CN106971105A - A kind of application program based on iOS meets with the defence method of flank attack - Google Patents
A kind of application program based on iOS meets with the defence method of flank attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN106971105A CN106971105A CN201710199687.XA CN201710199687A CN106971105A CN 106971105 A CN106971105 A CN 106971105A CN 201710199687 A CN201710199687 A CN 201710199687A CN 106971105 A CN106971105 A CN 106971105A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 12
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 abstract description 7
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 description 7
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 4
- 244000035744 Hura crepitans Species 0.000 description 3
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 2
- GOLXNESZZPUPJE-UHFFFAOYSA-N spiromesifen Chemical compound CC1=CC(C)=CC(C)=C1C(C(O1)=O)=C(OC(=O)CC(C)(C)C)C11CCCC1 GOLXNESZZPUPJE-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
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- 230000006837 decompression Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007123 defense Effects 0.000 description 1
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- 235000013399 edible fruits Nutrition 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/51—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/03—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/50, monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms
- G06F2221/033—Test or assess software
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses the defence method that a kind of application program based on iOS meets with flank attack, belong to the category of intelligent movable operating system security.The present invention is using the synergy between authentication mechanism and exclusive private key, to take precautions against various forms of flank attacks.The preventing mechanism of the present invention is prevented through commonly used attack meanses in two flank attacks, is Replay Attack respectively and invalidated application renewal.Therefore, implementation of the invention, can provide pragmatic and easy to implement solution for flank attack.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to the technical field of intelligent movable operating system security, and in particular to trusted bootstrap, program signature, sand
Box and rights management and key chain technology.
Background technology
Apple Inc. was proposed intelligent movable operating system iOS in 2007, and it is integrated and sealed by the software and hardware of height
The operating system closed, powerful safeguard protection is provided for iOS mobile devices.IOS is by enforcing trusted bootstrap, program label
Process security when name, sandbox mechanism and operation, it is ensured that only believable code and application program can be on the mobile apparatus
Operation, additional encryption and data protection can effectively protect the user data of mobile device.In addition, iOS passes through coercive procedure label
Name and apply Sandboxing, it is therefore prevented that the unwarranted code of third-party application load and execution；And by examining application program
Mode detect any suspect program operation behavior.In addition, also preventing user any using Digital Rights Management Technology
Sharing application is mounted between iOS equipment to limit the propagation of malicious application.
In order to strengthen the safeguard measure to user data, iOS device has used a series of encryptions and data protection function.For
This, iOS device provider can issue a pair of public keys and private key and certificate, coercive procedure label for each third party application
Name, using key, prevents third-party application from loading malicious code.IOS will not allow third-party application only by checking
Certificate is with regard to restocking to App Store (application program shop).In addition, it also prevents from attempting injection malicious code when program is run
Dynamic attacks.By defining single sandbox configuration file mode for each third party application, one is forbidden so as to realize
The code and data of another application program are accessed during individual application program operation.In addition, also using trend point in iCloud
Analysis, the multiple technologies such as dynamic listing and information filtering carry out automatic detection and prevent spam.
Although taking above-mentioned safety measure, pacify for the correspondence that the flank attack occurred recently can but bypass iOS
Full measure.So-called flank attack, exactly replacing rogue program using a series of means should from the original of App Store installations
With.Under normal circumstances, flank attack reaches attack purpose by two ways：One be by configuring Ad-hoc (point-to-point),
Another is to use enterprise's certificate signature.
In the case where configuring Ad-hoc, attacker needs to obtain the UDID (equipment unique identifier) of target device.So
And the difficulty for obtaining UDID (equipment unique identifier) is very big, and which can limit the number for the mobile device for installing application
Amount.Therefore attacker prefers the method using enterprise's certificate signature, is enterprise's certificate label using another benefit of which
The malicious application of name is easier to propagate, because it just can be with the basis of need not being passed through by App Store examination ＆ verification
On any mobile device.
Referring to Fig. 1, the App (application program) downloaded in App Store is replaced by the way of flank attack, using identical
The flows that are replaced to the application program in original App Store of bundle ID (applying unique identifier) it is as follows：
1) the bundle ID of intended application are read, the com.company.product shown in Fig. 1 is then intended application
bundle ID；
2) original App (APP to be replaced) that decompression analysis is downloaded from App Store, V.1.0 such as version number is；Repair
Change the original App of replacement, it is replacement APP V.1.1 to obtain version：Encapsulation of being signed again by business account is packed, environment of escaping from prison
Business account signature is not needed to be mounted directly down；
3) user of induction mobile device downloads the App for installing the website that attacker provides using (V.1.1), installs and replaces
Bag；
4) original App is opened after installation to find to have turned into the malicious application of attacker's offer.
On the problem of solving flank attack, if taking the mobile device number of limitation installation enterprises certificate signature application program
The mode of amount, then can hinder normal iOS to develop；On the other hand, forbid including the application of identical PID Packet Identifier (bundle ID)
It is also unpractical, because it will forbid normal renewal.Further, since malicious application need not pass through App
Store examination, is very difficult to verify the authenticity of its enterprise's certificate, then due to iOS closure (forbidding outside monitoring), so that
It is difficult to prevent the installation of the application comprising same software PID Packet Identifier, i.e., existing iOS safety to cause to lead to existing processing mode
Measure is not avoided that flank attack.
