CN107070629A - A kind of template attack method exported for SM4 cryptographic algorithms wheel - Google Patents
A kind of template attack method exported for SM4 cryptographic algorithms wheel Download PDFInfo
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- CN107070629A CN107070629A CN201610997538.3A CN201610997538A CN107070629A CN 107070629 A CN107070629 A CN 107070629A CN 201610997538 A CN201610997538 A CN 201610997538A CN 107070629 A CN107070629 A CN 107070629A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of joint template attack method for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output, comprise the following steps：S1：Template is set up in the input of selection SM4 cryptographic algorithm S boxes and output respectively, guesses key, calculates the joint probability of the S boxes input and output of all energy marks, the corresponding conjecture key of maximum probability is the respective loops rk attackedi, wherein i=0,1,2,3；S2：According to the preceding four-wheel respective loops rk0、rk1、rk2And rk3, by key schedule, inversely calculate initial key.Information utilization related to key in wall scroll energy mark can be improved using above-mentioned analysis method, curved line number needed for reduction template attack enhances flexibility, attack efficiency and the success rate of analysis.
Description
Technical field
Detection field is analyzed the present invention relates to cryptographic algorithm, more particularly to it is a kind of for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output
Joint template attack method.
Background technology
With the development of information and analysis circuit technology, no longer simple rest on is cracked to hardware encryption electronic equipment
In agreement and algorithm, but the information revealed during its processing data is started with, and is cracked.Hardware encryption electronic equipment
There is the leakage of the information such as energy, electromagnetism, mistake and time in the engineering of processing information, using the information of these leakages to close
Code electronic equipment is attacked, and is exactly so-called side-channel attack（Side Channel Attacks）, side-channel attack can divide
For power analysis, EMP attack N and fault analysis etc., wherein power analysis because efficiency it is higher, the master as side channel
Want means.
Template attack is with just implementing on the basis of the correlation of processing data based on crypto chip energy expenditure.Its
Attack process generally includes two stages：First stage is that template is set up, i.e. the energy expenditure to being possible to guess key
Feature is portrayed；Second stage is template matches, is gathered by the side channel information v on attack crypto chip, using polynary
Gaussian probability, which is weighed, calculates itself and the matching degree for the energy expenditure feature portrayed, and it neutralizes the average energy consumption for being and energy consumption association
Variance matrix.It can obtain the information about correct key.Because template attacks highly effective, realization simply and without largely provide
One of source, so be currently the emphasis in side Multiple Channel Analysis Attack Research field.
SM4 algorithms are a block ciphers, and block length is 128 bits, and key length is 128 bits, and encryption is calculated
Method and key schedule all take turns nonlinear iteration structure using 32.AES is identical with the structure of decipherment algorithm, simply takes turns
Using for key is sequentially opposite.Below by taking AES and key schedule as an example, SM4 algorithms are introduced.
The detailed process of SM4 AES SM4 AESs is as shown in Figure 1.In the figure, Xi∈Z2 32（Z2 eRepresent e
Bit vector set）, input in plain text is (X0,X1,X2,X3)∈(Z2 32)4, ciphertext is output as (Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3), wherein Xi、Xi+1、
Xi+2And Xi+3To take turns interative computation function F input, rki∈Z2 32For the round key of every wheel, i ∈ (0,1,2 ..., 31).
The computing that can be seen that wheel iteration function F from the flow of encryption includes has XOR, nonlinear transformation τ and linear change
L is changed, shown in the expression formula such as following formula (1-1) for taking turns iteration function, in (1-1) formula, T represents synthesis displacement, is become by non-linear
Change τ and linear transformation L is composited, iteration function F detailed flow is illustrated in fig. 2 shown below, in adding for whole SM4 cryptographic algorithms
In decrypting process, the such wheel iteration function F of 32 wheels is performed altogether.
Xi+4=F(Xi,Xi+1,Xi+2,Xi+3,rki)=Xi⊕T(Xi+1⊕Xi+2⊕Xi+3⊕rki) (1-4)
Nonlinear transformation τ is made up of 4 parallel S boxes, and each S boxes are fixed 8bit inputs, the displacement of 8bit outputs,
Input output between be one-to-one relationship, can not only find output by inputting, and by export counter can also release it is defeated
Enter.
