CN107204841A - A kind of method that many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized - Google Patents
A kind of method that many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
- H04L9/003—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA]
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Abstract
The present invention relates to the method that a kind of many S boxes of block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized, multiple parallel S boxes are changed first, obtain the displacement of 4 × 4S boxes, and the displacement of 4 × 4S boxes is numbered, then many S boxes randomization input technologies of block cipher are carried out to all 4 × 4S boxes displacements, so that the attacker of differential power attack can not Align Curves after acquisition power consumption profile according to related statistics difference method, therefore differential power attack is caused to fail, improve the security of block cipher realization, and this programme is only with the random number of the individual bits of g (n), reduced compared to other mask schemes a lot；Attack difficulty of the differential power attack in data processing greatly improved；In terms of speed, because original parallel S boxes are changed into the serial reusable S box frameworks of multidimensional by this programme, therefore can use pipelining technique so that speed is compared to original scheme reduction 30%.
Description
Technical field
Side-channel attack and defence theory and technology field in information safety system of the present invention, and in particular to one kind resists difference
The method that many S boxes of block cipher of power consumption attack are realized.
Background technology
Differential power attack is to be directed to crypto chip by US Experts Paul Kocher one kind put forward first in 1999
Physical attacks, the program collects chip power consumption for producing when running block cipher first, then using power consumption with closing
The correlation of key data, the method using statistics difference recovers key.Because it realizes the small advantage of efficiency high cost price, to letter
The security of breath security system, which is brought, greatly to be threatened and challenges, and its correlation theory has developed recent two decades, is still so far
The focus of expert's door research.
Along with the maturation that differential power attack is theoretical, many defense schemes are also arisen at the historic moment.Wherein there are two kinds to compare stream
OK, the first is random mask technology, and the technology is that appropriate random number is inserted in cryptographic algorithm, is not changing encryption and decryption knot
While fruit, random xor operation is carried out to the target critical data in differential power attack, so that critical data correspondence
Power consumption change, reach protection key purpose；Second is to introduce noise technique, and the technology is in cipher circuit
In artificial add noise so that attacker is reduced using the efficiency of differential power attack, or even can not recover key, reaches protection
The purpose of key.
But both the above technology have one it is common the drawbacks of, that is, significantly increase the resource of hardware consumption or reduce fortune
Speed is calculated, this also serious development that govern safety chip.Because S boxes are unique non-linear components in block cipher, its
The 50%-70% that aggregate resource is accounted for the resource of post consumption is realized, meanwhile, because its non-linear property is also to cause in power consumption attack
The reason for sensitive information being leaked, therefore how to realize that it is that the differential power consumption of research defence in recent years is attacked to be effectively protected to S boxes
The emphasis hit.
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to provide the method that a kind of many S boxes of block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized, so as to
The realization of S boxes is improved to be effectively protected.
Therefore, the invention provides the method that a kind of many S boxes of block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized, its feature
It is, comprises the following steps：
Step one：A kind of block cipher is selected, multiple parallel S boxes are changed, n 4 × 4 S boxes is obtained and puts
Change, and the displacement of 4 × 4 S boxes is carried out to number from 0 to n-1；
Specifically operating procedure is：
A, the S boxes of n independent parallel are converted into by the serial reusable S box frameworks S ' of a multidimensional by compression algorithm,
B, in S ' 4 × 4 S boxes displacement be numbered, i.e.,
Wherein, mn-1Represent the input of (n-1)th 4 bit S boxes displacement, Sn-1(mn-1) represent (n-1)th 4 bit S box and put
The output changed, S ' represents the serial reusable S box frameworks of multidimensional.
Step 2：S box computings are carried out, a random number are produced, and select corresponding 4 × 4 S boxes displacement of random number；
Specifically operating procedure is：
1) circuit is carried out before S box computings, produces a random number R1, i.e.,
R1=(r1,r2,…rg(n)) (2)
Wherein, 0≤R1≤ n-1, g (n) represent 2 system bits corresponding to the number n of the S boxes of actual participation computing 4 × 4
Digit；
2) R is passed through1Value select corresponding entrance S ' 4 × 4 S boxes displacement, i.e., this is replaced intoWhereinRepresent 4
The result of × 4 S boxes displacement.
