CN106559216A - A kind of Network Bank security method of commerce - Google Patents
A kind of Network Bank security method of commerce Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN106559216A CN106559216A CN201510623984.3A CN201510623984A CN106559216A CN 106559216 A CN106559216 A CN 106559216A CN 201510623984 A CN201510623984 A CN 201510623984A CN 106559216 A CN106559216 A CN 106559216A
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- China
- Prior art keywords
- usbkey
- user
- server end
- network bank
- sequence information
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- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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Abstract
The invention discloses Network Bank security method of commerce, needs the dynamic verification code of mobile terminal to participate in encryption and verify, while the trading order form information shown on the screen of USBkey is directly sent to USBkey ends from ebanking server end.Effectively prevent as other people illegal operations cause damage when the PIN code of user profile, USBkey and USBkey is lost, reduce the possibility that order data is maliciously tampered in transmitting procedure, further increase the security of network bank business.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to computer network field, more particularly to a kind of Network Bank security method of commerce.
Background technology
With flourishing for internet, the online trading business of Net silver also gos deep into industry-by-industry, while adjoint
The transaction security of Net silver also become the ebanking services major issue that must face of development, wherein how to determine
Validated user identity becomes key technology therein.Generally Net silver service provider adopts additional firmware equipment USBkey
To store personal digital certificate and private key for user.The USBkey can read in the PIN code string of its own temporarily
To participate in cryptographic calculation, and encrypted result is transmitted to ebanking server by conventional encryption means, to verify
The legitimacy of user identity.The USBkey is non-readable and replicates, and then ensure that individual digital signature and use
The security and authenticity of family private key, and then ensure that the safety of network bank business business.Such as industrial and commercial bank
USBkey is exactly using similar operation principle.
During the network bank business business of prior art, determine that user identity legitimacy contains following steps:
A), during network bank business, user browser end logs in the WEB page at ebanking server end, input transaction
Sequence information and to ebanking server end send submit to request;
B) ebanking server end sends the instruction of the USBkey of detection user to user side, if USBkey is just
PIN code that is normal then requiring the verification USBkey;
C) as the PIN code is correct, then the USBkey adopts itself algorithm, using the public key of ebanking server
And the sequence information is encrypted simultaneously by the private key for user that is stored in USBkey and number signature
It is sent to ebanking server end;
D), after ebanking server end is decrypted to the encryption information, user identity and order letter are confirmed
The legitimacy of breath;
E) USBkey obtains trading order form information from browser, and shows on the screen of USBkey itself
Show, user checks the sequence information of USBkey screen displays, correctly then determines on the USBkey and orders
List simultaneously completes network bank business, otherwise cancels and dropping the business.
Undoubtedly, in existing technology, by the private key for user stored in USBkey, user input USBkey
PIN code, be encrypted computing inside USBkey, check finally by the screen display of USBkey
Sequence information, has obtained a very reliable Secure Transaction effect, but if last defence line
The PIN code of USBkey and USBkey is obtained illegally, then disabled user also can be it is arbitrary enter
Row illegal transaction.
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to overcome shortcoming of the prior art with deficiency, there is provided a kind of safer net
Silver-colored method for secure transactions.
The present invention is achieved by the following technical solutions:A kind of Network Bank security method of commerce, comprises the steps:
S1:During network bank business, user browser end logs in the WEB page at ebanking server end, input transaction
Sequence information and to ebanking server end send submit to request;
S2:The request at ebanking server end response user browser end, and to the mobile terminal of user's binding in advance
It is upper to send a string random dynamic verification codes for generating;
S3:Ebanking server end sends the instruction of the USBkey of detection user to user side, if USBkey is just
It is normal then require user browser end in the WEB page at ebanking server end respectively input should
The PIN code of USBkey and the dynamic verification code;
S4:Ebanking server verifies the PIN code, instructs the USBkey using itself algorithm, profit if correct
Being signed with the public key and the private key for user being stored in USBkey and number of ebanking server will
The dynamic verification code and the sequence information are encrypted to the first encryption information, and first encryption is believed
Breath is sent to ebanking server end;
S5:After ebanking server end is decrypted to first encryption information, verification user identity, the dynamic
The legitimacy of identifying code and the sequence information, and the sequence information is encrypted to into the second encryption letter
The USBkey is ceased and is sent directly to, USBkey is by the sequence information after decryption in itself screen
Upper display;
S6:User verifies the sequence information on the USBkey screens, if the sequence information for showing and net
In the WEB page at syndication server end, the sequence information of user input is consistent, then in the USBkey
Upper determination order, completes network bank business;Otherwise drop the business.
Further, three authentication errors of the PIN code of the USBkey then abandon network bank business.
Further, the dynamic verification code check errors then abandon network bank business.
Further, the mobile terminal refers to that support SMS protocol, EMS agreements, the movement of MMS set
Standby (Short Messaging Service short message services, Enhanced Message Service enhanced short messages clothes
Business, Multimedia Messaging Service MMS (Multimedia Message Service)).
Further, the user browser end adopts ssl protocol transmission data (Secure with ebanking server end
Sockets Layer SSLs, are that one kind safety for providing safety and data integrity for network service is assisted
View, is encrypted to network connection in transport layer).
In order to be able to the apparent understanding present invention, illustrate that the present invention's is preferably real below with reference to description of the drawings
Apply mode.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of determination user identity legitimacy in ebanking services of the invention.
Specific embodiment
In network bank business of today, externally transfer accounts, remit money, online payment is most commonly seen operation, one
As bank system of web require user use browser as client.Meanwhile, in order to ensure the use that opens a bank account
The online transaction safety at family, user configuring USBkey of the bank to application Net silver confirm to use by USBkey
Family identity, Transaction Information signature, ensures Net silver transaction security, confidentiality and non repudiation.
