CN107169324A - A kind of Android application reinforcement means based on dynamic encryption and decryption - Google Patents
A kind of Android application reinforcement means based on dynamic encryption and decryption Download PDFInfo
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- CN107169324A CN107169324A CN201710331858.XA CN201710331858A CN107169324A CN 107169324 A CN107169324 A CN 107169324A CN 201710331858 A CN201710331858 A CN 201710331858A CN 107169324 A CN107169324 A CN 107169324A
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- 230000002787 reinforcement Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 17
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 42
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 30
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 23
- 239000000284 extract Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 7
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 6
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000006837 decompression Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000000605 extraction Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 abstract description 8
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000003014 reinforcing effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000003068 static effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 206010067171 Regurgitation Diseases 0.000 description 1
- 230000002159 abnormal effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000006835 compression Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000007906 compression Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000007596 consolidation process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007812 deficiency Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
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- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 1
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- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000006467 substitution reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/12—Protecting executable software
- G06F21/14—Protecting executable software against software analysis or reverse engineering, e.g. by obfuscation
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/16—Program or content traceability, e.g. by watermarking
Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of Android applications reinforcement means, belong to field of information security technology.The present invention includes code encryption, dynamic security, completeness check, four modules of dynamic load.Ciphering process is encrypted to Android application programs class.dex, to the secondary encryption of core code, and to the signature authentication after encryption, the result of encryption is embedded in into resource file.Dynamic security process, detection debugger and simulator, detect to be debugged or operate in and application program are exited in simulator.Open subprocess, subprocess and host process mutual ptrace monitoring, subprocess cycle detection debugger and simulator, it is debugged then terminate process.Integrity detection module, authentication signature information prevents resource and code to be tampered.Code decryption block extracts the encryption information being hidden in picture, and decryption obtains intermediate data, to the secondary decryption in core code part therein, and the result after decryption is loaded directly into internal memory to perform.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of Android applications reinforcement means, belong to field of information security technology.
Background technology
Android system is released from Google so far within 2007, and Android markets are developed rapidly, but Android platform is compiled
The application APK of generation is highly prone to attack.Attacker cracks Android applications by technologies such as decompiling, reverse-engineerings, steals
Application code and user data, many unsafe factors are brought to applying to use.Therefore, for the anti-reversing of android system
With regard to extremely important.By the reinforcing to application, reach protection application code, it is counter crack, regurgitation to, instead be implanted into etc. purpose so that
Ensure the original and integrality of Android applications.
Since Android2.3, Code Obfuscation Security Technology begins to use.By obscuring source JAVA codes or smali files
Etc. mode.Code obfuscation reduces the readability of code to a certain extent, protects code, can resist application code
Static analysis, but decompiling or debugging attack can not be resisted, actual consolidation effect is poor.
Software shelling technology is important in Android reinforcement techniques one.Software shelling source program is compressed or
Person encrypts.When application program is run, shell side sequence is run first, the source program for being compressed or being encrypted is decompressed or decrypted,
Restore source program and be loaded onto internal memory execution.With Android is applied and exuviating technology research, simple compression or
Encrypt and it is difficult to the external attack of resistance, reinforcing is easier to be broken.But excessively complicated encryption can also lower the fortune of program
Line efficiency.Software shelling conceals application source code, is effectively protected application program.But " shell " program itself is also required to
Protection, prevents from being attacked by attacker.
The content of the invention
The invention aims to protect Android application programs, protection application by static and dynamic analysis, does not overcome
The deficiency of existing reinforcement means, proposes a kind of Android applications reinforcement means, application code is encrypted, to key
The secondary encryption of partial code, realizes protection application code and operation security purpose.
The present invention design principle be：The present invention relates to a kind of Android applications reinforcement means, belong to information security technology
Field.The present invention includes code encryption, dynamic security, completeness check, four modules of dynamic load.Ciphering process pair
Android application programs class.dex is encrypted, to the secondary encryption of core code, and to the signature authentication after encryption, by encryption
As a result it is embedded in resource file.Dynamic security process, detection debugger and simulator, detect debugged or operate in simulator
Exit application program.Open subprocess, subprocess and the mutual ptrace monitoring of host process, subprocess cycle detection debugger and mould
Intend device, it is debugged then terminate process.Integrity detection module, authentication signature information prevents resource and code to be tampered.Code solution
Close module extracts the encryption information being hidden in picture, and decryption obtains intermediate data, to the secondary solution in core code part therein
It is close, the result after decryption is loaded directly into internal memory to perform.
The technical scheme is that be achieved by the steps of：
Step 1, when application program is encrypted, decompression needs Android applications APK file to be protected, obtains code file
Classes.dex, is extracted the method code of core in classes.dex, is obtained using symmetric encryption method encryption core code
Encryption data, encryption data is added after special start-stop flag bit, replaces key code in class.dex, generates new dex texts
Part.
