CN106658482A - Black hole attack defense method applied to route discovery - Google Patents
Black hole attack defense method applied to route discovery Download PDFInfo
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- CN106658482A CN106658482A CN201610876755.7A CN201610876755A CN106658482A CN 106658482 A CN106658482 A CN 106658482A CN 201610876755 A CN201610876755 A CN 201610876755A CN 106658482 A CN106658482 A CN 106658482A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
- H04W40/24—Connectivity information management, e.g. connectivity discovery or connectivity update
- H04W40/28—Connectivity information management, e.g. connectivity discovery or connectivity update for reactive routing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
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Abstract
The invention discloses a black hole attack defense method applied to route discovery. The objective of the invention is to solve the problem of incapability of detecting inner attacks and defending against black hole attacks in route discovery in the prior art. According to the method provided by the technical schemes of the invention, each node establishes a receiving route request table and a receiving route response table and compares the content of the receiving route request table and the receiving route response table; whether a suspicious node exists is judged; if a suspicious node exists, a determined threshold value in a training set is compared with the destination sequence number of a received route response packet; if the sequence number is larger than the threshold value, it is determined that a node which sends the route response packet is a black hole node, otherwise, the node which sends the route response packet is determined as a normal node; and in subsequent route discovery, only the data packet of the normal node is forwarded or received, and the data packet of the black hole node is not forwarded or received. According to the black hole attack defense method applied to route discovery of the invention, a third party is not introduced, all procedures are completely completed by nodes in a wireless ad hoc network, and therefore, the security requirements of the routing of the wireless ad hoc network can be satisfied. The method can be applied to defending against black hole attacks in the route discovery of the wireless ad hoc network.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to wireless network communication technique field, the black hole attack defender in more particularly to a kind of route discovery
Method, in can be used for mobile Ad hoc network.
Background technology
With developing rapidly for internet and digital technology, people increase year by year the demand of the network bandwidth, and
There is higher demand in the convenience and security of network insertion.Wireless self-organization network as a kind of new network construction form, with
Traditional cable network is compared, with mobility is strong, overlay area big, deployment flexibly, the low feature of lower deployment cost, wirelessly from group
Knitting network insertion will become the topmost mode in people's access internet.However, wireless self-organization network has each node
The inherent shortcoming such as equal, node energy is limited, node computing capability is limited, and its Routing Protocol does not have at the beginning of design
Consider internal security problem, therefore the problems referred to above cause to be highly prone to black hole attack in the route discovery stage.Black hole attack can be with
Easily palm off destination node or pretend to claim the optimum route oneself having to destination node, and do not suspected by other normal nodes.And
And except the black hole attack of malicious node, for because can not forward situations such as depleted of energy packet node will also result in it is right
The black hole attack of network.For the network for being subjected to black hole attack, because each node is equal so that the number that source node sends
All can be through black hole node, the problems such as cause serious privacy leakage, network availability to be deteriorated according to bag.
In normal wireless self-organization network route finding process, source node by broadcasting RREQ bags, is looked into a network
Look for destination node；Intermediate node receives the reverse route that source node is initially set up after RREQ bags, then looks up the route of oneself
Table, if the routing table of oneself has the route to destination node, sends RREP bags, otherwise by reverse route to source node
Continue to broadcast the RREQ bags that forwarding is received；Until real destination node is received after RREQ bags, and according to the reverse of source node
Route sends RREP bags to source node；Source node is received after RREP bags, extracts aim sequence number, if the sequence number is more than oneself
Sequence number, just the route is added to the route of destination node, otherwise without.But there is each section in a network environment
Point it is equal, introduce third party it is difficult the problems such as.Therefore, it is how efficient, accurate in the self-organizing network route discovery stage
The pass for detecting internal malicious node that may be present, being wireless self-organization network defends black hole attack in the route discovery stage
Key.