Fig. 1 is referred to, which is the flow chart of determination user identity legitimacy in ebanking services of the invention.The net
Silver-colored method for secure transactions comprises the steps:
S1:During network bank business, user browser end logs in the WEB page at ebanking server end, input transaction
Sequence information and to ebanking server end send submit to request;
S2:The request at ebanking server end response user browser end, and to the mobile terminal of user's binding in advance
It is upper to send a string random dynamic verification codes for generating;
S3:Ebanking server end sends the instruction of the USBkey of detection user to user side, if USBkey is just
It is normal then require user browser end in the WEB page at ebanking server end respectively input should
The PIN code (Personal Identification Number people's recognition codes) of USBkey and described dynamic
State identifying code;
S4:Ebanking server verifies the PIN code, instructs the USBkey using itself algorithm, profit if correct
Being signed with the public key and the private key for user being stored in USBkey and number of ebanking server will
The dynamic verification code and the sequence information are encrypted to the first encryption information, and first encryption is believed
Breath is sent to ebanking server end;
S5:After ebanking server end is decrypted to first encryption information, verification user identity, the dynamic
The legitimacy of identifying code and the sequence information, and the sequence information is encrypted to into the second encryption letter
The USBkey is ceased and is sent directly to, USBkey is by the sequence information after decryption in itself screen
Upper display;
S6:User verifies the sequence information on the USBkey screens, if the sequence information for showing and net
In the WEB page at syndication server end, the sequence information of user input is consistent, then in the USBkey
Upper determination order, completes network bank business;Otherwise drop the business.
In above-mentioned steps S5, the Direct Communication due to being ebanking server end and the driving layer of USBkey is kept away
When having exempted from the swapping data of browser and ebanking server of user, the possibility illegally distorted by data.
Relative to prior art, the Network Bank security method of commerce of the present invention is tested due to the dynamic for needing mobile terminal
Card code participates in encryption and verifies, effectively prevent due to the PIN code of user profile, USBkey and USBkey
Other people illegal operations during loss cause damage.Simultaneously as the trading order form letter shown on the screen of USBkey
Breath is directly to be sent to USBkey ends from ebanking server end, and effectively reduction order data is in transmitting procedure
The possibility being maliciously tampered, further increases the security of network bank business.
The invention is not limited in above-mentioned embodiment, if to the present invention various changes or deformation without departing from
The spirit and scope of the present invention, if these are changed and deformation belongs to the claim and equivalent technologies of the present invention
Within the scope of, then the present invention is also intended to comprising these changes and deforms.
Claims (5)
1. a kind of Network Bank security method of commerce, comprises the steps:
S1:During network bank business, user browser end logs in the WEB page at ebanking server end, input transaction
Sequence information and to ebanking server end send submit to request;
S2:The request at ebanking server end response user browser end, and to the mobile terminal of user's binding in advance
It is upper to send a string random dynamic verification codes for generating;
S3:Ebanking server end sends the instruction of the USBkey of detection user to user side, if USBkey is just
It is normal then require user browser end in the WEB page at ebanking server end respectively input should
The PIN code of USBkey and the dynamic verification code;
S4:Ebanking server verifies the PIN code, instructs the USBkey using itself algorithm, profit if correct
Being signed with the public key and the private key for user being stored in USBkey and number of ebanking server will
The dynamic verification code and the sequence information are encrypted to the first encryption information, and first encryption is believed
Breath is sent to ebanking server end;
S5:After ebanking server end is decrypted to first encryption information, verification user identity, the dynamic
The legitimacy of identifying code and the sequence information, and the sequence information is encrypted to into the second encryption letter
The USBkey is ceased and is sent directly to, USBkey is by the sequence information after decryption in itself screen
Upper display;
S6:User verifies the sequence information on the USBkey screens, if the sequence information for showing and net
In the WEB page at syndication server end, the sequence information of user input is consistent, then in the USBkey
Upper determination order, completes network bank business;Otherwise drop the business.
2. Network Bank security method of commerce as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that:The USBkey's
Three authentication errors of PIN code then abandon network bank business.
3. Network Bank security method of commerce as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that:The dynamic verification code
Check errors then abandon network bank business.
4. Network Bank security method of commerce as claimed in claim 3, it is characterised in that:The mobile terminal refers to
Support SMS protocol, EMS agreements, the mobile device of MMS.
5. Network Bank security method of commerce as described in claim 3, it is characterised in that:The user browses
Device end adopts ssl protocol transmission data with ebanking server end.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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CN201510623984.3A CN106559216A (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2015-09-25 | A kind of Network Bank security method of commerce |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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CN201510623984.3A CN106559216A (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2015-09-25 | A kind of Network Bank security method of commerce |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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CN106559216A true CN106559216A (en) | 2017-04-05 |
Family
ID=58416340
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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CN201510623984.3A Pending CN106559216A (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2015-09-25 | A kind of Network Bank security method of commerce |
Country Status (1)
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CN (1) | CN106559216A (en) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN107395600A (en) * | 2017-07-25 | 2017-11-24 | 金在(北京)金融信息服务有限公司 | Business datum verification method, service platform and mobile terminal |
-
2015
- 2015-09-25 CN CN201510623984.3A patent/CN106559216A/en active Pending
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN107395600A (en) * | 2017-07-25 | 2017-11-24 | 金在(北京)金融信息服务有限公司 | Business datum verification method, service platform and mobile terminal |
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PB01 | Publication | ||
WD01 | Invention patent application deemed withdrawn after publication |
Application publication date: 20170405 |
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WD01 | Invention patent application deemed withdrawn after publication |