CN106953839B - System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles - Google Patents

System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN106953839B
CN106953839B CN201710026253.XA CN201710026253A CN106953839B CN 106953839 B CN106953839 B CN 106953839B CN 201710026253 A CN201710026253 A CN 201710026253A CN 106953839 B CN106953839 B CN 106953839B
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
vehicle
rsu
vehicles
message
attribute
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
CN201710026253.XA
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN106953839A (en
Inventor
刘宴兵
叶青
常光辉
王宇航
李露
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications
Original Assignee
Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications filed Critical Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications
Priority to CN201710026253.XA priority Critical patent/CN106953839B/en
Publication of CN106953839A publication Critical patent/CN106953839A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN106953839B publication Critical patent/CN106953839B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
    • H04L63/0263—Rule management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/102—Entity profiles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Traffic Control Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention requests to protect a blocking control method and a blocking control system for propagation of non-trusted resources in an internet of vehicles, and designs an access control strategy for nodes of a resource output vehicle and a node trust value calculation method, wherein the method has the advantages that the fixed attribute and the dynamic attribute of the resource output vehicle are limited, and a fine-grained access control strategy is dynamically generated according to the vehicle running track, so that the access control strategy has higher expansibility and flexibility, the anonymous directional propagation of messages is realized, the resource waste is reduced, and the identity privacy of a communication vehicle is effectively protected; the calculation of the node trust value ensures the trust degree of a resource propagator, meets the requirements of safety-related messages in the Internet of vehicles on safety and privacy, can effectively identify malicious nodes, and prevents the injection of malicious resources and the propagation of non-trusted resources. The method can be widely applied to the related fields of mobile internet, wireless sensor network and the like.