The content of the invention
The goal of the invention of the present invention is：Have for bundle ID of the attacker based on acquisition and version information exploitation
The flank attack of the malicious application of identical bundle ID and next version number, proposes a kind of effective defence method.
A kind of application program based on intelligent movable operating system iOS of the present invention meets with the defence method of flank attack,
Comprise the following steps：
Increase fresh information in the attribute list file of application program, the fresh information includes more new key, and leads to
IOS provider is crossed to sign to more new key for the private key that the developer of application program issues；
When the mobile terminal based on iOS receives application program installation kit, iOS is received and mounted application program
More Xinmi City of the signature in fresh information is obtained when updating mount request using unique mark identical, in dependence listing file
Key, and the use of iOS device supplier is that the public key that application program is issued is decrypted；Decrypted result (is currently received again
More new key, referred to as current more new key) with local more new key (when application program in mobile device installs success first
Afterwards, the more new key of the signature in fresh information is obtained in dependence listing file, and the use of iOS device supplier is to apply journey
The public key that sequence is issued is decrypted, and obtains more new key and stores onto current movement.) matched, if matching, runs more
Newly；Otherwise, refuse.
Although bundle ID (applying unique identifier) and version information the exploitation tool that flank attack person can be based on acquisition
There is the malicious application of identical bundle ID next version number, but the not all people of more new key can use, even if
Attacker can collect or guess more new key by any mode, but it can not obtain iOS provider (apple official)
The private key issued for original development person.Therefore, attacker can not successfully pass through authentication mechanism proposed by the invention.Because such as
Fruit there is no the more new key using private key signature, and iOS would not allow for updating, so as to realize to the effectively anti-of flank attack
It is imperial.Alerted in addition, the safeguard measure of the present invention is not dependent on pop-up of the user to " not trusted Application developer "
Response.No matter user have selected " trust " or " distrust ", shows and is answered with former in the application program installation kit that will be updated
In the case of identical bundle ID with program, system can be checked (uses iOS provider by the more new key of former application program
What the private key signature to the developer of application program was crossed).Therefore, the first attack means failure of flank attack.Ought be
System prompts the user whether to trust this program, and user clicks " trust " button just, and nonetheless, malicious application can not be into
Work(is installed.
In order to solve the technical problem attacked again, the present invention by adding the random value of more new key in fresh information,
And will more new key and random value carry out XOR after more new key is signed again；
When iOS receives the application unique mark identical renewal mount request with mounted application program, dependence
In listing file obtain fresh information in random value, and with current application program stored mistake random value carry out
Match somebody with somebody, if the match is successful, refusal updates；Otherwise the use of iOS device supplier is the public key issued of application program to the different of signature
Or after value is decrypted, then with currently received random value XOR is carried out, current more new key is obtained, while storage is current
The random value of reception, the random value for the corresponding same application that will be received is stored on the mobile apparatus, for
The detection attacked again；
Then, currently more new key is matched with local more new key, if matching, operation updates；Otherwise, refuse
Absolutely.
Because Replay Attack is to bypass most one of intuitive way of certification.If only using original private keys to more new key
Signature, then Replay Attack can successfully break up this mean of defense.Attacker can be stolen by sniff or any other mode
The more new key of signature, then it is successfully executed the intended application of simulation original development personnel by resetting the more new key of signature
Renewal.In order to defend such a Replay Attack, present invention employs the random number in addition to more new key (being represented with symbol K)
N concept.The equal XORs of wherein K and N were calculated and by the private key signature of original development person.N is used as to be sent in plain text so that can be with
The K ⊕ N of signature are decrypted by public key, and then calculate more new key K.When installation kit is reached, N and it is locally stored
The random value of same application is matched, to ensure not occur Replay Attack.Then, system uses public key decryptions label mistake
The K ⊕ N of name, and XOR calculating is carried out again with last XOR result with N again, obtain more new key K.So, update
Key K and stored K matches to ensure certification.If where never received from the developer of destination application
N, and more new key and the cipher key match stored are crossed, then allows to update.The system in the case of the failure of any matching condition
Refusal updates.So as to successfully defend the attack meanses with Replay Attack.
In summary, by adopting the above-described technical solution, the beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：Can effectively defend to based on
The flank attack of iOS application program, and Replay Attack.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1：Flank attack flow chart schematic diagram；
Fig. 2：The flank attack defence policies schematic diagram of the present invention；
Fig. 3：The processing schematic diagram of Replay Attack is defendd by adding a random number N；
Embodiment
To make the object, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, with reference to embodiment and accompanying drawing, to this hair
It is bright to be described in further detail.