It is divided into two kinds for the black hole attack of wireless self-organization network in the route discovery stage, respectively single node black hole is attacked
Hit and conspire black hole attack with multinode.Single node black hole attack refers to that in the route discovery stage malicious node is receiving source section
After the RREQ bags of point, individually RREP bags are sent to source node so that source node is mistakenly considered malicious node to be had to destination node most
Excellent route, inveigles source node that the communication link from source node to destination node is set up with oneself.After link establishment is good, source node
The packet for being sent to destination node will all through malicious node, and malicious node can take these packets discarding, usurp
A series of attacks such as change, reset, forming a packet " black hole "；Multinode is conspired black hole attack and is referred in route discovery
Stage, multiple malicious nodes conspire to launch a offensive, one or more malicious nodes after the RREQ bags for receiving source node, jointly
RREP bags are sent to source node, it is common to inveigle source node one of malicious node as real destination node, and set up
To the route of the malicious node, in the data transmission procedure after, malicious node can be carried out by the mode such as abandoning, distorting
Attack, wireless self-organization network is caused safely to have a strong impact on.
In black hole attack, black hole node is that the RREP for allowing oneself to send is bundled into as most fresh RREP bags, and allows source to save
Point sets up the route to destination node according to the RREP bags, and the sequence number of the RREP bags that black hole node deliberately can send oneself sets
It is set to value as big as possible.So can cause in the route discovery stage, real purpose node and black hole node send in network
The value of RREP packet number has bigger difference.
It is to defend black hole attack, researcher to propose the static threshold of sequence number setting for RREP bags in the route discovery stage
The method of value or dynamic threshold.
Static threshold method, is to set the threshold to a value not changed with network state, when source node is received
When the aim sequence number of RREP bags is more than the threshold value, source node thinks there is black hole attack, just abandons the RREP bags；Otherwise recognize
It is occur without black hole attack.But the method flexibility of this static threshold is too poor, when network has the larger traffic,
The aim sequence number of RREP bags can increase quickly so that the method produces a large amount of wrong reports.
Dynamic threshold method, is to set the threshold to a value changed with network traffics, and its computing formula is：2×N
+max(seqRREP), wherein N for nodes number, seqRREPFor the sequence number of RREP bags, max (x) is to take all x
Maximum.The major defect of the method is that threshold value is excessive, particularly has the leakage occurred under less traffic cases in network
The excessive problem of report.
In existing patent, the defence method towards wireless self-organization network black hole attack has active probe method, credible
Third party's detection method.
Active probe method, is that whether nodes records receive black hole attack, if received by setting up a plurality of detection route
Having arrived black hole attack then reduces its degree of belief, and the node to successfully routeing then improves its degree of belief.But this active probe
Method sets up a plurality of detection route, excessively consumes node energy, reduces the availability of network.
Trusted third party's detection method, is in clustering self-organizing network, trusted node to be deployed near all cluster heads,
Real-time monitoring is carried out to all cluster head regions using trusted node, if the variation abnormality of leader cluster node data traffic, is existed black
Hole is attacked, and otherwise there is no black hole attack.But in wireless self-organization network, introduce trusted third party's difficulty, therefore the party
The practical application of method is very low.
The content of the invention
Present invention aims to above-mentioned the deficiencies in the prior art, propose that the black hole attack in a kind of route discovery is prevented
Imperial method, to reduce the failing to report or missing to black hole node in the case of with different communication amount of self-organizing network defense mechanism
Report, it is ensured that source node can set up one and correctly route to destination node.