Description

System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to a wireless communication technology for vehicle-mounted mobile application interaction in a vehicle networking environment, and particularly relates to access control and trusted computing.
Background
With the development of the internet of vehicles and the intellectualization of vehicles, the information security problem of the vehicles is gradually exposed, and the research on the security and privacy of the vehicles is gradually a research hotspot. The Internet of vehicles is an open dynamic network, the topology is changed at a high speed, the resources are diversified, and the vehicles in the network need to adopt an authentication method to protect the resources from being illegally accessed by malicious nodes.
Since the internet of vehicles has an ad hoc nature, the authentication method must also be flexible and extensible. The control strategy should be able to meet the flexible, reliable and expandable application requirements in the internet of vehicles in a complex and dynamically variable system environment. Researchers have conducted extensive analyses and validation of the characteristics of attribute-based access control policies. The access control method based on the attributes can meet the requirements in the security research of the Internet of vehicles, can effectively guarantee the privacy of vehicles, abstracts the access request, the attribute authority, the strategy and the judgment process, can describe the relationship among the access request, the attribute authority, the strategy and the judgment process in the model, and provides a specific condition that the access control process can be terminated. Researchers also provide attribute-based fine-grained access control strategies aiming at specific scenes in the Internet of vehicles, including emergency rescue services, paid business services and the like in a road network, and design a low-delay and low-consumption access control strategy by combining an attribute encryption method, so that the directional anonymous transmission of messages is realized, collusion attack can be effectively resisted, and the attribute security of accessed vehicles is ensured, thereby ensuring the security of payment services.
In the research on the security of the internet of vehicles, in addition to ensuring the identity security of the entity accessing the vehicle, the trust evaluation of the vehicle is also a research focus. Existing research summarizes methods for establishing trust in an on-board ad hoc network. In the research on the user behavior trust, a user credibility assessment method integrating various factors is designed, a trust theory is applied to an access control technology, the integration of entity trust and behavior trust is realized, and a new solution is provided for the application of the access control technology. In the safety authentication method for the trust evaluation of the vehicle-mounted ad hoc network, a final trust value is calculated according to the historical safety event record and the recommended trust of a vehicle, a malicious vehicle is identified by the method, and the vehicle is subjected to trusted calculation by combining a social network trust calculation method, so that the privacy of the vehicle is protected, and the safety of the network is guaranteed.
The above research on access control and security of the internet of vehicles aims at protecting resource owners, and a protection strategy is adopted for outflow of resources, and conversely, the threat of malicious resource pushing and injection exists in the vehicle-mounted terminal, so that the research on control on inflow of resources of the vehicle-mounted terminal is very necessary. The safety research on the internet of vehicles message transmission is only based on a single aspect, and the trust of a message receiving vehicle is guaranteed while the access control strategy realizes the directional transmission of the message. Therefore, it is important to verify the validity of the vehicle identity and ensure the reliability.
Because VANET (Vehicle Ad-hoc Network) is a self-organizing Network, in a V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) communication scene, resources are rich and have diversity, and there are malicious events such as identity falsification, illegal request, illegal resource push and injection. In order to prevent malicious resource injection attack in the internet of vehicles, a blocking control method and a blocking control system for propagation of untrusted resources in the internet of vehicles are provided, which can be called as a reverse access control scheme, in consideration of high dynamics and resource diversity of topology in the internet of vehicles, so that directional transmission of anonymous messages in the internet of vehicles is realized, the credibility of a resource propagator is ensured, output of the untrusted resources is blocked, and thus the security of resource inflow in a vehicle-mounted terminal is protected.
Disclosure of Invention
The present invention is directed to solving the above problems of the prior art. The system and the method for blocking propagation of the non-credible resources in the internet of vehicles are provided, wherein the system and the method are used for improving the safety reliability and improving the credibility of the message source. The technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a resistance control system for propagation of non-trusted resources in the Internet of vehicles comprises a roadside infrastructure (RSU), an intelligent vehicle node and a trusted party TA, wherein the roadside RSU comprises a synchronization module, an RSU trust calculation module, an RSU strategy matching module and a password service module; the system comprises a synchronization module, a RSU strategy matching module, a password service module and a network layer, wherein the synchronization module is used for carrying out interactive synchronization with the network layer, the RSU strategy matching module is used for finding and verifying vehicles which accord with an access control strategy and verifying the authenticity of the attributes of the vehicles, and the password service module is used for generating and releasing a decryption key;
