CN106686015B - A kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine - Google Patents
A kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine Download PDFInfo
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- CN106686015B CN106686015B CN201710157702.4A CN201710157702A CN106686015B CN 106686015 B CN106686015 B CN 106686015B CN 201710157702 A CN201710157702 A CN 201710157702A CN 106686015 B CN106686015 B CN 106686015B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/045—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
Abstract
The invention belongs to internet of things field, and in particular to a kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine.A kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine, comprising the following steps: (1) smart machine and distribution service interaction；(2) smart machine is interacted with authentication service；(3) smart machine is interacted with authentication service.A kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine disclosed by the invention has the advantages that the 1, dynamic confirming method uses the strong security logic of multilayer, the attack means such as the playback that can effectively prevent attacker from taking to smart machine and monitor bypass；2, authentication logic is made in each connection pressure of each smart machine, and the identity and code key signaling for being not only able to guarantee in this way between equipment and equipment are different, moreover it is possible to guarantee the uniqueness for the identity and code key signaling that the same smart machine connects every time.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to internet of things field, and in particular to a kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine.
Background technique
Internet of Things is the important component of generation information technology, and the important development stage in " informationization " epoch.
Its English name is: " Internet of things (IoT) ".As its name suggests, Internet of Things is exactly the connected internet of object object.This
There is two layers of meaning: first, the core of Internet of Things and basis are still internet, it is extension and extension based on the internet
Network；Second, its user terminal extends and extends between any article and article, information exchange and communication are carried out, that is,
Object object mutually ceases.
Internet of Things communicates cognition technology by Intellisense, identification technology and general fit calculation etc., is widely used in network
In fusion, also therefore it is referred to as the third wave that world information industry develops after computer, internet.Internet of Things is mutual
The application extension of networking, rather than Internet of Things is network, Internet of Things is business and application.Therefore, application innovation is object
The core of networking development is the soul of Internet of Things development using user experience as the innovation 2.0 of core.
In Internet of Things, smart machine safe networking is critical issue, and smart machine networking how to be made to have very strong safety
It is very important work.At present general authentication logic it is more or less there are some security risks.
Summary of the invention
Goal of the invention: the present invention has made improvements in view of the above-mentioned problems of the prior art, i.e., the invention discloses one kind
For the safe networking dynamic confirming method of smart machine, asked to solve safety that may be present in smart machine networking process
Topic.
A kind of technical solution: safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine, comprising the following steps:
(1) smart machine and distribution service interaction
(11) smart machine construction distribution access request, distribute access request in contain random factor, magic numerical value with
And the identification information of smart machine, using dynamic secret key pair distribution access request in data encrypted, then to encryption after
Data encoded based on privately owned binary protocol；
(12) the distribution access request constructed is sent to the distribution server；
(13) after the distribution server obtains distribution access request, privately owned binary protocol first is based on to the data of distribution request
Gray code is carried out, acquisition clear data then is decrypted using code key, then the magic numerical value of extraction plaintext and preset evil spirit
Art numerical value is verified, while being digitally signed verifying to random factor, the return authentication server info if being proved to be successful
To smart machine, conversely, returning to error message to smart machine if authentication failed, and terminate this operation；
(2) smart machine is interacted with authentication service
(21) smart machine construction activation request, activation request data include random factor and smart machine identification information,
It is digitally signed using smart machine and the preset secret key pair random factor of certificate server；
(22) the activation request for being encapsulated smart machine again using safe socket character layer protocol, is then sent activation request and arrived
Certificate server；
(23) certificate server receives activation request, and whether verifying digital signature, equipment identification information are legal, if activation
It is legal to request, then generates activation reply data, uses smart machine and the preset secret key pair reply data of certificate server
Symmetric cryptography is carried out, the packaged final reply data of safe socket character layer protocol is finally used, sends reply data to intelligence
Equipment, while certificate server is stored in certificate server and enters according to the final symmetrical code key of pre- code key signaling generation and walks
Suddenly (24)；If activation request is illegal, error message is returned to smart machine, and terminate this operation；
(24) smart machine gets the request-reply data of certificate server return, uses smart machine and authentication service
The preset code key of device is decrypted, and obtains the legal pre- identity and pre- code key signaling of return, is believed according to pre- code key
There are smart machine locals for the symmetrical code key for enabling generation final；
(3) smart machine is interacted with authentication service
(31) smart machine constructs certification request, and certification request data include random factor and equipment identification information, uses
The pre- code key signaling and smart machine and the preset code key of certificate server that step (24) obtains respectively to random factor,
Equipment identification information is digitally signed, and is then carried out using the final symmetrical secret key pair certification request data that step (24) generate
Encryption；
(32) certification request data are encapsulated using safe socket character layer protocol again, then send the certification request to certification
Server；
(33) certificate server receives certification request data, and the final symmetrical code key generated in (23) is used to be decrypted,
Then digital signature is verified, if verifying is legal, generates certification reply data, reply data includes final identity mark
Know and final code key signaling, the middle final symmetrical code key generated of use (23) are encrypted, finally uses security socket layer
Protocol encapsulation authenticates reply data, sends certification reply data to smart machine, and enter step (34)；If verifying does not conform to
Method then returns to error message to smart machine, and terminates this operation；
(34) smart machine gets the certification reply data of certificate server return, the final code key for using (24) to generate
It is decrypted, obtains the final identity of conjunction and final code key signaling of return, complete authentication logic.
Further, the reply data in step (23) includes pre- part mark and pre- code key signaling.
The utility model has the advantages that a kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine disclosed by the invention has with following
Beneficial effect:
1, the dynamic confirming method uses the strong security logic of multilayer, effectively can prevent attacker from adopting to smart machine
The attack means such as the playback taken and monitor bypass；
2, authentication logic is made in each connection pressure of each smart machine, be not only able to guarantee in this way equipment and equipment it
Between identity and code key signaling it is different, moreover it is possible to guarantee the identity and code key signaling that the same smart machine connects every time
Uniqueness.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is a kind of schematic diagram of the safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine disclosed by the invention.
Specific embodiment:
Detailed description of specific embodiments of the present invention below.
As shown in Figure 1, a kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine, comprising the following steps:
(1) smart machine and distribution service interaction
(11) smart machine construction distribution access request, distribute access request in contain random factor, magic numerical value with
And the identification information of smart machine, using dynamic secret key pair distribution access request in data encrypted, then to encryption after
Data encoded based on privately owned binary protocol；
(12) the distribution access request constructed is sent to the distribution server；
(13) after the distribution server obtains distribution access request, privately owned binary protocol first is based on to the data of distribution request
Gray code is carried out, acquisition clear data then is decrypted using code key, then the magic numerical value of extraction plaintext and preset evil spirit
Art numerical value is verified, while being digitally signed verifying to random factor, the return authentication server info if being proved to be successful
To smart machine, conversely, returning to error message to smart machine if authentication failed, and terminate this operation；
(2) smart machine is interacted with authentication service
(21) smart machine construction activation request, activation request data include random factor and smart machine identification information,
It is digitally signed using smart machine and the preset secret key pair random factor of certificate server；
(22) the activation request for being encapsulated smart machine again using safe socket character layer protocol, is then sent activation request and arrived
Certificate server；
(23) certificate server receives activation request, and whether verifying digital signature, equipment identification information are legal, if activation
It is legal to request, then generates activation reply data, uses smart machine and the preset secret key pair reply data of certificate server
Symmetric cryptography is carried out, the packaged final reply data of safe socket character layer protocol is finally used, sends reply data to intelligence
Equipment, while certificate server is stored in certificate server and enters according to the final symmetrical code key of pre- code key signaling generation and walks
Suddenly (24)；If activation request is illegal, error message is returned to smart machine, and terminate this operation；
(24) smart machine gets the request-reply data of certificate server return, uses smart machine and authentication service
The preset code key of device is decrypted, and obtains the legal pre- identity and pre- code key signaling of return, is believed according to pre- code key
There are smart machine locals for the symmetrical code key for enabling generation final；
(3) smart machine is interacted with authentication service
(31) smart machine constructs certification request, and certification request data include random factor and equipment identification information, uses
The pre- code key signaling and smart machine and the preset code key of certificate server that step (24) obtains respectively to random factor,
Equipment identification information is digitally signed, and is then carried out using the final symmetrical secret key pair certification request data that step (24) generate
Encryption；
(32) certification request data are encapsulated using safe socket character layer protocol again, then send the certification request to certification
Server；
(33) certificate server receives certification request data, and the final symmetrical code key generated in (23) is used to be decrypted,
Then digital signature is verified, if verifying is legal, generates certification reply data, reply data includes final identity mark
Know and final code key signaling, the middle final symmetrical code key generated of use (23) are encrypted, finally uses security socket layer
Protocol encapsulation authenticates reply data, sends certification reply data to smart machine, and enter step (34)；If verifying does not conform to
Method then returns to error message to smart machine, and terminates this operation；
(34) smart machine gets the certification reply data of certificate server return, the final code key for using (24) to generate
It is decrypted, obtains the final identity of conjunction and final code key signaling of return, complete authentication logic.
Further, the reply data in step (23) includes pre- part mark and pre- code key signaling.
Embodiments of the present invention are elaborated above.But present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above,
Technical field those of ordinary skill within the scope of knowledge, can also do without departing from the purpose of the present invention
Various change out.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine, which comprises the following steps:
(1) smart machine and distribution service interaction
(11) smart machine construction distribution access request, distributes in access request and contains random factor, magic numerical value and intelligence
The identification information of energy equipment is encrypted using the data in dynamic secret key pair distribution access request, then to encrypted number
It is encoded according to based on privately owned binary protocol；
(12) the distribution access request constructed is sent to the distribution server；
(13) after the distribution server obtains distribution access request, first the data of distribution request are carried out based on privately owned binary protocol
Then acquisition clear data is decrypted using code key in Gray code, then extract the magic numerical value and preset magic number of plaintext
Value is verified, while being digitally signed verifying to random factor, and return authentication server info is to intelligence if being proved to be successful
Energy equipment, conversely, returning to error message to smart machine if authentication failed, and terminates this operation；
(2) smart machine is interacted with authentication service
(21) smart machine construction activation request, activation request data include random factor and smart machine identification information, are used
Smart machine and the preset secret key pair random factor of certificate server are digitally signed；
(22) the activation request for encapsulating smart machine again using safe socket character layer protocol, then sends activation request to certification
Server；
(23) certificate server receives activation request, and whether verifying digital signature, equipment identification information are legal, if activation request
It is legal, then activation reply data is generated, is carried out using smart machine and the preset secret key pair reply data of certificate server
Symmetric cryptography finally uses the packaged final reply data of safe socket character layer protocol, sends reply data to smart machine,
Certificate server is stored in certificate server and enters step according to the final symmetrical code key of pre- code key signaling generation simultaneously
(24)；If activation request is illegal, error message is returned to smart machine, and terminate this operation；
(24) smart machine gets the request-reply data of certificate server return, pre- using smart machine and certificate server
The code key first set is decrypted, and obtains the legal pre- identity and pre- code key signaling of return, raw according to pre- code key signaling
At final symmetrical code key, there are smart machine locals；
(3) smart machine is interacted with authentication service
(31) smart machine constructs certification request, and certification request data include random factor and equipment identification information, uses step
(24) the pre- code key signaling and smart machine and the preset code key of certificate server obtained is respectively to random factor, equipment
Identification information is digitally signed, and is then added using the final symmetrical secret key pair certification request data that step (24) generate
It is close；
(32) certification request data are encapsulated using safe socket character layer protocol again, then send the certification request to authentication service
Device；
(33) certificate server receives certification request data, uses the final symmetrical code key generated in (23) to be decrypted, then
Digital signature is verified, if verifying is legal, generates certification reply data, reply data include final identity with
And final code key signaling, it uses the final symmetrical code key generated in (23) to be encrypted, finally uses safe socket character layer protocol
Encapsulation certification reply data sends certification reply data to smart machine, and enters step (34)；If verifying is illegal,
Error message is returned to smart machine, and terminates this operation；
(34) smart machine gets the certification reply data of certificate server return, and the final code key for using (24) to generate carries out
Decryption obtains the legal final identity and final code key signaling of return, completes authentication logic.
2. a kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine according to claim 1, which is characterized in that step
Suddenly the reply data in (23) includes pre- identity and pre- code key signaling.
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| CN201710157702.4A CN106686015B (en) | 2017-03-16 | 2017-03-16 | A kind of safe networking dynamic confirming method for smart machine |
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| CN106686015B true CN106686015B (en) | 2019-10-22 |
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| CN108965246B (en) * | 2018-05-31 | 2021-04-02 | 北京车和家信息技术有限公司 | Method, device and system for processing Internet of vehicles data |
Citations (4)
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101969438A (en) * | 2010-10-25 | 2011-02-09 | 胡祥义 | Method for realizing equipment authentication, data integrity and secrecy transmission for Internet of Things |
| CN103517273A (en) * | 2013-10-09 | 2014-01-15 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Authentication method, managing platform and Internet-of-Things equipment |
| CN105791272A (en) * | 2016-02-23 | 2016-07-20 | 青岛海尔智能家电科技有限公司 | Method and device for secure communication in Internet of Things |
| CN106330456A (en) * | 2016-08-19 | 2017-01-11 | Tcl集团股份有限公司 | Intelligent device security access method and system |
Family Cites Families (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101106455B (en) * | 2007-08-20 | 2010-10-13 | 北京飞天诚信科技有限公司 | Identity authentication method and intelligent secret key device |
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Patent Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101969438A (en) * | 2010-10-25 | 2011-02-09 | 胡祥义 | Method for realizing equipment authentication, data integrity and secrecy transmission for Internet of Things |
| CN103517273A (en) * | 2013-10-09 | 2014-01-15 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Authentication method, managing platform and Internet-of-Things equipment |
| CN105791272A (en) * | 2016-02-23 | 2016-07-20 | 青岛海尔智能家电科技有限公司 | Method and device for secure communication in Internet of Things |
| CN106330456A (en) * | 2016-08-19 | 2017-01-11 | Tcl集团股份有限公司 | Intelligent device security access method and system |
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