For achieving the above object, technical scheme includes：
1. the black hole attack defence method in a kind of route discovery, it is characterised in that include：
(1) suspect node step is obtained：
(1a) each node in network sets up two tables, respectively receives route requests table Tq, receive route response table
Tp；
(1b) in the Route establishment stage every a time interval Δ tiMore once receive route requests table TqWith reception road
By response table Tp：If TpIn IP address in TqIn, then the Route establishment stage do not have black hole attack to occur, and by TpAnd TqIn
IP address is arranged, and is formed and is trusted table Tt；Otherwise there is a possibility that black hole attack occurs, record suspect node, perform
Step (2)；
(2) network state step is confirmed：
(2a) set up a training set TR=tr | tr=Ai, wherein AiFor the threshold of the aim sequence number of route response bag
Value, tr is the element of training set TR；
(2b) set last elements A in training set '=ATR, whenever node is received after a route response bag, extract
Aim sequence number D in bag, and with training set in last elements A ' be compared, if D>A', then it is assumed that route discovery
There is black hole attack in the stage, nodes records send the IP address of the node of the route response bag, execution step (3), otherwise it is assumed that
There is no black hole attack, using training set TR in whole elements and aim sequence number D calculate current time routing request packet
Aim sequence number threshold valueWherein λs=e-(s-i-1)Represent memory curve function, AsFor front i moment institute
There is the aim sequence number threshold value of routing request packet, obtain Ai+1The end of training set TR is put it to afterwards；
(3) find, delete black hole node step：
(3a) in the reception route response table T of all nodespThe IP address recorded in middle lookup (2b), if certain node
Node is receiving route response table TpMiddle to find the IP address recorded in (2b), then the corresponding node of the IP address is black hole
Node；
(3b) node node rejects black hole node from network, i.e., the IP address of black hole node is arranged, and is formed
Blacklist Tb, route response table T will be receivedpWith reception route requests table TqIn except other IP address of black hole node IP address
Arranged, formed and trust table Tt, and no longer please to the node forwarding route in blacklist in the route finding process after
Bag is sought, the route response bag of blacklist interior joint transmission is not received yet.
The present invention has advantages below：
1. there is self-validation
Present invention introduces the distributed validation method between internal node, it is not necessary to introduce extra trusted third party or credible section
Put to be verified, be all each in the every checking information for obtaining suspect node, confirm network state and find black hole node
It is distributed on individual internal node to carry out, after being broken so long as not all nodes, it is possible to ensure the peace of global routing iinformation
Entirely, so as to prevent from introducing after trusted third party or trusted node, it causes the leakage of all routing iinformations after being broken.
2. there is very strong adaptability
Present invention introduces machine learning algorithm is trained to threshold value, it is ensured that threshold value can be according to the change of network busy degree
And change.When offered load hour, the maximum of sequence number is smaller in network, and the threshold value at this moment calculating is also smaller；
When offered load is high, than larger, the threshold value at this moment calculating is also than larger for the maximum of sequence number in network.Therefore, originally
The dynamic threshold algorithm of invention has good adaptability, can guarantee that the network suitable for various busy extents.
3. there is the ability that detection is internaled attack
Black hole attack can be from internal initiation, and black hole attack defence methods most at present is all helpless, the present invention
Using dynamic threshold, source node is by comparing the aim sequence number and threshold value of RREP bags, it can be determined that with the presence or absence of black in network
Hole is attacked, and realizes defending the target from the internal black hole attack initiated in the route discovery stage.
4. extensibility is strong
Defence method proposed by the present invention is deployed on internal node, without introducing extra node, therefore is being expanded
Method need not be in itself changed when network size, it is only necessary to simply defence method is configured into newly deployed section
On point, it is with good expansibility.
5. have and defend the ability of black hole attack in the route discovery stage
The security mechanism of the existing defence black hole attack in wireless self-organization network can be correctly established as with routeing
Precondition, the data transfer phase after the correct foundation of route plays a role, present invention achieves anti-in the route discovery stage
The method of imperial black hole attack, it is not necessary to especially set a precondition.
6. network availability is improve
The present invention compares RREP bags aim sequence number and threshold value using distributed method, rather than as existing method
The source node of relatively transferring to of RREP bags aim sequence number and threshold value is processed.This is improved can bear source node is effectively reduced
Carry, on the basis of saving source node energy, processing speed can also be improved, improve the availability of network.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the flowchart of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the sub-process figure that threshold value is calculated in the present invention；
Fig. 3 is machine learning schematic diagram in the present invention.
Specific embodiment
The present invention is used based on reception route requests table TqWith reception route response table TpMethod relatively obtains suspect node
Set, obtains afterwards the aim sequence number threshold value of route response bag using machine learning algorithm, and then source node is utilized and received
The aim sequence number of route response bag be compared with threshold value and judge whether black hole attack occurs, and reuse above-mentioned two
Table relatively obtains black hole node.