the intelligent vehicle node comprises a vehicle security verification module TPM, a vehicle strategy generator, a vehicle trust calculation module, a vehicle authority judgment module and a wireless communication module OBU, the vehicle safety verification module TPM is mainly used for storing basic vehicle safety information and providing password safety service for vehicles, and comprises CP-ABE technology, RSU digital signature, and asymmetric encryption and decryption technology, the vehicle trust calculation module is used for calculating the trust value of the vehicle to be interacted, the vehicle policy generator is used for generating an access control policy according to the requirements of the resource request vehicle and the dynamic attribute information, the vehicle authority judging module judges whether to receive the message transmitted by the vehicle by comparing the trust value of the message source vehicle with the trust threshold value, the wireless communication module OBU integrates multiple wireless communication modes and is used for wireless communication between a vehicle and a road.
The trusted party TA maintains a vehicle attribute library and historical behavior database, storing attributes and historical behaviors of the vehicle.
Further, the vehicle fixed attribute does not change or remains unchanged for a long time in the life cycle of the vehicle, and includes information of a license plate of the vehicle, a manufacturer of the vehicle, a model of the vehicle, and whether safety hardware is supported; dynamic attributes are periodically changing attributes that include information about vehicle applications and services, vehicle behavior, network conditions, and travel speed.
Further, to ensure the authenticity of the dynamic attribute, the vehicle may periodically update the dynamic attribute to the RSU, and the vehicle V sends a message M ═ { PK ═ to the RSURSU(t0LN loc speed dir), where PKRSUIs the public key of the RSU, t0For the message sending time, t is the current time, LN is the license plate of the vehicle, loc is the position of the vehicle, speed is the driving speed of the vehicle, dir is the driving direction of the vehicle, RSU first verifies the time t in M0If t-t0More than or equal to tau, sending a dynamic attribute updating request to the vehicle V, and if t-t is greater than or equal to tau0< τ, verify the attribute in M; if the verification is successful, the latest dynamic attribute of the vehicle V is stored and t is deleted0Previous attribute, sending confirmation message { SK to vehicle VRSU(LN||"Upodate_Success")}。
Further, when the vehicle runs in the tunnel, the traffic information which the vehicle wants to obtain can only come from the opposite vehicle and the vehicle which has run out of the tunnel in the same direction, and according to the above conditions, we can determine the running model of the information receiving vehicle, the running direction of the vehicle is defined by delta, the value of delta is 1 or-1, when delta isA＝δBWhen the two vehicles move in the same direction; v is the vehicle speed; t is the time required for resource transmission and t is m/vnM is the resource size, vnIs the current network rate; vAIs the message sender, VBIs the message recipient, λ is the maximum communication distance of the vehicle; the generated policy P is as follows:
Figure BDA0001209504030000041
the policy may be described as: and the position is outside the exit of the tunnel, the distance between the two vehicles in the running process is not more than the maximum communication distance of the vehicles within the time t for ensuring that the resources can be completely transmitted, and the vehicle meeting the condition is a candidate vehicle meeting the constraint condition.
Further, after the policy P is generated, the resource requester constructs an access structure Tp，TpIs a countermeasure
A normative Boolean expression of P, a cryptographic service module according to the encryption formula of CP-ABE
Encrypt(PK,M,Tp) The encryption process for generating the ciphertext M' comprises three stages:
setup: the trusted third party exports the public key PK generated by the ABE protocol using the implicit security parameters as inputABEAnd a master key MK, which is known only to the trusted party that generated it;
Encrypt(PK,M,Tp): the input of the encryption algorithm is a public key PK, a message M and an access structure T generated based on the required attributespThe algorithm encrypts M to generate a ciphertext M' implicitly containing the access structure TpM' can only be decrypted by entities that have attributes that satisfy the attributes in the access structure;
KeyGen (MK, S): the private key generation algorithm is deployed by a trusted party, the algorithm inputs a master key MK and an attribute set S, and a private key SK is outputs。
Further, when the vehicle VBReceives a signal from a vehicle VAThe policy generator of the vehicle first verifies the policy, and the process of verifying the policy can be described as:
Figure BDA0001209504030000042
the above formula is only when
Figure BDA0001209504030000043
Vr.Loc＝Pol.Loc and
Figure BDA0001209504030000044
satisfy simultaneously, VBOnly if this access policy is satisfied will it be for VBAnd performing the following operations, namely calculating the anonymous vehicle trust value measurement, the experience trust value, the recommendation trust value and the trust vector, and performing authority judgment.
A blocking control method for propagation of non-trusted resources in the Internet of vehicles based on the system comprises the following steps:
step 1, a vehicle initializes a local RSU, the RSU verifies the authenticity of a fixed attribute of the vehicle, confirms whether a dynamic attribute is latest, and calculates and stores a basic trust value of the vehicle according to the fixed attribute of the vehicle;
step 2, the resource request vehicle generates an access control strategy according to the requirement, and encrypts and broadcasts the message by using a CP-ABE method;
step 3, the RSU finds and verifies vehicles which accord with the access control strategy, verifies the attribute authenticity of the vehicles and issues a decryption key;
and 4, calculating the trust value of the resource exporter by the resource requester, and determining to receive the resource by comparing the trust value with the trust threshold value.