Step 3：Next random number is produced by random number more new algorithm, and selects 4 × 4S boxes corresponding with the random number
Displacement；
I.e.：By random number R1Xor operation is carried out with the output that selected first 4 × 4 S boxes for entering S ' are replaced, is obtained
The result arrived the random number R that alternatively next 4 × 4 S boxes are replaced2, i.e.,
Step 4：Repeat step three, if finding, 4 × 4 S boxes corresponding to newly-generated random number replace chosen mistake,
So by newly-generated random number, xor operation is carried out by turn, obtains 1 bit number；
Specifically operating procedure is：
A) repeat step three, if finding newly-generated random number Ri4 × 4 corresponding S boxes replace chosen mistake, that
Step b) is performed, until now newly-generated random number RiUntill 4 × 4 corresponding S boxes replace not selected mistake；
B) by RiXor operation is carried out by turn, obtains Ri *, i.e.,
Step 5：Selective discrimination function, reselects next 4 × 4 S boxes displacement, if being still the 4 of chosen mistake
× 4 S boxes are replaced, then continue executing with step 5, non-selected mistake and rebound step before 4 × 4 S boxes displacement found is
Three；
Concrete operations are：Select a distinguishing funotion f (Ri *)
If RiThe result R of xor operation is carried out by turni *During for " 0 ", then selection displacement Ri *During for " 1 "
Then selection displacementIf being still 4 × 4 S boxes displacement of chosen mistake after selection, this step is continued executing with,
The displacement of non-selected mistake before 4 × 4 S boxes displacement found is.
Step 6：Repeat step three is to step 5, until the displacement of all 4 × 4 S boxes all selects the beam that finishes.
Beneficial effects of the present invention：The many S boxes of this block cipher for resisting differential power attack that the present invention is provided are realized
Method, take resource and prior art provide resist differential power attack method it is essentially identical, consume resource and merely add
The 3% of total resources, but only with the random number of an individual bit of g (n), reduced a lot, greatly compared to other mask schemes
Width improves attack difficulty of the differential power attack in data processing；Due to distinguishing funotion f (Ri *) randomness so that attack
The power consumption profile length that person obtains S box critical datas every time is different, thus greatly improved DPA in the later stage to power consumption data pair
Difficulty when neat.
The present invention is described in further details below with reference to accompanying drawing.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of the method calculating process for many S boxes realizations of block cipher for resisting differential power attack.
The serial reusable S box frameworks S ' schematic diagrames of Fig. 2 multidimensional.
Register corresponding to Fig. 3 Sbox.
Fig. 4 Reg internal structures.
Fig. 5 trigger internal structures.
Embodiment
Reach technological means and effect that predetermined purpose is taken for the present invention is expanded on further, below in conjunction with accompanying drawing and reality
Embodiment, architectural feature and its effect of example to the present invention are applied, is described in detail as follows.
Embodiment 1
It is effectively protected, is attacked the invention provides a kind of differential power consumption of resisting as shown in Figure 1 in order to improve the realization of S boxes
The method that many S boxes of block cipher hit are realized, using pipelining, is added in the middle of the serial reusable S box frameworks of multidimensional
Three-level register so that the speed of crypto-operation is too many compared to what original scheme will not decline, improves efficiency.
Utilize many S boxes randomization input technologies of block cipher so that the attacker of differential power attack can not obtain work(
Aligned Curves after consumption curve according to related statistics difference method, therefore cause differential power attack to fail, improve packet
The security that password is realized.
Specific scheme comprises the following steps：
Step one：A kind of block cipher is selected, multiple parallel S boxes are changed, the displacement of 4 × 4 S boxes is obtained, and
The displacement of 4 × 4 S boxes is numbered from 0 to n-1 (change herein, according to Nikova theory, when input number of bits n >=
When 4, such displacement just has security, and we note that in cryptography scheme till now, minimum S boxes are also all 4 × 4
Scale, therefore, this programme assumes that minimum in the S box frameworks produced to be replaced into 4 × 4 be logical)；
Specifically operating procedure is：
A, the S boxes of n independent parallel are converted into by the serial reusable S box frameworks S ' of a multidimensional by compression algorithm,
B, in S ' 4 × 4 S boxes displacement be numbered, i.e.,
Wherein, mn-1Represent the input of (n-1)th 4 bit S boxes displacement, Sn-1(mn-1) represent (n-1)th 4 bit S box and put
The output changed, S ' represents the serial reusable S box frameworks of multidimensional.