Linear transformation L's is described as follows shown in formula (1-5)：
Bi⊕(Bi<<<2)⊕(Bi<<<10)⊕(Bi<<<18)⊕(Bi<<<24)(1-5)
In the formula, Ci∈Z2 32、Bi∈Z2 32, CiFor linear transformation L output, BiFor linear transformation L input, it is also simultaneously
Nonlinear transformation τ output.
Round key is generated by encryption key by key schedule, and its structure is similar with enciphering transformation.If encryption key
For MK=(MK0,MK1,MK2,MK3), i=0,1,2,3.Make Ki∈Z2 32, i=0,1,2 ..., 35, round key rki∈Z2 32, i=0,1,
2 ..., 31, then round key generation method such as following formula (1-6) and (1-7) are shown：
(K0,K1,K2,K3)=(MK0⊕FK0,MK1⊕FK1,MK2⊕FK2,MK3⊕FK3) (1-8)
rki=Ki+4=Ki⊕ T ＇ (Ki+1⊕Ki+2⊕Ki+3⊕CKi) (1-9)
Wherein, T ＇ conversion with enciphering transformation T convert it is essentially identical, simply linear transformation L therein must be revised as following
L ＇:
L ＇ (B)=B ⊕ (B<<<13)⊕(B<<<23) (1-10)
Systematic parameter FKiThe value of (i=1,2,3), is expressed as using 16 systems：FK0=A3B1BAC6, FK1=56AA3350, FK2=
677D9197, FK3=B27022DC。
Preset parameter CK obtaining value method is：If cki,jFor CKiJth byte (i=0,1,2 ..., 31;J=0,1,2,3),
That is CKi=(cki,0,cki,1,cki,2,cki,3)∈(Z2 8)4, then cki,j=(4i+j)*7(mod256).32 preset parameter CKiWith 16
System is expressed as：
00070e15, 1c232a31, 383f464d, 545b6269,
70777e85, 8c939aa1, a8afb6bd, c4cbd2d9,
e0e7eef5, fc030a11, 181f262d, 343b4249,
50575e65, 6c737a81, 888f969d, a4abb2b9,
c0c7ced5, dce3eaf1, f8ff060d, 141b2229,
30373e45, 4c535a61, 686f767d, 848b9299,
a0a7aeb5, bcc3cad1, d8dfe6ed, f4fb0209,
10171e25, 2c333a41, 484f565d, 646b727
According to key schedule, the anti-method for releasing key is as follows：
A, cryptographic calculation：
For cryptographic calculation, the respective loops rk of four-wheel before attacking out0, rk1, rk2And rk3, according to key schedule must under
Formula：
rk0=K4=K0⊕T(K1⊕K2⊕K3⊕CK0) （1）
rk1=K5=K1⊕T(K2⊕K3⊕K4⊕CK1)（2）
rk2=K6=K2⊕T(K3⊕K4⊕K5⊕CK2) （3）
rk3=K7=K3⊕T(K4⊕K5⊕K6⊕CK3)（4）
By (1), (2), (3) and (4), formula can obtain K3, as shown in (5) formula.
K3=rk3⊕T(rk0⊕rk1⊕rk 2⊕CK3) (5)
By (3) and (5), formula obtains K2, as shown in (6) formula.
K2=rk2⊕T(K3⊕rk0⊕rk1⊕CK2)(6)
By (2), (5) and (6), formula obtains K1, as shown in (7) formula.
K1=rk1⊕T(K2⊕K3⊕rk0⊕CK1) (7)
By (2), (5) and (6), formula obtains K0, as shown in (8) formula.