Further, the fixed attribute of the vehicle in the step 1 is information that does not change or remains unchanged for a long time in the life cycle of the vehicle, and includes information of a license plate of the vehicle, a manufacturer of the vehicle, a model of the vehicle, and whether safety hardware is supported; dynamic attributes are periodically changing attributes that include information about vehicle applications and services, vehicle behavior, network conditions, and travel speed.
Further, in step 1, to ensure the authenticity of the dynamic attribute, the vehicle will periodically update the dynamic attribute to the RSU, and the vehicle V sends a message M ═ { PK ═ to the RSURSU(t0LN loc speed dir), where PKRSUIs the public key of the RSU, t0For the message sending time, t is the current time, LN is the license plate of the vehicle, loc is the position of the vehicle, speed is the driving speed of the vehicle, dir is the driving direction of the vehicle, RSU first verifies the time t in M0If t-t0More than or equal to tau, sending a dynamic attribute updating request to the vehicle V, and if t-t is greater than or equal to tau0< τ, verify the attribute in M; if the verification is successful, the latest dynamic attribute of the vehicle V is stored and t is deleted0Previous attribute, sending confirmation message { SK to vehicle VRSU(LN||"Upodate_Success")}。
The invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
according to the access control method, the identity of the other party does not need to be known in the communication process of the vehicles, the generated access strategy is used for screening the message and receiving the vehicle, the directional transmission of the message is formed, and the safety and privacy of the communication of the networked vehicles are enhanced. And secondly, the invention adopts the vehicle attribute as the basic unit of the access strategy, and defines the fixed attribute and the dynamic attribute of the vehicle, so that the access control strategy has finer granularity, and the expressive property of the access control strategy is enhanced. The invention requires the vehicle to update the attribute periodically, so that the vehicle attribute has real-time property, and the real-time property requirement on communication in the Internet of vehicles is met. The vehicle generates an access strategy according to the self demand communication state, so that the access strategy has more flexibility and expandability. The access control scheme of the invention takes the trust value as the reference value of access control, thus enhancing the accuracy of access decision, avoiding false trust of anonymous request vehicles and achieving the purpose of blocking and controlling the propagation of non-trusted resources. The trust calculation module is deployed locally, so that compared with the traditional trust calculation server, the time delay of trust calculation is reduced, and the access control efficiency is improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of an access control architecture in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of a communication model of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a policy generation communication scenario of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a trust calculation model of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail and clearly with reference to the accompanying drawings. The described embodiments are only some of the embodiments of the present invention.
The technical scheme for solving the technical problems is as follows:
fig. 1 shows a general architecture structure of the system of the present invention, which includes: trusted party TA, roadside infrastructure RSU, vehicle node VAAnd VB。
Fig. 2 is a structure diagram of a vehicle-mounted terminal, which is divided into several parts: the TPM mainly stores and verifies the vehicle attribute and provides vehicle password service, and the TPM provides password security service for the vehicle, and the TPM comprises CP-ABE technology, RSU digital signature technology and asymmetric encryption and decryption technology and verifies the authenticity of the vehicle attribute; the OBU wireless communication module is used for integrating a plurality of wireless communication modes; the system comprises a strategy generation module, a trust calculation module and a permission judgment module. Different from the traditional trust calculation, in order to adapt to the real-time performance of the information transmission of the Internet of vehicles, the trust calculation module is deployed locally to reduce the time delay of the trust calculation, so that the access control efficiency is improved.
Referring to fig. 1 and 2, an access control execution process in the car networking of the present invention is specifically described, and the following steps are performed: step 1, a vehicle initializes a local RSU, the RSU verifies the authenticity of the fixed attribute of the vehicle, confirms whether the dynamic attribute is the latest, and calculates and stores a basic trust value of the vehicle according to the fixed attribute of the vehicle; step 2, the resource request vehicle generates an access control strategy according to the requirement, and encrypts and broadcasts the message by using a CP-ABE method; step 3, the RSU finds and verifies vehicles which accord with the access control strategy, verifies the authenticity of the attributes of the vehicles and issues a decryption key; and 4, calculating the trust value of the resource exporter by the resource requester, and determining to receive the resource by comparing the trust value with the trust threshold value.
The access control of the vehicle-mounted ad hoc network is mainly divided into two parts, namely access control strategy generation (steps 2 and 3) and vehicle trust calculation (step 4), which are explained in detail below.
S1: initialization:
in order to ensure that the real-time information of the vehicle is perceptible, the RSU must enter the vehicle when the vehicle enters the communication range of the local RSUThe row is initialized. According to the moving characteristics of the vehicle, the vehicle attributes are divided into fixed attributes and dynamic attributes, wherein the fixed attributes do not change or keep unchanged for a long time in the life cycle of the vehicle, such as the license plate of the vehicle, the manufacturer of the vehicle, the model of the vehicle, whether safety hardware support exists or not and the like; dynamic attributes are attributes that change periodically, such as vehicle applications and services, vehicle behavior, network conditions, travel speed, and the like. The vehicle registers to the RSU by using the license plate number, the RSU can be connected with a network to inquire the legality of the license plate and extract the corresponding fixed attribute of the vehicle, and the TPM calculates the safety evaluation value of the vehicle and submits the safety evaluation value to the RSU. Since the vehicle is dynamically moving, its dynamic attribute changes accordingly, and therefore, to ensure the authenticity of the dynamic attribute, the vehicle periodically updates the dynamic attribute to the RSU. The vehicle V sends a message M ═ { PK to the RSURSU(t0,LN||loc||speed||dir)}(PKRSUIs the public key of the RSU, t0For message sending time, t is current time, LN is vehicle license plate, loc is vehicle location, speed is vehicle speed, dir is vehicle direction), RSU first verifies time t in M0If t-t0More than or equal to tau, sending a dynamic attribute updating request to the vehicle V, and if t-t is greater than or equal to tau0< τ, verify the attribute in M. If the verification is successful, the latest dynamic attribute of the vehicle V is stored and t is deleted0Previous attribute, sending confirmation message { SK to vehicle VRSU(LN||"Upodate_Success")}。
S2: and (3) generating an access control policy:
as shown in fig. 3, it is a typical communication scenario in the car networking. In this scenario, the vehicles of both communication parties are in a fast moving state, and the vehicle at the exit of the tunnel needs to know the road condition ahead or has information to be exchanged, and only the vehicle which possesses these resources and reaches a certain trust value is selected to communicate with the vehicle. What we need to do is find a vehicle for the above conditions and ensure that the requested resource is available and fully received when the resource provider has not exited the communication range of the resource requester. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the time during which both communication parties can maintain communication with the time during which the resource is transmitted, and if the time is sufficient, this resource providing vehicle may be an alternative vehicle.
When a vehicle runs in a tunnel, the traffic information that the vehicle wants to obtain can only come from the oncoming vehicle and the vehicle which is in the same direction and has run out of the tunnel. Based on the above conditions, we can determine a driving model of the message receiving vehicle. The direction of travel of the vehicle is defined by δ, the value of δ being 1 or-1, when δ isA＝δBWhen the two vehicles move in the same direction; v is the vehicle speed; t is the time required for resource transmission and t is m/vnM is the resource size, vnIs the current network rate; vAIs the message sender, VBIs the message recipient, λ is the maximum communication distance of the vehicle; the generated policy P is as follows:
Figure BDA0001209504030000081
the policy may be described as: and the position is outside the exit of the tunnel, the distance between the two vehicles in the running process is not more than the maximum communication distance of the vehicles within the time t for ensuring that the resources can be completely transmitted, and the vehicle meeting the condition is a candidate vehicle meeting the constraint condition.
S3: and (3) message generation:
after the strategy P is generated, the resource requester constructs an access structure Tp，TpIs a normative Boolean expression to the policy P, the cryptographic service module encrypts (PK, M, T) according to the encryption formula of CP-ABEp) The encryption process for generating the ciphertext M' comprises three stages:
setup: the trusted third party exports the public key PK generated by the ABE protocol using the implicit security parameters as inputABEAnd a master key MK, which is known only to the trusted party that generated it.
Encrypt(PK,M,Tp): the input of the encryption algorithm is a public key PK, a message M and an access structure T generated based on the required attributespThe algorithm encrypts M to generate a ciphertext M' implicitly containing the access structure TpM' can only be decrypted by entities that have attributes that satisfy the attributes in the access structure.
KeyGen (MK, S): the private key generation algorithm is deployed by a trusted party, the algorithm inputs a master key MK and a attribute set S, and a private key SK is outputs.
To ensure real-time validity of a message, a time limit is appended to the message, including a message generation time t0And a validity period τ. The message may be expressed as
Figure BDA0001209504030000082
(
Figure BDA0001209504030000083
Is a signature of the RSU), then
Figure BDA0001209504030000091
The message m is time-stamped and signed by the RSU, using the public key PKABEAnd access structure TpAnd encrypting and finally broadcasting the encrypted message M.
S4: strategy matching:
when V isBReceives a message from VAWhen the message is received, the policy is verified first, and the process of verifying the policy can be described as:
Figure BDA0001209504030000092
the above formula is only when
Figure BDA0001209504030000093
Loc.loc ═ pol.loc and
Figure BDA0001209504030000094
satisfy simultaneously, VBOnly if this access policy is satisfied will it be for VBThe following operation is performed.
S4: anonymous vehicle trust value metric
S41: basic trust value: some basic security information of the vehicle is stored in the TPM, and the information mainly includes attributes that can represent the security status of the vehicle, such as the type of the vehicle, the user ID, a digital certificate, whether security hardware support exists, software certification, and the like. When safety evaluation is carried out on one vehicle-mounted terminal, quantitative analysis is not carried out on safety related attributes. Firstly, attributes influencing the safety performance of the vehicle are determined according to the system safety strategyThe sexual information is decomposed into m indexes, and the system safety relevance degrees of the indexes are Si∈[0,1](i ═ 1,2, …), and assigns them respective weights ω according to the security correlation degreesiThen the basic confidence level of the vehicle is:
Figure BDA0001209504030000095
the security assessment value is calculated and signed by the TPM and sent out as part of the sent message or header of the message.
