phase comprising hub node is preferentially attacked in the path of multiple hub node sections, with path degree centrality attack method
Than, under identical number of times of attack, network maximal connected subgraphs size variation can be made more violent, bigger destruction is caused to network,
Effectively improve the effect of attack.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is implementation process block diagram of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is that the present invention is tested most in Polbooks network with existing route degree centrality attack method
Big connected subgraph size with number of times of attack situation of change effect contrast figure.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments, present invention is further described in detail.
Complex network in the present embodiment is by taking Polbooks network as an example.
Referring to Fig.1, the complex network path attack method based on multi-hop, includes the following steps:
Step 1 defines path center formula CPl, while the specified path length to attacking network:
Define path center formula CPl, expression formula are as follows:
Wherein, l is hop count, kjIndicate the degree of node j,Indicate the whole nodes for being l with path P distance.
In addition, since attack method of the invention is attack for particular path length, it is therefore desirable to it is specified to
The path length of attack.The length should not be arranged too much, and the path that this will lead to the length in network is seldom, and attack process is very
It will terminate fastly, be unfavorable for examining attack effect.The path length of Polbooks network to be attacked is set in the present embodiment
4。
Hop count l when step 2, specified attack:
Hop count l, l=1 when initial when specified attack.
Step 3 obtains the set of paths that all length in network is specified path length:
Step 3a), judge in network that each node whether there is away from it as the node of specified path length, if so, execution
Step 3b), otherwise, execute step 7:
Judge that each node in current Polbooks network whether there is away from it apart from the node for 4, if so, executing step
Rapid 3b), continue the attack under the specified hop count；Otherwise, show that the path that length is 4 is not present in current Polbooks network,
Attack under the specified hop count terminates, and executes step 7, obtains this in Polbooks network and specifies maximal connected subgraphs under hop count big
The small variation with number of times of attack.
Step 3b), the node pair that saves each node and constituted away from it for the node of specified path length, and record each
Node between node pair, each node to the node to intermediate node and each of which node to the node to centre
Node company side constitute set of paths:
For there is the node for being 4 away from certain nodal distance in step 3a), the node for saving the node and being 4 away from its distance
The node pair of composition, and record the node between each node pair, each node to the node to intermediate node and its every
A node constitutes set of paths to company side of the node to intermediate node, finally obtains in current Polbooks network and owns
The set of paths that length is 4.
Step 4 calculates the path center that hop count is specified in each path in set of paths:
Step 4a), judge that each path in set of paths whether there is away from it for the node of specified hop count, if so, holding
Row step 4b), otherwise, execute step 7:
Judging that each path in all length is 4 in current Polbooks network set of paths whether there is away from it is
The node of specified hop count, if so, executing step 4b), continue the attack under the specified hop count；Otherwise, show current Polbooks
It is the node for specifying hop count that all paths, which are all not present away from it, in the set of paths that all length is 4 in network, then the specified jump
Attack under several terminates, and executes step 7, obtains under the specified hop count in Polbooks network maximal connected subgraphs size with attack
The variation of number.
Step 4b), utilize path center formula CPl, calculate the path center that each path specifies hop count:
For there is the path away from the node that distance in set of paths is specified hop count in step 4a), path center is utilized
Property formula CPlThe centrality for calculating its specified hop count, obtaining existing in current Plobooks network away from path is specified hop count
The path center in the path of node.
Step 5 specifies the maximum path of path center of hop count to attack in path each in set of paths: deleting road
Side in the maximum path of diameter centrality, obtains rest network:
The current maximum path of Plobooks network path centrality is selected to be attacked, when attack will be on the path
Edge contract, node retain, the remaining Polbooks network after being attacked.
Step 6, the maximal connected subgraphs size for calculating rest network:
Every time after attack, needs to calculate the maximal connected subgraphs size of remaining Polbooks network, saved, so as to step
The Polbooks network maximal connected subgraphs size under specified hop count is obtained in rapid 7 with the variation of number of times of attack, finally in step 8
In obtain the Polbooks network maximal connected subgraphs size under different hop counts with the variation of number of times of attack.The present invention uses range
First search algorithm calculates the largest connected size of network, specifically: the size of connected subgraph where calculating it to each node, so
The maximal connected subgraphs size of selection maximum value whole network the most afterwards.