Step 2：Circuit carries out S box computings, produces a random number, and the span of random number is replaced in 4 × 4 S boxes
In the range of being numbered, and select 4 × 4 S boxes displacement corresponding with random number；
Specifically operating procedure is：
1) circuit is carried out before S box computings, produces a random number R1, i.e.,
R1=(r1,r2,…rg(n)) (2)
Wherein, 0≤R1≤ n-1, g (n) represent 2 system bits corresponding to the number n of the S boxes of actual participation computing 4 × 4
Digit；
2) R is passed through1Value select corresponding entrance S ' 4 × 4 S boxes displacement, i.e., this is replaced intoWhereinRepresent 4
The result of × 4 S boxes displacement.
Step 3：Next random number is produced by random number more new algorithm, and selects 4 × 4S boxes corresponding with the random number
Displacement；
I.e.：By random number R1Xor operation is carried out with the output that selected first 4 × 4 S boxes for entering S ' are replaced, is obtained
The result arrived the random number R that alternatively next 4 × 4 S boxes are replaced2, i.e.,
Step 4：Repeat step three, if finding, 4 × 4 S boxes corresponding to newly-generated random number replace chosen mistake,
So by newly-generated random number, xor operation is carried out by turn, obtains 1 bit number；
Specifically operating procedure is：
A) repeat step three, if finding newly-generated random number Ri4 × 4 corresponding S boxes replace chosen mistake, that
Step b) is performed, until now newly-generated random number RiUntill 4 × 4 corresponding S boxes replace not selected mistake；
B) by RiXor operation is carried out by turn, obtains Ri *, i.e.,
Step 5：Selective discrimination function, reselects next 4 × 4 S boxes displacement, if being still the 4 of chosen mistake
× 4 S boxes are replaced, then continue executing with step 5, non-selected mistake and rebound step before 4 × 4 S boxes displacement found is
Three；
Concrete operations are：Select a distinguishing funotion f (Ri *)
If RiThe result R of xor operation is carried out by turni *During for " 0 ", then selection displacement Ri *During for " 1 "
Then selection displacementIf being still 4 × 4 S boxes displacement of chosen mistake after selection, this step is continued executing with,
The displacement of non-selected mistake before 4 × 4 S boxes displacement found is.
Step 6：Repeat step three is to step 5, until the displacement of all 4 × 4 S boxes all selects the beam that finishes.
The method that many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized has the following advantages that：
(1) this programme is reduced much only with the random number of the individual bits of g (n) compared to other mask schemes,
(2) due to distinguishing funotion f (Ri *) randomness so that attacker obtains the power consumption profile of S box critical datas every time
Length is different, therefore the DPA difficulty when being alignd to power consumption data in the later stage greatly improved.
(3) in terms of resource, this programme is either also based on gate based on look-up tables'implementation and realized, with original realization side
Case can't increase much compared to consumption resource.
(4) in terms of speed, because original parallel S boxes are changed into serial S boxes by this programme, therefore it can use
PIPELINE methods so that speed can't be reduced too much compared to original scheme.
Embodiment 2
By taking block cipher DES as an example, the present invention is described in further details.
Although it is understood that the DES algorithms of 56bit keys are proved to be unsafe in many applications.But we know
Road Triple-DES still has a wide range of applications in e-payment field, because it possesses 112bits key, by
It is proved to be safe.
DES algorithms are the DSE arithmetic in cipher system, and be otherwise known as Data Encryption Standard, is U.S. in 1972
The DSE arithmetic AES that IBM Corporation of state develops.It is grouped in plain text by 64, key length 64, key is in fact
Be 56 participate in DES computings (the 8th, 16,24,32,40,48,56,64 be check bit so that each key has odd number
1) encryption method for the method formation ciphertext group that plaintext group and the key step-by-step of 56 after being grouped are substituted or exchanged.
According to the content of DES algorithms, its S box is made up of parallel the S boxes of 86 × 4, and its 6 bit is defeated in each S boxes
The 1st entered and the 6th is for determining that its 2nd to the 5th 4 bits constituted input enters in 44 × 4 displacements
Which.Therefore, actually 86 × 4 S boxes are made up of 32 4 × 4 S boxes.We are calculated DES flow in scheme
Method S boxes are realized, are comprised the following steps that：
1st, the S boxes of 86 × 4 in DES algorithms are converted into 32 4 × 4 S boxes, passed through using Bilgin multiplexing thought
The S boxes of n independent parallel are converted into the serial reusable S box frameworks S ' of a multidimensional, the logic chart after conversion by compression algorithm
As shown in Fig. 2 wherein GK, GL, F, Aij, Bij, CijFor known displacement, bibliography [1] is specifically replaced.