S42: calculating empirical confidence values
The experience trust value is a direct experience established from historical interaction records of two interacting parties. And taking the historical resource propagation event initiated by the current resource propagator as the basis of modeling. The propagation event with correct and complete resources and credibility is called as a benign record, and the propagation event with incomplete resources or malicious code injection event and the like are called as bad records. Since the internet of vehicles is a dynamic real-time network, the evaluation time is used as one of the calculation factors, and the algorithm of the verified trust value of the node is as follows:
Figure BDA0001209504030000101
wherein m is the total historical interaction times of the two vehicles, delta tiIs the difference between the present time and the access time, Δ tiThe larger, the smaller the weight; the parameter lambda is set by itself according to the time unit used. I isiDistributing the weight of the resource transmitted to A for the ith time of the vehicle B according to the correlation between the resource and the safety, wherein if the information contained in the resource is correct and complete, the weight is positive, otherwise, the weight is negative; m is the total number of historical interactions, Te, of the vehicles A and BA→BAs an output, the empirical trust value of resource receiver a to resource sender B is represented.
S43: calculating a recommended trust value
When calculating the trust value of A to B, A has no experience of directly interacting with B, and the trust value of B needs to be calculated indirectly through the trust value of B by a recommender Si. The traditional trust model takes the trust value of a node as a weight, and the following steps are carried out:
Figure BDA0001209504030000102
wherein
Figure RE-GDA0001311144640000103
Is A to SiThe value of the trust of (a) is,
Figure RE-GDA0001311144640000104
is SiA trust value for B. This means that nodes a to SiThe higher the trust value of (c), the more important its recommendation. However, the algorithm ignores the possibility of collusion attack, and the malicious node obtains a higher trust value through disguising and carries out malicious resource propagation on the normal node. Thus, A is paired with SiTrust values are not good as weights. Therefore, the similarity is used as the weight to calculate the recommendation trust value of A to B, and FIG. 4 is a recommendation trust calculation model.
Behavior similarity: trust value R for m vehicles within a period of time t for vehicle aa＝{ra1,ra2,ra3...ramThe trust value R of the m vehicles by the vehicle Bb＝{rb1,rb2,rb3…rbmAnd the similarity of the vehicles A and B is as follows:
Figure BDA0001209504030000105
SbA→B∈[-1,1]，SbA→Bthe larger the value of (b), the higher the similarity between the two.
Suppose there are k recommenders Si(i ═ 1,2, …, k) gives feedback on their confidence value for B
Figure BDA0001209504030000106
A uses oneself and SiDegree of similarity of
Figure BDA0001209504030000107
As weightsThe suggested confidence level of A with respect to B is calculated.
Figure BDA0001209504030000111
S44: trust vector
The invention calculates four trust values of the vehicle, namely a basic trust value, an empirical trust value and a vehicle recommendation trust value. The calculation strength of the trust value is different according to the security level of the resource shared by the vehicles and the communication condition of the vehicles. The trust calculation weight is defined as omega,
Figure BDA0001209504030000112
Figure BDA0001209504030000113
corresponds to VBOf the ith trust value of, and
Figure BDA0001209504030000114
when in use
Figure BDA0001209504030000115
Time, means that the corresponding trust value is not calculated. For example, when a vehicle newly joins the network, there is no past behavior record, so only its initial trust value is calculated, and at this time, the weight ω corresponding to its empirical trust value and recommended trust value is 0, then the comprehensive trust value T of the vehicle isB＝tB*ωBFig. 4 is a diagram of a trusted computing model of a vehicle.
S5: authority determination
The message receiver calculates the trust value of the message propagator, compares the trust value with a preset trust threshold value, and can obtain the connection establishment only when the trust value of the vehicle meets T. T is defined as follows:
Figure BDA0001209504030000116
wherein c belongs to [0,1], c is a threshold value and is set by a resource provider, and different types of resources have different values for c.
If the trust value of the resource provider reaches the threshold value requirement, establishing communication and receiving the message; otherwise, the message is discarded.
The reverse access control scheme in the Internet of vehicles provided by the invention is used for resisting malicious resource injection in the Internet of vehicles, generating a control strategy for a resource propagator and ensuring the safety and reliability of a message source. The vehicle nodes do not contain identity information of vehicles in the information exchange process, and two communication parties do not need to know the identity of the other party, so that anonymous communication between vehicles is realized, the secrecy of communication is ensured, and the identity privacy and track privacy of the nodes are protected. In addition, the information is directionally propagated, meanwhile, the credibility of the resource exporter is calculated, the credibility of the resource exporter is quantized, a comprehensive trust value is obtained, and whether the resource is received or not is judged by comparing the comprehensive trust value with a trust threshold value. The access control scheme provided by the invention not only protects the identity privacy of the user, but also ensures the credibility of the message source, and achieves the purpose of resisting the malicious resource injection in the Internet of vehicles.
The above examples are to be construed as merely illustrative and not limitative of the remainder of the disclosure. After reading the description of the invention, the skilled person can make various changes or modifications to the invention, and these equivalent changes and modifications also fall into the scope of the invention defined by the claims.