Step 2, another key K2 is set, by the dex file encryptions generated in step 1, the file after encryption is embedded in and provided
Source file.
Step 3, the resource file after insertion is signed, will encryption key K1, K2 twice, signature verification information and decryption
Program, file extraction procedure are deposited into so files, repack application program, the new APK file of signature generation.
Step 4, dynamic security.When application program is run, whether host process detection current system running environment is simulator
Or debugging machine, when detect operate in simulator and debugging machine, directly quit a program operation；Host process fork goes out subprocess, main
Process and the mutual ptrace monitoring of subprocess；Subprocess timing detection debugging machine and simulator, detect application and are debugged,
Subprocess is exited, and when host process monitors subprocess and had dropped out, exits application program.
Step 5, integrity detection.Whether signing messages, the checking signing messages extracted in so files be correct.
Step 6, dynamic load.When application program is run, the key in encryption file and so storehouses in resource file is extracted
K1, K2, using K2 to encryption file decryption, obtain intermediate code, navigate to key code encrypted location, extract key code
Encryption data, is decrypted using K1 to key code, is obtained original class.dex codes, is loaded onto internal memory.
Beneficial effect
Compared to existing Code obfuscation reinforcement means, code only increases code and sees reading difficulty, code protection journey
Degree is weaker, and code is encrypted the present invention, can preferably protect code.
Compared to the reinforcement means of software shelling, the present invention is secondary to key code to add to common code one-time pad encryption
It is close, it is effectively protected the protection of code, particularly key code.Simultaneously by the result and key of encryption by way of watermark
Embedded picture, protects encrypted result.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is a kind of Android applications reinforcement means schematic diagram of the invention；
Fig. 2 is to apply encrypting module flow chart；
Fig. 3 is dynamic security module host process overhaul flow chart；
Fig. 4 is dynamic security module subprocess overhaul flow chart；
Fig. 5 is to apply deciphering module flow chart.
Embodiment
In order to better illustrate objects and advantages of the present invention, with reference to embodiment of the embodiment to the inventive method
It is described in further details.
Idiographic flow is：
Step 1, key code is encrypted.
Step 1.1, the classes.dex files in Android application APK compressed files are extracted.
Step 1.2, core code is positioned, core code part includes：Program Activity, Service life cycle generation
Yard, program login etc. is related to code, program kernel algorithmic code of the key with checking.Each section of core code is extracted respectively.
Step 1.3, using key K1, AES encryption is carried out to every piece of key code.
Step 1.4, the code after each section is encrypted adds start-stop flag, replaces original code, recalculates dex files long
Degree and check value.
Step 2, dex file encryptions.
Step 2.1, the dex generated to step 1, is encrypted using key K2, encrypted result is embedded in into resource file.
Step 2.2, the resource file of embedded encrypted result is utilized into HMAC-MD5 signature checks, signature key uses K1+
K2 (string-concatenation), twice Hash check values, encryption key K1, K2 and for extract the code in resource file, decryption generation
Code storage is into so files.
Application in step 3 modification AndroidManifest.xml, by APK resource files and customized shell
Dex files and so files are repacked and signed, generate new APK file.
Step 4 dynamic security.
Step 4.1, it is pid's just to store process number by proc file system reading/proc/pid/status files
TracerPid in process status, timing detection/proc/pid/status, if the field represents debugging process when not being 0
Pid, if it is not 0 to detect TracerPid, application is debugged.When debugging is applied, during application program is operated in virtually.
Compared to real equipment, there are some special files ,/system/bin/qemu-props ,/system/lib/ in virtual machine
Libc_malloc_debug_qemu.so files and catalogue/sys/qemu_trace, detect that these three files or catalogue are respectively
It is no to exist, if in the presence of, then it is assumed that operate in simulator.When detecting debugged or operating in simulator, then directly kill
Host process, exits application program.
Step 4.2, subprocess is gone out using fork functions fork, host process and subprocess call ptrace respectively, mutually prison
Control.Subprocess injects one section of character string using pipe pipeline communications to host process, and host process reads subprocess injection message, when one
Fix time it is interior do not read character string, then subprocess starts abnormal, directly exits application program
Step 4.3 subprocess cycle detection debugs machine and simulator.Detect whether to be debugged using step 4.1 method.Separately
Outside, when being applied using IDA debugging, android_server monitors 23946 ports.Detection/proc/net/tcp files, when
When 23946 ports are taken by android_server, detect to apply and debugged by IDA.When using IDA debuggers come
When crossing anti-debug, the mode taken is single-step debug.Compared to normal operation, the speed of service of single-step debug wants slowly many, just
The speed general time performed in 1000ms, detection code of normal code command, empirical value 2000ms is set, works as time interval
More than threshold value, then it is assumed that by anti-debug.By above flow, when detecting by anti-debug, subprocess is exited, host process
When monitoring subprocess and having logged out, application program is directly exited.