The present invention is receiving route requests table Tq, receive route response table TpRelatively the step of and apply machine learning algorithm
The knowledge of set theory and engineering optimization is applied in the step of dynamic calculation sequence number threshold value, the symbol for being used is as shown in table 1.
Note：0<i<N
The present invention is described in further detail below in conjunction with accompanying drawing.
With reference to Fig. 1, the realization of the present invention is as follows：
Step 1, obtains suspect node
(1a) node is received after the routing request packet that neighbor node is sended over, and will send the neighbours of the routing request packet
The IP address of node is added in reception route requests table set Q, is formed and is received route requests table Tq；
(1b) node is received after the route response bag that neighbor node is sended over, and will send the neighbours of the route response bag
The IP address of node is added in reception route response table set P, is formed and is received route response table Tp；
(1c) at each moment, all nodes are to respective reception route requests table set Q and receive route response table collection
Close P once to be compared, and black hole attack is judged whether according to comparative result；
(1c1) all nodes calculate the poor C=for each receiving route response table set P and reception route requests table set Q
P-Q, if C=is Φ, shows that the current route discovery stage does not occur black hole attack, set E=P ∪ Q is made, by set E
Element is arranged, and is formed and is trusted table TtIf C ≠ Φ shows that the current route discovery stage may have occurred black hole attack, note
The lower suspect node of record, forms suspicious set S, i.e. S=C；
Step 2, confirms network state
(2a) initial threshold A is obtained using PCA algorithms1：
With reference to Fig. 2, this step realizes that step is as follows：
(2a1) one section of safety time T is created for the route discovery incipient stages, the TsComprising k timeslice Δ tiIf,
In each timeslice Δ tiInterior network sequence state vector is xi=(xi1,xi2,xi3), 0≤i<k；
(2a2) safety time T is calculatedsInterior network sequence state vector xiAverage
(2a3) safety time T is calculatedsInterior all-network serial-number-state vector xiTo network sequence state vector averageApart from d (x)i：
(2a4) according to the k calculated in step (2a3) apart from d (x)i, calculate initial threshold A1：
A1=d (x)I, I=argmaxd (x)i,<3>
(2b) make training set TR=tr | tr=Ai, the threshold value of each timeslice is calculated based on machine learning algorithm；
With reference to Fig. 3, the realization of this step is as follows：
(2b1) initial threshold A that (2a4) is calculated1In being added to training set TR, as the initial element of training set TR
Element；
(2b2) set last elements A in training set '=A|TR|, after safety time terminates, network enters security
Unknown route discovery stage, each of which timeslice is Δ ti；
(2b3) in each timeslice Δ tiIn, aim sequence number D of each routing request packet that Node extraction is received,
And with training set TR in last elements A ' be compared, if D>A', then it is assumed that black hole attack occurs in the route discovery stage,
Nodes records send the IP address of the node of the route response bag, execution step (3), otherwise it is assumed that the route discovery stage does not go out
Existing black hole attack, execution step (2b4)；
(2b4) current network sequence number threshold value A is calculatedi+1：
Wherein AsFor the aim sequence number threshold value of all routing request packets of front i moment, λs=e-(s-i-1)Represent that memory is bent
Line function, obtains current network sequence number threshold value Ai+1After put it into training set TR, i.e. Ai+1∈TR。
Step 3, deletes black hole node
(3a) in the reception route response table T of all nodespThe IP address recorded in middle lookup (2b3), if certain section
Point node is receiving route response table TpMiddle to find the IP address recorded in (2b3), then the corresponding node of the IP address is
Black hole node；
(3b) node node is arranged the IP address of black hole node, forms blacklist Tb；
(3c) node node will receive route response table TpWith reception route requests table TqIn except black hole node IP address
Other IP address are arranged, and are formed and are trusted table Tt；
(3d) node node is deleted only to be received in black hole node, i.e. route finding process of the node node after and is trusted table
TtThe route response bag that the corresponding node of middle IP address sends, only to trusting table TtThe corresponding node of middle IP address sends route please
Bag is sought, and no longer to blacklist TbThe corresponding node of middle IP address sends routing request packet, does not also receive blacklist TbMiddle IP address
The route response bag that corresponding node sends, realizes the defence to black hole attack.