K0=rk0⊕T(K1⊕K2⊕K3⊕CK0) (8)
(K again0,K1,K2,K3)=(MK0⊕FK0, MK1⊕FK1, MK2⊕FK2, MK3⊕FK3), so key can be obtained for MK0=
K0⊕FK0, MK1= K1⊕FK1, MK2= K2⊕FK2, MK3= K3⊕FK3。
B, decryption computing：
For decryption computing, the respective loops rk of four-wheel before attacking out0、rk1、rk2And rk3, according to key schedule must under
Formula：
rk0=K35=K31⊕T(K32⊕K33⊕K34⊕CK31) （9）
rk1=K34=K30⊕T(K31⊕K32⊕K33⊕CK30) （10）
rk2=K33=K29⊕T(K30⊕K31⊕K32⊕CK29) （11）
rk3=K32=K28⊕T(K29⊕K30⊕K31⊕CK29) （12）
By (9),（10）、（11）(12) formula, obtains K32、K33、K34And K35, i takes 31 to 0, calculates Ki=Ki+4⊕T(Ki+1⊕
K i+2⊕K i+3⊕CKi), you can obtain K0、K1、K2And K3, (K again0,K1,K2,K3)=(MK0⊕FK0, MK1⊕FK1, MK2⊕
FK2, MK3⊕FK3), so key can be obtained for MK0= K0⊕FK0, MK1= K1⊕FK1, MK2= K2⊕FK2, MK3= K3⊕FK3。
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to provide a kind of joint template attack method for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output, with
Solve not making full use of all information related to key in single curve for the progress template attack of SM4 cryptographic algorithms, and
The problem of curved line number needed for caused attack is more and success attack rate is low.I.e.：SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output are corresponding
Curve, has revealed the useful information related to same key, it is possible to combine the input and output of S boxes to attack key, drop
Curved line number needed for low attack, while success rate can be improved.The selection SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output of the invention
The point of attack attacked as template, realizes the joint template attack for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output, enhances point
The validity and practicality of analysis.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a kind of joint template for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output
Attack method, specifically includes following steps：
S1：Template is set up in the input of selection SM4 cryptographic algorithm S boxes and output respectively, guesses key, calculates the S boxes of all energy marks
Input and the joint probability of output, the corresponding conjecture key of maximum probability is the respective loops rk attackedi, wherein i=0,1,
2,3；
S2：According to the respective loops rk of the preceding four-wheel round function0、rk1、rk2And rk3, it is anti-to release by key schedule
Initial key.
Further, S1 specifically includes following steps：
S11：The first round of enciphering/deciphering is attacked, i=0 is initialized；
S12：Input random known-plaintext and key, collecting energy curve, it is defeated that every curve i-th of calculating takes turns corresponding 4 S boxes
Enter to export SinjAnd Soutj, wherein j=0,1,2,3, according to SinjAnd Soutj, Sin is set up respectivelyjCorresponding energy template set
Ωj, and SoutjCorresponding energy template set Φj；
S13：Collection determines that 4 S boxes of the i-th wheel input corresponding curved section by the energy curve under attack key and known-plaintext
aj, the corresponding curved section b of 4 S boxes outputsj, guess key, with reference to the corresponding plaintext of every curve, calculate corresponding 4 S boxes defeated
Enter to export SinjAnd Soutj, according to SinjIn ΩjMiddle lookup template T Ωj, according to SoutjIn ΦjMiddle lookup template T Φj, calculate
Guess the joint probability of all single S boxes input and output of curve under key, Pj= ∏n s=1Ps (aj ,TΩj )PS (bj ,Tφj)
Wherein n represents curved line number, corresponding conjecture key when joint probability is maximum, is the key attacked, 4 keys for being gone out
Respective loops rk can be constitutedi；
S14：Wheel number i Jia 1 certainly, the step of returning to S12 ~ S14, the respective loops rk of four-wheel before attacking out0、rk1、rk2With
rk3；
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is SM4 AES flow charts；
Fig. 2 is SM4 cipher key spreading flow charts;
Fig. 3 is the joint template attack flow chart for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output.
Embodiment
The embodiment to the present invention is described below, in order to which those skilled in the art understand this hair
It is bright, it should be apparent that the invention is not restricted to the scope of embodiment, for those skilled in the art,
As long as various change is in the spirit and scope of the present invention that appended claim is limited and is determined, these changes are aobvious and easy
See, all are using the innovation and creation of present inventive concept in the row of protection.
For the joint template attack method of SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output, following steps are specifically included：
S1：Template is set up in the input of selection SM4 cryptographic algorithm S boxes and output respectively, guesses key, calculates the S boxes of all energy marks
Input and the joint probability of output, the corresponding conjecture key of maximum probability is the respective loops rk attackedi, wherein i=0,1,
2,3；
S2：According to the respective loops rk of the preceding four-wheel round function0、rk1、rk2And rk3, it is anti-to release by key schedule
Initial key.