2nd, because 4 × 4 S boxes of actual participation DES algorithm S box computings have 8, therefore n=8, then g (n)=3.In order to
Follow-up algorithm requirement is met, we carry out an amendment to g (n).
Make g (n) '=g (n)+1=4, therefore the random number R of generation1=(r1,r2,…rg(n)′)=(r1,r2,r3,r4), 0
≤R1≤15。
3rd, R is set1'=(r2,r3,r4), pass through R1' value select first enter S ' 4 × 4 S boxes replace, i.e. the displacement
For
4th, by random number R1Xor operation is carried out with the output that selected first 4 × 4 S boxes for entering S ' are replaced, is obtained
Result alternatively next 4 × 4 S boxes displacement random number.
5th, repeat step 3,4, if finding newly-generated random number RiCorresponding 4 × 4 S boxes displacement was selected, that
Perform step 6.
6th, by RiXor operation is carried out by turn, obtains Ri *.I.e.
7th, a distinguishing funotion f (R is selectedi *)
If RiThe result R of xor operation is carried out by turni *During for " 0 ", then selection displacementFor " 1 " Shi Zexuan
Select displacementIf being still 4 × 4 S boxes displacement of chosen mistake after selection, this step is continued executing with, until
4 × 4 S boxes found replace the displacement of non-selected mistake and rebound step 3 before being.
8th, above step is repeated, until 84 × 4 S boxes displacements have all been selected and enter the serial reusable of multidimensional
S box frameworks terminate.
Finally the security to the present invention program is illustrated.
This programme safety analysis
The theory of power consumption analysis
DPA power consumption attack targets are directed to the output of the register in cipher circuit corresponding to S boxes, with 4 ×
Exemplified by 4Sbox, if figure is specific circuit diagram, Fig. 3 power region are that attacker wants to collect the region of power consumption.
The region is made up of 4 1bit register, and one bit of each of which reg correspondences Sbox's is defeated
Go out, reg internal structures such as Fig. 4.
One of reg is made up of a small amount of control device and a d type flip flop, as shown in figure 5, d type flip flop again by
6 NAND gates are constituted.
Therefore, when input D produces saltus step, then the CMOS having inside about 8 and door, 1 OR gate and a NOT gate is brilliant
Body pipe produces instantaneous dynamic power consumption, and attacker can be attacked the equipment according to these power consumptions of collection using DPA.
This programme employs the technology of the S boxes of stochastic inputs 4 × 4 so that, must in the serial reusable S box frameworks of multidimensional
Be possible to recover correct key when must guess key simultaneously with random number.It guesses key and the corresponding crucial number of random number
According to as shown in table 1 with the possibility of power consumption number.
| Guess key | Guess random number | Critical data | Power consumption number | |
| Possibility 1 | Correctly | Correctly | It can determine that | It can determine that |
| Possibility 2 | Correctly | Mistake | At random | At random |
| Possibility 3 | Mistake | Correctly | At random | At random |
| Possibility 4 | Mistake | Mistake | At random | At random |
Table 1
Next the probability that attacker recovers key is calculated.The probability of a group key of hitting it is：1/16,4 × 4S boxes of hitting it
Probability be：1/8, it is located in differential power attack, attacker is from n groups plaintext.
The possibility for analyzing key corresponding to i-th group of 4 × 4 S box is no more than (1/2)3(n+4)。
Because generally n value is about between 1000~2000, it can thus be seen that only in differential power attack
There is attacker while when guesing out key and random number, being possible to confirm correct key.But in later data processing, due to
The present invention has used distinguishing funotion f (Ri *), so attacker wants to align, all aim curves are also extremely difficult.
Above content is to combine specific preferred embodiment further description made for the present invention, it is impossible to assert
The specific implementation of the present invention is confined to these explanations.For general technical staff of the technical field of the invention,
On the premise of not departing from present inventive concept, some simple deduction or replace can also be made, should all be considered as belonging to the present invention's
Protection domain.
