CN106487495B - Lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos - Google Patents
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- 238000013507 mapping Methods 0.000 claims description 20
- 238000004215 lattice model Methods 0.000 claims description 14
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 abstract description 12
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 description 6
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- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 5
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B5/00—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems
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- H04B5/77—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems specially adapted for specific purposes for interrogation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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Abstract
The invention discloses a lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos, which utilizes pseudo-random numbers to ensure the freshness of communication contents between a tag and a reader and utilizes a Hash function to ensure the confidentiality of the communication contents, thereby being capable of resisting common attack means such as impersonation attack, replay attack, eavesdropping and the like.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of RFID authentication, in particular to a lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos.
Background
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is a contactless automatic identification technology, which is essentially wireless communication between a reader and an electronic tag attached to an identified object. The RFID technology can be widely applied to various fields such as traffic, retail and logistics, and is one of important support technologies of the Internet of things. However, the application of RFID technology is greatly restricted by the security problem of the RFID system, and the main security problem is the authentication problem between the electronic tag and the reader. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an authentication protocol suitable for the RFID system.
The Hash-Lock protocol uses meta ID to replace the real ID of the tag to transmit in a wireless channel, so as to avoid the leakage of the real ID of the tag. Where the metaID is obtained by hashing the key. In the Hash-Lock protocol, for a specific tag, the communication content of the tag is the same as that of a reader every time of authentication, and a random number is not used for guaranteeing the message freshness, so that the tag is easily locked and tracked by an attacker. In addition, in the last step of authentication process of the protocol, the real unique ID of the label is directly transmitted through an unsafe channel and is easy to monitor. Therefore, the Hask-Lock protocol is not perfect.
The zhangxing et al proposes an RFID authentication protocol based on a lightweight cryptographic algorithm PRESENT in a document "RFID security authentication protocol based on a PRESENT algorithm", which utilizes PRESENT to encrypt a tag ID and also sets an ID refresh mechanism. However, the PRESENT algorithm is designed on the basis of S-boxes, which imposes a certain burden on the storage of tags. In addition, a timing mechanism is designed in the protocol, and if the response time is longer than the set time, the authentication is stopped, which cannot well resist denial of service attack, and once the information is intercepted or the transmission is delayed, the authentication is terminated.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos, which utilizes pseudo-random numbers to ensure the freshness of communication contents between a tag and a reader and utilizes a Hash function to ensure the confidentiality of the communication contents, thereby being capable of resisting common attack means such as impersonation attack, replay attack, eavesdropping and the like.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
a lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos comprises the following steps:
the reader generates two pseudo-random numbers R1And R2And sends an authentication request Query and a pseudo random number R1Sending to the label; wherein the pseudo-random number R2From pseudo-random numbers R1Iteration generation;
after the tag receives the authentication request Query, the pseudo random number is used asR1Computing a pseudorandom number R for a key2Then Hash operation is carried out on the ID TID of the self-body to obtain H (TID), and H (TID) and pseudo-random number R are used2XOR operation result H (TID) & gtR2Sending the data to a reader;
h (TID) ≧ R sent by the reader receiving the label2Then, it is mixed with a pseudo random number R2Performing XOR operation to obtain H (TID), and then sending H (TID) to a database;
the database inquires whether certain data H (TID ') exists locally or not, so that the H (TID ') is H (TID), and if the H (TID ') does not exist, the authentication fails; if yes, H (TID ^ RID') is calculated and sent to the reader; the RID' is a locally stored reading identifier with tag reading authority;
after receiving H (TID ^ RID ') sent by the database, the reader combines the H (TID ^ RID') with the pseudo-random number R2Performing XOR operation, and converting the operation result H (TID ^ RID ^ R)2And sending to the label; the label receives H (TID ^ RID ^ R2Then, it is first combined with a pseudo random number R2Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain H (TID '. gtoreq.RID'), calculating H (TID. gtoreq.RID) by using the TID and the RID stored in the exclusive-or operation, verifying whether H exists (TID '. gtoreq.RID') (H (TID. gtoreq.RID)), and if the equation is satisfied, passing the authentication; otherwise, authentication fails.