Claims (6)

1. A resistance control system for propagation of non-trusted resources in the Internet of vehicles is characterized by comprising a roadside infrastructure (RSU), an intelligent vehicle node and a trusted party TA, wherein the roadside RSU comprises a synchronization module, an RSU strategy matching module and a password service module; the system comprises a synchronization module, an RSU strategy matching module, a password service module and a network layer, wherein the synchronization module is used for carrying out interactive synchronization with the network layer, the RSU strategy matching module is used for finding and verifying vehicles which accord with an access control strategy and verifying the authenticity of the attributes of the vehicles, and the password service module is used for generating and releasing a decryption key;
the intelligent vehicle node comprises a vehicle security verification module TPM, a vehicle strategy generator, a vehicle trust calculation module, a vehicle authority judgment module and a wireless communication module OBU, the vehicle security verification module TPM is mainly used for storing vehicle attributes and providing password security services for vehicles, and comprises CP-ABE technology, RSU digital signature, and asymmetric encryption and decryption technology, the vehicle trust calculation module is used for calculating the trust value of the vehicle to be interacted, the vehicle policy generator is used for generating an access control policy according to the requirements of the resource request vehicle and the dynamic attribute information, the vehicle authority determination module determines whether to receive the message transmitted by the vehicle by comparing the trust value of the message source vehicle with the trust threshold value, the wireless communication module OBU integrates a plurality of wireless communication modes and is used for wireless communication between a vehicle and a road;
the trusted party TA maintains a vehicle attribute database and a historical behavior database, and stores the attributes and the historical behaviors of the vehicle;
to ensure the authenticity of the dynamic attribute, the vehicle periodically updates the dynamic attribute to the RSU, and the vehicle V sends a message M { PK ═ to the RSURSU(t0LN loc speed dir), where PKRSUIs the public key of the RSU, t0For message sending time, LN is vehicle license plate, loc is vehicle position, speed is vehicle running speed, dir is vehicle running direction, RSU first verifies time t in M0If t-t0More than or equal to tau, sending a dynamic attribute updating request to the vehicle V, and if t-t is greater than or equal to tau0< τ, verify the attribute in M; if the verification is successful, the latest dynamic attribute of the vehicle V is stored and t is deleted0Previous attributes, sending a confirmation message to the vehicle V;
when the vehicle runs in the tunnel, the road condition information which the vehicle wants to obtain can only come from the opposite vehicle and the vehicle which has run out of the tunnel in the same direction, a running model of the information receiving vehicle is determined, the running direction of the vehicle is defined by delta, the value of delta is 1 or-1, when delta isA＝δBWhen the two vehicles move in the same direction; v is the vehicle speed; t is the time required for resource transmission and t is m/vnM is the resource size, vnIs the current network rate; vAIs the message sender, VBIs the message recipient, vAIs the speed of the message sender, vBIs the speed of the message recipient, λ is the maximum communication distance of the vehicle; the generated policySlightly P is as follows:
Figure FDA0002450438790000021
the policy may be described as: the position is outside the exit of the tunnel, and the distance between two vehicles in the running process is not more than the maximum communication distance of the vehicles within the time t for ensuring that the resources can be completely transmitted, and the vehicle meeting the condition is an alternative vehicle meeting the constraint condition;
after the strategy P is generated, the resource requester constructs an access structure Tp，TpIs a normative Boolean expression to the policy P, the cryptographic service module encrypts (PK, M, T) according to the encryption formula of CP-ABEp) The ciphertext M' is generated, and the encryption process includes three stages:
setup: the trusted third party exports the public key PK generated by the ABE protocol using the implicit security parameters as inputABEAnd a master key MK, which is known only to the trusted party that generated it;
Encrypt(PK,M,Tp): the input of the encryption algorithm is a public key PK, a message M and an access structure T generated based on the required attributespEncryption algorithm encryption M generates ciphertext M ', M' implicit access structure TpM' can only be decrypted by entities with attributes that satisfy the access structure;
KeyGen (MK, S): the private key generation algorithm is deployed by a trusted party, the algorithm inputs a master key MK and an attribute set S, and a private key SK is outputs。
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the fixed attributes of the vehicle do not change or remain unchanged for a long time during the life cycle of the vehicle, including information about license plate, manufacturer of the vehicle, model of the vehicle, presence or absence of security hardware support; dynamic attributes are periodically changing attributes that include information about vehicle applications and services, vehicle behavior, network conditions, and travel speed.
3. The in-vehicle networking untrusted resource propagation resistance according to claim 1A control system characterized in that when the vehicle V is runningBReceives a signal from a vehicle VAThe policy generator of the vehicle first verifies the policy, and the process of verifying the policy can be described as:
Figure FDA0002450438790000031
the above formula is only when
Figure FDA0002450438790000033
Loc.loc ═ pol.loc and
Figure FDA0002450438790000032
satisfy simultaneously, VBOnly if this access policy is satisfied will it be for VBAnd performing the following operations, namely calculating the anonymous vehicle trust value measurement, the experience trust value, the recommendation trust value and the trust vector, and performing authority judgment.
4. A method for blocking propagation of untrusted resources in an internet of vehicles based on the system of claim 1, comprising the steps of:
step 1, a vehicle initializes a local RSU, the RSU verifies the authenticity of a fixed attribute of the vehicle, confirms whether a dynamic attribute is latest, and calculates and stores a basic trust value of the vehicle according to the fixed attribute of the vehicle;
step 2, the resource request vehicle generates an access control strategy according to the requirement, and encrypts and broadcasts the message by using a CP-ABE method;
step 3, the RSU finds and verifies vehicles which accord with the access control strategy, verifies the authenticity of the attributes of the vehicles and issues a decryption key;
and 4, performing trusted calculation on the resource exporter while directionally propagating the message, quantizing the credibility of the resource exporter to obtain a comprehensive trust value, and judging whether to receive the resource or not by comparing the comprehensive trust value with a trust threshold value.
5. The method for controlling the propagation of the untrusted resource in the internet of vehicles according to claim 4, wherein the fixed attribute of the vehicle in step 1 is information that does not change or remains unchanged for a long time in the life cycle of the vehicle, including information of license plate, manufacturer of the vehicle, model of the vehicle, and presence or absence of support of safety hardware; dynamic attributes are periodically changing attributes that include information about vehicle applications and services, vehicle behavior, network conditions, and travel speed.
6. The method as claimed in claim 4, wherein step 1 is implemented to ensure the authenticity of the dynamic attribute, the vehicle periodically updates the dynamic attribute to the RSU, and the vehicle V sends a message M ═ { PK } to the RSURSU(t0LN loc speed dir), where PKRSUIs the public key of the RSU, t0For the message sending time, t is the current time, LN is the license plate of the vehicle, loc is the position of the vehicle, speed is the driving speed of the vehicle, dir is the driving direction of the vehicle, RSU first verifies the time t in M0If t-t0More than or equal to tau, sending a dynamic attribute updating request to the vehicle V, and if t-t is greater than or equal to tau0< τ, verify the attribute in M; if the verification is successful, the latest dynamic attribute of the vehicle V is stored and t is deleted0The previous attribute, an acknowledgement message is sent to the vehicle V.
CN201710026253.XA 2017-01-13 2017-01-13 System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles Active CN106953839B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201710026253.XA CN106953839B (en) 2017-01-13 2017-01-13 System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201710026253.XA CN106953839B (en) 2017-01-13 2017-01-13 System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN106953839A CN106953839A (en) 2017-07-14
CN106953839B true CN106953839B (en) 2020-06-16