Step 5, integrity detection.So library files are accessed using JNI (Java Native Interface) call-by mechanism,
The K1 and K2 and signature check value in so files are extracted, the HMAC- of the resource file comprising encrypted result is calculated using K1+K2
MD5 values, compare the signature check value in so files, if two values are different, application code is tampered, exits and apply journey
Sequence.
Step 6, dynamic load.
Step 6.1, encrypted original dex files are extracted from resource file
Step 6.2, key K2 is extracted, step 5.1 is extracted and encrypted, intermediate result is obtained.
Step 6.3, key K1 is extracted, intermediate result is scanned, identification strings 0x6D61696E0x76312E30 is found, read
Take ensuing 8 character lengths and length for binary stream, the binary stream that extracts is decrypted using K1, will be solved
Close result, which is replaced in intermediate result, includes identification strings, length and binary stream part.Whole intermediate result is scanned, is used
The binary code decrypted is loaded directly into internal memory by DexClassLoader Classloaders, does not generate intermediate file, is completed
Decryption work.
Above-described to specifically describe, purpose, technical scheme and beneficial effect to invention have been carried out further specifically
It is bright, it should be understood that the specific embodiment that the foregoing is only the present invention, the protection model being not intended to limit the present invention
Enclose, within the spirit and principles of the invention, any modification, equivalent substitution and improvements done etc. should be included in the present invention
Protection domain within.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of Android applications reinforcement means, is that methods described comprises the following steps：
Step 1, when application program is encrypted, decompression needs Android applications APK file to be protected, obtains code file
Classes.dex, is extracted the method code of core in classes.dex, is obtained using symmetric encryption method encryption core code
Encryption data, encryption data is added after special start-stop flag bit, replaces key code in class.dex, generates new dex texts
Part；
Step 2, another key K2 is set, by the dex file encryptions generated in step 1, the file after encryption is embedded in resource text
Part；
Step 3, the resource file after insertion is signed, will encryption key K1, K2 twice, signature verification information and decryption journey
Sequence, file extraction procedure are deposited into so files, repack application program, the new APK file of signature generation；
Step 4, dynamic security.When application program is run, whether host process detection current system running environment is simulator or tune
Test-run a machine, when detect operate in simulator and debugging machine, directly quit a program operation；Host process fork goes out subprocess, host process
With subprocess mutual ptrace monitoring；Subprocess timing detection debugging machine and simulator, are detected using being debugged, son enters
Journey is exited, and when host process monitors subprocess and had dropped out, exits application program；
Step 5, integrity detection.Whether signing messages, the checking signing messages extracted in so files be correct；
Step 6, dynamic load.When application program is run, extract the encryption file in resource file and key K1 in so storehouses,
K2, using K2 to encryption file decryption, obtains intermediate code, navigates to key code encrypted location, extracts adding for key code
Ciphertext data, is decrypted using K1 to key code, is obtained original class.dex codes, is loaded onto internal memory.
2. a kind of Android applications reinforcement means according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Key code in step 1
It is related to code, application program core algorithm of the key with checking including Activity, Service life cycle function, login etc.
Code.
3. a kind of Android applications reinforcement means according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Dynamic security side in step 4
Case host process and subprocess multi-process detection debugging detection, host process create subprocess, and mutually ptrace monitoring by fork.
4. a kind of Android applications reinforcement means according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Host process passes through in step 4
TracerPid in detection/proc/pid/status judges whether to be debugged, detecting system file/system/bin/qemu-
Props ,/system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_qemu.so file and catalogue/sys/qemu_trace judge whether
Operate in simulator.
5. a kind of Android applications reinforcement means according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Step 4 sub-process passes through
Host process detection method and detection IDA debugging port 23946 judge whether to be debugged by IDA；Detection time is poor, judges that IDA is
It is no by single-step debug.
6. a kind of Android applications reinforcement means according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：In step 4, host process and
Subprocess is communicated by pipeline pipe.
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| CN108388778A (en) * | 2018-03-21 | 2018-08-10 | 北京理工大学 | The APP that Android platform merges multiple features demodulates method for testing |
| CN109460674A (en) * | 2018-10-23 | 2019-03-12 | 上海金档信息技术有限公司 | A kind of JAVA application program guard method |
| CN109614772A (en) * | 2018-11-20 | 2019-04-12 | 江苏通付盾信息安全技术有限公司 | Code conversion method and device based on application installation package file |
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| CN107977553A (en) * | 2017-12-25 | 2018-05-01 | 中国电子产品可靠性与环境试验研究所 | The method and device of the security hardening of mobile applications |
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| CN109460674A (en) * | 2018-10-23 | 2019-03-12 | 上海金档信息技术有限公司 | A kind of JAVA application program guard method |
| CN109614772B (en) * | 2018-11-20 | 2021-02-02 | 江苏通付盾信息安全技术有限公司 | Code conversion method and device based on application installation package file |
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Application publication date: 20170915 |