Further, S1 specifically includes following steps：
S11：The first round of enciphering/deciphering is attacked, i=0 is initialized；
S12：Input random known-plaintext and key, collecting energy curve, it is defeated that every curve i-th of calculating takes turns corresponding 4 S boxes
Enter to export SinjAnd Soutj, wherein j=0,1,2,3, according to SinjAnd Soutj, Sin is set up respectivelyjCorresponding energy template set
Ωj, and SoutjCorresponding energy template set Φj；
S13：Collection determines that 4 S boxes of the i-th wheel input corresponding curved section by the energy curve under attack key and known-plaintext
aj, the corresponding curved section b of 4 S boxes outputsj, guess key, with reference to the corresponding plaintext of every curve, calculate corresponding 4 S boxes defeated
Enter to export SinjAnd Soutj, according to SinjIn ΩjMiddle lookup template T Ωj, according to SoutjIn ΦjMiddle lookup template T Φj, calculate
Guess the joint probability of all single S boxes input and output of curve under key, Pj= ∏n s=1Ps (aj ,TΩj )PS (bj ,T
φj) wherein n represents curved line number, corresponding conjecture key when joint probability is maximum, be the key attacked, 4 are gone out
Key can constitute respective loops rki；
S14：Wheel number i Jia 1 certainly, the step of returning to S12 ~ S14, the respective loops rk of four-wheel before attacking out0、rk1、rk2With
rk3；
In the wall scroll energy curve of SM4 cryptographic algorithms, the input of S boxes has revealed the information related to same key simultaneously to output,
Common template attack, normally only selects single information leakage point to implement attack during attack, and while the invention
Two information leakage points of the input of S boxes and output are selected, implements attack by calculating the joint probability of S box input and output, reaches
The useful information revealed in energy curve is made full use of, curved line number needed for reduction attack improves the purpose of attack rate, realized
Joint template for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output is attacked.
Claims (2)
1. for the joint template attack method of SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output, it is characterised in that methods described includes following
Step：
S1：Template is set up in the input of selection SM4 cryptographic algorithm S boxes and output respectively, guesses key, calculates the S boxes of all energy marks
Input and the joint probability of output, the corresponding conjecture key of maximum probability is the respective loops rk attackedi, wherein i=0,1,
2,3；
S2：According to the respective loops rk of the preceding four-wheel round function0, rk1, rk2And rk3, it is anti-to release just by key schedule
Beginning key.
2. the joint template attack method according to claim 1 for SM4 cryptographic algorithm S box input and output, its feature
It is, the S1 specifically includes following steps：
S11：The first round of enciphering/deciphering is attacked, i=0 is initialized；
S12：Input random known-plaintext and key, collecting energy curve, it is defeated that every curve i-th of calculating takes turns corresponding 4 S boxes
Enter to export SinjAnd Soutj, wherein j=0,1,2,3, according to SinjAnd Soutj, Sin is set up respectivelyjCorresponding energy template set
Ωj, and SoutjCorresponding energy template set Φj；
S13：Collection determines that 4 S boxes of the i-th wheel input corresponding curved section by the energy curve under attack key and known-plaintext
aj, the corresponding curved section b of 4 S boxes outputsj, guess key, with reference to the corresponding plaintext of every curve, calculate corresponding 4 S boxes defeated
Enter to export SinjAnd Soutj, according to SinjIn ΩjMiddle lookup template T Ωj, according to SoutjIn ΦjMiddle lookup template T Φj, calculate
Guess the joint probability of all single S boxes input and output of curve under key, Pj= ∏n s=1Ps (aj ,TΩj )PS (bj ,T
φj), wherein n represents curved line number, and corresponding conjecture key when joint probability is maximum is the key attacked, 4 are gone out
Key can constitute respective loops rki；
S14：Wheel number i Jia 1 certainly, the step of returning to S12 ~ S14, the respective loops rk of four-wheel before attacking out0, rk1, rk2With
rk3。
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Application publication date: 20170818 |