Step 7 obtains under specified hop count maximal connected subgraphs size with the variation of number of times of attack: repeating to hold to rest network
Row step 3~6, until each node is not present away from each path in its node or set of paths for specified path length
All there is no until away from the node that it be specified hop count, obtain specifying under hop count maximal connected subgraphs size with the change of number of times of attack
Change:
The experimentation under specified hop count is repeated, when the node for being 4 away from its distance is not present in node each in step 3a)
Or step 4a) each path in set of paths is when being all not present away from the node that it is specified hop count, attacking under the specified hop count
Hit stopping.Obtain under specified hop count that maximal connected subgraphs size is continued to execute with the variation of number of times of attack in Polbooks network
Step 8.
Step 8 obtains under different hop counts maximal connected subgraphs size with the variation of number of times of attack: enabling l=l+1, repetition is held
Row step 2~7, it is that the node of specified hop count is that each path when attacking first time in set of paths, which is all not present away from it,
Only, maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under different hop counts with the variation of number of times of attack:
Change specified hop count, enable l=l+1, repeat the experimentation under specified hop count, the step 4a when attacking first time)
Stopping when away from the node that it is specified hop count is all not present in each path in set of paths, because when l increases again, in network not
Have path and exist be away from it specified hop count node, obtain in Polbooks network maximal connected subgraphs size under difference hop counts
With the variation of number of times of attack.
Below in conjunction with emulation experiment, elaborate to technical effect of the invention.
1, simulated conditions and content
The present invention in Ubuntu operating system using C++ program, in Polbooks network simulate the present invention with it is existing
The attack process of path degree centrality attack method, both obtains maximal connected subgraphs size with number of times of attack situation of change,
As a result as shown in Figure 2.Abscissa t indicates number of times of attack in figure, and ordinate S indicates maximal connected subgraphs size.When experiment, wait attack
The path length for hitting network is set as 4, and the value of hop count l is 1~4 in the present invention.
2, analysis of simulation result
Referring to Fig. 2, star-like line is maximal connected subgraphs size in path degree center thrust method with number of times of attack in figure
Variation；Figure intermediate cam shape line respectively indicate in text invention when hop count l value is 1,2,3,4 maximal connected subgraphs size with
The variation of number of times of attack.From Fig. 2 it is observed that maximal connected subgraphs size is all with the increasing of number of times of attack in two kinds of attack methods
Add and reduces.But the invention enables network maximal connected subgraphs size variations to become apparent from, this shows that the present invention is better than based on road
The degree centrality attack method of diameter, can cause bigger destruction to network.
Embodiment described above only illustrates advantage of the present invention compared to tradition based on path degree center thrust method, and
Limitations on the scope of the patent of the present invention therefore cannot be interpreted as.It should be pointed out that for those of ordinary skill in the art
For, without departing from the inventive concept of the premise, various modifications and improvements can be made, these belong to guarantor of the invention
Protect range.Therefore, the scope of protection of the patent of the invention shall be subject to the appended claims.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of complex network path attack method based on multi-hop, which comprises the steps of:
(1) path center formula CP is definedl, while the specified path length to attacking network；
(2) value range for specifying hop count l, l when attack is 1~4；
(3) set of paths that all length in network is specified path length is obtained:
(3a) judges that each node whether there is away from it as the node of specified path length in network, if so, step (3b) is executed,
Otherwise, step (7) are executed；
The node pair that (3b) saves each node and constitute away from it for the node of specified path length, and each node is recorded to it
Between node, each node to the node to intermediate node and each of which node to the node to intermediate node
Even side constitutes set of paths；
(4) path center that hop count is specified in each path in set of paths is calculated:
(4a) judges that each path whether there is away from the arbitrary node in each path as the section of specified hop count l in set of paths
Point otherwise, executes step (7) if so, executing step (4b)；(4b) utilizes path center formula CPl, calculate each path
The path center of specified hop count；
(5) it specifies the maximum path of path center of hop count to attack in path each in set of paths: deleting path center
Side in the maximum path of property, obtains rest network；
(6) the maximal connected subgraphs size of rest network is calculated；
(7) maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under specified hop count with the variation of number of times of attack: step is repeated to rest network
(3)~(6), until each node is not present away from each path in its node or set of paths for specified path length
Until away from the node that it is specified hop count, maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under specified hop count with the change of number of times of attack
Change；
(8) maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under different hop counts with the variation of number of times of attack: being enabled l=l+1, is repeated step
(2)~(7), it is that the node of specified hop count is that each path when attacking first time in set of paths, which is all not present away from it,
Only, maximal connected subgraphs size is obtained under different hop counts with the variation of number of times of attack.
2. the complex network path attack method according to claim 1 based on multi-hop, which is characterized in that in step (1)
The path center formula, expression formula are as follows:
Wherein, l is hop count, kjIndicate the degree of node j,Indicate the whole nodes for being l with path P distance.
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