[1]Bilgin B,Knezevic M,Nikov V,et al.Compact Implementations of
Multi-Sbox Designs[C]//International Conference on Smart Card Research and
Advanced Applications. Springer International Publishing,2015:273-285。
Claims (6)
1. a kind of method that many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps：
Step one：A kind of block cipher is selected, multiple parallel S boxes are changed, n 4 × 4S boxes displacements are obtained, and it is right
The displacement of 4 × 4S boxes carries out 0 to n-1 and numbered；
Step 2：S box computings are carried out, a random number are produced, and select the corresponding 4 × 4S boxes displacement of random number；
Step 3：Next random number is produced by random number more new algorithm, and selects 4 × 4S boxes corresponding with the random number to put
Change；
Step 4：Repeat step three, if finding, 4 × 4S boxes corresponding to newly-generated random number replace chosen mistake, then
By newly-generated random number, xor operation is carried out by turn, obtains 1 bit number；
Step 5：Selective discrimination function, reselects next 4 × 4S boxes displacement, if being still 4 × 4S boxes of chosen mistake
Displacement, then continue executing with step 5, non-selected mistake and rebound step 3 before the 4 × 4S boxes displacement found is；
Step 6：Repeat step three is to step 5, until the displacement of all 4 × 4S boxes all selects the beam that finishes.
2. a kind of method that many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack are realized, it is characterised in that the step one is specific
Operating procedure is：
A, the S boxes of n independent parallel are converted into by the serial reusable S box frameworks S ' of a multidimensional by compression algorithm,
B, in S ' 4 × 4S boxes displacement be numbered, i.e.,
Wherein, mn-1Represent the input of (n-1)th 4 bit S boxes displacement, Sn-1(mn-1) represent what (n-1)th 4 bit S box was replaced
Output, S ' represents the serial reusable S box frameworks of multidimensional.
3. the method that a kind of new many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack according to claim 1 are realized, its
It is characterised by, the step 2 comprises the following steps：
1) carry out before S box computings, produce a random number R1, i.e.,
R1=(r1,r2,…rg(n)) (2)
Wherein, 0≤R1≤ n-1, g (n) represent 2 system number of bits corresponding to the number n of actual participation computing 4 × 4S boxes；
2) R is passed through1Value select corresponding entrance S ' 4 × 4S boxes displacement, i.e., this is replaced intoWhereinRepresent 4 × 4S boxes
The result of displacement.
4. the method that a kind of new many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack according to claim 1 are realized, its
It is characterised by, the step 3 concrete operations are：
By random number R1Xor operation is carried out with the output that the selected first 4 × 4S box for entering S ' is replaced, obtained result is made
To select the random number R of next 4 × 4S boxes displacement2, i.e.,
5. the method that a kind of new many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack according to claim 1 are realized, its
It is characterised by, the step 4 comprises the following steps：
A) repeat step three, if finding newly-generated random number RiCorresponding 4 × 4S boxes replace chosen mistake, then perform
Step b), until now newly-generated random number RiUntill corresponding 4 × 4S boxes replace not selected mistake；
B) by RiXor operation is carried out by turn, obtains Ri *, i.e.,
6. the method that a kind of new many S boxes of the block cipher for resisting differential power attack according to claim 1 are realized,
Characterized in that, the concrete operations of the step 5 are：Select a distinguishing funotion f (Ri *)
If RiThe result R of xor operation is carried out by turni *During for " 0 ", then selection displacementRi *Then selected during for " 1 "
DisplacementIf being still 4 × 4S boxes displacement of chosen mistake after selection, this step is continued executing with, until finding
4 × 4S boxes displacement be before non-selected mistake displacement.
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| CN110401627A (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2019-11-01 | 中国科学院软件研究所 | A kind of resisting differential fault attacks security assessment method and system suitable for block cipher protection against infection |
| CN110401627B (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2020-07-10 | 中国科学院软件研究所 | Differential fault attack resistance security evaluation method and system suitable for block cipher algorithm infection protection |
| CN110336656A (en) * | 2019-06-04 | 2019-10-15 | 湖北大学 | Binomial APN function and its generation method in a kind of peculiar sign finite field |
| CN111339577A (en) * | 2020-02-12 | 2020-06-26 | 南京师范大学 | Construction method of S box with excellent DPA resistance |
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