Referring to Fig. 2, target APP bundle ID are com.company.product, and version number is V.1.0, mask attacks
The person of hitting is by imitating target APP bundle ID, the malice APP of the pseudo- more redaction of generation V.1.1, and by malice APP and conjecture
Obtained renewal key is sent to user.When installation kit reaches user equipment, system (iOS) can be from plist (i.e. attribute lists
File) target APP bundle ID and version number information are obtained in file.Because in the plist texts of application program in the present invention
Fresh information (the renewal key for including signature) is added in part, when iOS receives the bundle ID with mounted application program
When identical updates mount request, the more new key of the signature in fresh information is obtained from plist files, and is set using iOS
Standby supplier is that the public key that application program is issued carries out signature decryption, obtains currently updating key, then by itself and local renewal
Key is matched, if matching, operation updates；Otherwise, refuse.
Wherein, local update key acquisition modes are：When the mobile terminal based on iOS receives application program installation kit,
The renewal of the signature in fresh information is obtained when iOS receives the mount request first of application program, in dependence listing file
Key, is that the public key that application program is issued carries out signature decryption using iOS device supplier, obtains more new key and store to this
Ground；
Therefore when above-mentioned malice APP and update key reach mobile terminal when, although update key be probably it is correct, still
It does not possess private key (the renewal key of the i.e. non-private key signature for using iOS device supplier to be issued for application program), so as to lead
Renewal is caused to be prevented from.Referring to Fig. 3, in order to tackle Replay Attack, the renewal key for being each APP sets a Nonce values N
(Nonce values, mean Number used once, are a random values that can only be only used once).Key will be updated in advance (to use
K is represented) XOR is carried out with N, then to being put into after K ⊕ N signatures in APP plist files, and N is also placed in plist files
In, i.e. N to send in plain text；
When the mobile terminal based on iOS receives application program installation kit, the renewal installation that iOS receives application program please
When asking, by judging that currently received N is matched with the random value stored of the APP, if identical, it there occurs that playback is attacked
Hit, refusal updates；Otherwise based on the use of iOS device supplier being that the K ⊕ N of signature are decrypted the public key issued of application program
Afterwards, then with currently received N XOR is carried out, obtains current more new key, while currently received random being locally stored
Value N.Finally, currently more new key is matched with local more new key, if matching, operation updates；Otherwise, refuse.
In mechanism proposed by the present invention, more new key is the private key signature of the original development person oneself using application program
's.In addition to the developer of the first edition or developer team, nobody can possess this private key.It is therefore proposed that
Mechanism successfully prohibits chance that malicious application updated using target program to replace original application.In addition, of the invention
The update mechanism of proposition has non repudiation.In the case that i.e. application program obtains any renewal after, the original in source is updated
Beginning property is never changed.
The foregoing is only a specific embodiment of the invention, any feature disclosed in this specification, except non-specifically
Narration, can alternative features equivalent by other or with similar purpose replaced；Disclosed all features or all sides
Method or during the step of, in addition to mutually exclusive feature and/or step, can be combined in any way.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of application program based on intelligent movable operating system iOS meets with the defence method of flank attack, it is characterised in that
Comprise the following steps：
Increase fresh information in the attribute list file of application program, the fresh information includes more new key, and passes through iOS
Equipment supplier signs for the private key of program developer to more new key；
When the mobile terminal based on iOS receives application program installation kit, iOS receives the application with mounted application program
The more new key of the signature in fresh information is obtained when unique mark identical updates mount request, in dependence listing file,
And the use of iOS device supplier is that the public key that application program is issued is decrypted；Again by decrypted result and local more new key
Matched, if matching, operation updates；Otherwise, refuse；
Wherein local more new key acquisition modes are：After application program is installed successfully first in mobile device, dependence row
The more new key of the signature in fresh information is obtained in list file, and the use of iOS device supplier is the public affairs that application program is issued
Key is decrypted, and obtains more new key and stores to local.
2. the method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that the fresh information also includes the random value of more new key, and
The result that more new key is carried out after XOR again to XOR with random value is signed；
When iOS receives the application unique mark identical renewal mount request with mounted application program, dependence list
In file obtain fresh information in random value, and with the random value of stored mistake is matched in current application program, if
The match is successful, then refusal updates；Otherwise the use of iOS device supplier is that the public key that application program is issued enters to the XOR value of signature
Go after decrypting, then XOR is carried out with currently received random value, obtain current more new key, while storage is currently received
Random value；
Currently more new key is matched with local more new key, if matching, operation updates；Otherwise, refuse.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201710199687.XA CN106971105B (en) | 2017-03-30 | 2017-03-30 | IOS-based application program defense method against false face attack |
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| CN201710199687.XA CN106971105B (en) | 2017-03-30 | 2017-03-30 | IOS-based application program defense method against false face attack |
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN109816389A (en) * | 2018-12-03 | 2019-05-28 | 深圳市新国都支付技术有限公司 | A kind of POS machine signature verification method and system |
| CN112199713A (en) * | 2020-12-03 | 2021-01-08 | 成都中科大旗软件股份有限公司 | Confusion encryption method for IOS system software operation algorithm |
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2017
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| CN106971105B (en) | 2020-02-18 |
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