And the pseudo-random number R1 is generated by taking the XOR result of the system time and the user password as an iteration initial value and then being introduced into a coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model for iteration.
Setting the system size L of the coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model to be 16;
the current time of the system is taken, the accuracy is up to the second, and the system and the user password are operated according to the following rules:
initialvalue(0)＝timearray(0)+pw(0)；
initialvalue(1)＝timearray(1)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(2)＝timearray(2)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(3)＝timearray(3)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(4)＝timearray(4)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(5)＝timearray(5)+pw(5)；
initialvalue(6)＝timearray(6)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(7)＝timearray(7)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(8)＝timearray(8)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(9)＝timearray(9)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(10)＝timearray(10)+pw(0)；
initialvalue(11)＝timearray(11)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(12)＝timearray(12)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(13)＝timearray(13)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(14)＝timearray(14)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(15)＝timearray(15)+pw(5)；
wherein initialvalue is an iteration initial value vector, timerray is a byte array form of the current time of the system, and pw is a byte array form of the user password;
substituting the initial value vector initialvalue into a coupled dynamic integer tent image lattice model to iterate for L +10 steps to obtain a pseudo-random number R1。
The pseudo random number R2With pseudo-random numbers R1And substituting the initial value into the coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model for iteration in the step L +10 to obtain the initial value.
The technical scheme provided by the invention can show that 1) the communication content of the tag and the reader is transmitted after Hash operation and exclusive-or operation, even if intercepted, the transmitted content is only a series of random numbers seen by an attacker, and due to the unidirectional property of the Hash function, the attacker cannot obtain a legal tag identification TID from H (TID) and cannot obtain any useful information, so that the interception can be effectively prevented. 2) Because of the participation of the pseudo-random number in each authentication, the contents of each communication in the authentication process of the same label are completely different, so that an attacker cannot lock any label from the contents of the communication, and the position tracking is avoided. 3) Since each authentication process generates a different pseudo random numberAn attacker intercepts and captures H (TID) ^ R sent by the label in one authentication process2After the next time the reader sends out the authentication request, H (TID) < R >2The replay can not pass the authentication, so that the replay attack can be effectively prevented. 4) For counterfeit tags, because the TID is confidential data, after the reader initiates an authentication request, the counterfeit tags have difficulty in simulating legal response data h (TID ≧ R)2And further cannot pass the authentication of the database; for a fake reader, the fake reader cannot obtain the user's password first, and then cannot generate the correct pseudo-random number R1And R2(ii) a On the other hand, the identity identification RID of the reader is also confidential, an attacker cannot simulate H (TID behavior), and cannot pass the authentication of the tag; thereby effectively preventing impersonation attacks. 5) The database realizes the authentication of the label by confirming whether H (TID') exists; the tag authenticates the reader by confirming whether H (TID ≧ RID') is satisfied, thereby realizing bidirectional authentication.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings needed to be used in the description of the embodiments are briefly introduced below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art to obtain other drawings based on the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention are clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The flow chart of the lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos provided by the embodiment of the invention is shown in FIG. 1, and mainly comprises the following steps:
step 1, the reader generates two pseudo random numbers R1And R2And sends an authentication request Query and a pseudo random number R1And sending to the tag.
In the embodiment of the invention, the pseudo random number R1And taking the XOR result of the system time and the user password as an iterative initial value (key) and then bringing the iterative initial value into a coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model for iterative generation. While pseudo-random number R2Is represented by R1Iteratively generated for an initial value of the iteration (key).
The coupled dynamic integer tent map grid model is illustrated as follows: the dynamic integer tent mapping is a nonlinear mapping formed by performing integer transformation on the tent mapping and adding dynamic parameters. The method not only keeps the characteristic of uniform distribution of tent mapping, but also overcomes the short period problem of integer tent mapping, is integer chaotic mapping with excellent performance, and is very suitable for constructing a cryptographic algorithm. The mathematical description of the dynamic integer tent map is as follows:
wherein g (n) ═ x (n) + k (n)]mod2k； (2)
In the above formula, x (n) represents the iteration result of the nth step; k (n) represents a dynamic parameter during each step of iteration, and the value of k (n) is related to the number of iteration steps; 2k-1 is the upper bound of the integer set of values of x (n); mod is the remainder taking operation.
To further obtain a well-performing crypto sequence, the dynamic integer tent maps are now coupled using a coupled-map lattice model (CML). The CML is a model which is extremely important for people to research nonlinear spatiotemporal chaos behaviors, and different values of a selected nonlinear function, the size of a system grid, a coupling coefficient and a nonlinear function parameter directly influence the complexity of a sequence generated by a coupling mapping grid system, so that the safety of a cryptosystem constructed by the CML is influenced. In order to make the time sequence generated by the system have uniform distribution characteristics, the CML structure is improved, namely, the dynamic integer tent mapping is used as a nonlinear function of a coupling mapping grid system, and the coupling mode is shown as a formula (3):
xi(n+1)＝(f[xi(n)]+f[xi-1(n)]+f[xi+1(n)])mod2k (3)
in the formula, the value range of i is as follows: 0,1, …, L-1(L is the system size), xi(n +1) represents the state value obtained by the (n +1) th iteration of the ith lattice point, f (·) represents the nonlinear function of the lattice point, wherein the nonlinear function is taken as the dynamic integer tent mapping (formula (1)), and mod is the remainder operation; 2kThe number of states that the grid takes value. Each grid point value is determined by the three grid point values of the previous iteration, and each grid point can influence the three grid points of the next iteration, so that coupling among the grid points is realized, and information confusion and diffusion are facilitated.
Generation of pseudo-random numbers R in conjunction with a coupled dynamic integer tent map lattice model1The method comprises the following steps:
firstly, setting a system size L of a mapping lattice model of the coupling dynamic integer tent; for example, an embodiment of the present invention sets L-16;
then, the current time of the system is taken to be accurate to the second, and the current time and the user password are calculated according to the following rules:
initialvalue(0)＝timearray(0)+pw(0)；
initialvalue(1)＝timearray(1)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(2)＝timearray(2)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(3)＝timearray(3)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(4)＝timearray(4)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(5)＝timearray(5)+pw(5)；
initialvalue(6)＝timearray(6)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(7)＝timearray(7)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(8)＝timearray(8)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(9)＝timearray(9)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(10)＝timearray(10)+pw(0)；
initialvalue(11)＝timearray(11)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(12)＝timearray(12)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(13)＝timearray(13)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(14)＝timearray(14)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(15)＝timearray(15)+pw(5)；
the initialvalue is an iteration initial value vector, the timerray is a byte array form of the current time of the system, and pw is a byte array form of the user password.
For example, if the system current time is 2016-03-2015: 24:35, then time error [50,48,49,54,48,51,50,48,49,53,50,52,51,53], where the number represents the ASCII code of the character, excluding symbols such as dashes, colon, etc., 50 for '2', 48 for '0', 49 for '1', etc. If the user enters 123456, pw is ═ 49,50,51,52,53, 54.
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the specific values referred to above are merely examples and are not limiting on the scheme itself.
And finally, substituting the initial value vector initialvalue into a coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model for iteration in a step L +10 to obtain a pseudo-random number R1。
Analogously, pseudo-random number R2With R1And substituting the initial value into the coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model for iteration in the step L +10 to obtain the initial value.
Illustratively, two pseudo-random numbers generated in a certain authentication are:
R1＝0x9DAF619CEAF5107266A9ADFDE2745BB5；
R2＝0x3EEB7544396DC5EB98210D1EDFED1DBC。
step 2, after the label receives the authentication request Query, the pseudo random number is represented by R1Computing a pseudorandom number R for a key2Then Hash operation is carried out on the ID TID of the self-body to obtain H (TID), and H (TID) and pseudo-random number R are used2Exclusive OR operation ofCalculation result H (TID) & gtR2And sending the data to a reader.
In the initial stage, the tag already stores its own identity TID and the reader identity RID with reading right.
Illustratively, one may have:
TID＝0x020000A6800010D00112DEE1；
RID＝0x100000A6800010D001000111。
then the identity TID is subjected to Hash operation to obtain:
H(TID)＝0xCE97C5BAE19A0D6B3EB1DE38B0D8815C；
h (TID) and pseudo-random number R2The result of the exclusive or operation:
H(TID)⊕R2＝0xF07CB0FED8F7C880A690D3266F359C。
step 3, the reader receives H: ^ R (TID) sent by the label2Then, it is mixed with a pseudo random number R2And performing exclusive OR operation to obtain H (TID), and sending the H (TID) to a database.
Step 4, the database inquires whether certain data H (TID ') exists locally or not, so that H (TID ') is H (TID), and if the data H (TID ') does not exist, the authentication fails; if yes, H (TID ^ RID') is calculated and sent to the reader; the RID' is a locally stored reading identification with tag reading authority.
In an initial phase the database has stored a legal identity TID 'and a reader identity RID' with the reading right of the tag.
Illustratively, the calculated H (TID ≧ RID') is 0xB3CFB82F6EECA3BC34B07FF4B8F1EE 16.
Step 5, after the reader receives H (TID ^ RID') sent by the database, the H and the pseudo-random number R are combined2Performing XOR operation, and converting the operation result H (TID ^ RID ^ R)2And sending to the label; the label receives H (TID ^ RID ^ R2Then, it is first combined with a pseudo random number R2Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain H (TID '. or. RID'), calculating H (TID. or. RID) by using TID and RID stored in the calculation unit, verifying whether H (TID '. or. RID'). H (TID. or. RID) exists, and if the equation is satisfied, confirming that H (TID '. or. RID') existsPassing the certificate; otherwise, authentication fails.
Illustratively, H (TID ≧ RID ^ R2＝0x8D24CD6B57816657AC9172EA671CF3AA。
To clarify what each of the above examples corresponds to, the following Table 1 is attached.
TABLE 1 legends
The scheme of the embodiment of the invention mainly has the following advantages:
(1) effective eavesdropping prevention
The communication content of the tag and the reader is transmitted after Hash operation and exclusive-or operation, even if intercepted, the transmitted content is only a series of random numbers seen by an attacker, and due to the unidirectional property of the Hash function, the attacker cannot obtain a legal tag identification TID from H (TID) and cannot obtain any useful information.
(2) Effective prevention of location tracking
Because of the participation of the pseudo-random number in each authentication, the contents of each communication in the authentication process of the same label are completely different, so that an attacker cannot lock any label from the contents of the communication, and the position tracking is avoided.
(3) Effective prevention of replay attacks
Because different pseudo random numbers are generated in each authentication process, an attacker intercepts and captures H (TID) and ^ R sent by a label in one authentication process2After the next time the reader sends out the authentication request, H (TID) < R >2Playback also fails authentication.
(4) Effective prevention of impersonation attacks
For counterfeit tags, because the TID is confidential data, after the reader initiates an authentication request, the counterfeit tags have difficulty in simulating legal response data h (TID ≧ R)2And further cannot pass the authentication of the database;
for counterfeit readers, the first one is not available to the userThe password, and thus the correct pseudo random number R cannot be generated1And R2(ii) a On the other hand, the id RID of the reader is also kept secret, and an attacker cannot simulate H (TID ≧ RID) and cannot pass authentication of the tag.
(5) Implementing two-way authentication
The database realizes the authentication of the label by confirming whether H (TID') exists; the tag authenticates the reader by confirming whether H (TID ≧ RID') is established or not.
Through the above description of the embodiments, it is clear to those skilled in the art that the above embodiments can be implemented by software, and can also be implemented by software plus a necessary general hardware platform. With this understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments can be embodied in the form of a software product, which can be stored in a non-volatile storage medium (which can be a CD-ROM, a usb disk, a removable hard disk, etc.), and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods according to the embodiments of the present invention.
The above description is only for the preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present invention are included in the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims (3)
1. A lightweight RFID authentication method based on integer chaos is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the reader generates two pseudo-random numbers R1And R2And sends an authentication request Query and a pseudo random number R1Sending to the label; wherein the pseudo-random number R2From pseudo-random numbers R1Iteration generation;
after the label receives the authentication request Query, the pseudo random number is represented by R1Computing a pseudorandom number R for a key2Then put its own bodyHash operation is carried out on the part identification TID to obtain H (TID), and H (TID) and pseudo-random number R are used2XOR operation result H (TID) & gtR2Sending the data to a reader;
h (TID) ≧ R sent by the reader receiving the label2Then, it is mixed with a pseudo random number R2Performing XOR operation to obtain H (TID), and then sending H (TID) to a database;
the database inquires whether certain data H (TID ') exists locally or not, so that the H (TID ') is H (TID), and if the H (TID ') does not exist, the authentication fails; if yes, H (TID ^ RID') is calculated and sent to the reader; the RID' is a locally stored reading identifier with tag reading authority;
after receiving H (TID ^ RID ') sent by the database, the reader combines the H (TID ^ RID') with the pseudo-random number R2Performing XOR operation, and converting the operation result H (TID ^ RID ^ R)2And sending to the label; the label receives H (TID ^ RID ^ R2Then, it is first combined with a pseudo random number R2Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain H (TID '. gtoreq.RID'), calculating H (TID. gtoreq.RID) by using the TID and the RID stored in the exclusive-or operation, verifying whether H exists (TID '. gtoreq.RID') (H (TID. gtoreq.RID)), and if the equation is satisfied, passing the authentication; otherwise, authentication fails;
and the pseudo-random number R1 is generated by taking the XOR result of the system time and the user password as an iteration initial value and then being introduced into a coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model for iteration.
2. The integer chaos-based lightweight RFID authentication method according to claim 1,
setting the system size L of the coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model to be 16;
the current time of the system is taken, the accuracy is up to the second, and the system and the user password are operated according to the following rules:
initialvalue (0)＝timearray (0)+pw (0)；
initialvalue(1)＝timearray(1)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(2)＝timearray(2)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(3)＝timearray(3)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(4)＝timearray(4)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(5)＝timearray(5)+pw(5)；
initialvalue(6)＝timearray(6)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(7)＝timearray(7)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(8)＝timearray(8)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(9)＝timearray(9)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(10)＝timearray(10)+pw(0)；
initialvalue(11)＝timearray(11)+pw(1)；
initialvalue(12)＝timearray(12)+pw(2)；
initialvalue(13)＝timearray(13)+pw(3)；
initialvalue(14)＝timearray(14)+pw(4)；
initialvalue(15)＝timearray(15)+pw(5)；
wherein initialvalue is an iteration initial value vector, timerray is a byte array form of the current time of the system, and pw is a byte array form of the user password;
substituting the initial value vector initialvalue into a coupled dynamic integer tent image lattice model to iterate for L +10 steps to obtain a pseudo-random number R1。
3. The integer chaos-based lightweight RFID authentication method according to claim 2, wherein the pseudo-random number R2With pseudo-random numbers R1And substituting the initial value into the coupled dynamic integer tent mapping lattice model for iteration in the step L +10 to obtain the initial value.
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