Above description is only example of the present invention, does not constitute any limitation of the invention.Obviously to ability
For the professional in domain, after present invention and principle has been understood, all may be without departing substantially from the principle of the invention, the feelings of structure
Under condition, various amendments and the change in form and details is carried out, but these amendments and change based on inventive concept still exist
Within the claims of the present invention.
Claims (3)
1. the black hole attack defence method in a kind of route discovery, it is characterised in that include：
(1) suspect node step is obtained：
(1a) each node in network sets up two tables, respectively receives route requests table Tq, receive route response table Tp；
(1b) in the Route establishment stage every a time interval Δ tiMore once receive route requests table TqRing with route is received
Answer table Tp：If TpIn IP address in TqIn, then the Route establishment stage do not have black hole attack to occur, and by TpAnd TqIn IP ground
Location is arranged, and is formed and is trusted table Tt；Otherwise there is a possibility that black hole attack occurs, record suspect node, execution step
(2)；
(2) network state step is confirmed：
(2a) set up a training set TR=tr | tr=Ai, wherein AiFor the threshold value of the aim sequence number of route response bag, tr
For the element of training set TR；
(2b) set last elements A in training set '=A|TR|, whenever node is received after a route response bag, in extracting bag
Aim sequence number D, and with training set in last elements A ' be compared, if D>A', then it is assumed that route discovery stage
Generation black hole attack, nodes records send the IP address of the node of the route response bag, execution step (3), otherwise it is assumed that not having
Generation black hole attack, using training set TR in whole elements and aim sequence number D calculate current time routing request packet mesh
Sequence number threshold valueWherein λs=e-(s-i-1)Represent memory curve function, AsFor all roads of front i moment
By the aim sequence number threshold value of request bag, A is obtainedi+1The end of training set TR is put it to afterwards；
(3) find, delete black hole node step：
(3a) in the reception route response table T of all nodespThe IP address recorded in middle lookup (2b), if certain node node
Receiving route response table TpMiddle to find the IP address recorded in (2b), then the corresponding node of the IP address is black hole section
Point；
(3b) node node rejects black hole node from network, i.e., the IP address of black hole node is arranged, and forms black name
Single Tb, route response table T will be receivedpWith reception route requests table TqIn carry out except other IP address of black hole node IP address
Arrangement, forms and trusts table Tt, and no longer to the node forwarding routing request packet in blacklist in the route finding process after,
The route response bag of blacklist interior joint transmission is not received yet.
2. method according to claim 1, wherein each node sets up two tables in step (1a), enters as follows
OK：
(1a1) each node is received every time after routing request packet, according to the order that routing request packet is reached, the forwarding bag
The IP address of node is arranged, and is formed and is received route requests table Tq；
(1a2) each node is received every time after route response bag, according to the order that route response bag is reached, the forwarding bag
The IP address of node is arranged, and is formed and is received route response table Tp。
3. method according to claim 1, wherein sets up a training set TR in step (2a), is to use PCA algorithm meters
Calculate the finite element of training set TR, i.e. initial threshold A of route response bag aim sequence number1, and by initial threshold A1It is put into training
In collection TR, i.e. A1∈TR。
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| CN112911584A (en) * | 2020-12-16 | 2021-06-04 | 中南大学 | Method for avoiding black hole node attack based on detection route to obtain node trust value in energy collection wireless sensor network |
| CN115297470A (en) * | 2022-08-03 | 2022-11-04 | 中南大学 | Black hole node detection method based on combination of active detection and backtracking in self-organizing sensor network |
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| CN112911584A (en) * | 2020-12-16 | 2021-06-04 | 中南大学 | Method for avoiding black hole node attack based on detection route to obtain node trust value in energy collection wireless sensor network |
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| CN115297470B (en) * | 2022-08-03 | 2024-04-19 | 中南大学 | Black hole node detection method based on combination of active detection and backtracking in self-organizing sensor network |
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| CN106658482B (en) | 2020-04-07 |
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