Family

ID=59465372

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN201710026253.XA Active CN106953839B (en) 2017-01-13 2017-01-13 System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN106953839B (en)

Families Citing this family (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN109195162B (en) * 2018-10-12 2020-05-08 暨南大学 Message reliability assessment method for aggregating two kinds of trust assessment in Internet of vehicles
CN109286631B (en) * 2018-10-18 2019-07-30 长安大学 The vehicle node method for evaluating trust of social attribute is merged in vehicle-mounted social networks
CN109543439B (en) * 2018-12-04 2021-07-13 北京锐安科技有限公司 Service request method and device for Internet of vehicles
CN110139278B (en) * 2019-05-20 2020-08-04 西安安盟智能科技股份有限公司 Method of safety type collusion attack defense system under Internet of vehicles
CN111181958B (en) * 2019-12-27 2021-09-03 西安电子科技大学 Method and system for improving attack resistance in Internet of vehicles
CN111372219B (en) * 2020-02-19 2022-04-12 重庆邮电大学 Internet of vehicles link selection and resource allocation method
CN111586107B (en) * 2020-04-13 2021-06-22 浙江大学 Multi-party strategy fusion method based on attributes in Internet of vehicles information distribution scene
CN113727282B (en) * 2021-08-18 2023-05-26 暨南大学 Similarity-based trust evaluation method for privacy protection in Internet of vehicles

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103763334A (en) * 2013-05-28 2014-04-30 大连理工大学 Multimedia cooperative sharing method based on P2P-BT in VANET
CN104363626A (en) * 2014-11-07 2015-02-18 中国人民武装警察部队工程大学 Bayesian theory based credible routing method for VANET (vehicular ad-hoc network)
CN103179114B (en) * 2013-03-15 2015-09-23 华中科技大学 Data fine-grained access control method during a kind of cloud stores
CN105991278A (en) * 2016-07-11 2016-10-05 河北省科学院应用数学研究所 Ciphertext access control method based on CP-ABE (Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption)
CN106330910A (en) * 2016-08-25 2017-01-11 重庆邮电大学 Strong privacy protection dual authentication method based on node identities and reputations in Internet of vehicles

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105554105B (en) * 2015-12-14 2019-05-07 安徽大学 A kind of car networking group key management method of multi-service oriented and secret protection
CN105847235B (en) * 2016-03-14 2019-01-01 安徽大学 The efficient anonymous batch of authentication method of identity-based under a kind of car networking environment

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103179114B (en) * 2013-03-15 2015-09-23 华中科技大学 Data fine-grained access control method during a kind of cloud stores
CN103763334A (en) * 2013-05-28 2014-04-30 大连理工大学 Multimedia cooperative sharing method based on P2P-BT in VANET
CN104363626A (en) * 2014-11-07 2015-02-18 中国人民武装警察部队工程大学 Bayesian theory based credible routing method for VANET (vehicular ad-hoc network)
CN105991278A (en) * 2016-07-11 2016-10-05 河北省科学院应用数学研究所 Ciphertext access control method based on CP-ABE (Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption)
CN106330910A (en) * 2016-08-25 2017-01-11 重庆邮电大学 Strong privacy protection dual authentication method based on node identities and reputations in Internet of vehicles

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN106953839A (en) 2017-07-14

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN106953839B (en) System and method for controlling propagation of untrusted resources in Internet of vehicles
Manivannan et al. Secure authentication and privacy-preserving techniques in Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs)
Zhang et al. Privacy-preserving cloud establishment and data dissemination scheme for vehicular cloud
Liu et al. Efficient privacy-preserving dual authentication and key agreement scheme for secure V2V communications in an IoV paradigm
Feng et al. A method for defensing against multi-source Sybil attacks in VANET
Zhong et al. Conditional privacy-preserving authentication using registration list in vehicular ad hoc networks
Chattaraj et al. Block-CLAP: Blockchain-assisted certificateless key agreement protocol for internet of vehicles in smart transportation
Petit et al. Pseudonym schemes in vehicular networks: A survey
CN109362062B (en) ID-based group signature-based VANETs anonymous authentication system and method
US11689367B2 (en) Authentication method and system
Zhao et al. PBTM: A privacy-preserving announcement protocol with blockchain-based trust management for IoV
CN114286332B (en) Dynamic efficient vehicle-mounted cloud management method with privacy protection function
Giannetsos et al. Securing V2X communications for the future: Can PKI systems offer the answer?
Wang et al. ISC-CPPA: Improverd-Security Certificateless Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme With Revocation
Tan et al. An atomic cross-chain swap-based management system in vehicular Ad hoc networks
Tyagi et al. Providing trust enabled services in vehicular cloud computing
Qin et al. ECAS: An efficient and conditional privacy preserving collision warning system in fog-based vehicular ad hoc networks
Berlato et al. Smart card-based identity management protocols for V2V and V2I communications in CCAM: a systematic literature review
Bagga et al. Blockchain for Smart Transport Applications
Wang et al. A consortium blockchain-based model for data sharing in Internet of Vehicles
Chang et al. An Attribute-based Fine-grained Access Control Scheme in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
Moni Protocols and Architecture for Privacy-preserving Authentication and Secure Message Dissemination in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Serna-Olvera A trust-driven privacy architecture for vehicular ad-hoc networks
Stephen et al. Roadside unit‐based pseudonym authentication in vehicular ad hoc network
Chen et al. C-V2X Security Technology

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant