CN106685639B - Sequence cipher encryption safe transmission method based on artificial noise addition in 5G communication system - Google Patents
Sequence cipher encryption safe transmission method based on artificial noise addition in 5G communication system Download PDFInfo
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- CN106685639B CN106685639B CN201611161639.3A CN201611161639A CN106685639B CN 106685639 B CN106685639 B CN 106685639B CN 201611161639 A CN201611161639 A CN 201611161639A CN 106685639 B CN106685639 B CN 106685639B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
- H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
Abstract
The invention discloses a sequence cipher encryption safe transmission method based on artificial noise in a 5G communication system, wherein in an uplink time slot stage, a single-antenna user sends a pilot frequency sequence, a key negotiation result and encryption information; then, the base station end completes the signal reception and updates the key; and finally, the base station end adds artificial noise to the encrypted information to form a mixed signal and sends the mixed signal to the user end, and the user end receives the signal. The invention uses the 'secret key' to generate the sequence cipher through the sequence cipher generation algorithm, then uses the sequence cipher to encrypt the secret information, and matches with the key negotiation to continuously update the secret key, so that the eavesdropping node can not track the change of the secret key.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a safe transmission method of a wireless communication system, in particular to a sequence cipher encryption safe transmission method based on artificial noise in a 5G communication system.
Background
In the wireless communication, a radio signal is used as an information carrier, so that the restriction of wired communication on the position of a communication terminal is eliminated, and the wireless communication is rapidly and deeply conscious of flexibility and portability, and has been rapidly developed in the last decade. However, as wireless communication technology develops and is more and more widely used, security problems during communication become more and more exposed. Wireless communication brings convenience to people, and the opening of a wireless channel is caused by the broadcasting characteristic of electromagnetic waves. This openness at the physical layer makes security of wireless communication more challenging, i.e., what is commonly referred to as "wireless communication is less secure than wired communication".
In a mobile communication system, a network has the characteristic of high asymmetry, that is, available space spectrum resources of a base station are very rich, while a terminal can only be equipped with one or two antennas due to the limitations of physical size and energy consumption, and available space spectrum resources are limited. In the highly asymmetric MIMO system, the uplink and downlink safety capacity is highly asymmetric, and the downlink capacity is greatly higher than the uplink capacity.
In the technical aspect of the existing physical layer secure transmission, in the patent of "uplink secure transmission method based on downlink feedback assistance in 5G communication system", an uplink secure transmission method based on downlink feedback assistance is proposed to solve the problem that the existing physical layer secure transmission technology cannot be directly applied to a 5G uplink communication system, or only can bring limited security performance gain. Although this method can solve the problem of imbalance of uplink and downlink safety capacity to some extent, there is a case where downlink estimation errors are accumulated in the uplink.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects and provides a sequence cipher encryption secure transmission method based on artificial noise in a 5G communication system, information transmitted by a base station node can only be received and useful information can be extracted by an expected user Bob, and an eavesdropping user cannot extract useful information from a received signal, so that the purpose of secure communication is achieved.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention comprises the steps of:
step one, in an uplink time slot stage, a single-antenna user sends a pilot frequency sequence, a key negotiation result and key encryption information passing the negotiation;
secondly, the base station end receives the signal and updates the key;
thirdly, the base station end adds artificial noise to the encrypted information to form a mixed signal and sends the mixed signal to the user end, and the user end receives the signal.
The first step comprises the steps of:
firstly, before transmitting safety information, a single-antenna user node Bob firstly sends pilot frequency sequence information to a base station node Alice, and the base station node Alice estimates M-dimensional column vector channel information from the Bob to the Alice by using pre-shared pilot frequency sequence information and received information;
step two, the multi-antenna base station node Alice utilizes the estimated frequency domain channel information HABSelecting a subcarrier channel H of a frequency point with minimum frequency domain fadingAB,iI is the frequency point corresponding to the subcarrier, and the carrier channel H is estimatedAB,iCalculating the null-space matrix Ψ of the subchannelABWherein ΨAB∈CM*(M-1)And is
Step three, the base station node Alice generates a new secret key K with the length of N bitnTo K fornCRC encoding to obtain Kn', at the same time, using a key K passed by the negotiationoAnd generating a sequence password key through a sequence password generating algorithm, and encrypting the secret information by using the generated sequence password key.
In the first step, M is more than or equal to 3.
The specific method of the second step is as follows:
the base station node Alice sends the secret key K generated in the step 3n' combining the encrypted information into a hybrid signal s and transmitting it on a subcarrier channel HAB,iAdding artificial noise eta to the null space; the signal received by the user node Bob isWherein n isBAssuming that Gaussian distribution is obeyed for the received noise at the single-antenna user node Bob; bob obtains estimated value of transmitted symbol by maximum likelihood decoding methodDue to the channel H between the base station node Alice and the eavesdropping node EveAEDifferent from the channel H between the base station node and the desired user node BobABThe signal passing through eavesdropping channel HAEWhen the eavesdropping node Eve is reached, the received signals are as follows:wherein n isEEavesdropping the received noise at the node Eve for a single antenna; the information received by Eve is a random scrambling of the original information s, which makes it impossible for the eavesdropping node Eve to decode directly with maximum likelihood as the desired node Bob.
The third step includes the steps of:
step one, a single-antenna user node Bob extracts encryption information and a secret key K by using a received mixed signaln', using a negotiated secret key KoGenerating a sequence password key by using a sequence password generating algorithm same as that of the base station node Alice, and decrypting the encrypted information by using the generated sequence password to obtain confidential information;
step two, the user node Bob pairs K containing check bitsn' CRC check is performed and the secret key K is extractednIf the verification passes, updating KoI.e. Ko＝KnAnd sends ACK to notify Alice to update Ko(ii) a If the check fails, then K is discardednAnd sends NACK in parallel to inform Alice to discard Kn。
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the invention ensures that the transmission of confidential information is safer through the continuous updating of the secret key, and the essence of the traditional manual noise adding method is that a plurality of antennas are utilized to send signals or noise in a plurality of beams, so that the null space of the noise beams is aligned to a legal user, and the interference only affects the eavesdropping user. In the traditional method, because the number of the antennas at the transmitting end is limited, the white noise without directivity but the color noise with directivity is added in the space. Therefore, as long as the number of eavesdropper antennas is sufficiently large, it is theoretically possible to decrypt the signal. Generating a sequence password by using a 'secret key' through a sequence password generation algorithm, encrypting the confidential information by using the sequence password, and continuously updating the secret key by matching with secret key negotiation so that the eavesdropping node cannot track the change of the secret key;
2. the method obtains the sequence cipher through the sequence cipher generation algorithm for the 'secret key' by the base station node, and realizes the encryption of the 'secret key', thereby consolidating the security of secret key transmission and effectively blocking the tracking of the eavesdropping user on secret key updating;
3. in the invention, the 'secret key' is encrypted, and the safety of uplink data transmission is ensured by using the steady and safe information transmission of a downlink, so that even if an eavesdropping user receives the information sent to a base station by the user, the eavesdropping user cannot obtain secret information because the eavesdropping user cannot obtain the secret key information.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic view of the present invention;
fig. 1(a) shows an uplink stage, and fig. 1(B) shows a downlink stage. In the figure, an M antenna base station A represents an M antenna base station node Alice, a single antenna user B represents a single antenna user node Bob, and a single antenna eavesdropping node E represents a single antenna passive eavesdropping node Eve;
FIG. 2 is a system frame structure diagram according to the present invention;
wherein, the uplink time slot represents that the user node Bob sends information, and the base station node Alice receives the information; the downlink time slot represents that the base station node Alice sends information and the user node Bob receives the information.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
In the embodiment of the present invention, the number M of base station node antennas is 8. The secure transmission means that the information transmitted by the base station node can only be received and useful information extracted by the expected user Bob, and the eavesdropping user cannot extract the useful information from the received signal. The eavesdropping user only carries out passive eavesdropping and does not transmit signals. In addition, when the channel is slowly changed, the reciprocity of the channel can be fully ensured through a time division duplex transmission mode. An embodiment comprises the steps of:
setting Alice and Bob two ends to cache a secret key K which has the length of N and passes negotiationoAnd synchronously updating the secret key K by the base station node Alice and the user node Bob through secret key negotiationo。
Step 1, before transmitting security information, a single-antenna user node Bob (in the figure, the single-antenna user Bob) first sends pilot sequence information to a base station node Alice (in the figure, an M-antenna base station Alice). The base station node Alice estimates M-dimensional column vector channel information from Bob to Alice by using pre-shared pilot frequency sequence information and the received information;
step 2, the multi-antenna base station node Alice utilization estimationOf the frequency domain channel information HABSelecting a subcarrier channel H of a frequency point with minimum frequency domain fadingAB,i(i is the frequency point corresponding to the subcarrier), and the carrier channel H is estimatedAB,iCalculating the null-space matrix Ψ of the subchannelAB
Therein ΨAB∈CM*(M-1)And is and
step 3, the base station node Alice generates a new secret key K with the length of N bitnTo K fornCRC encoding to obtain Kn'. At the same time, the key K passing the negotiation is usedoGenerating a sequence password key through a sequence password generating algorithm, and encrypting the secret information by using the generated sequence password key;
step 4, the base station node Alice sends the secret key K generated in the step 3n' combining the encrypted information into a hybrid signal s and transmitting it on a subcarrier channel HAB,iAdding artificial noise eta to the null space; the signal received by the user node Bob is
nBAssuming that Gaussian distribution is obeyed for the received noise at the single-antenna user node Bob; bob can obtain estimated value of transmitted symbol by maximum likelihood decoding methodDue to the channel H between the base station node Alice and the eavesdropping node EveAEDifferent from the channel H between the base station node and the desired user node BobABThe signal passing through eavesdropping channel HAEWhen the eavesdropping node Eve is reached, the received signals are as follows:
wherein n isEEavesdropping the received noise at the node Eve for a single antenna; eve receptionThe resulting information is a random scrambling of the original information s, which makes it impossible for the eavesdropping node Eve to decode directly with maximum likelihood as the desired node Bob.
Step 5, the single-antenna user node Bob extracts the encryption information and the secret key K by using the received mixed signaln', using a negotiated secret key KoAnd generating a sequence password key by using the same sequence password generation algorithm as the base station node Alice, and decrypting the encrypted information by using the generated sequence password to obtain the confidential information.
Step 6, the user node Bob pairs K containing check bitsn' CRC check is performed and the secret key K is extractednIf the verification passes, updating KoI.e. Ko＝KnAnd sends ACK to notify Alice to update Ko(ii) a If the check fails, then K is discardednAnd sends NACK in parallel to inform Alice to discard Kn。
In the above steps, the downlink receiving stage completes the verification of the demodulated information, and stores the verified and correct key, then the uplink sending stage scrambles the stored key to the security information to be transmitted, and finally the uplink process sends the data after the scrambling. The downlink secure transmission ensures the security of the 'key', and even if an eavesdropper completely eavesdrops on the data sent by a legal user in the uplink communication, the eavesdropper cannot know the 'key', so that the eavesdropper cannot correctly decode the real information. On the other hand, since the "key" itself is data transmitted by the base station node in the downlink communication, which naturally knows the key information, it is possible to perform descrambling using the "key" to recover the data.
When proceeding to the next secure signal transmission phase, the process in steps 1 to 6 is repeated.
Considering that uplink and downlink communication are alternately performed in time division duplex and a large-scale antenna enables the downlink secret communication rate to be large enough, the base station can divide the secret communication rate into two parts in the downlink communication process, wherein one part is used for sending own secret information, and the other part is used for sending a secret key. The base station node transmits the two pieces of information to the user node in a secure communication rate in a secure coding mode, so that the user node can completely decode the two pieces of information, and an eavesdropper cannot obtain the two pieces of information. In the following uplink communication process, the user node can use the decoded 'secret key' to encrypt the information to be sent to the base station node. Although the eavesdropping node can receive the information sent by the user node, the real information sent by the user node to the base station node cannot be decoded because the 'secret key' is not known. Since the "key" itself is known to the base station node, the "key" can be used to solve the security information. The key can be changed every time of communication, so that the one-time pad is really realized.
FIG. 2 is a frame structure of a system with two sections of transceiving, in an uplink time slot stage, a user node Bob sends a pilot sequence and a key negotiation result to a base station node Alice, and if the key negotiation is passed, the two ends of transceiving synchronously update a key; if the key negotiation fails, the receiving and transmitting ends discard the new key and continue to use the old key. In the downlink time slot stage, the base station node performs channel estimation through the received pilot frequency sequence, and generates a sequence password by using a key passed by negotiation, and encrypts the secret information.
Claims (2)
- The sequence cipher encryption safe transmission method based on artificial noise in the 1.5G communication system is characterized by comprising the following steps:setting Alice and Bob two ends to cache a secret key K which has the length of N and passes negotiationoAnd synchronously updating the secret key K by the base station node Alice and the user node Bob through secret key negotiationo；Firstly, before transmitting safety information, a single-antenna user node Bob firstly sends pilot frequency sequence information to a base station node Alice, and the base station node Alice estimates M-dimensional column vector channel information from the Bob to the Alice by using pre-shared pilot frequency sequence information and received information;step two, the multi-antenna base station node Alice utilizes the estimated frequency domain channel information HABSelecting a subcarrier channel H of a frequency point with minimum frequency domain fadingAB,iI is a memberFrequency point corresponding to carrier, and sub-carrier channel H estimatedAB,iCalculating the null-space matrix psi of the sub-carrier channelABWherein ΨAB∈CM*(M-1)And isC is the whole complex space;step three, the base station node Alice generates a new secret key K with the length of NbitnTo K fornCRC encoding to obtain Kn', at the same time, using a key K passed by the negotiationoGenerating a sequence password key through a sequence password generating algorithm, and encrypting the secret information by using the generated sequence password key;step four, the base station node Alice sends the secret key K generated in the step threen' combining the encrypted information into a hybrid signal s and transmitting it on a subcarrier channel HAB,iAdding artificial noise eta to the null space; the signal received by the user node Bob isWherein n isBAssuming that Gaussian distribution is obeyed for the received noise at the single-antenna user node Bob; bob obtains estimated value of transmitted symbol by maximum likelihood decoding methodDue to the channel H between the base station node Alice and the eavesdropping node EveAEDifferent from the channel H between the base station node and the desired user node BobABThe signal passing through eavesdropping channel HAEWhen the eavesdropping node Eve is reached, the received signals are as follows:wherein n isEEavesdropping the received noise at the node Eve for a single antenna; the information received by Eve is random scrambling of the original information s, so that the eavesdropping node Eve cannot be directly decoded by the maximum likelihood as the expected node Bob;step five, the single-antenna user node Bob utilizes and connectsExtracting the encryption information and the key K from the received mixed signaln', using a negotiated secret key KoGenerating a sequence password key by using a sequence password generating algorithm same as that of the base station node Alice, and decrypting the encrypted information by using the generated sequence password to obtain confidential information;step six, the user node Bob pairs K containing check bitsn' CRC check is performed and the secret key K is extractednIf the verification passes, updating KoI.e. Ko＝KnAnd sends ACK to notify Alice to update Ko(ii) a If the check fails, then K is discardednAnd sends NACK in parallel to inform Alice to discard Kn。
- 2. The method for encrypted and secure transmission of sequence ciphers based on artificial noise in 5G communication system according to claim 1, wherein in the first step, M is greater than or equal to 3.
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| CN109412797B (en) * | 2018-11-05 | 2020-09-25 | 北京捷安通科技有限公司 | Key negotiation method and client based on bit error rate decision state base |
| CN110492996B (en) * | 2019-08-08 | 2020-08-11 | 东南大学 | Key generation method applied to multi-user large-scale MIMO system |
| CN112437432B (en) * | 2019-08-09 | 2023-05-05 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Physical layer secret key distribution method and communication equipment |
| CN111934863B (en) * | 2020-08-11 | 2024-01-09 | 南方电网科学研究院有限责任公司 | Key sharing method based on artificial noise and security coding in edge calculation |
| CN113473457B (en) * | 2021-06-25 | 2023-06-27 | 暨南大学 | Non-orthogonal security coding method based on privacy protection |
| CN113727340B (en) * | 2021-08-27 | 2022-07-15 | 西安交通大学 | Physical layer secret key generation method for wireless secure communication |
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